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ABSTRACT 
My thesis examines whether the extent to which audit f i rms concentrate their 
bus iness in particular industries ( 'audi t f irm industry special isat ion ') improves the 
usefu lness of published financial reports for analysts ' predictions of future earnings, 
and whether the strength of any observed association varies in a manner consistent 
with the exis tence of a causal relat ionship between audit quality and analyst forecast 
accuracy. Prior research presents diametrically opposite predictions and results 
regarding the directional relationship between audit f i rm industry specialisation and 
analyst forecast accuracy. My thesis shows that the confl ict ing results in the 
literature arise largely f rom prior studies ' focus on short-horizon (end-of-year) 
forecast accuracy, which is subject to compet ing effects related to audit quality, and 
which in turn renders the resulting empirical models highly sensitive to model 
specif icat ion. I argue that analyst long-horizon (beginning-of-year) forecast accuracy 
is a more direct measure of the usefulness of published earnings for the prediction of 
fu ture per formance , and demonstrate that regressions using this metric consistently 
report a significant positive relation between audit f i rm industry specialisation and 
forecast accuracy. I then examine whether the observed positive association between 
audit f i rm industry specialisation and forecast accuracy varies with factors argued to 
reflect the relative importance of audit quality to the predictability of earnings. First, 
I show that the impact of audit f i rm industry specialisation on forecast accuracy 
increases with the underlying riskiness of cl ients ' operations (proxied by cash f low 
volatility and innate accrual quality). I then argue that audit f i rm industry 
specialisation should have a greater impact on the forecast accuracy of lower-quali ty 
analysts (where quality is proxied by experience, employer size, 'Al l -Star ' status and 
composite measures), who rely relatively heavily on published earnings when 
generating forecasts. To this end, I present evidence that audit firm industry 
specialisation has a greater impact on forecast accuracy for: (1) firm-years where the 
average 'quality' of analysts covering the firm is lower, and (2) for forecasts issued 
by individual analysts of lower quality. My results are robust to the use of controls 
for the endogenous selection of industry specialist auditors. In sum, my study 
presents evidence that greater audit quality does improve the usefulness of financial 
statements for the prediction of future earnings. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of f inancial reporting is to provide information useful to a max imum 
number of pr imary users for the purpose of making decisions about whether to 
provide resources to the f i rm (Statement of Financial Account ing Concepts [SFAC] 
No. 8, F A S B 2010 0 B 8 and O B I ) . Primary users include existing and potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors (SFAC No. 8, FASB 2010 0 B 2 and BC1.9), 
but it is acknowledged that even well- informed and diligent users may need to seek 
professional advice, such as that provided by securities analysts, to understand 
information about complex phenomena (SFAC No. 8, FASB 2010 QC32). Central to 
users ' resource allocation decision is the prediction of f i rms ' ability to generate 
fu ture cash f lows (SFAC No. 8, FASB 2010 OB2 and OB3), critical to which is the 
information about a f i r m ' s past and expected future earnings (SFAC No. 8, FASB 
2010 BC1.31) . It fo l lows that high-quality financial reports should be useful for 
predicting f i rms ' future earnings and, ceteris paribus, that usefulness should extend 
to a broad range of financially competent users. My thesis examines whether the 
extent to which audit f i rms concentrate their business in particular industries ( 'audit 
f i rm industry special isat ion ') affects the usefulness (quality) of clients ' published 
f inancial reports for securities analysts ' predictions of future earnings, and whether 
the strength of any observed relationship varies in a manner consistent with theory 
regarding the relative influence of audit quality on earnings predictability. 
The demand for external financial reporting arises largely in response to agency 
confl ic ts originating between self-interested management and equity investors who 
are unable to observe directly management ' s behaviour and opportunity set (Jensen 
and Meckl ing 1976). ' One means of mitigating agency costs is the introduction of 
moni tor ing or bonding mechanisms designed to align the interests of the principal(s) 
and agent(s) (Jensen and Meckl ing 1976). The requirement that management reports 
to shareholders regarding the use of resources entrusted to them is one of such 
mechanisms, and the quality of these financial reports is critical to reducing agency 
costs (Watts and Z immerman 1978). Mandated accounting standards establish rules 
governing the preparation of financial reports and constrain the range of acceptable 
methods for recording and reporting transactions. However , financial reports are 
prepared by management (the agent), who may exercise discretion over accounting 
est imates and reporting choices to bias the financial reports in pursuit of their self-
interest. This gives rise to a demand for the third-party verification of financial 
reports and the management assertions underpinning them (Benston 1985). 
The external audit service involves the provision of an auditor 's opinion about 
whether the financial s tatements are in material conformity with the accounting 
standards and fai thful ly represent the client f i rm ' s underlying financial position and 
per formance (Statement on Audit ing Standards [SAS] No. I, American Institute of 
Cert i f ied Public Accountants , Auditing Standards Board [AICPA] 1972 AU Section 
110). Auditors have responsibilities to plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatements 
' There are also agency costs of debt relationships and there are means (e.g. debt covenants) to 
mitigate these costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1978). However, agency 
costs of debt are of less direct relevance to my thesis. 
caused by errors or fraud (SAS No. 1, A ICPA 1972 AU Section 110 and AU Section 
230). In addition to providing assurance, auditors may influence the content of 
financial reports through the auditor-client negotiation process. If auditors have 
greater expertise relevant to their clients' operations, they may negotiate more 
effectively with management regarding the application of the accounting standards 
and estimates affecting accruals, thereby improving the usefulness of audited 
financial statements for decision making (Gibbins et al. 2001; Kwon 1996). As 
investors and their information agents (analysts) rely on the information in the 
financial statements to frame their understanding of the firm's current position and 
performance, their predictions of future performance should be more accurate for 
clients of higher-quality auditors. 
The quality of the audit services provided to a client is not observable directly; 
however, prior studies have identified observable audit firm (or partner) attributes 
argued to indicate the supply of superior quality audit services. These proxy 
measures include audit firm size (Francis and Yu 2009; Davidson and Neu 1993), 
audit firm and/or partner tenure (Chen et al. 2008; Carey and Simnett 2006) and the 
audit firm's fee dependence on a client (Ball et al. 2012; Lim and Tan 2008). My 
focus, however, is on audit firm industry specialisation, which I conceive as the 
extent to which auditors concentrate their business in particular industries, and which 
thus improves their domain-specific expertise and quality of services rendered 
(Bedard and Chi 1993). The domain-specific expertise of an industry specialist 
auditor may arise from more valuable knowledge spillover across clients with 
fundamentally similar operations (Simunic and Stein 1987; Gramling and Stone 
2001). Further, economies of scale in the audit production function may motivate 
audit firms to specialise by industry to obtain greater benefits from investment in 
industry-specific technology, training and methodology. Large auditing firms have 
recognised the importance of specialising in industries and have shown a tendency to 
concentrate their engagements in particular industries (General Accounting Office 
2003b; Gramling and Stone 2001; Hogan and Jeter 1999). Importantly, there is 
evidence that industry specialist auditors use their superior experti.se throughout the 
audit processes to improve specific audit outcomes. In particular, they are more 
likely to resist clients' pressure over accrual estimates and policy choices and 
negotiate with clients to reduce any potential manipulations (Gibbins et al. 2001, 
Gibbins et al. 2003; Kwon 1996). Prior studies also demonstrate that clients of an 
industry specialist auditor report lower discretionary accruals (Becker et al. 1998; 
Krishnan 2003; Balsam et al. 2003), increased disclosure quality (Dunn and Mayhew 
2004), lesser likelihood of benchmark-beating earnings management behaviour 
(Payne 2008) and more timely market responsiveness to earnings surprises (Teoh 
and Wong 1993; Knechel et al. 2007). 
Despite the significant coverage of the effects of auditor industry specialisation on 
variables indirectly associated with the stated objectives of financial reporting, 
whether industry specialisation improves the reliability (quality) of financial reports 
for users' predictions of future performance, the primary criteria identified in the 
Conceptual Framework, has received less attention. Further, the extant research 
addressing this issue is compromised by methodological issues. My thesis addresses 
this gap in our understanding by robustly examining whether the clients of industry 
specialist audit firms are associated with more accurate analysts' earnings forecasts, 
and the extent to which there is supporting evidence consistent with the existence of 
a causal relationship. Below, I briefly describe the key recent literature and identify 
the methodological weaknesses present in these studies that I propose to address in 
my thesis. 
Some recent empirical research examines the relationship between indicators of 
high-quality audit services and the predictability of earnings reflected in analysts' 
short-horizon (end-of-year) forecasts. Behn et al. (2008; hereafter 'BCK' ) argue that 
superior audit quality improves the quality of accruals and the reliability of current 
earnings for predicting future performance. They show that the accuracy of analysts' 
prediction of earnings increases for clients of Big N audit firms, and that auditor 
industry specialisation reduces forecast errors, but only for clients of non-Big N 
auditors. However, Lawrence et al. (2011) find no evidence that clients of Big N 
audit firms are associated with analyst short-horizon forecast accuracy after 
matching these firms to non-Big N audit firm clients with similar characteristics. 
Notwithstanding the above argument and evidence, Payne (2008) conjectures that 
high-quality audit providers are more likely to constrain management's manipulation 
of accruals that could be used to 'meet or just beat' the analysts' current consensus 
forecast (Bannister and Newman 1996; Burgstahler and Eames 2006), which in turn 
increases realised forecast errors (decreasing forecast accuracy). Payne (2008) shows 
that auditor industry specialisation (as a proxy for audit quality) decreases the 
likelihood of 'meeting or just beating' earnings manipulation behaviour^ and 
decreases the accuracy of analysts' forecasts of earnings. 
^ Using a matched sample approach. Minutti-Meza (2013) shows that market-share measures of 
industry specialisation are not associated with any of a broad range of earnings quality proxies, 
including the l ikelihood that a client firm 'meets or just beats' the analysts' consensus forecast. 
I argue that the above research design, which employs forecasts issued immediately 
prior to the release of earnings ( 'short-horizon forecasts ') , can only weakly test the 
relationship between indicators of audit quality, such as auditor industry 
specialisation, and the predictability of earnings. This is because the accuracy of 
short-horizon analysts' forecasts is a function of a broad information set, a relatively 
small proportion of which comprises historic financial reporting data, and is subject 
to potentially competing effects of audit quality. I aim to explain the conflicting 
results in the literature and to show that, by employing an alternative research design 
focusing on the accuracy of forecasts issued immediately after the release of prior 
period earnings ( ' long-horizon forecasts'), a robust positive relationship between 
analyst forecast accuracy and auditor industry specialisation exists. My first research 
question is: 
RQ I: Is audit firm industry specialisation associated with analyst forecast accuracy? 
I contend that the directional effect of auditor industry specialisation on short-
horizon forecast accuracy is unclear, but that this indicator of audit quality should 
improve analyst long-horizon forecast accuracy because these forecasts are less 
likely to represent a benchmark for the manipulation of earnings at the end of the 
year. Further, the accuracy of long-horizon forecasts should be more sensitive to 
information present in prior period financial reports, and thus variations in the 
quality of the audited financial reports, because this information represents a 
relatively large proportion of the total information set available at the time of the 
forecast. 
While tests derived f rom the first research question may produce evidence consistent 
with auditor industry specialisation causally affecting analyst long-horizon forecast 
accuracy, I plan to bring more persuasive evidence to bear by investigating whether 
the empirical association between auditor industry specialisation and analyst forecast 
accuracy is stronger in cases in which theory suggests that audit quality should have 
a greater influence on the predictability of earnings. Therefore, my second research 
question is: 
RQ2: Does the strength of the association between audit firm specialisation and 
analyst forecast accuracy vary with factors affecting the relative importance of audit 
quality to the predictability of earnings? 
I argue that the importance of audit quality varies cross-sectionally with respect to: 
(a) the underlying riskiness of client firms' operations and (b) the quality (expertise) 
of analysts covering the auditor 's clients. Client f i rm's operating risk reflects the 
uncertainty underlying clients' business and financing activities, the level of which 
may reduce the precision of information available (e.g. accruals) for predicting f i rms ' 
future cash f lows and earnings (Minton et al. 2002). This, in turn, increases the 
difficulty facing analysts in trying to understand the implications of accruals for 
future earnings and the difficulty for auditors charged with the responsibility of 
verifying clients' accrual estimates and policy choices. The effect of auditor industry 
specialisation on the predictability of earnings should be greater where client 's 
operating risk is higher, because the impact of audit quality on accrual estimation 
errors should be greater when the scope for such errors in accrual estimates (and thus 
earnings) is larger. Moreover, high-quality auditors increase their effort in response 
to increased client risk, with their additional effort having a greater impact in 
improving earnings predictability (O'Keefe et al. 1994; Schelleman and Knechel 
2010; Caramanis and Lennox 2008). Thus, I predict that the effect of auditor 
industry specialisation on the accuracy of analysts' prediction of earnings is greater 
when client firm's operating risk is higher. Second, analyst quality captures analysts' 
superior access to private information beyond that contained in the financial reports 
as well as their superior ability to identify and process relevant complex information. 
If auditor industry specialisation increases the reliability of earnings for predicting 
future earnings as expected, this effect should be pronounced when there is a (greater) 
need for high-quality earnings and other financial information. Lower-quality 
analysts rely more heavily on published financial reports to generate earnings 
forecasts (Das et al. 1998; Clement 1999); accordingly, they should benefit relatively 
greatly from improvements in the quality of financial reports (and thus audit quality). 
Higher-quality analysts may benefit from their private information and ability to 
process complex information, making them less dependent on published financial 
reports when making forecasts. Therefore, I predict that the impact of auditor 
industry specialisation on the accuracy of analysts' prediction of earnings will be 
greater when the quality of the analysts issuing the forecasts is lower. 
Below, I briefly describe the research design employed in my thesis. To examine the 
extent to which audit firms' concentration of their business in particular industries 
affect the accuracy of analysts' prediction of earnings, 1 regress the absolute value of 
short- or long-horizon forecast errors relating to client earnings (inverse measures of 
forecast accuracy) on measures of audit firm portfolio-share industry specialisation 
and a vector of control variables (base model). I use audit firm portfolio-share 
industry specialisation as my main proxy for audit quality because it captures 
audi tors ' expert ise resulting f rom audit f i rms ' strategic concentration of their 
services within industries and it is most closely related to the economic concept of 
specialisation (Simunic and Stein 1987; Krishnan 2001). Conversely, market-share-
based measures of specialisation do not measure specialisation directly, and they are 
potentially contaminated by undesirable effects associated with market dominance.^ 
In examining the extent to which the relationship between audit quality and forecast 
accuracy varies with client f i rm ' s operating risk, I modi fy and expand the base 
regression models to include a commonly used proxy for f i rm ' s operating risk; that 
is, cash f low volatility (Minton et al. 2002; Allayannis et al. 2005) and its interaction 
with audit f i rm industry specialisation.' ' To explore whether the relationship between 
audit f i rm industry specialisation and forecast accuracy varies with the quality of the 
analysts covering the client f irm, I modify the base model and add the main and 
interaction effects between audit f i rm industry specialisation, analyst quality and 
forecast accuracy. In addition to this test, I compute the difference in forecast errors 
between the 'wors t ' and 'best ' quality analysts, and regress the difference against 
audit f i rm industry specialisation and controls. My analyst quality measures are 
drawn f rom prior literature (Clement 1999; Chan et al. 2004; Drake and Myers 2011) 
and include analysts ' general experience, f irm-specific experience, brokerage size 
and 'Al l -Star ' status. In addition to these single-attribute analyst quality proxies, I 
develop two composi te measures to capture various aspects of analyst quality. The 
first composi te score is a funct ion of the four above-mentioned analyst quality 
proxies, while the second includes proxies that represent analysts ' personal qualities 
21 test the marke t - sha re measures of audi tor industry special isat ion in robus tness tests. 
^ I use the innate accrual q u a h t y measure , deve loped by Francis et al. (2005a) to proxy cl ient f i r m ' s 
opera t ing r isk in sensi t ivi ty analyses . 
(general or firm-specific experience and 'All-Star' status). All of my tests are 
estimated using both single-stage regression and two-stage regressions, designed to 
account for the likely endogenous selection of specialist auditors. 
I now briefly describe my sample and summarize my main findings. I study U.S. 
firms for the period 1989 to 2010 and focus on clients of Big N firms to control for 
any potential factors that might affect my analysis arising from differences induced 
by audit firm size. In accordance with the existing literature, I find no evidence that 
auditor industry specialisation consistently improves or impairs analyst short-horizon 
forecast accuracy, and I show that subtle changes in model specification substantially 
influence the direction and significance of the measured relationship between these 
variables. Conversely, I find that long-horizon earnings forecasts for clients of 
industry specialist auditors are significantly more accurate than are those for other 
firms, and that these results are robust to numerous model specifications and 
modelling choices. These findings are consistent with my argument that audit quality 
has conflicting effects on short-horizon forecast accuracy and that long-horizon 
forecast accuracy is a theoretically superior meter of the impact of audit quality on 
the usefulness of financial reports for the purpose for which they are prepared. 
Further, I find that the relationship between auditor industry specialisation and 
analyst forecast accuracy varies cross-sectionally with client f irm's operating risk 
and analyst quality. This variation is consistent with theory regarding the 
circumstances in which audit quality should make a greater difference to forecast 
accuracy. I show that the relationship between auditor industry specialisation and 
analysts' absolute forecast errors is stronger when client f irm's operating risk is 
higher, consistent with a greater return to audit quality in situations in which the 
audi tor ' s tasic complexi ty is higher. I further demonstrate that auditor industry 
specialisation more greatly affects forecast accuracy when analyst quality is lower. 
This supports my conjecture that the positive effect of audit quality on the usefulness 
of f inancial reports for predicting future performance should be greater for lower-
quality analysts, who are expected to rely more heavily on published information 
such as f i rms ' audited financial reports when making forecasts. These f indings are 
broadly robust to a variety of modell ing choices, although the results for the 'market-
share ' type specialisation proxies are less consistent compared to those for my main 
tests. Overall , my tests of RQ2 {Does the strength of the association between audit 
firm specialisation and analyst forecast accuracy vary with factors affecting the 
relative importance of audit quality to the predictability of earnings?) provide 
evidence consistent with the existence of a causal relationship between audit quality 
and analysts ' earnings forecast accuracy. 
1.2 Contributions 
My thesis has both practical and theoretical contributions. First, I identify the 
condi t ions under which published earnings more closely fulfil the forward-looking 
and 'user coverage ' objectives of financial reporting, which is of clear interest to 
regulators and investors who rely on these reports. In particular, I present evidence 
that the extent to which an audit f irm concentrates its business in an industry is 
posit ively associated with the accuracy of analysts ' prediction of earnings, consistent 
with auditor industry specialisation improving the quality of published general-
purpose f inancial reports for predicting future performance (as per S F A C No. 8, 
F A S B 2010 OB2, 0 B 3 and BCI .31) . I further show that this improvement in 
usefu lness of f inancial reports for predicting future per formance concentrates among 
those financial statement users that rely relatively heavily on published financial 
reports in making decisions (i.e. analysts of lower quality), indicating that f inancial 
reports may be useful for a greater number of financially competent users. 
Second, I reconcile and explain the inconsistent prior f indings regarding the 
relat ionship between auditor industry specialisation and analyst forecast accuracy. 
Whi le other recent papers attempt to provide greater theoretical background to, and 
explanat ion for, B C K ' s hypothesised relation between auditor industry specialisation 
(audit quality) and forecast accuracy, they are silent regarding the contradictory 
predict ions and f indings in Payne ' s study (Choi and Kwon 2008; He et al. 2011; 
Lawrence et al. 2011). I show that the directional relationship between auditor 
industry specialisation and short-horizon analysts ' forecast errors is sensitive to 
model specification, and in particular to the choice of deflator for forecast accuracy 
and whether the endogenous selection of auditor is controlled. More importantly, I 
argue and show that the accuracy of analysts ' long-horizon forecasts is a superior 
measure of the impact of audit quality on the usefulness of financial reports. I 
attribute the greater consistency in the long-horizon results to two factors: (1) long-
horizon forecasts are more sensitive to the quality of published accounting data, and 
(2) managers have less incentive to manipulate future earnings to 'meet or just beat ' 
long-horizon consensus forecasts because these forecasts are likely to be redundant 
at the end of the reporting year. This is of clear relevance to future research that 
seeks to investigate the impact of factors posited to affect the quality of published 
f inancial reports. 
Third, my study contributes more broadly to the auditing literature by enhancing our 
understanding of the economic role of audit quality. While there is much evidence 
about the impact of audit quality (proxied by various observable auditor attributes) 
on management's reporting choices and stock price response (Teoh and Wong 1993; 
Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Balsam et al. 2003; Knechel at al. 2007; 
Francis and Yu 2009; Reichelt and Wang 2010), the literature regarding the 
relationship between audit quality, proxied in my thesis by audit firm industry 
specialisation, and analysts' decision making is relatively scarce. Audited financial 
information is a key input in the forecasting process of analysts. My thesis presents 
evidence that industry specialist audit firms do improve the accuracy of analysts' 
forecasts, with the effect being more pronounced when firm's operating risk is 
relatively high and the quality of analysts is relatively low. These results produce 
strong evidence consistent with the existence of a causal relationship between audit 
quality and analysts' forecasting performance. 
Finally, my study contributes to the financial analyst forecasting and earnings quality 
literature. Sell-side analysts are sophisticated intermediaries, whose earnings 
forecasts appear to be strong proxies for market expectations of future earnings 
(Kothari 2001; Affleck-Graves et al. 2002; Crabtree and Maher 2005; Dichev and 
Tang 2009). My findings should be useful to investors and creditors who make 
decisions upon analysts' forecasts, as my results suggest that analysts' forecasts are 
more accurate for client firms that are audited by an industry specialist audit provider. 
Further, the firm-year-level analyst quality metrics developed in my thesis may be of 
use in testing the relative impact of other earnings quality proxies. In particular, the 
difference in forecast accuracy between the 'worst' and 'best' quality analysts 
following a given firm may be usefully applied in assessing the impact of real and 
accrual-based earnings manipulation and disclosure quality. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
The remainder of my thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
of general and specific relevance to my research questions. This chapter develops 
and describes a theoretical framework, based on that of Knechel et al. (2013), which 
articulates the means by which the supply of higher-quality audit services may lead 
to superior financial reporting quality. While my literature review emphasises the 
connection between audit firm industry specialisation and measures of audit or 
financial reporting quality, the relevant literature concerning audit quality and its 
impacts more broadly is also analy.sed. Building on the extant literature, I develop 
five hypotheses in Chapter 3. The first two hypotheses predict an association 
between audit firm industry specialisation and analyst short- and long-horizon 
forecast accuracy, while the remaining three hypotheses propose that the relationship 
between industry specialisation and analyst forecast accuracy varies cross-sectionally 
with the underlying riskiness of the client firms' operations and the quality of the 
analysts covering the client firm. Chapter 4 introduces and explains the empirical 
measures chosen as my test variables: audit firm industry specialisation and analyst 
quality. I identify and describe several measures of audit firm industry specialisation 
and argue that audit firm portfolio-share industry specialisation is the most direct 
measure of the underlying phenomena that I wish to study. 1 further describe several 
measures of analyst quality proxies that are commonly used in the prior literature 
and identify analysts' general and firm-specific experience, brokerage size and II 
'All-Star' status as the measures most relevant to my study. Chapter 5 describes the 
research design, starting with an overview of the general form of the regression 
models, followed by a description of the variable measurement and estimation 
methods, and concluding with a detailed description of the full regression models 
employed to test my hypotheses. A description of the samples used to test my 
hypotheses is provided in Chapter 6. I then report and analyse the results for the tests 
of the first two hypotheses in Chapter 7 and the remaining three hypotheses in 
Chapter 8. Chapter 9 discusses the conclusions, implications of my study, limitations 
and future research opportunities. 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
My thesis examines the relation between audit firm industry speciahsation and client 
financial reporting quality, as measured by the accuracy of securities analysts' 
forecasts of client earnings. In this chapter, I review and analyse the findings of the 
relevant literature to inform the later development of specific hypotheses relating to 
my research questions. Central to my research questions is the issue of whether 
industry specialist audit firms provide superior quality audit services to their clients. 
Consequently, my literature review encompasses studies of the broader nature and 
impacts of audit quality in addition to those focusing on industry specialisation. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The underlying audit quality constructs 
employed in the existing literature are described and discussed in Section 2.2. In 
Section 2.3, I develop a theoretical framework modelled on that of Knechel et al. 
(2013) to identify the mechanisms through which the supply of higher-quality audit 
services may lead to higher-quality audit outcomes. Specific applications of this 
framework are elaborated with supporting empirical evidence in Sections 2.4 - 2.7. 
Section 2.4 identifies and analyses the elements of audit inputs that are argued to 
improve auditors' judgment and negotiating power and con.sequently improve 
financial reporting quality. The extant empirical evidence regarding these audit 
inputs and auditors' behaviour during audit processes is reviewed in Section 2.5. In 
Section 2.6, I examine auditor incentives and their influence on the above 
relationship. Evidence on how audit inputs and processes affect audit outcomes is 
discussed in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes the chapter. Chapter 3 then appHes 
these general findings to the development of specific hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between audit firm industry specialisation and analyst forecast accuracy. 
2.2 Audit Quality Constructs 
Academics and regulators have proposed several definitions of audit quality over the 
past three decades. Although 'audit quality' is the subject of an extensive scholarly 
literature, the underlying construct considered and the empirical proxies employed 
differ significantly across the literature. This lack of scholarly consensus is reflected 
in regulatory pronouncements recognising the difficulty in defining audit quality and 
conceding that the regulation of auditor performance against any assumed quality 
definition is problematic (Financial Reporting Council [FRC] 2006, 16; International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions [IOSCO] 2009, 3). 
Two related but distinct constructs underpin scholarly audit quality studies, with 
each reflecting a different aspect of the services rendered by an auditor to their client. 
The first construct conceives audit quality singularly as a function of the likelihood 
that material misstatements and errors in the client's financial statements will be 
detected and reported (DeAngelo 1981). However, the detection and reporting of 
errors and irregularities does not necessarily imply that the objectives of financial 
reporting are being met.' My thesis employs a broader audit quality construct that 
emphasises the auditor's impact on the overall quality of the client's financial reports, 
where reporting quality reflects the attributes of information that are considered 
' Recall that the objectives of financial reporting are to provide financial information that is useful for 
investors lenders and creditors' allocations of scarce resources, assessing firms' future cash Hows and 
future performance (SFAC No. 8, FASB 2010 OB I-3, and BCI .3 I ) . 
desirable by regulators, scholars or financial statement users (Palmrose 1988; BCK 
2008; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Studies invoking this 'financial reporting quality' 
construct typically consider the auditor's role in providing assurance on, and 
improving the relevance and reliability of, the audited financial statements (DeFond 
and Zhang 2014). This effect may derive from the auditor's influence on 
management's accounting estimates and policy choices, in addition to simply 
detecting and reporting errors (Francis and Yu 2009). 
2.3 Auditor Attributes, the Audit Processes and Financial Reporting 
Quality 
The broader audit quality construct is operationalised by observing audit outcomes: 
financial reporting data and various financial reporting quality summary measures 
are commonly used. Since the impact of an audit/auditor on reporting quality is 
rarely observable directly, prior studies focus on the relationship between observable 
audit firm (or partner) attributes^ and proxies for financial reporting quality (e.g. 
analyst forecast accuracy, accounting restatements, discretionary accruals, and 
disclosure quality). In this section, I first identify and briefly describe various 
financial reporting outcomes argued to indicate superior quality audit services, and 
then introduce and describe a theoretical framework identifying the mechanisms 
through which the observed audit/auditor attributes may affect financial reporting 
outcomes. Subsequent sections of this chapter describe in detail the theoretical and 
empirical literature concerning the audit inputs (Section 2.4), processes (Section 2.5), 
' "Common proxies are audit firm size (Davidson and Neu 1993; Francis and Y u 2009), audit firm 
industry specialisation (Krishnan 20003; Payne 2008), auditor tenure (Chen et al. 2005; Carey and 
Simnett 2006) and audit fees (Ball et al. 2012; L im and Tan 2008). 
moderating factors (Section 2.6) and outputs (2.7) identified in the Audit Quality 
Framework. 
2.3.1 Audit Outcomes—Financial Reporting Quality 
My thesis maintains that audit quality can be inferred by observing financial 
reporting quality. In this sub-section, I briefly introduce various measures of 
financial reporting quality, to contextualise the following discussion of the Audit 
Quality Framework. In a later section (2.7), I return to examine the relation between 
audit inputs and processes and financial reporting quality more deeply. 
Broadly, I assume that the quality of financial reporting reflects its consistency with 
the objectives of financial reporting as prescribed in the Conceptual Framework, 
which states: 'The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide 
financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential 
investors, lenders, and other creditors in making decisions about providing resources 
to the entity' (SFAC No. 8, FASB 2010 OB I and OB2). Central to these decisions is 
the need to assess the prospects for future net cash inflows to an entity (SFAC No. 8, 
FASB 2010 OB3). The Framework also acknowledges that the provision of 
information about a firm's financial performance as measured by earnings and its 
components is the primary focus of financial reporting, as earnings information is 
considered superior to current cash flow information for the purpose of predicting 
future cash flows (SFAC No. 8, FASB 2010 BC 1.31). 
The empirical reporting quality literature assesses the extent to which these 
objectives are achieved by measuring financial statement (audit) outcomes, which 
comprise : (a) measures of the properties of the financial reports and related 
disclosures (e.g. disclosure quality and accrual manipulations) and (b) measures of 
f inancial statement users" reaction to financial reports (e.g. stock price response to 
account ing information and analyst forecast accuracy). 
Measures reflecting the properties of the financial reports and accompanying 
disclosures include disclosure quality and accrual manipulations. Disclosure quality 
encompasses the quantity and decision usefulness of client disclosures additional to 
the data presented on the face of the financial statements. Such disclosure includes 
both f inancial (e.g. management forecasts of earnings or sales) and non-financial 
information (e.g. information on ownership structure, new products and business 
plans). Discretionary accruals, estimated as the proportion of a cl ient 's total accruals 
that cannot be explained by the cl ient 's economic fundamentals , are argued to 
capture management ' s discretionary reporting decisions. Greater absolute 
discretionary accruals are argued to reflect poorer financial reporting quality 
(Schipper and Vincent 2003). Payne (2008) implicitly views analyst forecast 
accuracy as a reporting outcome, arguing that the manipulation of reported earnings 
al lows clients to 'meet or just beat ' consensus forecasts. From this perspective, 
forecasts that are more accurate are argued to reflect greater earnings manipulat ions 
and thus poorer audit quality. 
Measures reflecting investor reaction to financial reports include aggregate stock 
price response and analyst forecast accuracy. Market responsiveness to earnings 
surprises reflects the market perception of clients ' earnings quality, and is measured 
by the speed and bias in the price reaction to earnings news (Teo and Wang 1993; 
Kothari 2001). Other studies focus on the impact of audit quality on client cost of 
capital (Khurana and Raman 2004). Unlike Payne (2008), authors such as BCK 
(2008) and Choi and Kwon (2008) view greater analyst forecast accuracy in a 
positive light, arguing that accuracy reflects how effectively sophisticated users of 
financial reports are able to use reported financial information to predict future 
realisations of earnings. Thus, in this sense, analyst forecast accuracy is viewed as a 
response to the quality of financial reporting (BCK 2008; Choi and Kwon 2008), and 
may directly assess the extent to which the financial reporting objectives are 
achieved. 
2.3.2 Theoretical Audit Quality Framework 
There have been several recent attempts to develop a framework within which to 
understand audit quality and audit quality research. The U.K. Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC 2008) proposes an Audit Quality Framework designed to complement 
existing regulations and to promote five key drivers of audit quality; (1) the 
organisational culture within an audit firm, (2) the skills and personal qualities of 
audit partners and staff, (3) the effectiveness of the audit process, (4) the reliability 
and usefulness of audit reporting and (5) factors outside the control of auditors. 
More recently, scholars including Francis (2011) and Knechel et al. (2013) propose 
frameworks for understanding audit quality and related research. Francis's (2011, 
125) framework is intended to help scholars, practitioners, regulators and 
policymakers to understand better the various drivers of audit quality. Francis (2011) 
argues that audit quality is affected by six units of analysis, beginning with a 
granular view of the audit inputs, to a broader view of the economic outcomes of an 
audit. These units of analysis include audit inputs, audit process, accounting firm (i.e. 
engagement team), audit industry and markets (i.e. industry structure), institutions 
(i.e. State Boards of Accountancy, the AICPA, FASB, SEC and PCAOB and legal 
system) and economic consequences of audit outcomes. Knechel et al. (2013) pursue 
a similar object ive to Francis (2011) and propose a f ramework based on a large body 
of auditing research to conceptualise audit quality as arising within a system 
compris ing inputs, process, context and outcomes. ' While these two frameworks are 
alike, the Knechel et al . ' s (2013) f ramework (hereafter 'KKPSV Framework ' ) allows 
a clearer focus on the various audit inputs and processes and the links therein, and is 
thus employed as the base of the f ramework used in my thesis. 
While the f rameworks described above are useful for understanding and classifying a 
diverse audit quality literature, they are less well suited to explaining the link 
between observable auditor attributes and audit outcomes. Consequently, I modify 
the K K P S V Framework to accommodate an examination of the link between 
observable auditor attributes, such as industry specialisation, and financial reporting 
quality. The f ramework within which I explain the theory underpinning my research 
question is illustrated in Figure 2.1.^ 
The logic underpinning my audit quality framework reflects the following 
maintained assumptions and definitions. First, audit quality is innately related to the 
quality of the resulting financial reports, which in turn reflects the extent to which 
these reports satisfy the reporting objectives identified in the regulatory conceptual 
f rameworks . Second, the auditor 's impact on reporting quality can be directly 
' T h e or iginal K K P S V f r a m e w o r k is presenled in Appendix A. 
' T h e F r a m e w o r k is descr ibed and e laborated with support ing empir ical ev idence in Sect ions 2 .4 -2 .7 . 
assessed by observing audit outcomes, which are a funct ion of imperfectly observed 
audit inputs and processes. Audit inputs ( ' Inputs ' in Figure 2.1) comprise the human 
and technological resources dedicated to an audit, and include the expertise of audit 
personnel and the effect iveness of technological and methodological support 
resources. Audi t processes ( 'Processes ' in Figure 2.1) consist of a series of activities 
leading to the issuance of an audit opinion, and include analytical review procedures, 
control tests, substantive tests, negotiation with clients and quality control 
procedures. The application of professional judgment and decision making is critical 
in each audit process. In particular, audit personnel exercise judgment in performing 
analytical procedures, assessing clients ' risks and obtaining and evaluating evidence. 
Af ter assessing controls and performing substantive audit tests, auditors negotiate 
with clients. The audi tor 's ability to influence clients ' reporting decisions regarding 
the account ing estimates and choices presented in their financial reports may affect 
financial reporting outcomes, and thus audit quality. However, while an auditor may 
possess great expertise and have access to superior support resources and thus be 
capable of exercising high-quality judgment and negotiation in audit processes, 
personal incentives ( 'Modera tors ' in Figure 2.1)—such as reputational concerns, fee 
dependence and market dominance—may affect the extent to which inputs and 
professional judgment are actually applied to audit processes. This, in turn, has the 
potential to affect the quality of financial reports. Each of the above key inputs and 
processes and their relationships with each other and with audit outcomes are 
examined in detail in the fol lowing sections. 
Figure 2.1 Audit Quality Framework 
1 1 = 6 
Outcomes—Financial Reporting Quality 
Section 2.7 
Disclosure quality 
Accrual manipulations 
Market responsive to earnings surprises 
Analyst forecast accuracy 
2.4 Inputs 
Audit inputs comprise tiie human and other resources dedicated to an audit, and 
include audit staff expertise and audit support resources. While experimental studies 
typically examine the association between inputs and the quality of audit processes, 
archival research largely focuses on the influence of the observable attributes of 
inputs on proxies for financial reporting quality. As the interrelationship between 
inputs, processes and outcomes is complex, I first describe the audit inputs identified 
in the literature in this section and highlight that industry specialist auditors possess 
these inputs. Later sections detail the interrelationships between inputs, processes 
and outcomes. 
2.4.1 Expertise 
A key input identified in the audit literature is the collective expertise of the audit 
staff employed. Expertise is generically defined as a high level of knowledge or skill 
in a particular field (Oxford Dictionary of English 2010, 616; Cambridge Advanced 
Learner's Dictionary 2008, 492). Scholars have defined expertise as consisting of 
'knowledge about a particular domain, understanding of domain problems, and skill 
about solving some of these problems' (Hayes-Roth et al. 1983, 400), where 
knowledge is defined as 'acquired information that can be activated in a timely 
fashion in order to generate an appropriative response' (Charness and Schultetus 
1999, 6) and skill refers to a particular ability developed through training and 
experience to do something well (Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary 2008, 
1347). In auditing research, this ability is frequently contextualised as problem-
solving ability (Bedard and Chi 1993; Bonner and Lewis 1990). Therefore, my thesis 
defines auditor expertise as an auditor's knowledge about auditing problems and 
skill in solving these problems. Knowledge and skills are considered to be developed 
through training and practice. 
Since expert ise is not directly observable, the literature employs proxy measures for 
this purpose. In early behavioural research, expertise is measured as an individual 's 
years of exper ience in a discipline, with the assumption that knowledge and skills are 
gained through years of practice. This perspective has been adopted in clinical 
psychology (Oskamp 1965), physics (Chi et al. 1982) and auditing (Ashton 1991; 
Frederick and Libby 1986; Hamilton and Wright 1982). 
However , this experience-based proxy for expertise has been criticised in recent 
studies, which contend that auditors ' expertise is domain-specific. Knowledge and 
skills may not be simply accumulated with years of experience; the nature of that 
exper ience matters. For example, Bedard and Chi (1993) propose that auditors need 
to possess general auditing knowledge as well as knowledge about accounting 
principles and client-industry specifics (domain-specific knowledge). Auditing a 
manufac tur ing company requires a different set of skills and knowledge than that 
applied to the audit of an insurance company, because the transaction structure, tax 
rules and accounting systems are substantially different. Relevant domain-specific 
knowledge may be gained through serving many clients in that industry or auditing 
clients in a particular industry for many years, rather than simply performing audit 
work for many years. A similar argument is proposed by Bonner and Lewis (1990) 
regarding problem-solving abilities; they further point out that experience together 
with ability develops knowledge, and that knowledge combined with ability 
improves per formance . 
Accept ing that the ef fec t of exper ience on expertise is contingent, recent 
exper imenta l audit ing researchers (Solomon et al. 1999; Wright and Wright 1997; 
Taylor 2000; Low 2004; Moroney 2007)' ' and archival researchers (Davidson and 
Neu 1993; Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2005; Reichelt and Wang 2 0 1 0 ) ' " use 
proxies such as audit f i rm size or industry special isat ion—which are argued to 
indicate greater knowledge and problem-solving ski l ls—when studying the effect of 
expert ise on judgmen t and financial reporting qual i ty ." 
Audit f i rm size and industry specialisation are argued to proxy expertise for a 
number of reasons. Large audit f i rms are argued to recruit greater numbers of audit 
personnel , and personnel with superior expertise. DeAngelo (1981) argues that Big 
N f i rms have greater industry-specific knowledge and possess more expertise in 
preparing S E C documents relative to small f i rms. In addition, large audit f i rms have 
a greater incentive and ability to promote in-house skills and knowledge transferring 
among auditors. Francis and Yu (2009) conjecture that these expertise accumulat ing 
and sharing processes are more profound in larger audit offices, as such f i rms/off ices 
have more substantial training programs, standardised audit programs and 
informat ion technology support. A similar argument is apparent in studies that 
examine industry specialist audit f i rms. Specifically, Solomon et al. (1999) claim 
that industry specialists have superior knowledge of the f requency of financial 
s tatement error in industries in which they are specialised relative to other industries. 
In addition to general auditing knowledge, individual auditors working for industry 
specialist f i rms can gain domain-specif ic knowledge about their c l ient ' s industry 
' E x p e r i m e n t a l r esea rchers use induslry-re la led exper ience to measure industry special isat ion. 
Arch iva l r e sea rche r s a lso e m p l o y industry special isat ion to proxy exper t ise and use var ious indust ry 
spec ia l i sa t ion measu res , which I descr ibe substant ively in Chapte r 4. 
" T h e empir ica l ev idence is e labora ted in the fo l lowing sect ions. 
(Bedarcl and Chi 1993) and may develop this expertise relatively quickly, as they can 
access training that is more comprehensive and can learn from colleagues and 
seniors that have significant industry-specific experience. 
The impact of expertise on performance has been studied in many contexts (e.g. 
chess masters' recall superiority and physics problem solving speed), with a positive 
relationship generally being documented (Chase and Simon 1973; Simon and Simon 
1978). The impact of expertise on auditors' judgment quality, negotiation powers 
over clients and opinions on financial reports has also been extensively researched in 
the auditing literature. This is examined in detail in Section 2.5. 
2.4.2 Technology and Methodology 
Technological and methodological support is another important audit input that 
potentially affects the quality of the audit services supplied. In the previous section, I 
discussed why auditor expertise might affect performance. To be an expert, 
knowledge is essential. However, expertise is not innate; it is acquired through 
practice, with instruction, training and feedback. Audit firms assist audit staff in the 
collection and analysis of evidence by devising audit programs, testing procedures 
and providing internal administrative support (Francis 2011). Thus, an audit firm's 
comprehensive support system (including technological and methodological support) 
facilitates the knowledge and skill acquisition process, in turn improving auditors' 
judgments and quality of decision making throughout the audit processes. 
An audit methodology is a particular set of processes and procedures that guide 
auditors from the preliminary risk assessment phase to the reviewing phase. It is 
designed to help auditors to cope with uncertainty in a systematic manner (Knechel 
et ai. 2013). Public accounting firms deploy different audit methodologies, and this 
may affect auditors' judgment (Wilks and Zimbelman 2004). Advanced information 
technology and audit programs provide essential technical support to auditors and 
may directly influence the knowledge acquisition process and auditors' judgment, 
which will ultimately affect audit outcomes (Dowling and Leech 2007; O'Donnell 
and Schultz 2003; Janvrin et al. 2008).'^ 
Large and industry specialist audit firms are argued to provide auditors with greater 
technological and methodological support. Specifically, because large audit firms 
may benefit from the economies of scale or scope in the audit process, they may 
invest heavily in specific technologies and/or methodological support. Prior study 
suggests that large audit firms (proxied by Big N membership) develop their own 
methodological framework complying with the accounting rules and auditing 
standards to guide auditors, who will therefore be more likely to make better 
judgments in the audit processes and increase audit outcomes (Davidson and Neu 
1993). Audit firms of given size are more likely to invest in technologies, physical 
facilities, personnel and organisation control systems in industries in which they 
have a greater likelihood of obtaining a return on that investment. For auditors with 
many clients in an industry, the potential returns to industry-specific investment are 
greater (Simunic and Stein 1987; Gramling et al. 2001). Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that industry specialist firms provide superior audit support resources, which 
improve judgment and decision-making processes and ultimately lead to high-quality 
audit outcomes. 
The empirical evidence regarding how technology and methodology improve judgment and 
decision-making quality is reviewed in Section 2.5. 
2.5 Processes 
Audit processes compr i se a series of activities leading to the issuance of an audit 
opinion. This includes analytical review procedures, control tests, substantive tests, 
client negotiat ion and quality control procedures. The application of professional 
j udgmen t and decision making is critical at each step in the audit processes. Audit 
services are not homogenous ; they are provided to diverse clients with different 
report ing risks. The idiosyncratic nature of an audit service requires resources to be 
tailored to each client during each stage of the audit. Therefore, the quality of the 
audi tor ' s j udgmen t and decision making applied during the various stages of the 
audit and the quality of negotiation outcomes are argued to affect audit outcomes. 
Audi t inputs and their importance have been discussed in the previous .section. 
General ly, auditors with greater expertise and better support are likely to apply 
superior professional judgment in assessing audit evidence, which in turn increases 
their power over clients in negotiations regarding reporting matters (Wright and 
Wright 1997; Taylor 2000; Chen et al. 2005; Moroney 2007). This section explains 
the mechanisms through which superior quality audit inputs are considered to 
improve the quality of audit processes. The empirical evidence is also reviewed with 
regard to the relationship between various indicators of audit input quality and the 
quality of audit processes, with an emphasis on the evidence of the role of industry 
specialisation in this context. 
2.5.1 Judgment and Decision Making 
Bonner (2008, 2) describes judgment as ' forming an idea, opinion, or est imate about 
an object , an event, a state or another type of phenomenon ' , whereas decisions 
30 
reflect 'mak ing up o n e ' s mind about the issue at hand and taking a course of act ion ' . 
Crucial ly, decis ions taken reflect judgments . As such, the quality of judgments is 
vital to the quality of decision outcomes. In auditing research, judgment and decision 
making quality is vital to superior audit outcomes. This is because auditors apply 
j udgmen t in making decis ions throughout all stages of an audit, and their judgment 
and decision making quality have an immediate and direct influence on clients ' 
f inancial s ta tements (Knechel et al. 2013, 13). Empirical research (described below) 
demonstra tes that auditor expert ise and comprehensive audit support systems 
promote audi tors ' j udgmen t quality in performing analytical procedures, assessing 
the c l ien t ' s risk and obtaining and evaluating audit evidence. 
2.5.1.1 Assessing risk 
Audi tors ' risk assessments are important because they can have a significant effect 
on the subsequent nature, extent and conduct of an audit (Arens et al. 2013, 233; 
Knechel et al. 2013). Industry specialists are argued to possess greater industry-
specif ic expertise, which may allow them to identify more accurately cl ient ' s 
material misstatements . For example . Low (2004) examines the impact of industry 
specialisation (as measured by industry-related experience) on auditors ' judgment 
and decision making at the planning stage, and finds that industry specialists can 
eff ic ient ly utilise knowledge of the cl ient ' s industry and more accurately assess the 
audit risks associated with a client. L o w ' s results also show that industry specialists 
are associated with a greater likelihood of modifying the nature of the planned audit 
procedures , increasing the quality of audit procedure changes and final audit 
programs. Taylor (2000) presents experimental evidence that banking industry 
specialists are less conservat ive in assessing clients ' inherent riskiness and are more 
conf ident about their assessments than are non-specialists with similar experience. 
I have previously argued that large audit f i rms and industry specialists are likely to 
employ the methodologies best suited to their industries and that these 
methodologies may affect their assessments of client f i rms ' inherent risk. Studies 
have found that the audit methodology applied can affect auditors ' assessments of 
inherent risk, including that attributable to fraud risk. Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) 
study 95 audit managers f rom Big 5 accounting f i rms and find that auditors ' f raud 
risk assessments are more likely to be understated when they use a holistic fraud 
r isk-assessment approach rather than using an approach that separates assessments 
for managemen t ' s attitude, opportunities and incentives. Therefore, to the extent that 
industry specialists use a superior methodology, they may provide risk assessments 
that are more accurate, given that audit methodology improves the accuracy of risk 
assessment. 
2.5.1.2 Conducting analytical procedures 
Analytical procedures, required during the planning and completion phases of an 
audit, are used to assess the reasonableness of account balances or other data through 
compar isons and relationship analysis (Arens et al. 2013, 132). Prior research 
investigates the importance of audit support systems on judgment and decision 
making quality during analytical procedures. O 'Donne l l and Schultz (2003) examine 
the inf luence of different audit support software on auditor planning-phase analytical 
procedures, and f ind that auditors who use business-process-focused software 
identify more of the seeded risk factors and assess misstatement risk at higher levels 
than their counterpar ts who use transaction-cycle-focused software. They argue that 
the bus iness-process- focused format provides a more effect ive f ramework for 
auditors to acquire knowledge , bringing a subsequent improvement in their decision 
making quali ty. This is consistent with prior claims and evidence that decision-
making aids embedded in audit support systems (rather than c h e c k l i s t s ) " can 
enhance audit quality through improving audit eff iciency and risk management and 
promot ing compl iance with accounting standards and the f i rm ' s methodology 
(Ashton and Wil l ingham 1988, Dowling and Leech 2007). 
Other research examines the relationship between auditor expertise and judgment 
and decision making quality in analytical procedures. By accumulating knowledge 
and problem-solving abilities, experts become aware of the relations of internal 
control weaknesses and accounting errors and the relations among accounts, and are 
more likely to make judgments that are consistent with accounting and auditing 
theory (Frederick and Libby 1986). Using industry-related experience to differentiate 
experts and novices, Wright and Wright (1997) conduct an experiment on 34 
auditors with significant retailing experience and 38 auditors without such 
experience. They argue that industry specialists enhance hypothesis generation in the 
p lanning phase, which leads to a greater likelihood of industry-specific error 
detect ion. This improves the effect iveness and eff iciency of subsequent audit testing 
and ult imately leads to superior decision performance. Wright and Wrigh t ' s results 
support these expectat ions, which are also consistent with early evidence generated 
by Bedard and Biggs (1991), who report that auditors with greater industry 
" T h e r e are va r ious types of dec is ion aids, including checklis ts , knowledge -based expert sys tems, 
dec i s ion suppor t sys tems . Dec is ion suppor t sys tems are interactive compute r -based so f twa re that 
assis t aud i to r s in mak ing dec is ions . 
exper ience (as a proxy for specialisation) are more likely to identify the errors 
present in a complex analytical procedure task. 
2.5.1.3 Obtaining and evaluating evidence 
An important audit process involves the identification and evaluation of relevant 
client data. Auditors with greater expertise are argued to be better able to link 
concepts learned, organise them to develop effect ive problem-solving strategies and 
apply them to actual tasks (Bonner 2008). Therefore, these auditors are more likely 
to increase information search eff iciency and the effectiveness of judgments in the 
evidence evaluation phase. For example, Bedard and Mock (1992) use a 
computer ised information display board with more than 200 information items to 
study audit experts ' and novices ' information acquisition behaviour, and report that 
experts obtain a greater amount of relevant information and a lesser amount of 
irrelevant information compared to novice auditors. 
Using audi tor ' s industry-related experience as a proxy for expertise, Moroney (2007) 
reports that industry specialists outperform non-specialists with regard to the t ime 
taken to read case material, search for and read information cues and in the 
effect iveness of information usage (as measured by consistency with the expert 
pane l ' s model solutions to the hypothetical cases). These results are stronger for 
clients in the superannuation industry than for manufacturing clients, which is 
attributable to the greater client heterogeneity in the latter industry. Moroney and 
Carey (2011) present experimental evidence that industry-based experience is more 
important than task-based experience in improving auditor performance (measured 
by the completeness of experimental audit participants' solutions when compared to 
those provided by the expert panel). 
2.5.2 Auditor-Cl ient Negotiation 
Auditors negotiate with clients throughout the audit processes regarding the choice 
of appropriate accounting policies, estimates and disclosures. Audited financial 
statements are the product of the auditor-client negotiation process (Antle and 
Nalebuff 1991). As such, the negotiation process plays an integral role in 
determining financial reporting quality. However, several factors may influence the 
extent to which the published financial reports reflect clients' or auditors' preferred 
position. Prior re,search (e.g. Gibbins et al. 2001; Gibbins et al. 2003; Brown and 
Wright 2008) provides comprehensive reviews of the negotiation research in 
auditing, and a number of factors have been identified as affecting negotiation 
outcomes. These are external conditions and environmental characteristics (e.g. 
GAAP, regulatory bodies, and litigation risk), the interpersonal context (e.g. auditor-
client relationship, personal and organisational agendas, and expectations), client 
characteristics (e.g. expertise, risk tolerance, and power) and auditor characteristics 
(e.g. auditor accounting expertise and negotiation experience). 
The audit f i rm ' s industry expertise is one of the most influential factors affecting the 
auditor-client negotiation process and outcomes (Gibbins et al. 2001, Gibbins et al. 
2003). To the extent that industry specialist firms have greater expertise relevant to 
their cl ient 's industry, they will be more confident in their propositions and 
demonstrate a greater ability to resist management 's pressure over financial reporting 
issues and constrain management 's discretion in applying accounting principles 
(Kwon 1996). In this case, the audited financial statements are more likely to be of 
high quality and be presented consistent with the auditor's preferred position, rather 
than that of the client (Gibbins et al. 2001; Chen et al. 2005). Instead of directly 
assessing auditors' expertise, Chen et al. (2005) examine clients' perception of 
auditors ' expertise, presenting survey evidence that auditors are more likely to 
succeed in the negotiation process when they are perceived to be industry 
specialists. ' ' ' 
2.6 Moderators/Incentives 
Like all human actors, auditors are subject to private incentives that may diminish or 
enhance the extent to which auditor expertise actually flows through to superior 
process performance and thus superior audit quality. These incentives, discussed in 
turn below, include reputational concerns, fee incentives and market dominance 
incentives. 
2.6.1 Audit Firm Reputation 
Fombrun et al. (2000, 87) consider corporate reputation the 'cognitive repre.sentation 
of a company ' s actions and results that crystallises the company's ability to deliver 
valued outcomes to its stakeholders' . Reputation is gained though constantly 
providing products or services that are superior to those of other companies and that 
exceed people 's expectations. Prior research argues and shows that a good 
company ' s product differentiation strategy is important to maintain reputation 
C h e n et al. (2005) use c l icnts ' C F O or C A O percept ion of an audit f i r m ' s industry special isat ion to 
m e a s u r e indust ry specia l isa t ion and documen t ev idence support ing their expecta t ions . In their 
sensi t iv i ty tests they use audit firm industry market share (detailed in Chapter 4) to measure industry 
specia l i sa t ion , and genera te inconsis tent results . T h e y explain that the d i f fe rences in their results may 
be a t t r ibutable to the impor tance of c l ients ' percept ion of an aud i to r ' s industry special isat ion in the 
c o m p l e x negot ia t ion process . 
among its customers , and this will have a positive impact on its pricing power 
(Jarmon 2009). 
Audit f i rms are argued to invest in brand name capital to signal quality. The 
established brand name acts as a bond guarantor of auditors ' performance so the 
audit f i rm can earn quasi-rents on its reputation (DeAngelo 1981). Thus, f i rms with 
established reputation are more likely to deliver higher-quality services, as the 
private cost of supplying low audit quality services is greater than the associated 
short-term benefits . 
Large audit f i rms are particularly concerned about their reputation capital. These 
f i rms are internationally renowned and subject to significant public attention. Further, 
the greater wealth of large audit f irms provides a relatively strong incentive to 
maintain service quality considering the low importance of one single client weighed 
against the risk that the audit f irm could lose entire clients if caught misreporting for 
one client (DeAngelo 1981; Francis and Wilson 1988). Several studies that report 
significant fee premia to Big N audit f irms attribute part of this premia to a 
reputational effect (Francis 1984; Francis and Simon 1987; Bandyopadhyay and Kao 
2001). Applying this reputation hypothesis, empirical research documents a positive 
association between Big N audit f irms and financial reporting quality, such as 
disclosure quality (Davidson and Neu 1993) and earnings quality (Teoh and Wong 
1993; Francis and Yu 2009). 
Similarly, to the extent that specialisation allows audit f irms to provide a 
different iated product , industry specialist f i rms may experience stronger incentives 
to protect their reputation capital, and thus economic rents, by providing higher-
quality audit services (Craswell et al. 1995; Abbott et ai. 2005). Industry specialist 
f i rms may develop their reputation by investing in acquiring industry-specific 
expert ise over t ime, which may translate into fee premia. Craswell et al. (1995) show 
that audit fee premia are higher for industry specialists than non-specialists within a 
sample of Australian Big N firms. Similar results are documented by DeFond et al. 
(2000) in a Hong Kong setting. 
2.6.2 Fee Dependence and Incentives 
Fee dependence refers to the extent to which a client (consciously or otherwise) 
exerts power over an audit f irm (or audit partner) due to the relative importance of 
that c l ient ' s fees in the audi tor 's (partner 's) portfolio. If a cl ient 's fees represent a 
large proportion of an audi tor 's total fee income, an incentive may exist to lower 
audit quality to avoid losing the client. While the empirical evidence regarding the 
impact of fees on audit quality is mixed, there is evidence that fee dependence may 
impair auditor judgment and decrease financial reporting quality (Houston 1999; 
Chen et al. 2010; Frankel et al. 2002). Houston (1999) experimentally examines the 
influence of fee pressure and client risk on audit seniors' judgment and decisions in 
t ime budgeting, showing that these decisions are less re.sponsive to increased client 
risk when auditors are subject to fee pressure. Chang and Hwang (2003) conduct a 
similar experimental study and show that auditors may tolerate clients ' aggressive 
reporting practices (i.e. auditors tolerate clients ' estimation of bad debt expen.ses and 
accept cl ients ' footnote disclosure rather than proposing an accounting entry that 
decreases cl ients ' earnings) when clients ' retention incentives are high and clients ' 
business risk concerns are low. Chen et al. (2010) demonstrate that auditors ' 
propensi ty to issue a modif ied audit opinion is lower for clients whose fees are 
relatively important to audit partners when investor protection is relatively weak. 
Other research f inds that fee incentives or client importance does not compromise 
audi tors ' independence or reduce audit quality. For example. Big N audit f irms are 
found to be more conservative with respect to clients ' discretion on accruals 
(Reynolds and Francis (2001) and insurance clients ' tendency to under-reserve 
(Gaver and Paterson 2007) when these clients are more important (and thus pay 
greater audit fees) to the local audit offices. Chen et al. (2010) report that the 
negative relationship between the probability of an individual auditor 's issuance of a 
modif ied opinion and client importance (greater audit fees) becomes insignificant 
during periods of improvement in China ' s legal and regulatory environment. This 
evidence is consistent with the argument that auditors (particularly those with large 
clients) will trade off economic dependence for reputation protection and litigation 
avoidance (Reynolds and Francis 2001; Chen et al. 2010; Stice 1991). 
The provision of non-audit services may further strengthen auditors' economic bond 
to their clients. Frankel et al. (2002) report a positive association between non-audit 
fees and f i rms ' absolute discretionary accruals (a measure of earnings management) . 
However , other studies refute this association (Francis and Ke 2003; Ashbaugh et al. 
2003; Larcker and Richardson 2004), with some even providing an opposite f inding 
to Franke l ' s (e.g. Reynolds and Francis 2001). Moreover, DeFond et al. (2002) f ind 
no evidence that non-audit services threaten audit outcomes when outcomes are 
surrogated by auditors ' propensity to issue going-concern opinions. These later 
studies conclude that reputational incentives and litigation concerns dominate fee 
retention incentives. 
As discussed above, industry specialists are strongly motivated to protect their 
reputational capital. It is thus reasonable to contend that their reputational incentives 
outweigh any fee incentives, maintaining their judgment and decision quality. 
2.6.3 Market Power 
Economic theory suggests that monopoly power exists where demand and marginal 
revenue are divorced (Taylor and Frost 2009, Chapter 8). There have been 
cont inuing concerns regarding the dominance of the audit market by the Big 4 firms, 
and the potential negative impact of Big 4 market power on the quality of audit 
ou tcomes in the U.S., Great Britain and the European Union (House of Lords 2010a, 
2010b, 2010c; European Commiss ion 2010; General Accounting Office 2003a). 
Specifically, the U.S. General Accounting Office (2003a, preface) states that 
'domest ical ly and globally, there are only a few large f i rms capable of auditing large 
public companies , which raises potential choice, price, quality and concentration risk 
concerns ' . Al though the General Accounting Off ice f inds no evidence of impaired 
audit quality, it raises concerns regarding the potential negative effects f rom market 
concentrat ion and the market power of the major audit f irms. 
Recent academic research has also addressed this issue of market concentration by 
providing both theoretical and empirical evidence. One perspective is that the 
perceived lack of competi t ion in the audit market may reduce the incentives for 
dominant auditors to conduct high-quality audits; however, others argue that the 
observed Big 4 dominance reflects a demand for high-quality audits. Numan and 
Wiilekens (2012) examine the association between audit quality, competitive 
pressure and industry specialisation, and find that audit quality has been negatively 
affected by pressure from close competitors (a measure based on auditors' industry 
market share), not by industry specialisation per se. Francis et al. (2012) report that 
audit quality is decreased in countries with greater within-Big 4 market 
concentration, but is increased when the Big 4 have a larger market share as a group. 
In summary, based on the above regulatory concerns and competing evidence, the 
use of market concentration as an indicator of audit quality is problematic. My thesis 
measures audit quality in an alternative way: by capturing auditors' expertise within 
their own portfolios, rather than relying on auditors' market dominance. I detail this 
measure in Chapter 4. 
2.7 Audit Outcomes—Financial Reporting Quality 
As noted in Section 2.3.1, I assume that audit quality can be observed or inferred 
from financial reporting quality indicators. Financial reporting quality reflects the 
usefulness of financial reports for the prediction of future earnings (and thus long-
run cash flows) (SFAC No. 8, FASB 2010 BCI.31). This aspect of financial 
reporting quality can be measured by observing (a) the properties of financial reports 
and accompanying disclosures, such as disclosure quality and accrual manipulations, 
and (b) the reaction of financial statement users to published financial reports, 
including stock price reaction to the content of financial reports and the accuracy of 
analysts' forecasts of earnings and other performance measures. The quality of 
audited financial statements should be increased with the quality of the audit process 
applied. 
1 argue above that auditor expertise and access to superior technology and 
methodology potentially improve auditor decision making throughout each audit 
process. Evidence from the literature suggests that industry specialist audit firms 
possess expertise and superior technological and methodological resources, which 
they utilise in various stages of the audit processes. As such, it follows that the 
clients of these specialist firms may produce higher-quality financial statements. 
This section reviews the empirical literature examining the relation between the 
proposed indicators of the quality of audit inputs (large and industry specialist audit 
firms) and observed financial reporting outcomes (disclosure quality, accrual 
manipulations, market reactions to earnings surprises and analyst forecast 
accuracy)." 
2.7.1 Disclosure Quality 
Disclosure quality encompasses the quantity and decision usefulness of client 
disclosures additional to the data presented on the face of their financial statements. 
Such disclosures might include management forecasts of earnings or sales, 
information on shareholding breakdown, information on new products or business 
analysis. Whi le I do not study disclosure quality directly, superior disclosure quality 
may affect the usefulness of audited financial statements for predicting future 
earnings. Existing research generates mixed evidence as to whether industry 
specialisation positively influences disclosure quality. Industry specialist audit firms 
' ' Account ing conservatism is also considered to indicate financial reporting quality (Knechcl et al. 
2013). The iradilional definition of accounting conservatism is a principle that anticipates no profit, 
but anticipates all losses (Bliss 1924. in Basu 1997). In the empirical literature, accounting 
conservatism is interpreted as reflecting 'the accountant's tendency to require a higher degree o f 
verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses' (Basu 1997, 7). 
Prior studies find that audit firm size and industry specialisation increase the levels of accounting 
conservatism (Basu et al. 2001; Krishnan 2005). Since accounting conservatism is not directly related 
to the -valuation' perspective of financial reporting quality that I employ in my thesis, it is not 
explicitly discussed. 
possess greater industry-specif ic expertise and can apply this to assist clients in 
developing and disseminat ing disclosures. Further, clients hiring these audit f i rms 
may demonst ra te an intention to provide enhanced disclosures, as these f i rms are 
more likely to discover any deficiencies in client reporting (Dunn and Mayhew 
2004). Therefore , it appears logical to expect that disclosure quality will be greater 
for clients of industry specialists. Consistent with this expectation, Dunn and 
M a y h e w (2004) report a positive association between industry specialisation and 
client disclosure quality, as measured by analysts ' rankings of company disclosures 
reported by the Association for Investment Management and Research, in 
unregulated industries. However , other research argues that industry specialist f i rms 
(as a proxy for high-quality audit f irms) are more likely to be hired by clients who 
wish to disclose less and seek additional auditor credibility as a substitute (Peters et 
al. 2001). Under this argument, high-quality audit f irms are regarded as a reputable 
intermediary that provides additional assurance to alleviate the effects of information 
asymmetry . Consistent with this contention, Peters et al. (2001) find that clients of 
industry specialist f i rms make less extensive commodi ty derivative disclosures than 
do clients of non-specialist audit f irms. 
T w o studies have examined the relationship between audit f i rm size and 
managemen t ' s forecast errors. Davidson and Neu (1993) predict and document a 
posit ive relation between management ' s forecast errors and audit f i rm size (as a 
proxy for high audit quality). Davidson and Neu (1993) assert that auditors are not 
responsible for clients ' forecasts or forecast accuracy, and attribute their results to 
larger audit f i rms ' influence on management 's reporting discretion on earnings."^ 
Conversely, Clarkson (2000) revisits Davidson and Neu 's (1993) assumption and 
argues that high-quality auditors directly influence management forecasts. Clarkson 
contends that high-quality auditors pay careful attention to all aspects of a prospectus, 
including the forecasts, rather than narrowly concentrating on the financial 
statements. He predicts a negative relationship between management 's forecast 
errors and audit firm size. Examining the one-year-ahead management earnings 
forecasts included in initial public offerings prospectuses, Clarkson (2000) finds that 
audit firm size (as a proxy for high-quality audit services) is associated with smaller 
management forecast errors after controlling for firm business risk and examining 
periods during which audit firms are responsible for audit-level assurance relative to 
review-level assurance. 
2.7.2 Accrual Manipulations 
A number of studies argue that high-quality auditors discipline managerial attempts 
to manipulate accruals and policy choices. Typically, these manipulations are 
measured by 'discretionary accruals ' , which represent the proportion of a f i rm's total 
accruals that cannot be explained by the firms' economic fundamentals. Measures of 
discretionary accruals are argued to capture management 's discretionary judgment in 
financial reporting, which is thus commonly used to measure the degree of earnings 
management (Jones 1991; Healy and Wahlen 1999).'^ Several scholars argue that 
high-quality auditors constrain management attempts to manipulate accrual estimates 
" T h e r e has been a p le thora of ev idence sugges t ing that h igh-quah ly audit service is a m e c h a n i s m that 
cons t ra ins m a n a g e m e n t ' s d iscret ion regard ing account ing es t imates and pol icy choices , leading lo 
d e c r e a s e d ea rn ings m a n a g e m e n t and increased earn ings quali ty (Reichel t and W a n g 2010 ; Francis and 
Y u 2 0 0 9 ) Th i s aspec t of audi t o u t c o m e is fur ther e labora ted in Sect ion 2.7.2. 
" S u b r a m a n y a m (1996) p roposes lhat d iscre t ionary accruals could be used as a s ignal l ing tool in 
ca ses w h e r e m a n a g e m e n t s m o o t h s earnings . Such discre t ionary accruals may convey private 
i n fo rma t ion abou t a f i rm that may not usual ly be ref lected under the historical cost account ing method . 
and policy choices (Becker et al. 1998; Krishnan 2003; Payne 2008; Francis and Yu 
2009) , improving the reliability, persistence and predictability of accruals and 
publ ished earnings (Sloan 1996; Xie 2001). 
Industry specialists have greater expertise relevant to clients ' operations and 
f inancial reporting concerns (Bedard and Chi 1993). They have also developed their 
reputation over t ime and have a greater incentive to protect their reputation to 
maintain clients and continue to earn fee premia (Craswell et al. 1995; Abbott et al. 
2005). Therefore , specialist auditors are more likely to make better judgments 
throughout the audit processes (Taylor 2000; Low 2004). Specifically, while 
assessing clients ' discretion on reported earnings and when disputing clients ' accrual 
est imates and policy choices, specialist auditors are more likely to resist client 
pressure and negotiate with clients to reduce the incidence of manipulation (Kwon 
1996; Gibbins et al. 2001, 2003). For these reasons, industry specialists are argued to 
reduce discretionary accruals, as a proxy for earnings management (Balsam et al. 
2003; Krishnan 2003; Reichelt and Wang 2010). 
Consistent with the reasoning above, there is empirical evidence that clients of audit 
industry experts have smaller absolute discretionary accruals, suggesting that 
industry specialists are better able to constrain earnings management , and thus 
improve earnings quality (Krishnan 2003; Balsam et al. 2003). Reichelt and Wang 
(2010) different iate specialisation according to the level of geographic aggregation, 
def ining national and city-specific industry specialists. They find lower 
It has been a rgued that audit f i rms ' industry expert ise is largely c i ly-specif ic because most audi tors 
con t inue to serv ice c l ients p redominan t ly in one locale and der ive deep industry exper t ise pr imari ly 
out of o f f i c e s in that locale (Ferguson et al. 200.1; Francis et al. 2005b) . More discuss ion on the city-
spec i f i c m e a s u r e of industry special isat ion is provided in Chapte r 4. 
discret ionary accruals among clients audited by city-specific industry specialists, and 
the lowest discret ionary accruals for clients audited by both national and city-
specif ic industry specialists. Adopt ing a less direct approach, Payne (2008) argues 
that industry specialist audit f i rms may constrain the earnings management 
behaviour associated with 'benchmark-beat ing ' i ncen t i ve s , " which may in turn 
increase realised short-horizon forecast errors (i.e. realised errors in forecasts that are 
made immediate ly prior to the earnings announcement)."" Using a sample restricted 
to Big N clients and an array of industry specialisation measures, Payne (2008) f inds 
that industry specialisation increases short-horizon absolute forecast errors (i.e. 
decreases forecast accuracy) and reduces the likelihood of meeting or beating the 
forecast benchmark. However , using audit f irm industry market share as a proxy for 
industry specialisation and a PSM approach, Minutt i-Meza (2013) finds no evidence 
that audit f i rm specialisation is associated with a reduction in clients ' propensity to 
meet or beat analysts ' forecasts. 
The related literature using audit f i rm size as a proxy for audit quality develops 
similar arguments and predictions regarding the relationship between audit f irm size 
and cl ients ' earnings management . Early research reports that clients of Big N 
auditors (as a proxy for large audit f irms) have lower absolute discretionary accruals 
than do other f i rms (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999). Bauwhede et al. (2000) 
" Ex tens ive pr ior research indicates that managemen t tias an incent ive to manipula te earn ings to 
' m e e t or ju s t bea t ' ana lys t s ' ea rn ings forecas ts to avoid negative shocks to c o m p a n i e s ' s tock pr ices 
(Sk inne r and S loan 2002 ; D e c h o w et al. 2003) . For example . Bannis ter and N e w m a n ( 1 9 % ) and 
Burgs tah le r and E a m e s (2006) show that m a n a g e m e n t exerc ises discret ion to alter accruals lo 'mee t or 
just bea t ' ana lys t s ' c o n s e n s u s forecasts . 
^^ Fo recas t e r ro r s are the undel la tcd d i f fe rences be tween actual earnings and forecast earnings . 
H o w e v e r P a y n e ' s a r g u m e n t rel ies on the assumpt ion that managemen t a t tempts to 'mee t ' as opposed 
to ' bea t ' fo recas t s If for example , the p re -managed earnings forecast error is - $ 0 . l . repor ted earn ings 
are man ipu la t ed u p w a r d s to $0 .15 (a case of ' just bea t ing ' analys ts ' expecta t ions) , with earn ings 
fo recas t e r ro r increas ing with earn ings m a n a g e m e n t behaviour . If an industry special is t cons t ra ins this 
behav iour , the forecas t e r ror should decrease . 
provide further support for these findings in their study of a matched sample of 
public and private Belgian firms, which finds that the presence of Big N auditors 
suppressed income-decreasing earnings management. Francis and Yu (2009) argue 
and demonstrate further that Big N firms' office size is systematically associated 
with lower discretionary accruals. 
Although academics frequently use discretionary accruals as an earnings quality 
proxy, the empirical meaningfulness of discretionary accrual measures is highly 
questionable (Ball 2013). The measurement of discretionary accruals is likely to be 
contaminated by non-discretionary accruals, and this contamination may induce a 
systematic bias in regression coefficients (Dechow et al. 1998; Ball 2013). Ball 
(2013) argues that stochastic shocks to business transactions are likely to be 
measured as 'discretionary accruals', and that controlling for these shocks in 
empirical models is problematic. Moreover, Francis (2011) claims that the extreme 
values of earnings in the statistical distribution are not necessarily an indicator of the 
misstatement of financial information; rather, they may reflect the cross-sectional 
variation in the statistical properties of earnings. 
2.7.3 Market Responsive to Earnings Surprises 
Stock market reaction to earnings announcements reflects whether financial 
information is useful for investors to make rational decisions regarding the value of a 
client. Stock prices are a function of the present value of expected future dividends, 
information regarding which is provided by accounting earnings (Ohlson 1990). 
Better quality earnings are argued to improve the reliability of information about a 
firm's future economic profits and dividend-paying ability (Kothari 2001; Teo and 
W o n g 1993). Therefore , stock prices or changes in stock prices may reflect the 
extent to which the market perceives the quality of earnings or a change in the 
quality of earnings. Clients ' earnings response coefficient (ERC) and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) are commonly used in the literature to assess the stock 
market responsive to earnings surprises. Since auditors provide assurance on the 
reported accounting numbers, the ERC or CAR measure can be used to assess 
investors ' perceptions of auditors ' reliability and financial information credibility 
and their subsequent decisions upon the perceptions. As large firms or industry 
specialist audit f irms are generally more experienced and knowledgeable in the 
industries, they are more likely to influence clients to produce informative financial 
statements. As such, a positive link between clients of these audit f irms and clients ' 
E R C is expected (Teoh and Wong 1993; Balsam et al. 2003). Teoh and Wong (1993) 
report evidence that the ERC of companies audited by Big 8 (as a proxy for audit 
f i rm size) is greater than that of non-Big 8 clients. Balsam et al. (2003) find similar 
results by examining industry specialist f irms. Similarly, if clients switch f rom a 
higher-quality audit f i rm to a lower-quality audit f irm, a negative market reaction 
should be observed. Knechel et al. (2007) examine 159 firms that have switched 
between Big 4 auditors and find that clients experience the largest negative market 
reaction (as measured by the three-day CAR around the date of auditor switch) when 
clients switch f rom an industry specialist to a non-specialist audit firm. This negative 
association provides further evidence that audit quality increases the market ' s 
perception of earnings quality. 
2.7.4 Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
Analyst forecast accuracy is the absolute difference between analysts' forecasts of 
client earnings and the realisation of those earnings. Analyst forecast accuracy is 
perhaps the most direct way to assess whether the primary objective of financial 
reporting quality (and thus audit quality), which emphasises the importance of 
earnings for users' prediction of firms' future performance, has been achieved. 
Rccall that large or industry specialist audit firms may constrain management 
attempts to manipulate accrual estimates and policy choices, improving the 
reliability of accruals and thus earnings (Krishnan 2003; Balsam et al. 2003; Reichelt 
and Wang 2010; Francis et al. 1999). There is substantial empirical evidence 
showing a positive relationship between accrual quality and analyst forecast 
accuracy (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Ahmed et al. 2005). Therefore, if superior 
audit quality improves the quality of clients' financial reports, this should increase 
the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. Below I describe the empirical evidence 
regarding the association between accrual quality and analyst forecast accuracy, 
followed by a discussion of the literature linking audit firm industry specialisation to 
forecast accuracy. 
Several papers examine the relationship between accrual quality and analyst forecast 
accuracy, suggesting that discretionary accruals in general mislead analysts unless 
there is an event signalling the presence of earnings management. Abarbanell and 
Lehavy (2003) find that extreme forecast errors are positively correlated with the 
presence of large discretionary accruals in the realised earnings figures, suggesting 
that analysts are not able to anticipate perfectly firms' earnings management 
behaviour. Ahmed et al. (2005) find that analyst forecast accuracy is negatively 
associated with f i rms ' prior period discretionary accruals, suggesting that analysts 
either do not recognise the lower persistence of discretionary accrual component of 
earnings or are not motivated to do so. However, Wilson and Wu (2011) show that 
the sensitivity of analysts ' forecast errors to current-period discretionary accruals is 
lower in cases where a clear public signal of earnings management incentives exists, 
consistent with analysts ' recognition of client attempts to bias earnings. 
Recent empirical research theoretically connects high-quality audit services with 
greater predictability of earnings and tests this relationship using analysts ' forecast 
errors.^ ' BCK (2008) argue that higher-quality auditors subtend higher earnings 
quality and thus decrease forecasting task complexity. Analysts are thus more likely 
to evaluate the implications of current earnings information correctly, and in turn 
make earnings forecasts that are more accurate. Therefore, they predict a negative 
(positive) relation between absolute forecast errors (accuracy) and audit quality. 
BCK (2008) f ind that analysts ' forecast errors are lower (i.e. forecasts are more 
accurate) for clients of Big N audit firms, and that audit f irm industry specialisation 
reduces forecast errors, but only for clients of non-Big N auditors. However, 
Lawrence et al. (2011) show that there is no relationship between analysts ' forecast 
errors and audit f i rm size after matching client characteristics for samples of 
fundamenta l ly similar client firms. 
The theory underpinning B C K ' s findings that analyst forecast accuracy positively 
correlates with high-quali ty audit services has been examined deeply in two recent 
As noted in Sect ion 2.7.2, Payne (2008) reports that audi tor industry special isat ion is negat ively 
re la ted to fo recas t accuracy . However , P a y n e ' s s tudy does not explicit ly e x a m i n e the impor tance of 
audi t qual i ty on use rs ' predic t ion of f i rms ' fu ture earnings. Rather , it focuses on its impact on 
manage r i a l b e n c h m a r k - b e a t i n g behaviour , and thus earning quali ty. Shor t -hor izon forecast accuracy is 
used to assess this ea rn ings qual i ty . 
papers. Choi and Kwon (2008) argue analytically and use a theoretical prediction 
model to show that accounting errors decrease with high-quality audit, which then 
enhances analysts' ability to predict firms' future earnings. These arguments are 
consistent with BCK's results. He et al. (2011) investigate the influence of audit 
quality on analysts' earnings forecasts by focusing on analysts' information 
environment. Using Barron et al.'s (1998) model, He et al. (2011) find that high-
quality audits (proxied by either audit firm size or industry specialisation) are 
associated with a greater use of common information by analysts when making 
forecasts, and with greater precision of analysts' common and private information. 
While these studies attempt to explain the rationale behind BCK's findings, they are 
silent about Payne's predictions and findings. In Chapter 5, I explore the 
differences in research design across the BCK and Payne studies and show that their 
contradictory findings derive from model specification and the choice of deflators 
for key variables. 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature relevant to the connection between audit 
firm industry specialisation and measures of audit or financial reporting quality. I 
maintained that audit quality reflects the auditor's impact on overall financial 
reporting quality, and that audit quality can be inferred by observing financial 
reporting outcomes (Section 2.2). A theoretical framework adapted from that of 
KKPSV, which I use to describe the means by which the supply of higher-quality 
audit services may affect financial reporting quality, was described in Section 2.3. I 
(2008). 
next def ined and described key audit inputs and examined their importance in 
Section 2.4, with an emphas is on industry specialist auditors ' superior quality of 
audit inputs. In Section 2.5, 1 analysed the empirical evidence concerning the 
relat ionship between various indicators of audit input quality and the quality of audit 
processes, again emphasis ing evidence of the role of audit f irm industry 
specialisation. The impact of auditors ' private incentives on the extent to which the 
quality of audit inputs f low through to superior process performance was examined 
in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 examined the interrelationship between audit 
inputs, audit processes and audit outcomes. Audit outcomes are used to assess 
financial reporting quality, and thus audit quality. Of the various audit outcomes 
identified, I argue that analyst forecast accuracy is the most direct measure of 
whether the primary objective of financial reporting quality (thus audit quality) has 
been achieved. Flowing f rom this logic, I develop hypotheses regarding the generic 
and cross-sectional relationships between audit firm industry specialisation and 
analyst forecast accuracy in Chapter 3. 
CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, I reviewed the extant research examining the means by which the 
supply of higher-quali ty audit services may result in superior financial reporting 
quality, with an emphasis on the role of audit f irm industry specialisation in that 
context . I argued that audit quality could be inferred f rom the properties of the 
financial reports published, and f rom the impact of the financial reports upon 
markets and market participants. In this chapter, I develop hypotheses concerning the 
relat ionship between audit f irm industry specialisation and the performance of a key 
group of market participants: securities analysts. First, I analyse the predictions and 
f indings of prior studies that have examined the impact of audit f i rm industry 
specialisation on the accuracy of analysts ' forecasts, and develop predictions 
regarding the generic relationship between these variables in Section 3.1 
(Hypotheses l a and lb) . Although tests of the overall relationship between audit f irm 
industry specialisation and forecast accuracy may produce evidence consistent with a 
causal relationship, I develop additional hypotheses, tests of which may present more 
convincing evidence regarding the existence of a causal effect of audit quality on 
analyst forecast accuracy. These additional hypotheses predict that the relationship 
between audit quality and analyst forecast accuracy varies cross-sectionally with the 
inherent diff iculty of the forecasting task. Hypothesis 2 examines the association 
between audit quality and analyst forecast accuracy when the client f i rm ' s operating 
risk varies (Section 3.2), while Hypotheses 3a and 3b explore this association 
condit ional on the est imated quality (expertise) of the analysts fol lowing a client f irm 
(Section 3.3). Section 3.4 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Hypotheses la and lb—Audit Firm Industry Specialisation, Forecast 
Accuracy and Forecast Horizon 
The object ive of f inancial reporting is to provide information that is useful to 
f inancial ly literate investors, lenders and creditors when as.sessing the prospects for 
fu ture net cash f low (SFAC No. 8, FASB 2010 OB2 and OB3). Measuring and 
reporting earnings and its components is the primary focus of financial reporting 
because this information is central to the prediction of earnings and future cash f lows 
(SFAC No. 8, FASB 2010 BC 1.31; OB 17; OB 18). Therefore, the usefulness of 
f inancial reporting is a funct ion of earnings quality, which in turn is heavily 
influenced by the quality of accrual estimates and supporting disclosures. Accrual 
quality reflects the extent to which accruals shift or adjust the realisation of cash 
f lows, such that earnings can better capture the f i rm ' s underlying performance 
(Dechow and Dichev 2002) and the quality of accruals decreases in the magnitude of 
est imation errors (whether intentional or not) (Allen et al. 2013; Dechow and Dichev 
2002). Disclosure quality embraces the quantity and decision usefulness of client 
disclosures (e.g. management forecast, and supplemental information that enhances 
the interpretation of the performance figures). Thus, when clients ' accrual and 
disclosure quality are high, published financial reports should be more useful for 
predicting future earnings by financially literate users such as securities analysts. 
Prior studies argue and show that clients have better financial reporting outcomes as 
ref lected in accrual and disclosure quality when the financial reports are audited by a 
high-qual i ty audit provider, typically proxied by audit f irm size and industry 
specialisation (Becker et al. 1998; Krishnan 2003; Dunn and Mayhew 2004; 
Clarkson 2000). These superior reporting outcomes are argued to derive f rom 
auditors ' domain-speci f ic expert ise relevant to clients ' operations and their strong 
incentive to protect their reputation capital (Bedard and Chi 1993; Solomon et al. 
1999; DeAngelo 1981). Reputation concerns motivate auditors to improve their 
judgment quality and negotiate with clients over the application of accounting 
principles (DeAngelo 1981; Gibbins et al. 2001, 2003), while auditors ' greater 
expert ise provides them with greater confidence in their propositions and improves 
their j udgmen t and decision making quality throughout the auditing processes 
(Gibbins et al. 2001, 2003; Kwon 1996; Low 2004). For instance, high-quality 
auditors may be more likely to resist management ' s pressure over accrual estimates 
and policy choices and negotiate with management to reduce the incidence of 
manipulat ions (Kwon 1996). Their clients have also been found to have lower 
discretionary accruals (Becker et al. 1998; Krishnan 2003; Balsam et al. 2003). 
Similarly, high-quali ty auditors may reduce unintentional estimation errors in clients ' 
reported earnings, reducing the difference between the reported earnings and the 
' t rue ' economic earnings (Watkins et al. 2004; Choi and Kwon 2008). If superior 
audit quality is associated with lower discretionary accruals and unintentional 
est imation errors, it should increase the quality of accruals, which in turn improves 
the reliability of earnings for users ' prediction of future performance (BCK 2008). 
Further, high-quali ty auditors may improve the quality and breadth of supporting 
disclosures (Dunn and Mayhew 2004; Clarkson 2000), which in turn may be of use 
in forecast ing clients ' future earnings. On the basis of the argument and empirical 
f indings discussed above, I expect that the financial reports of clients audited by a 
high-qual i ty audit provider should be more useful for predicting future earnings, and 
that this greater usefu lness will be reflected in the accuracy of analysts ' earnings 
forecasts . 
Notwi ths tanding the above argument, there are reasons that the empirically observed 
relat ionship between audit quality and forecast accuracy may be of opposite 
direction to that suggested above. Payne (2008) argues that managers perceive a 
fu ture private benefi t in 'meet ing or just beating' the level of earnings implied by 
end-of-year consensus forecasts, ^^  and may attempt to manipulate accruals to 
achieve these benchmarks . High-quality audit providers may be more effect ive in 
constraining clients ' at tempts to manage current earnings towards the zero forecast 
error level. As such, high audit quality may be associated with larger forecast errors 
(i.e. lower forecast accuracy). Thus, the empirically observed relationship between 
audit quality and forecast accuracy is likely to depend on the intra-year timing of the 
forecasts studied. 
Prior studies examining the relationship between audit quality and analysts ' forecast 
errors test their proposit ions by focusing on the accuracy of analysts ' short-horizon 
forecasts (Payne 2008; BCK 2008). Short-horizon forecasts (also known as 'end-of-
year forecas ts ' ) are the forecasts outstanding at the client f i rms ' reporting date, and 
are typically issued or revised in the weeks immediately prior to reporting. While 
B C K (2008) propose that high-quality audit providers improve analyst forecast 
accuracy, they find a positive association between forecast accuracy and the presence 
Burgs tah le r and E a m e s (2006) provide visual and slatislical ev idence lliat m a n a g e m e n t s avoidance 
of nega t ive ea rn ings surpr ises b e c o m e s progress ively weaker when forecas ts are issued t rom 271 to 
3 6 0 d a y s be fo re the current year earn ings report ing date ( long-hor izon forecas ts in my s tudy) relat ive 
to when fo recas t s a re issued c lose to the earnings release date (shor t -hor izon forecasts) . 
of Big N audit f irms, but no significant association between Big N audit f i rms' 
portfolio-share industry specialisation and analyst forecast accuracy. Payne (2008) 
argues and shows that industry specialist auditors reduce the effectiveness of clients' 
attempts to manage current earnings towards consensus forecasts, which in turn 
increase analysts ' absolute forecast errors (lower forecast accuracy)."'' 
I argue that the relationship between short-horizon forecast errors and the provision 
of high-quality audit services is potentially confounded by the competing effects 
described above. On the one hand, industry specialist auditors may improve the 
usefulness of prior period or interim financial reports for predicting earnings, and to 
the extent that the current auditor was responsible for those prior period reports, a 
negative association between absolute forecast errors and audit quality may be 
expected. However, short-horizon forecasts are likely to be the focus of benchmark-
beating incentives, and thus a superior auditor may be more likely to constrain 
managerial attempts to bias current-period earnings towards market expectations. If 
both of these effects occur simultaneously, the directional impact (if any) of audit 
f i rm industry specialisation on analysts' absolute forecast errors is unclear. Thus, I 
state the following non-directional maintained hypothesis regarding the association 
between audit firm industry specialisation and analysts' short-horizon forecast errors; 
Hla: Analysts' short-horizon absolute forecast errors are associated with audit firm 
industry specialisation. 
H o w e v e r a recent s tudy f inds no ev idence that audit f i rm special isat ion, measured using market-
share app roach , is assoc ia ted with a reduct ion in chen t s ' propensi ty to 'meet or just beat" analysts-
fo recas t s o n c e cMem character is t ics are appropr ia te ly control led (Minut t i -Meza 2013) . 
As the compet ing theoretical impacts of audit firm industry specialisation on short-
horizon forecast errors impair the interpretation of any tests of that relationship, I 
propose a more direct test focusing on the impact of industry specialisation on 
analyst long-horizon (beginning-of-year) absolute forecast errors. Long-horizon 
forecasts are those issued immediately after the release of prior period earnings. I 
argue that their accuracy is a more powerful meter of audit quality for two reasons. 
First, over this forecast horizon, audited financial reports represent a relatively large 
proport ion of the information available for predicting future earnings; thus, the 
accuracy of these forecasts is logically more sensitive to variations in the quality of 
the audited reports.^' Second, with long-horizon forecasts, there is a lesser likelihood 
of earnings management behaviour aimed at 'meeting or just beating' these forecasts 
than is the case with short-horizon forecasts. Put simply, while there are well-known 
incentives for f i rms to attempt to 'meet or just beat ' earnings forecasts current at the 
t ime earnings are released (Burgstahler and Eames 2006), there is no obvious 
incentive for a f i rm to manipulate earnings to achieve a redundant target. Therefore, 
I argue that long-horizon forecast accuracy is a more direct and less noisy measure of 
the extent to which the objectives of financial reporting are being satisfied. 
To illustrate the lesser likelihood of 'benchmark-beating ' (or expectation 
management ) behaviour with respect to long-horizon forecasts, I examined the 
proport ions of forecast errors for which actual earnings meet or beat consensus by 1 
cent or less. In the case of short-horizon forecast errors, approximately 20 per cent of 
all forecast errors fall in this range, whereas less than 3 per cent of long-horizon 
" H e e t a l ( 2 0 1 1 ) s t u d y forecasts'issued immediately after the release of prior year earnings and 
a r g u e t h J t h e i forecasts are most d.rectly affected by the qual.ty of publtshed account,ng 
information. 
forecast errors are between 0 and I cent.^*^ This suggests that earnings management 
to avoid negative earnings surprise are substantially weaker for long-horizon 
forecasts (which are issued an average of 304 days ahead of the release of actual 
earnings). Thus, the impact of higher audit quality on the reliability of prior year 
earnings is likely to dominate any association between audit quality and 'benchmark-
beating' behaviour. Thus, I predict that clients of industry specialist auditors have 
lower long-horizon absolute forecast errors: 
Hlb: Analysis' long-horizon absolute forecast errors are negatively associated with 
audit firm industry specialisation. 
3.3 Hypothesis 2—Audit Firm Industry Specialisation, Client Firm 
Operating Risk and Forecast Accuracy 
Hypothesis lb predicts that high-quality audit services increase the usefulness of 
published financial reports for forecasting future earnings and thus improve the 
accuracy of analysts' long-horizon forecasts. To further examine whether any 
observed empirical relationship between audit quality and forecast accuracy may be 
causal, I develop additional hypotheses that predict cross-sectional variation in the 
association between auditor industry specialisation and forecast accuracy. One 
source of predicted variation in this relationship is client firm operating risk. In this 
section, I develop a hypothesis in which I argue that where clients' operations are 
inherently very stable, and accrual estimates are relatively easy to verify, audit 
T o fu r the r e x a m i n e the associa t ion be tween audit f i rm industry special isat ion and t ienchmark 
beat ing , I es t imate probi t regress ions similar m form to Payne (2008) to model the p robab i luy of a 
d i e m firm ach iev ing a 0 or 1 cent forecast error (see Appendix B). I show that for ^h"r . -hor ,zon 
forecas t s , audi t f i rm indust ry speciahsat ion is s ignif icant negatively associated with the l ikel ihood of 
•meet ing or jus t bea t ing ' consensus . Howeve r , when appl ied to long-hor izon forecasts , there is no 
re la t ion be tween such benchmark-bea t ing behaviour and audit quali ty. 
quality has a reduced influence on the accuracy of earnings forecasts, and therefore 
indicators of audit quality, such as auditor industry specialisation, should be more 
strongly associated with forecast accuracy. Testing this hypothesis has the potential 
to bring stronger evidence to bear regarding whether any findings from tests of H l b 
are consistent with the existence of a causal relationship. 
My thesis defines client firm operating risk as subsuming the uncertainty arising 
from business and financing activities. While this risk is not directly caused by 
accounting decisions and estimates, its presence may decrease the precision of 
information available for the prediction of firms' future cash flows and earnings 
(Minton et al. 2002)."^ The information critical to the prediction of firms' future 
performance is the accrual component of earnings (Barth et al. 2001; Minton et al. 
2002). Estimation errors in accruals (intentional or otherwise) may affect the extent 
to which accruals map to future cash flows, thus decreasing the extent to which the 
reported earnings are useful for predicting future earnings (Allen et al. 2013)."® 
Empirical evidence shows that analysts' forecasts do not fully incorporate the lower 
persistence of accrual information (Ahmed et al. 2005; Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003). 
Therefore, client firm operating risk is likely to be associated with greater accrual 
estimation errors, and thus greater absolute earnings forecast errors. 
" This definition of operating risk is closely related to auditors' concept of inherent risk, but differs in 
the fact that it refers only to externally observable measures of variability in lirms' performance. The 
traditional audit concept of inherent risk includes these factors, but may also be alfected by other 
factors such as prior audit results, the auditor-client-specific experience, the existence ol related 
parties and non-routine transactions (Arenseta l . 2013, 239) 
Al len e t a l ( 2 0 1 3 ) d e c o m p o s e accruals i n to 'good accruals and accrual estimation errors . Good 
accruals reverse when the realisation of cash How is anticipated, so that actual realisation of cas^ now 
does not affect earnings. 'Accrual estimation errors' do not anticipate luture benelits and their 
reversal are not offset by the anticipated cash flow, resulting in an impact on earnings. Allen et a . 
[2013) argue and find thm the low persistence of earnings is caused by the accrual estimation error , 
not by 'good' accruals. 
I argue that audit quality should more greatly affect analysts' absolute forecast errors 
when client operating risk is high. This prediction reflects assumed cross-sectional 
differences in both the difficulty of the audit task and the level of audit effort 
supplied, which I now describe. Recall that high-quality audit providers have been 
found to reduce clients' accrual estimation errors to a greater extent than do other 
audit providers (Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003). This, in turn, improves the 
reliability of clients' published financial statements as a basis for predicting their 
future earnings. The impact of audit quality on accrual estimation errors, and thus 
earnings predictability, should be greater when the scope for such errors is larger, 
and the scope for accrual estimation errors is greater when the client operating risk is 
higher, as discussed above. It logically follows that if audit firm industry 
specialisation is associated with superior audit quality, the extent of specialisation 
should have a greater effect in improving earnings predictability (decreasing absolute 
earnings forecast errors) when client firm operating risk is higher. For example, if a 
client has zero operating risk, accrual estimates should be perfect and earnings can 
be predicted without error, implying that industry specialist auditors should have no 
role in constraining accrual estimation errors and improving earnings forecast 
accuracy. However, when a client has a high level of operating risk, accrual 
estimation errors are higher and earnings forecast for this client will be less accurate. 
For these riskier clients, industry specialist auditors are likely to reduce clients' 
accrual estimation errors to a greater extent than would other audit providers, 
improving the usefulness of financial information for analysts' predictions of 
earnings. Thus, the impact of audit industry specialisation in improving earnings 
forecast accuracy is greater when the client operating risk is higher. 
Second, studies of the closely related concept of inherent risk find that this measure 
of risk is positively associated with audit effort, and that returns to the additional 
effort are greater for high-quality providers than for other auditors (O 'Keefe et al. 
1994; Schelleman and Knechel 2010; Caramanis and Lennox 2008). Auditors 
increase their effort with assessed inherent risk (O'Keefe et al. 1994), and this 
greater audit effort has been shown to constrain income-increasing earnings 
management (i.e. decrease accrual estimation errors) (Caramanis and Lennox 2008). 
Prior studies also show that high-quality audit providers exert greater effort in 
response to signals of higher risk in clients' operations (e.g. higher levels of short-
term accruals) than other auditors, and that the returns to each additional unit of 
effort are greater for these high-quality auditors (Schelleman and Knechel 2010; 
Caramanis and Lennox 2008). Therefore, when risk is higher, industry specialist 
auditors are predicted to supply greater effort than non-specialists, and the additional 
audit effort supplied is likely to have a greater impact in reducing the errors in 
accruals (and thus earnings), which in turn increases the predictability of earnings. 
Based on the above rationale, I argue that if any observed relationship between 
auditor industry specialisation and long-horizon absolute forecast errors is causal, 
audit firm industry specialisation should decrease absolute forecast errors to a greater 
extent when the riskiness of clients' operations is higher. Hypothesis 2 reflects this 
prediction: 
H2: The negative association between analysts' long-horizon absolute forecast 
errors and audit firm industry specialisation increases with the level of the client 
firm's operating risk. 
3.4 Hypotheses 3a and 3b—Audit Firm Industry Specialisation, Analyst 
Quality and Forecast Accuracy 
In this section, I develop additional hypotheses relating to the predicted cross-
sectional variation in the impact of audit quality on analyst forecast accuracy. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b focus on differences in the quality (expertise) of the analysts 
issuing the forecasts of a client f i rm ' s earnings, and the extent to which the accuracy 
of those forecasts is affected by industry specialist auditors. These hypotheses 
predict that audit f i rm industry specialisation has a greater impact on the accuracy of 
lower-quali ty analysts, and they imply tests that may provide further evidence 
support ing (or contradicting) the existence of a causal relationship between audit 
quality and analyst forecast accuracy. Tests of H3a and H3b also directly examine 
whether audit quality contributes to the extent to which the objectives of financial 
reporting are met. The Conceptual Framework states that an objective of general-
purpose financial reporting is to provide financial information relevant to decision 
making that 'will meet the needs of the maximum number of primary users' (SFAC 
No. 8, F A S B 2010 OB8), where primary users refer to existing and potential 
investors (including analysts), lenders and other creditors (SFAC No. 8, FASB 2010 
O B 2 and BC1.9) . Although the Conceptual Framework assumes that primary users 
( including analysts) possess a min imum level of financial competence, it logically 
fo l lows that f inancial reports are of superior quality when they are useful to a greater 
number of f inancially competent users. 
Consis tent with much of the analyst literature, my thesis assumes that analyst quality 
derives f rom individual analysts ' access to information outside that contained in the 
financial s ta tements ,^ ' and f rom the accretion of superior ability to identify and 
process relevant complex informat ion , ' " Since analyst quality cannot be observed 
directly, prior studies employ numerous proxies for analyst quality, including 
analysts ' general and f i rm-specif ic forecast ing experience, the size of the analysts ' 
employer , analysts ' prior forecast accuracy, the simplicity of the analysts ' portfolios 
of covered f i rms and 'Al l -Star ' analyst status. There is empirical evidence of a 
posit ive relationship between these proxies for analyst quality and analyst forecast 
accuracy (Clement 1999; Clement and Tse 2005; Clement 2007; Kim et al. 2011; 
Drake and Myers 2011).^' I discuss the literature relevant to the selection of analyst 
quality proxies in Chapter 4. 
To the extent that the superiority of high-quality analysts reflects their superior 
access to private information and ability to identify and analyse both public and 
private information, higher-quality analysts will be less reliant on the quality of 
published financial reports when making predictions of future earnings. For example, 
high-quali ty analysts have been shown to adjust forecasts according to the level of 
total accruals present (Drake and Myers 2011). Similarly, high-quality analysts may 
I con tend that this in fo rmat ion is not restr icted to informat ion obtained legally or o therwise f rom 
corpora te insiders and may extend to other relevant non-earnings informat ion s ignals ident i f ied by 
analysts . 
T h e in fo rmat ion e f fec t re f lec ted in analyst quali ty measures (i.e. access to more private 
i n fo rma t ion ) may have b e c o m e weaker af ter the introduction of Regula t ion Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
on 2.S O c t o b e r 2000 . Reg F D prohibi ts analys ts ' access to private informat ion f roin managers ; thus, 
o n e of the a c h i e v e m e n t s of Reg F D has been a reduct ion in the informat ion a symmet ry a m o n g all 
ana lys t s (E l e swarapu et al. 2004) . Prev ious ev idence shows that analyst forecast accuracy is 
s ign i f ican t ly d i f fe ren t when c o m p a r i n g the p re -Reg F D and pos t -Reg F D per iods (Hel l in et al. 200.^; 
F ind lay and M a t h e w 2006) . Th is in format ion a rgument about analyst quali ty may be re levant to my 
s tudy, as my sample (which is descr ibed in Chapte r 6) starts f rom year 1989. Therefore , to year 2000 , 
ana lys t s ' p r iva te in fo rmat ion may have inf luenced their forecast accuracy . In view of this, I 
inves t iga te the impac t of Reg F D on my hypothes ised re la t ionships in my sensit ivity tests. 
" Un l ike mos t pr ior analyst qual i ty studies, which examine shor t -honzon forecast accuracy , my thesis 
f o c u s e s on long-hor izon forecasts , which are m a d e immedia te ly af ter the release of p rev ious years-
f inanc ia l repor t s . T h e only extant s tudy in this area is Drake and M y e r s ' s (2011) invest igat ion of 
w h e t h e r ana lys t qual i ty is related to analysts ' long-hor izon forecast accrual-related over -op t imism. 
M y thes is expl ic i t ly s tates that analys t quali ty increases forecast accuracy, and I e x a m i n e whether 
ana lys t qual i ty mode ra t e s the relat ion be tween audit quality and forecast accuracy . 
use informat ion obtained f rom other sources to predict earnings and improve forecast 
accuracy when the precision of pubUcly available information (i.e. financial reports) 
is low (Keskek et al. 2013). Conversely, lower-quality analysts may benefit 
relatively greatly f rom improvements in financial reporting quality (and thus audit 
quality) because these analysts are relatively dependent on primary information 
sources such as general-purpose financial reports, and may be less able to undo 
distort ions associated with abnormal accruals. It thus follows that if higher-quality 
audit providers, such as industry specialist auditors, improve the usefulness of 
published financial reports for predicting future earnings, the resulting impact on 
forecast accuracy should be greater for lower-quality analysts. 
From this general contention, I develop two specific hypotheses pertaining to the 
association between auditor industry specialisation, analyst quality and forecast 
accuracy, which differ according to the unit of analysis (i.e. f irm-years or analyst-
f i rm-years) . First, I argue that the overage quality of the analysts covering a firm in a 
given year moderates the association between audit f irm industry specialisation and 
analysts ' consensus long-horizon forecast errors. Where average analyst quality is 
high, their aggregate information set is also relatively high, and accordingly the 
importance of basic signals such as those contained in the published financial reports 
is relatively low. Conversely, where average analyst quality is low, analysts may rely 
more heavily on easily accessible public information, such as that contained in the 
published financial statements, when making earnings forecasts. In these cases, 1 
argue that the quality of those financial statements (and thus audit f irm industry 
specialisation) should have a greater influence on analysts' absolute forecast errors. 
Thus: 
H3a: The negative association between analysts' long-horizon absolute forecast 
errors and audit firm industry specialisation decreases with the average quality of 
analysts following a firm. 
I apply similar logic in developing a hypothesis concerning the relative forecast 
accuracy of individual analysts fol lowing a given client firm. To the extent that 
greater audit f i rm industry specialisation leads to higher-quality financial reports and 
has a greater impact on the forecast accuracy of lower-quality analysts, the 
di f ference in forecast accuracy between the 'worst ' and 'best ' quality analysts 
fo l lowing a f i rm should be reduced. Hypothesis 3b is therefore: 
H3b: Greater audit firm industry specialisation reduces the difference in analysts' 
absolute forecast errors between the 'worst' and 'best' quality analysts following a 
firm. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter developed three hypotheses in accordance with the research questions 
identified in Chapter 1. Hypotheses l a and lb concern the generic relationship 
between audit f i rm industry specialisation and analyst forecast accuracy. I then 
developed two hypotheses that I argue bring stronger evidence to bear concerning 
the possible existence of a causal relation between auditor industry specialisation and 
forecast accuracy. Hypothesis 2 predicts that audit f irm industry specialisation is of 
greater importance on forecast accuracy when the f i rm ' s operating risk is higher. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b propose that audit firm industry specialisation has a greater 
impact on the forecast accuracy of lower-quality analysts, improving the extent to 
which the financial reports are useful for a broader range of users rather than experts. 
In the next chapter, I discuss in detail the empirical proxies for my key measures: 
audit f i rm industry specialisation and analyst quality. 
CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL PROXIES FOR AUDITOR AND 
ANALYST QUALITY 
4.1 Introduction 
I argued in the previous chapters that the empirical impact of the quality of audit 
services provided to a client could be inferred by observing audit outcomes, 
including the usefulness of the resulting financial reports for predicting future 
earnings. I also developed five hypotheses relating to the impact of audit f irm 
industry specialisation on the predictability of future earnings, each of which implies 
a dependent variable that is a function of earnings predictability. To test each of my 
hypotheses, a measure of the extent to which the quality of audit services is expected 
to vary (audit f irm industry specialisation) is required, and the tests of Hypotheses 3a 
and 3b also require metrics for 'analyst quali ty ' . This chapter introduces and 
explains my choice of empirical proxies for each of these key constructs, which 
represent the test variables in my thesis. I introduce these key measures here, as the 
nature of the chosen measures affects subsequent modelling choices. The balance of 
this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 discusses in detail the use of audit 
f i rm industry specialisation as a proxy for superior audit quality and examines the 
various extant measures of audit f i rm industry specialisation. In Section 4.2, 1 
identify and explain the empirical proxies for analyst quality used in my study. 
Section 4 .3 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Audit Firm Industry Specialisation and Audit Quality 
My thesis focuses on whether audit f irm industry speciaHsation improves the quality 
of the audit services supplied, which would in turn enhance the predictability of 
fu ture earnings. As early as the late eighteenth century, Smith (1776) proposed that 
specialisation increases economic eff iciency. Smith (1776) argues that the division 
of labour is central to economic eff iciency, and he proposes a number of reasons for 
this effect , two of which are particularly relevant to the audit market. First, the 
division of labour reduces the scope of the work tasks required of particular labour 
suppliers, encouraging the accumulation of skills through repetition. Second, the 
division of labour encourages invention and the use of machinery dedicated to 
particular tasks, the application of which facilitates and abridges labour effort and 
time.^" It is thus arguable that greater specialisation (division of labour) within the 
production of audit services may improve efficiency, for reasons elaborated upon 
below. 
Large audit f i rms recognise the importance of industry specialisation, and since the 
late twentieth century have shown an increasing trend to concentrate their 
engagements in particular industries (Gramling and Store 2001; Hogan and Jeter 
1999). For example , K P M G emphasises that 'we structure ourselves by industry 
sector as well as by our three core services of Audit, Tax and Advisory ' (KPMG 
2014), while PricewaterhouseCoopers states that they focus on audit and assurance, 
tax and consult ing services and concentrate services in 16 key industries (PWC 
2014). In addition, Ernst and Young use an industry-focused approach to provide 
audit and advisory services (EY 2014). Audit f i rms for which this concentration of 
A n o t h e r benef . l of specia l isa t ion p roposed by Smith (1776) is (hat the division of labour saves t ime 
lost in m o v i n g f r o m one task to another . 
clients is particularly great are referred to as ' industry specialists ' . Recall that 
industry specialists are considered to develop general and domain-specific 
knowledge and problem-solving skills (and thus expertise) relevant to their clients' 
industries (Bedard and Chi 1993). In addition, industry specialists invest 
disproport ionately in technologies, physical facilities, personnel and organisation 
control systems in industries in which they choose to concentrate (Simunic and Stein 
1987; Graml ing et al. 2001). The accumulation of greater expertise and investment in 
particular industries enables industry specialist auditors to apply superior judgment 
and decision making throughout the audit processes, which may lead to better audit 
outcomes, such as the production of financial reports that are more useful for 
predicting future earnings. 
The extant literature employs several empirical proxies for the existence and 
intensity of audit f i rm industry specialisation. In experimental and survey-based 
research, individual auditors ' level of industry-specific audit experience is frequently 
used to proxy industry specialisation. Archival re.search typically measures audit 
f i rm industry specialisation by either the extent to which an audit f i rm 's total audit 
fee revenue is earned within a particular industry (the 'portfolio-share ' measure) or 
by the audit f i rm ' s share of aggregate audit fees paid by clients in a particular 
industry (the 'market -share ' measure). The conceptual basis of these and other 
measures of industry specialisation and the extent to which they are likely to capture 
underlying audit quality are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
4.2.1 Audit Firm Industry Specialisation—Market-share Measure 
A number of studies use a market-share-type metric to capture the effect of industry 
specialisation on auditor expertise (Balsam et ai. 1993; Craswell et al. 1995; Godfrey 
and Hamilton 2005). Market-share measures of industry specialisation reflect an 
audit f i rm's share of the total audit fee revenue generated in an industry. Due to data 
limitations, many academics use client total assets as a proxy for client fees (Payne 
2008; BCK 2008; Gul et al. 2009) ." The generic form of the continuous market-
share measure of industry specialisation is shown below. 
Market = the sum of the square root of the total assets of the clients that an 
share audit firm services in a particular industry divided by the sum of the 
square root of the total assets of all clients in that industry 
Market-share measures of industry specialisation are argued to capture expertise 
arising from two sources: knowledge spillovers and economies of scale. Yardley et 
al. (1992, 151) argue that industry market share is related to expertise because, 
ceteris paribus, greater market share increases the value of knowledge transfers 
between services provided to multiple clients. Audit firms with high industry market 
share may experience greater knowledge spillover benefits than other audit firms, 
because they supply a greater amount of audit services to fundamentally similar 
clients. Krishnan (2001) argues that industry expertise is associated with production 
efficiencies through economies of scale, which result in lower-cost audits.^' An audit 
firm will concentrate operations in an industry until the production efficiencies 
through economies of scale are fully absorbed. Thus, the existence of economies of 
" Audi t fee da ta are only ava i lab le f r o m Audi t Analyt ics for years af ter 1999. Many other s tudies use 
c l ien ts ' total r evenue (Kr i shnan 2003; G o d f r e y and Hamil ton 2005) or the number ol cl ients of an 
audi t f i rm (Chin and Chi 2009 ; Ba l sam el al. 2003) to proxy audit fees and generate similar results as 
to the s tudies us ing c l ien ts ' total assets. 
I de sc r ibe the d i c h o t o m o u s measu re in detail in Chapte r 5. 
' ' T h e under ly ing a s sumpt ion to the a rgument is that homogeneous products , price compet i t ion and 
p n c e - i n e l a s t i c aggrega te d e m a n d exist in the audit market (Krishnan 2001) . 
scale is argued to imply that industry expert ise is reflected in audit f irm industry 
market share (Krishnan 2001), 
Whi le the market-share measure of industry specialisation may have desirable 
attributes such as the ability to capture the value of knowledge spillovers and 
economies of scale, this approach has potential significant limitations. The first 
l imitation stems f rom product differentiation theory, which assumes that audits are 
not homogeneous , and that differences in (perceived) audit provider quality affect 
the demand curve fac ing each auditor (Krishnan 2001). If industry expertise is a 
component of auditors ' product differentiation strategy, greater expertise will 
increase the slope of the demand curve facing the audit f irm. If cost funct ions are 
similar across expert and non-expert f irms, Krishnan (2001, 131-132) shows that the 
expert auditor will have a smaller market share than the non-expert in equilibrium. 
Consequent ly , Krishnan (2001) concludes that the asserted positive association 
between industry expertise and market share cannot hold if expertise is a component 
of auditors ' product differentiation strategy. 
Second, the market-share measure of industry specialisation is increasing in market 
dominance , which in turn may imply well-known dysfunctional consequences 
(Yardley et al. 1992). In addition to the market power held by a single audit f irm, the 
l ikelihood of a small number of (potentially colluding) f irms dominating a market 
increases with f i rms ' market share. As market power and/or market concentration 
reduce competi t ion and may induce collusion, the leading ( ' industry specia l is t") 
f i rms may exper ience lower returns to the provision of quality (Yardley et al. 1992). 
Whi le regulators have expressed concerns regarding the negative impact of 
monopoly power and market concentration on the quality of audit outcomes (Great 
Britain: House of Lords 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; European Union: European 
Commiss ion 2010; United States: General Accounting Off ice 2003a, 2008), 
academics have examined their consequences empirically (Francis et al. 2012; 
Boone et al. 2012). Francis et al. (2012) find that earnings quality is lower in 
countries with greater within-Big 4 market concentration, and attribute this to weaker 
competi t ion among those audit f irms. Boone et al. (2012) argue that audit f i rms with 
leading market power are likely to collude and devote less audit effort; they show 
that auditors ' tolerance of earnings management (indication of lower audit quality) 
increases with audit market concentration. ' ' ' 
In summary , while greater market share may increase knowledge spillover benefits 
and economies of scale, the potentially confounding effect of market dominance and 
product differentiat ion effects suggest that the market-share measure of industry 
specialisation is at best a very noisy measure of the quality of audit services provided; 
it may even be associated with reduced qua l i ty . " Therefore, I limit the use of this 
proxy to my sensitivity analyses. An alternative measure of industry expertise, 
argued to be superior to the market-share approach, is examined in the next section. 
^^  B o o n e et al. ( 2012) p ropose an al ternat ive v iew that states that market dominance may reduce 
aud i to r s ' need to curry f avour with cl ients through means of sacr i f ic ing some degree of scept icism 
because of fear of be ing rep laced . Dominan t audit f i rms are thus more likely to provide better audit 
services . H o w e v e r , this v iew is not suppor ted by their results . 
" T h e third l imitat ion concerns the nois iness of the empir ical measures of market share. Typical ly , 
the marke t - sha re app roach only ident if ies large audit f i rms (Big N) as industry special is ts because 
these f i r m s tend to h a v e large cl ients in a part icular industry. However , knowledge spi l lovers may 
a lso occur in re la t ively small audit f i rms that concentra te activities on a few small cl icnts in an 
indust ry . T h e s e f i rms m a y a lso deve lop expert ise f rom providing audit services to a group of similar 
small f i r m s or se rv ic ing a par t icular client firm for many years in that industry. Howeve r , they are 
less l ikely to be r ecogn i sed as special is ts due to the relatively small size of their c l ients (Yardley et al. 
1992; M i n u U i - M e z a 2013) . This l imitat ion of the market-share measure has l iule impact on my study 
because my s a m p l e is res t r ic ted to cl ients of Big N firms. 
4.2.2 Industry Specialisation—Portfolio-Share Measure 
The audit f i rm portfolio-share measure of industry specialisation is a frequently 
employed alternative (or complement) to the market-share measure described above 
(e.g. Krishnan 2001, 2003; BCK 2008; Payne 2008). The portfolio-share industry 
specialisation measure attempts to capture the extent to which audit firms 
concentrate their productive activities (and thus fee base) within particular industries. 
This measure implicitly assumes that audits and audit quality are heterogeneous, and 
that industry specialisation may be one means through which auditors differentiate 
their product (Krishnan 2001). The generic estimation of an audit f i rms' portfolio-
share measure is described below:'^ 
Portfolio = the sum of the square root of the total assets of the clients that an 
share audit firm services in a particular industry divided by the sum of the 
square root of the total assets of all clients of that audit firm 
The portfolio-share measure emphasises industry share within an audit f i rm's 
portfolio, rather than the audit f i rm's share within an industry. In this way, the 
measure focuses on auditor industry expertise resulting from the audit f i rm's 
strategic business decisions. Simunic and Stein (1987) and Neal and Riley (2004) 
argue that audit f irms invest heavily in industry-specific technologies, physical 
facilities, personnel and organisation control systems in industries in which they are 
more likely to obtain a return on the investment. These resources may facilitate 
auditors ' knowledge and skill acquisition process and help them to develop industry-
specific expertise (Francis 2011). Therefore, audit firms that invest in the industries 
in which they concentrate their services are argued to develop significant industry-
specific expertise. These industry specialist audit firms are subsequently more likely 
I use both c o n l i n u o u s and d i c h o t o m o u s measures , which I detail and descr ibe the measu remen t of 
in C h a p t e r 5. 
to exhibit improved judgment and decision making when assessing clients' inherent 
risks, conducting analytical procedures and obtaining and evaluating evidence 
(Dowling and Leech 2007; O'Donnell and Schultz 2003; Janvrin et al. 2008), which 
may lead to superior audit outcomes. Therefore, the portfolio-share measure of 
industry specialisation is argued to capture the provision of higher audit quality 
(Neal and Riley 2004; Numan and Willekens 2012). In practice, large audit firms 
have recognised the importance of industry expertise and concentrated their services 
in particular industries (KPMG 2014, PWC 2014); thus, it is also arguable that the 
portfolio-share measure most directly reflects such business decisions.^' 
As with other measures, the portfolio-share measure has potential limitations. First, 
the measure is mathematically affected by the relative size of the industry (Neal and 
Riley 2004). Under traditional applications of this method, an audit firm is more 
likely to be identified as a specialist for clients in industries where the total industry 
fee base is large relative to other industries in the audit firm's potential portfolio."" 
Consequently, I control for this limitation of the portfolio-share method using two-
stage regression analyses, which account for the relative size of the fee base in the 
client's industry. Another potential weakness of the portfolio-share measure is that 
the effect of knowledge spillovers might not be captured as cleanly as under the 
Further, client's size relative to the rest of the industry systematically affects the identification of 
specialists under the market-share measure, but does not impose similar effects on the portfolio-share 
measure. The portfolio-share measure may potentially recognise relatively small audit firms as 
specialists in industries where they may generate most revenue, even if they do not have leading 
market share in that industry (Neal and Riley 2004). However, since I restrict my sample to clients 
audited by a B ig N firm, this advantage o f the portfolio-share measure over the market-share measure 
is not o f direct relevance to my thesis. 
••"Assume for example, that an auditor serves three clients: Firm 1 is a member of industry A, and 
Firms 2 and 3 arc members of industry B. Industry A is an industry comprised of many large firms 
that typically pay very high audit fees (e.g. Firm 1 pays the auditor $50 mill ion). Indu.stry B is a small 
industry in which Firm 2 and Firm 3 pay $5 mill ion and $10 mill ion in audit fees, respectively, to that 
auditor According to the portfolio-share metric, the auditor is recognised as having specialisation m 
Industry A (76.92%: 50 m / (50 m+5+10), relative to Industry B (23.08%: 15 m / 65 m), although the 
auditor services two clients in Industry B. 
market -share measure , as the value of spillovers may be more directly a funct ion of 
the aggregate number of (fee revenue f rom) similar clients, rather than the proportion 
of similar clients in the audi tor ' s portfolio. 
In summary , I maintain that the portfolio-share measure of audit firm industry 
specialisation most closely reflects the economic construct of specialisation (as 
proposed by Smith 1776). It also captures the audit f i rm ' s expertise in industries in 
which the f i rm makes a greater relative investment. This is consistent with the 
industry-focused object ives asserted by the large audit f irms that are the focus of my 
study. Further, while the market-share measure of industry specialisation is 
increasing with market dominance, which does not necessarily lead to positive audit 
outcomes , such a problem is not of direct relevance when the portfolio-share 
measure of industry specialisation is used. Empirical auditing research frequently 
uses the portfol io specialisation measure to proxy audit quality and f inds a positive 
relation between this measure and desired audit outcomes (Krishnan 2001, 2003; 
Peters et al. 2001; Abbot t et al. 2005; BCK 2008; Payne 2008; Numan and 
Wil lekens 2012). Therefore , my thesis uses the portfolio-share measure as the 
pr imary proxy for audit f i rm industry specialisation, and controls for its limitations 
accordingly. 
4.2.3 Refinements of the Market-share and Portfoho-share Measures 
Recent audit ing research has proposed ref inements of the basic market-share and 
portfol io-share measures, as described below. 
4.2.3.1 Weighted market-share measure 
Owing to the potential problems associated with the exclusive use of either the 
market-share or the portfol io-share measure, Neal and Riley (2004) propose an 
alternative measure that captures the complementary relation between the two 
measures . Noting the inconsistent results reported in prior research across these 
proxies, Neal and Riley (2004) argue that these two measures may capture different 
aspects of auditor expertise, and may act as complements rather than substitutes. 
Thus , they propose a 'weighted market-share ' measure equal to the product of the 
audit f i rm market-share and portfolio-share measures: 
Weighted Market share = Market share * Portfolio Share 
Under this approach, the previously identified shortcomings of the individual 
measures can be mitigated. For example, if an audit firm has a high portfolio share 
with respect to f i rms in a large industry, this may simply reflect the size of the 
industry (and the fees payable within it). The weighted market-share measure will 
only be 'h igh ' if the audit f irm also has high market share in that industry. Likewise, 
if an audit f i rm has a very high market share in some industries, this may possibly 
reflect the level of audit market concentration or the size of the client f i rms in a 
particular industry. The weighted market share again will only be 'high ' if the audit 
f i rm has high portfolio share in that industry. Therefore, the weighted market-share 
approach captures some of the attributes of both approaches. This approach is later 
used in an examination of audit f irm industry specialisation and accounting 
restatements by Romanus et al. (2008), who find that industry specialisation is 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of accounting restatements. 
Neal and Riley 's (2004) complementary measure is based on the assumption that 
both market share and portfolio share are increasing in industry expertise and are 
thus positively related to audit outcomes. Therefore, if one of the measures does not 
capture audit quality, and thus does not lead to positive audit outcomes, the weighted 
market-share approach will reduce the explanatory power of the single specialisation 
measure that is appropriately defined. As I have already argued that greater market 
share may be associated with lower audit quality in some cases, this limitation may 
also affect the complementary measure similarly. Thus, I use the weighted market 
share as a supplementary, rather than primary, measure of audit firm industry 
specialisation. 
4.2.3.2 City-based industry specialisation measures 
Both the market-share and portfolio-share measures described above have 
traditionally been estimated across national audit markets. As such, each implicitly 
assumes that the industry expertise of accounting firms is transferrable across 
different offices within audit firms. However, more recently, academic research 
argues that audit f i rm's industry expertise is largely city-specific and is not easily 
transferable to other offices throughout the f i rm's network (Ferguson et al. 2003; 
Francis et al. 2005b; Reichelt and Wang 2010). The above argument is based on the 
following contentions. First, deep industry expertise resides in the unique individual 
audit partners and staff, and is thus limited to their offices of practice, which most 
often service clients predominantly in one locale (Ferguson et al. 2003). Second, in 
the U.S. where the audit market is quite decentralised and Big N audit offices are 
widespread across the country, it may be difficult to maintain a uniform firm-wide 
exper t ise across all o f f ices (Francis et al. 2005b) . Thus , deep industry expertise is 
argued to be ci ty-specif ic . 
Empir ical research provides some evidence in favour of the superiority of city-
specif ic expert ise measures . Using the audit f i rm ' s fee premium to explore national 
and city-level industry expert ise, Ferguson et al. (2003) find a fee premium only for 
Austral ian audit f i rms that are both national and city market-share leaders. A similar 
study based on U.S. data reports a fee premium for city-specific industry specialists 
w h o are not national industry specialists (Francis et al. 2005b).'*' In addition, 
Reichelt and W a n g (2010) f ind lower discretionary accruals for clients audited by 
ci ty-specif ic industry specialists relative to national industry specialists, and even 
lower discret ionary accruals in clients audited by joint national and city-specific 
industry specialists. Digging deeper, Francis and Yu (2009) claim that audi tor 's 
expert ise is dependent on their off ice size. Audit f i rms with larger off ices and greater 
engagement hours provide their audit staff with superior local support and more 
opportuni t ies to consult with peers, which facilitates the development of 'in-hou.se' 
expert ise and results in better audit outcomes. Their empirical results show that Big 4 
audit f i rms ' of f ice sizes are positively associated with audit outcomes measured by 
the l ikel ihood of issuing a going-concern opinion and lower levels of absolute 
discret ionary accruals (Francis and Yu 2009). Since city-level audit f irm data are 
"" F ranc i s et al. ( 2 0 0 5 b ) expla in that the incons is tency in their f ind ings relat ive to Ferguson el al. 
( 2 0 0 3 ) is ma in ly d r iven by the inst i tut ional d i f f e rences be tween Austra l ia and the U.S. and the 
decen t ra l i sa t ion of the U.S . audi t marke t . Speci f ica l ly . Austral ian account ing s tandards and repor t ing 
r e q u i r e m e n t s a re less de ta i led , and the regulatory body , the Austra l ian Secur i t ies and Inves tments 
C o m m i s s i o n , is re la t ive ly less aggress ive in regula t ing c o m p a n i e s than is the Securi t ies and E x c h a n g e 
C o m m i s s i o n in the U S In addi t ion , while most Austra l ian publ ic ly listed c o m p a n i e s and Big N audit 
f i r m s h a v e h e a d q u a r t e r s in Sydney , Me lbou rne and Perth, c l ients and audit firms are more 
g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d i spe r sed in the U.S. 
only available f rom Audit Analytics after 1 9 9 9 / " my main analysis focuses on 
national-level data, although I conduct city-level tests in my sensitivity analysis. 
4.3 Analyst Quality 
Analyst quality is conceived in my thesis as reflecting analysts ' access to private 
information''^^ and analysts ' superior ability to identify and process relevant complex 
information. Whi le analyst quality cannot be observed directly, prior studies identify 
numerous proxies, including analysts ' general and firm-specific forecasting 
experience, the size of the analyst 's employer (brokerage size), analyst prior forecast 
accuracy, analysts ' portfolio complexity and measures based on rankings published 
in the financial press (the 'All-Star ' status). I now describe these proxies in detail 
and analyse the extent to which each proxy may capture underlying analyst quality. 
4.3.1 Analyst Experience 
Experience is ' the knowledge or skill acquired by a period of practice of something 
especially that gained in a particular profession' (Oxford English Dictionary 2010, 
615). As knowledge and skill have positive effects on individuals' decision making 
and performance, experience is argued to improve judgment and decision making 
quality (Bonner 2008). Empirical research documents a positive relationship between 
" A city is defined as the U.S. Census Bureau's definition of metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). 
Due to data limitations, Francis et al. (2005b) assume that the engagement office of an audit firm is 
located in the same city as the clients' headquarters and they thus simply use the city codes of clients' 
headquarters as reported in COMPUSTAT to represent those for audit firms, and match these codes 
with MSA codes. A more precise measure of auditor city developed in recent studies (i.e. Francis and 
Yu 2009; Reiehelt and Wang 2010) identifies auditors' cities from Audit Analytics and matches them 
with MSA codes. My thesis uses this more precise and recent method to measure city-specific auditor 
industry specialisation. More details are provided in the sensitivity analysis section in Chapter 7. 
"" As footnoted in Chapter 3, analysts' access to private information sourced from within the covered 
firms was specifically proscribed by the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on 23 October 2000. 
However, private information need not refer only to that sourced from within the covered firms. 
Superior analysts may have superior contacts in other areas, such as in industry advocacy bodies, 
economic consultancies and the business press firms. 
experience and per formance in several disciplines, including clinical psychology 
(Oskamp 1965), physics (Chi et al. 1982) and auditing (Frederick and Libby 1986; 
Hamil ton and Wright 1982), 
In the analyst literature, experience is measured in terms of the period over which an 
analyst has issued forecasts, either for any firm (general experience) or for a specific 
f i rm (f irm-specif ic experience). Analysts who acquire greater knowledge and skills 
over t ime are argued to be more capable of identifying and processing complex 
information and making accurate forecasts (Jacob et al. 1999; Clement and Tse 2003, 
2005; Drake and Myers 2011). Further, analysts with greater experience may be 
better able to develop strong relationships with the covered f i rms and (prior to the 
enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure [Reg FD] at least) obtain more relevant 
information about the covered firms outside those reported on the financial reports 
(Clement 1999). The fol lowing sections describe these experience measures and 
review the literature relevant to their interpretation. 
4.3.1.1 General experience 
General experience refers to the period over which an analyst has issued forecasts for 
any f i rm and is argued to increase analyst quality and improve analyst forecast 
accuracy (Clement 1999, Clement and Tse 2003; 2005; Casey 2012; Kim et al. 2011; 
Brown and Mohammad 2010; Drake and Myers 2011). Clement (1999) documents a 
significant positive relation between analysts ' general experience and individual 
analysts ' absolute forecast errors.""* Kim et al. (2011) argue that the documented 
" C l e m e n t (1999) uses a relat ive measure of ana lys t s ' absolute forecast error , de f ined as the 
d i f f e r e n c e be tween the ana lys t ' s absolute forecast error for a given f i rm and the mean absolu te 
forecas t er rors for that firm, d iv ided by the latter. 
relationship between analyst quality proxies and forecast accuracy may also be 
attributable to the f requency with which analysts update their forecasts late in the 
reporting year. They f ind that analysts ' general experience increases the likelihood 
that the analyst will revise forecasts later in the quarter and thus reduces analysts ' 
absolute forecast errors.''^ 
Analyst general experience is also found to be positively related to analysts ' other 
forecast ing performance. Clement and Tse (2005) investigate the relation between 
analyst quality and forecast boldness. They identify 'bold forecasts ' as those deriving 
f rom forecast revisions that result in the new forecast being more extreme than both 
the analyst ' s own previous forecasts and extant consensus forecasts. Thus, bold 
forecasts reflect cases in which the analyst 's opinion diverges f rom consensus. 
Conversely, 'herding forecasts ' are those that are issued at a level between the 
analyst ' s prior forecasts and the consensus forecasts. Clement and Tse ' s (2005) 
results show that analysts with greater general experience are less likely to herd, and 
are more accurate. Further, Drake and Myers (2011) refine the earlier study of 
Bradshaw et al. (2001) to investigate the impact of analyst quality on the relation 
between forecast opt imism and the accrual component of earnings. Bradshaw et al. 
(2001) f ind that analysts are misled by the mean reversion implications of large 
accruals, or that they deliberately collaborate with management to inflate forecasts. It 
is suggested that the market inefficiency in pricing the components of earnings 
(Sloan 1996) may be attributable to analysts ' behaviour. Drake and Myers (2011) 
provide evidence that more experienced analysts exhibit lower accrual-related long-
K i m et a l . ' s ( 2011) measure of analys ts ' absolute forecast er rors is the numera tor in C l e m e n t ' s 
metr ic . 
horizon forecasts opt imism, suggesting that these analysts predict the resolution of 
accruals more accurately than do others.''® 
4.3.1.2 Firm-specific experience 
Firm-specif ic experience refers to the period over which an analyst has issued 
forecasts for a specific f irm and is argued to increase analysts ' understanding of the 
idiosyncrasies of covered f i rms ' financial performance and reporting practices, 
thereby improving forecast accuracy. However , the reported results with regard to 
the relation between firm-specific experience and forecasting performance are 
inconsistent (Mikhail et al. 1997; Clement 1999; Keskek et al. 2013; Jacob et al. 
1999). These prior results are detailed below. 
Some prior studies posit and document evidence that analysts ' f irm-specific 
experience improves forecast accuracy, while others show that the impact of f irm-
specific experience on forecast accuracy is not significant. For example, Mikhail et 
al. (1997) f ind that short-horizon forecast accuracy is positively correlated with 
analysts ' f i rm-specif ic experience, and Clement (1999) reports a positive relation 
between forecast accuracy and analysts ' f i rm-specific experience. However, 
examining analyst forecast accuracy over a sample period similar to Clement ' s 
(1999), Jacob et al. (1999) find no evidence that forecast accuracy increases with 
analysts ' f i rm-specif ic experience. This difference in results is likely due to 
di f ferences in these studies ' research designs. For example, while Clement (1999) 
controls for f i rm-year f ixed effects, Jacob et al. (1999) control for analyst aptitude 
D r a k e and M y e r s (2011) find that their main resuUs are consis tent with either an exper t i se /ab ih ty 
e f fec t or an in format ion e f fec t , but they p roduce addit ional ev idence (pre-pos t -Reg FD tests) 
sugges t ing that the in fo rmat ion ef fec t is the most likely dr iver of their results . 
and ana lys t -broker and ana lys t -company alignment by including analyst f ixed 
effects , brokerage f i rm f ixed effects and analys t -company and analyst- industry fixed 
e f f e c t s / ' Keskek et al. (2013) show that analysts ' f irm-specific experience is 
correlated with analyst forecast accuracy in the pre-Reg FD period, but not in the 
post-Reg FD period. They interpret this result as evidence that analysts ' (former) 
access to management ' s information drives the firm-specific experience effect . 
Therefore , as an additional analysis, I employ the Reg FD reforms as an exogenous 
shock to the importance of my analyst 'quali ty ' measures, and re-test my hypotheses 
accordingly. 
Examining other analysts ' forecasting properties, prior studies find no evidence that 
f i rm-specif ic experience affects performance. Clement and Tse (2005) demonstrate 
that analysts with greater general experience are less likely to herd, but find no 
association between analysts ' f irm-specific experience and forecast boldness (as 
against herding forecasts). Further, Drake and Myers (2011) find no evidence that 
analysts with greater f irm-specific experience exhibit lower accrual-related forecast 
opt imism. 
In conclusion, the impact of analysts ' f irm-specific experience on forecasting 
per formance observed in earlier studies is likely to reflect differences in research 
design and sample period. Although the empirical evidence regarding the 
relationship between firm-specific experience and forecasting performance is mixed. 
" M y thesis e x a m i n e s the associat ion be tween audit quality, forecast accuracy and analyst quali ty on 
a f i rm-yea r or ana lys t - f i rm-year basis. I ei ther calculate the average values of the analyst quali ty 
p rox ies at the f i rm-year level, or use the values of quali ty proxies to ident i fy the 'wors t ' and ' b e s f 
qual i ty analys ts fo l lowing a given f i rm. There fo re , Jacob et a l . ' s (1999) control var iables , which are 
par t icular ly re levant to a s tudy examin ing individual analys ts ' forecas t ing pe r fo rmance , are of little 
r e levance to my thesis . 
the theoretical argument underpinning a positive association between analysts ' f irm-
specif ic exper ience and analysts ' forecasting performance appears sound. For this 
reason, I include analysts ' f i rm-specific experience as a proxy for analyst quality. 
4.3.2 Brokerage Size 
The size of the f irm for which an analyst works is another factor posited to affect the 
properties of analysts ' forecasts. Large brokerage firms are able to provide the 
analyst better support, including administrative assistance, training opportunities, 
superior datasets, evaluation procedures and techniques to analyse data (Drake and 
Myers 2011; Clement 1999). In addition, large brokerage firms may have developed 
strong relationships with covered firms over time and possess a greater amount of 
relevant information about a f irm (Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999). Thus, analysts 
working for these larger brokerage firms may have (or have previously enjoyed) 
more information about a covered firm and superior skills and support relevant to 
their forecasting decisions. These analysts are argued to generate forecasts that are 
more accurate (Jacob et a l . l999; Clement 1999). 
Brokerage f i rm size has been shown to affect analysts' forecasting performance 
positively. Jacob et al. (1999) and Clement (1999) each reports a positive association 
between brokerage size and analyst forecast accuracy. Examining the impact of 
brokerage size on other forecasting properties, prior studies show that analysts f rom 
larger brokerage f i rms are more likely to make bold forecasts (Clement and Tse 2005) 
and issue more timely forecasts (Kim et al. 2011). 
However , other recent studies find either a weak or an insignificant relationship 
between brokerage f i rm size and analyst forecasting properties. Drake and Myers 
(2011) show that accrual-related over-optimism decreases with brokerage size, 
al though the s ignif icance of the negative association between brokerage size and 
forecast over-opt imism disappears after controlling for the number of analysts 
fo l lowing a f i rm as well as f i rm size and firm age. Keskek et a). (2013) find no 
relat ionship between brokerage f irm size and forecast accuracy in the post-Reg FD 
periods. They fur ther demonstrate that brokerage size in their sample is associated 
with a decrease in analysts ' forecasting abilities (as measured by prior forecast 
accuracy and forecast boldness) and an increase in analysts ' portfolio complexity 
(measured by the number of f irms fol lowed by an analyst) in the post-Reg FD 
periods. This evidence reinforces the importance of examining the impact of Reg FD 
in my sample as a sensitivity analysis. 
4.3.3 'All-star' Status 
Large buy-side investment institutions have an incentive to identify outstanding 
analysts who provide more accurate forecasts and recommendations, and they 
consequent ly subscribe to services that rank analysts. Two analyst-ranking systems 
are particularly well known: the All-American Research Team rankings published by 
Institutional Investor {11), and the 'Best on the Street ' list published by The Wall 
Street Journal (WSJ). Analysts selected to appear in these rankings/lists are 
colloquially described as 'All-Star ' analysts. These analysts are considered to have 
superior ability and/or resources, which contribute to their better forecasting 
per formance . The ranking procedures are different in the two systems and described 
separately below. 
U n d e r the 11 r ank ing p rocedures , surveys are dis t r ibuted each year in March , Apri l or 
M a y to f u n d m a n a g e r s and directors of research in U.S., European and Asian 
inves tmen t f u n d s . Survey respondents are required to submit votes for the four mos t 
he lp fu l or va luab le ana lys t s by recal l ing their names (i.e. they must wri te the analys ts ' 
n a m e s on the fo rm) . / / requires respondents to evaluate analysts based on a 
combina t i on of 'hard" at t r ibutes (earnings forecasts and stock selections) and soft 
a t t r ibutes (e.g. indust ry knowledge , special services, and quality of sales force) . In 
the Oc tobe r 2 0 1 0 issue of U's magaz ine , 11 explained that their: 
Rankings were determined strictly by using numerical scores. We took the 
number of votes awarded to each analyst and weighted the votes based on the 
size of the institution responding and the place it awarded to that analyst (first, 
second, third or fourth) ... We consulted nearly 3,500 individuals at some 970 
firms, including more than 90 of the 100 bigge.st U.S. equity managers. Our 
respondents manage an estimated $10.2 trillion in U.S. equities. 
By cont ras t , the WSJ ranking sys tem ranks analysts according to a s ingle cri ter ion: 
the indus t ry -ad jus ted returns on port fol ios constructed f r o m the ana lys t ' s 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s dur ing the year and prior to the ranking. The WSJ ranks the top 
f ive ana lys t s in each industry subject to the constraint that analysts cover at least f ive 
f i rms in that industry. O w i n g to these d i f fe rences in the ranking procedures , WSJ 
typical ly recognises more analysts f r o m smaller b rokerage f i rms as 'Al l -S tar ' 
(Bagnol i et al. 2005).^^® However , for the purposes of my thesis, which examines the 
fac tors a f f ec t ing earn ings forecast accuracy (rather than inves tment 
T h e / / r ank ing p rocedures ask survey respondents to write down analys ts ' names . Analys t s f r o m 
larger b roke rage f i rms are more likely to be known either through the brokerage firms' re la t ionships 
with large f u n d m a n a g e r s or through these firms' advert is ing force. Therefore , this ranking sys tem 
f avou r s analys ts f r o m large b rokerage houses . 
recommendat ions) , the / / ranking system is of most direct relevance; it is thus the 
only ranking system that I employ. 
A large body of academic research explores the performance of 'All-Star ' analysts 
on forecast ing per formance . Stickel (1992) obtains forecasts f rom Zacks database 
and f ind that / / 'Al l -Star ' analysts generally forecast more often and more accurately 
than do other analysts in the selection year. Chan et al. (2004) study the differences 
in forecast accuracy over a three-year period between 'All-Star ' analysts, selected 
f rom either II or WSJ, and their counterparts for the period 1992-2001. They show 
that 'Al l -Star ' analysts consistently provide more accurate short-horizon forecasts 
than do others in the year before the 'All-Star ' selection, in the selection year and in 
the post - 'Al l -Star ' selection year. 
4.3.4 Portfolio Complexity 
Analysts ' portfolio complexi ty increases with the number of f i rms and industries 
fo l lowed by an analyst (Clement 1999; Clement and Tse 2003, 2005; Keskek et al. 
2013; Drake and Myers 2011). There are competing arguments regarding the impact 
of analysts ' portfolio complexi ty on forecast accuracy. Studies proposing a negative 
relat ionship between analysts ' portfolio complexity and forecasting performance 
consider that analysts ' t ime and resources are scarce and, as such, that following 
fewer f i rms and industries allows more time and attention to be devoted to each 
covered f i rm, helping these analysts to develop close relationships with firms and 
acquire a greater amount of relevant information (Clement 1999; Drake and Myers 
2011). Therefore , analysts ' portfolio complexity is typically viewed as an inverse 
proxy for analyst quality, and thus as negatively related to forecast accuracy. 
Conversely, considering the capability, specialisation and diversification effects, the 
empirical association between analysts' portfolio complexity and forecasting 
performance may be unclear or positive. Prior studies argue that more capable (and 
thus higher quality) analysts are likely to be assigned greater responsibilities, as 
reflected in the analyst's portfolio (Jacob et al. 1999). For example, Stickel (1992) 
shows that // 'All-Star' analysts follow a median of 14 firms, while non-star analysts 
follow a median of only eight firms."'Although Clement (1999) and Drake and 
Myers (2011) make opposite predictions about portfolio complexity and forecasting 
performance, they show that more experienced analysts (who are likely of higher 
quality) cover more firms and industries. As discussed above, these higher-quality 
analysts (more experienced, or awarded 'All-Star' status) possess superior ability to 
identify and process relevant information. As such, it is unclear whether the 
capability effects outweigh the information disadvantage associated with portfolio 
complexity. 
In addition to the capability argument, analysts following multiple firms within the 
same industry are argued to benefit significantly from knowledge spillovers across 
the covered firms and to develop specialisation in that industry (Jacob et al. 1999; 
Siegel et al. 2011; Gilson et al. 2001). Gilson et al. (2001) explicitly regard an 
analyst as a specialist with respect to a covered firm if that analyst follows at least 
five other firms within the same industry as the sample firm. Further, Kini et al. 
(2009) argue that there is a trade-off between the relative information benefits of 
simple and complex portfolios. They propose that analysts following multiple 
« In mv samnie // 'All-Star' analysts follow more firms than do non-star analysts, with the difference 
being slatistieal'ly significant. I also find that more experienced analysts cover more firms and 
industries than do inexperienced analysts. 
industries (complex portfol io) may reduce some of the information benefi ts 
associated with fo l lowing a simple portfolio, but gain exposure to complementary 
information and acquire knowledge f rom the coverage of related industries. If the 
benefi ts f rom the complementary information and knowledge are relatively 
important , analysts with more complex portfolios may forecast more accurately. 
Thus , ' busy ' analysts may actually have a greater amount of relevant information 
and the superior ability to process such information, increasing the accuracy of their 
issued forecasts . The empirical results are discussed. 
Some empirical evidence shows that portfolio complexity is negatively associated 
with forecast ing performance. Clement (1999) documents evidence that analyst 
forecast accuracy decreases with analysts ' industry and firm coverage. Similarly, 
Jacob et al. (1999) report a negative association between forecast accuracy and 
analysts ' f i rm coverage, although they propose an alternative argument as stated 
above. According to Kim et al. (2013), the number of f irms and industries an analyst 
fo l lows is negatively associated with more timely forecasts (i.e. forecasts tend to be 
revised later in the forecasting period) and forecast accuracy. 
Other studies find weak or no evidence that analysts ' portfolio complexity is 
associated with forecasting performance. Siegel et al. (2011) provide evidence that 
portfol io complexi ty (measured by the number of industries an analyst follows) is 
not associated with analyst forecast accuracy after controlling for analyst 
specialisation in business segments (i.e. the number of f i rms ' business segments in 
the industry fol lowed by an analyst relative to the total number of segments for all 
f i rms fol lowed by that analyst). Clement et al. (2003) examine the relationship 
between analyst quality and forecast accuracy across 10 countries, and find that the 
number of firms followed by an analyst positively affects forecast accuracy in only 
three of the non-U.S. countries. Using a two-stage Heckman approach to account for 
the fact that portfolio choice is endogenously determined, Kini et al. (2009) show 
that analyst forecast accuracy increases when analysts diversify their coverage 
portfolio across industry sectors (more complex portfolio). Examining other analyst 
forecast properties, Clement and Tse (2005) document evidence that analysts who 
follow a large number of industries are less likely to make bold forecasts; these 
authors show no evidence that the number of firms followed by an analyst is 
associated with forecast boldness. Drake and Myers (2011) demonstrate that after 
controlling for firm characteristics, analysts who follow fewer firms have a better 
understanding of the accruals towards which they show less over-optimism. 
However, this relationship does not hold when industry coverage is used to indicate 
analysts' portfolio complexity. 
Since prior studies report competing arguments and predictions regarding the impact 
of analysts' portfolio complexity on forecast accuracy and demonstrate inconsistent 
evidence, I do not use this measure as a proxy for analyst quality. However, as 
portfolio complexity may be correlated with forecast accuracy and other analyst 
quality proxies discussed above, I include this in my empirical tests. For example, 
analysts employed by a larger broker may follow a smaller number of firms and 
industries and those ranked as 'All-Star' may follow a greater number of firms, 
portfolio complexity variables thus could be correlated with brokerage size and 'All-
Star' status. Experience proxies may be correlated with portfolio complexity 
variables if more experienced analysts follow more complex portfolios (Clement 
1999). 
4.3.5 Analyst Pr ior Forecast Accuracy 
Analyst prior period forecast accuracy is also frequently used in the literature as a 
proxy for analyst quality. Evidence suggests that analysts with superior prior period 
forecast accuracy are likely to issue forecasts in the current period that are more 
accurate, more bold (Clement and Tse 2005; Keskek et al. 2013) and more timely 
(Kim et al. 2013). However, analyst prior forecast accuracy is not appropriate for use 
in my thesis, as it represents the lagged value of my dependent variable. As my main 
test variable (audit quality) is relatively 'sticky' across time, if analyst prior accuracy 
were to be included in the regression, this would likely cause an endogeneity 
problem, as any factors (such as audit quality) that explain current year forecast 
accuracy might also be the cause of analyst prior accuracy. For this reason, analyst 
prior accuracy is not used to proxy analyst quality in my study. 
4.3.6 Analyst Proxies Used in M y Thesis 
My thesis uses analysts' general and firm-specific experience, brokerage size and 
'All-Star' status as alternate proxies for analyst quality. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, each of these proxies reflects the properties underlying the construct for 
'analyst quality', which advances forecast accuracy. I also develop composite score 
measures to capture the attributes of an analyst along the four identified dimensions 
to assess the analyst's overall quality. The precise measurement of each of these 
variables is detailed in the following chapter. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced and described the proxies for audit firm industry 
specialisation and analyst quahty used in my thesis. Section 4.2 identified and 
discussed the various measures of audit firm industry specialisation (as a proxy for 
audit quality) and emphasised the superiority of the portfolio-share measure over the 
other measures as to capturing audit firm industry expertise and thus superior quality 
audit services. Section 4.3 described several measures of analyst quality identified in 
the literature and argued that general experience, firm-specific experience, brokerage 
size and II 'All-Star' status are the measures of most direct relevance to my thesis. In 
the following chapter, I introduce and discuss the regression models and estimation 
methods used to test my hypotheses. I also explain in detail the measurement of my 
dependent, test and control variable. 
C H A P T E R 5: RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I developed my hypotheses regarding the impact and importance of 
audit f i rm industry specialisation on overall analyst forecast accuracy and the extent 
to which the relat ionship between audit f irm industry specialisation and forecast 
accuracy varies cross-sectionally with the underlying riskiness of the client f i rm 's 
operat ions and the quality of the analysts covering the client firm. The empirical 
proxies for auditor industry specialisation and analyst quality were described in 
Chapter 4. In this chapter, I describe my research design. First, Section 5.2 provides 
an overview of the general form of the regression models employed to test my 
hypotheses and the structure of the data u.sed. I then describe the measurement of 
variables in Section 5.3. Finally, in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively, I discuss the 
details of the estimation methods and the specific regression models employed. 
Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Overview of the Models and Methods 
This section describes the general form of the regression models used to test my 
hypotheses. These simpler formulations of my regression models are provided to 
contextual ise the fol lowing descriptions of variable measurement (Section 5.3) and 
the choice of regression method (Section 5.4). The complete (detailed) specifications 
of the various regression models are provided in Section 5.5. 
Hypotheses la and lb make predictions about the relationship between audit firm 
industry specialisation and consensus analyst forecast accuracy. H l a is non-
directional due to the competing effects of audit quality on the reliability of financial 
statements as an information source and on the client's ability to manipulate current 
earnings. However, H l b conjectures a positive association between analyst long-
horizon forecast accuracy and audit firm industry specialisation, as benchmark-
beating incentives are much weaker with respect to forecasts redundant at the end of 
the financial year. While Hla and Hlb differ in the forecast horizon examined and 
with respect to the time at which industry specialisation is measured, the 
composition of the empirical models used to test these hypotheses is otherwise 
similar. I regress analysts' absolute short- or long-horizon forecast errors on proxies 
for audit firm industry specialisation and a set of controls previously found to be 
associated with forecast errors.'" 1 use both continuous and dichotomous measures of 
audit firm industry specialisation. The general form of these models is detailed in 
Equation (1): 
ABSFE = Po + fiilNDSP + CONTROLS -t- e (1) 
where 
ABSFE = analysts' absolute forecast errors, measured as the absolute value 
of difference between actual I/B/E/S earnings per share and 
forecast earnings per share, deflated by beginning-of-month 
stock price, measured either immediately before current earnings 
are announced (Hla) or immediately after prior period earnings 
are announced (Hlb); and 
INDSP = audit firm industry specialisation, measured as the sum of the 
square root of the total assets of the clients that an audit firm 
services in a particular industry, relative to the sum of the square 
root of the total assets of all clients of that audit firm. 
Ana lvs t s ' abso lu te forecas t errors are an inverse measure of analyst forecast accuracy and are 
f r e t e S u s f d in the l i terature (Payne 2008; Hall and Tacon 2010; Dhal iwal c . al. 2012) . The deta . ls 
„f .kn o^nrrni varlnhlp.; are d iscussed in Section 5.3.6. of the cont ro l var iab les are d iscussed in 
T o suppor t H I a, w h i c h predic ts that audit f i rm industry special isat ion (INDSP) is 
assoc ia ted wi th shor t -hor izon forecas t errors , INDSP is expec ted to have a s ignif icant 
coe f f i c i en t (fi,) of e i ther sign. A s ignif icant negat ive coef f ic ien t for INDSP is 
p red ic ted unde r H l b , w h i c h argues that ana lys t s ' long-hor izon forecas ts are more 
accura te (abso lu te fo recas t errors are lower) when audit qual i ty is higher . 
Hypo thes i s 2 predic ts that audit f i rm industry special isat ion has a greater e f fec t on 
forecas t e r rors w h e n the under ly ing uncer ta inty sur rounding a client f i r m ' s bus iness 
t ransac t ions is greater , because in these c i rcumstances a high-qual i ty audi tor has a 
greater potent ia l impac t on accrual es t imat ion errors and the overall quali ty of c l ients ' 
suppor t ing d isc losures . Whi l e analys ts ' absolute forecast errors are expec ted to be 
dec reas ing in audit qual i ty , this negat ive re la t ionship is predicted to be s tronger 
w h e n c l i en t ' s opera t ing risk is higher. T o test this hypothes is , proxies for c l ients ' 
opera t ing risk and their interact ion with audit f i rm industry special isat ion are added 
to the mode l in t roduced above , as per Equat ion (2): 
.Rcr-f _ P0 + P1INDSP+P2CUENT OPERATING RISK + 
ABSht - p^if^Dsp*CLIENT OPERATING RISK + CONTROLS+ e 
If the nega t ive associa t ion be tween audit f i rm industry special isat ion and analys ts ' 
abso lu te forecas t errors is s t ronger when c l ien t ' s operat ing risk is high as per H2 , the 
coe f f i c i en t {fi}) fo r the interact ion term is expec ted to be s ignif icant ly negat ive. 
H y p o t h e s e s 3a and 3b predict that industry specialist audi tors affect the relat ive 
forecas t accuracy of h igh-qual i ty and low-qual i ty analysts . H3a appl ies this general 
p ropos i t ion to the d i f ferent ia l impact of audit f i rm industry special isat ion on forecas t 
accuracy across f i rm-yea r s for which the average quali ty of the cohor t of analysts 
fo l lowing a f i rm differs . I test H3a by expanding the model used to test H l b to 
include proxies for the mean quality of analysts fol lowing a client f irm in a particular 
year, and the interactions between these proxies and audit quality. The various 
proxies for analyst quality and their interactions are included in a single regression 
model (Equation [3]) to control for the potential collinearity among these proxies 
(Clement 1999). 
PO +PIINDSP + J.ANALYST QUALITY + ( 3 ) 
INDSP*1ANALYST QUALITY + CONTROLS + e 
Where I use a composi te measure derived f rom the specific analyst quality proxies, 
this composi te measure and its interaction with audit f irm industry specialisation are 
included in Equation (4). 
P0 + P1INDSP + P2ANALYST QUALITY + ( 4 ) 
- F^JF^QSP*ANALYST QUALITY+CONTROLS + E 
Hypothesis 3a is supported if the coefficient(s) for the interaction(s) between audit 
f i rm industry specialisation and analyst quality proxy is (are) positive and significant, 
indicating that audit quality has a smaller (greater) impact in improving forecast 
accuracy when the average quality of analysts is higher (lower). 
Hypothesis 3b proposes that greater audit f irm industry specialisation reduces the 
di f ference in forecast accuracy between the 'worst ' quality analyst and the 'best ' 
quality analyst fol lowing a client firm in a given year. I argue that a high-quality 
audit should have a greater impact on the accuracy of the 'worst ' analyst, who may 
depend more heavily on the quality of the published audited financial statements 
when making forecasts. Equation (5) regresses the difference in forecast errors 
between the 'wors t ' quality and 'best ' quality analyst (estimated separately for each 
of the individual analyst quality proxies) fol lowing a client firm in a given year on 
audit f i rm industry specialisation and control variables. 
DIFABSFE = P0 + P1INDSP+CONTROLS+ e (5) 
Where 
DIFABSFE = the absolute forecast error of the 'worst ' quality analyst minus 
the absolute forecast error of the 'best ' quality analyst where the 
'worst ' and 'best ' quality analysts are determined with respect to 
a particular analyst quality proxy. 
A significant negative coefficient for INDSP would support H3b, indicating that 
higher audit quality increases the usefulness of the current year 's earnings for 
predicting future earnings, in turn reducing the difference in forecast accuracy across 
the 'wors t ' and 'best ' quality analysts. 
The models described above are estimated by applying regression techniques to 
archival data. The composition of the models and the structure of the sample suggest 
two main concerns regarding the choice of regression method. First, the sample 
consists of repeated observations of the same firms across several years. A simple 
pooling of the sample may result in inconsistent estimates due to unobserved firm or 
time effects. A firm effect occurs when the residuals for a given firm are correlated 
across years, while a time effect occurs when the residuals for a particular year are 
correlated across different firms (Wooldridge 2002). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
est imators are unbiased only if the residuals generated are independent and 
identically distributed. If this is not the case, adjustments must be made by either 
t ransforming the data to remove the dependence (e.g. the use of firm and/or time 
f ixed effects) or adjusting the estimated standard errors to reflect within-subject 
and/or within-year clustering (Peterson 2009, 435). My study controls for f irm 
effects by adjust ing OLS standard errors for within-firm clustering. Time effects are 
controlled either by adjus tment of standard errors for clustering or by the inclusion 
of t ime f ixed effects depending on the nature of the data used to test a particular 
hypothesis. 
The second issue of concern is the possible endogenous determination of the key test 
variable, audit f irm industry specialisation. Godfrey and Hamilton (2005) show that 
the selection of an industry specialist auditor is not random; it is affected by several 
factors including the client f i rm ' s research and development expenditures, length of 
operating cycle, size, leverage and earnings per share. The factors affecting the 
choice of an industry specialist auditor may be correlated with the factors affect ing 
the accuracy of analysts ' forecasts and their effect may not be fully captured in the 
vector of control variables. If this is the case, an endogenous selection bias may exist 
(i.e. the factors affect ing the .selection of an industry specialist auditor may be 
correlated with the residuals f rom the regressions described above). Consequently, if 
standard OLS regression were applied to these models, this might generate 
inconsistent estimators. To address this potential endogeneity threat, I employ two-
stage regression approaches, including two-stage least squares (2SLS), propensity 
score matching (PSM) and Heckman treatment-effect regressions. These methods are 
described in detail in Section 5.4. 
5.3 Measurement Issues and Data Sources 
In the fo l lowing sub-sections, I describe the measurement of the variables employed 
in my regression models . The measurement of the dependent variables, analyst 
forecast accuracy and the difference in forecast accuracy of the 'worst' and 'best' 
analysts, are first described (Section 5.3.1), followed by the proxies for audit quality 
(Section 5.3.2). An illustration of the temporal relation between these two variables 
is provided in Section 5.3.3. Sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 describe the measurement of 
the variables used to test Hypotheses 2, 3a and 3b; namely, firm operating risk and 
analyst quality. Finally, the control variables and their measurement are identified 
and described in Section 5.3.6. 
5.3.1 Analyst Forecast Accuracy 
The majority of my empirical tests focus on explaining the properties of analysts' 
consensus long-horizon forecast errors. Long-horizon consensus forecasts are 
measured by the mean value of each individual analyst's first one-year-ahead EPS 
forecast made subsequent to the prior year's earnings announcement date. To reduce 
the noise caused by other information, forecasts that are issued more than 90 days 
after the prior year's earnings reporting date are excluded. Short-horizon consensus 
forecasts, used to test H l a only, are measured by the mean of the final forecasts 
made by each individual analyst in the 90 days immediately prior to the earnings 
reporting date. Analysts' forecasts and their respective actual values are obtained 
from the I/B/E/S Detail History file. Following prior literature (Payne 2008; Hall and 
Tacon 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2012), forecast accuracy is measured as the absolute 
value of the forecast error, where the forecast error is the difference between the 
mean analyst forecast EPS and the actual EPS as reported by 1/B/E/S (this is an 
inverse function of analyst forecast accuracy, as a larger value indicates a less 
accurate forecast) . '" Since prior literature differs concerning the scaling of forecast 
accuracy, I use two measures: an undeflated measure and a measure of forecast 
accuracy deflated by stock price, as per Equations 6a and 6b below: 
ABSFE_un = \Actual EPS - Forecast EPS \ (6a) 
ABSFE = \(Actual EPS - Forecast EPS) / P\ (6b) 
Where 
ABSFEjiin = undeflated absolute forecast errors; 
ABSFE = price-deflated absolute forecast errors; 
Actual EPS = reported EPS f rom l/B/E/S Detail File; 
Forecast EPS = mean of outstanding analyst forecasts for annual EPS ; and 
P = stock price one month prior to reporting date 
My tests of H3b employ the difference in forecast errors between the 'worst ' and 
'best ' quality analysts (DIFABSFE) as the dependent variable, where the 'worst" and 
'best ' analysts are identified according to each individual analyst quality proxy, as 
described in Chapter 4. I provide an example of the detailed calculations of 
DIFABSFE in Section 5.3.5. 
DIFABSFE = the absolute forecast error of the 'worst ' quality analyst (7) 
(ABSFE_W) minus the absolute forecast error of the 
'best ' quality analyst (ABSFE_B), where the 'worst ' and 
'best ' analysts are determined based on the values of each 
analyst quality proxy. 
I conduct a separate test of H3b for each analyst quality proxy. 
" For consistency, both the forecast earnings and actual earnings for calculating forecast errors were 
collected from l/B/E/S, each of which is based on the opinion of the majority of analysts regarding the 
inclusion/exclusion of non-recurring items from the earnings measure, and which often differ from 
GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). In addition, the VB/E/S data are adjusted to reflect the 
effects of stock splits and other dilution factors. 
5.3.2 Proxies for Audit Firm Industry Specialisation 
Industry specialists are argued to apply valuable resources and industry-specific 
knowledge and skills to audit processes, thereby improving audit quality as 
evidenced by outcomes such as financial reporting quality. I use the auditor portfolio 
share as my primary measure of industry specialisation for reasons detailed in 
Chapter and also because this measure is common to the most directly relevant 
prior papers (Payne 2008; BCK 2008). The portfolio-share industry specialisation 
measure attempts to capture the extent to which audit firms concentrate their 
productive activities (and thus fee base) within particular industries, thus capturing 
auditor expertise in industries within which auditors are demonstrably willing to 
concentrate. The continuous measure of audit firm industry specialisation is 
described in Equation 8 . " 
INDSP_cont = the sum of the square root of the total assets of the clients (8) 
that an audit firm services in a particular industry divided by 
the sum of the square root of the total assets of all clients of 
that audit firm. 
Prior studies also use a dichotomous measure of audit firm industry specialisation 
(Krishnan 2001; Payne 2008). Krishnan (2001) argues that, in the absence of audit 
firm industry specialisation, an audit f i rm's portfolio share should be distributed 
evenly over the industries (i.e. I / number of industries). If an audit firm chooses to 
concentrate their operations in particular industries, this strategy will be reflected in 
a portfolio share of greater than 1 / number of industries. Payne (2008) applies 
Krishnan's approach, but argues that the benchmark should be adjusted according to 
' ' In my robus tness tests, I a lso used the al ternat ive measures of audit l lrm industry special isat ion 
desc r ibed in Chap t e r 4 . 1 present and analyse these results in Chapter 7. 
" I a lso re -es t imated my tests using special isat ion metrics based on cl ients total sales (as per 
Kr i shnan 2 0 0 ^ ; Ba l sam et al. 2003) and audit f i rms ' total audit fees (as per Hab ib and Bhuiyan 2011 ; 
Bha t t aeha rya 2011) . In these untabula ted regress ions , I obtained quali tat ively similar results to my 
main tests. 
the sample to bring the portfolio-share measure more in line with the market-share 
approach; that is, to avoid recognising a substantially higher percentage of industry 
portfolio specialists than industry market specialists. Payne (2008) uses a 
dichotomous measure of industry specialisation that defines a specialist as existing 
when the continuous measure of portfolio share is greater than 3 / number of 
industries (i.e. a particular industry is over-represented in an auditor 's portfolio by a 
factor of 3). The advantage of the dichotomous measure over the continuous measure 
is that it only recognises dominant auditors as being specialised. It is possible that 
industry expertise accrues only when industry portfolio share reaches certain 
threshold levels (Balsam et al. 2003). However, the empirical usefulness of the 
dichotomous measure of specialisation depends on the suitability of the arbitrary cut-
off threshold chosen. My primary tests use Payne 's benchmark to derive the 
dichotomous measure of portfolio specialisation, as per Equation (9): 
INDSP_dum = 1 if INDSPjzoni > (3 / number of two-digit industry codes (9) 
used in the analysis in any given year), '" 0 otherwise.'"'' 
In my additional analysis, I test the sensitivity of my main results to variations in the 
definition of the cut-off threshold above. 
^^  I a l so test a l ternat ive th resho lds because the threshold at which the d i c h o t o m o u s variable lor 
indus t ry spec ia l i sa t ion d e f i n e d is arbi t rary; I report and analyse the results in Chap te r 7. B C K do not 
use a d i c h o t o m o u s m e a s u r e of industry special isat ion in their tabulated regress ions . 
T h e r e are be tween 5 2 and 59 two-digi t SIC industr ies included in the analys is in each year within 
my s a m p l e pe r iod . A l though Payne (2008) aggregates observa t ions in three mul t i -year per iods for 
e s t ima t ing spec ia l i sa t ion var iables , I es t imate the industry special isat ion measures annual ly to 
e n h a n c e the comparab i l i t y wi th B C K ' s results . Untabula ted regress ions us ing Payne s pooled me thod 
gene ra t e s imi la r resul ts to those repor ted in my thesis . 
5.3.3 Relative Timing of the Measurement of Forecast Accuracy and Audit 
Quality 
The long-horizon and short-horizon regressions estimated in my thesis measure both 
audit firm industry specialisation and forecast accuracy at different times within the 
reporting year. Figure 5.1 illustrates the typical timing of long- and short-horizon 
forecasts and their relation to the measurement of audit firm industry specialisation. 
When testing Hi a, which examines the accuracy of short-horizon forecasts, I 
measure audit firm industry specialisation in the year of the earnings that is the 
subject of the forecasts (year I), consistent with the established literature (Payne 
2008; BCK 2008)." ' When testing Hlb , which examines long-horizon forecast 
accuracy, I measure audit firm industry specialisation in the year prior to the 
earnings being forecast (year t-1). Since long-horizon accuracy is argued to reflect 
the quality of already published financial reports, audit firm industry specialisation 
(audit quality) is measured contemporaneously with those reports. 
' ^ B C K (2008) d o no . ident i fy clearly the l iming of llieir aud. l quality measurement . I inferred the 
l iming of the , r m e a s u r e m e n t f r o m their theoretical d iscuss ions of the reasons for t hen hypotheses . 
Figure 5.1 Illustrations of the Forecast Errors and Audit Quality Being Examined 
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5.3.4 Proxy for Firm's Operating Risk 
Hypothesis 2 proposes that audit firm industry specialisation has a greater effect on 
earnings quality when the firm's operating risk is higher, and that analyst forecast 
accuracy is more strongly associated with audit quality in such cases. 
I use cash flow volatility as my main proxy for client operating risk, not only 
because this measure captures client's underlying riskiness (Minton et al. 2002; 
Allayannis et al. 2005), but also because cash flow volatility is largely exogenous to 
audit quality." Cash flow volatility is measured as the natural logarithm of the five-
" I also use the innate accrual quality measure, developed by Francis et al. (2()05a) to proxy client 
firm's operating risk in robustness tests. I discuss the details in Chapter 8. 
year standard deviation of net cash flows from operating activities deflated by 
average total assets.'** Net cash flow from operations has been shown to be more 
persistent than accruals and subject to less management manipulation (Sloan 1996; 
Xie 2001). Conversely, earnings volatility, which is affected by the behaviour of 
both cash flows and accruals, reflects economic volatility as well as the impact of 
managerial accrual decisions, which may be subject to discretionary biases such as 
income smoothing (Levitt 1998; Leuz et al. 2003) and 'bath-taking' (Givoly and 
Hayn 2000). Audit quality may be causally related to clients' earnings volatility, as 
high-quality auditors may be more effective in constraining accrual manipulations. 
Conversely, reported operating cash flow is relatively independent of audit quality, 
because auditors have no obvious responsibility to discipline the cash transactions in 
which the firm engages, and these transactions are relatively objective and verifiable. 
Therefore, consistent with prior literature (Dichev and Tang 2009; Jayaraman 2008), 
I use cash flow volatility to proxy firm's underlying riskiness. 
5.3.5 Proxies for Analyst Quality 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict that audit firm industry specialisation has a greater 
impact on the accuracy of lower-quality analysts. High-quality analysts are argued to 
have access to more private information and to possess superior ability to process 
complex information. As such, they are able to make more accurate forecasts than 
are other analysts. As analyst quality cannot be observed directly, 1 use various 
proxy measures drawn from prior literature, including analysts' general and firm-
specific experience, the size of the analyst's employer (brokerage size) and an 'All-
Star' measure. As discussed in Chapter 4, both the extant theory and empirical 
The natural logarithm o f cash How volatility is more normally distributed than the raw measure, as 
are the resulting regression residuals. 
findings suggest lhat the direction of any relationship between analysts' portfolio 
complexity and analyst forecast accuracy is not clear. Thus, I include analysts' 
portfolio complexity as a control variable only, to reduce potential omitted variable 
bias. The measurement of this control variable is described in Section 5.3.6. 
At any given time r, the quality of an individual analyst /, is estimated by the 
following measures: 
General = the number of years through year t for which analyst i 
experiencejj supplied at least one forecast for any firm; 
Firm-specific = the number of years through year t for which analyst / 
experience^,, supplied at least one forecast for firm j; 
Brokerage size^., = the number of analysts employed by brokerage k, which 
employs analyst i in year t; and 
All-Starij = an indicator variable equal to '1 ' if analyst i was ranked by 
II's All-America Research Team in year t. 
As H3a makes predictions regarding firm-year relationships, the firm-year variants 
of the analyst quality proxies described above are used to test that hypothesis. 
However, as H3b predicts differences in the performance of the individual analysts 
following a firm in a given year, analyst quality is measured at the analyst-firm-year 
level when testing this hypothesis. These firm-year and analyst-firm-year analyst 
quality measures are described in detail below. 
To test H3a, which predicts that the average quality of analysts following a firm 
moderates the negative association between analysts' absolute forecast errors and 
audit quality, forecast error is regressed on audit quality, each of the analyst quality 
proxies and their interactions with audit quality (Equation 3). The mean value of the 
analyst quality proxies is computed at firm-year level within the forecast window. 
For example, if a firm is followed by 10 analysts during the long-horizon forecast 
window in year t, individual analysts' general experience is first calculated and the 
average of these statistics is used as the measure of the test variable. Similar 
calculations apply to other analyst quality proxies. 
I also use two composite measures based on the specific analyst quality measures, as 
illustrated in Table 5.1. The first composite measure (CSCOREl) is a function of all 
four analyst quality proxies, while the second measure (CSCOREl) includes only 
those proxies that capture analysts' personal attributes (general and firm-specific 
experience and 'All-Star' status).^' To construct the composite score measures, I first 
identify all of the N analysts who submitted a forecast for any firm during a 
particular f i rm's beginning-of-year forecast window. I then rank analysts according 
to each individual quality proxy. If there are N analysts issuing forecasts, the lowest 
analyst ranking for a quality proxy is ranked 1, and the best analyst is ranked N. In 
cases in which there is a tie, the average of the adjacent ranks is assigned to these 
analysts. A stylised example of these calculations is provided in Table 5.1. There are 
five analysts (A, B, C, D and E) active during Firm X's beginning-of-year forecast 
window, among which Analysts D and E have equivalent 'firm experience' (Panel 
A). In this case, the average of the adjacent ranks (3.5) is assigned to these analysts. 
A related procedure is applied to the ranking for 'All-Star' status: all 'All-Star' 
analysts and all non-star analysts are assigned average ranks. For example. Analysts 
C and D are 'All-Star', and thus their average ranks are 4.5 (i.e. [5+4J/2 = 4.5). The 
average rank for the non-star analysts (Analysts A, B and E) is 2. I then sum the 
I exc lude b roke rage size in the second compos i t e measure for two reasons. First, it is a p roxy 
cap tu r ing ana lys t e m p l o y e r s ' at tr ibutes, ra ther than the quah ty of an individual analyst . Second, a 
recent s tudy f inds no re la t ionship be tween brokerage size and forecast accuracy in the pos t -Reg F D 
per iod (Keskek et al. 2013) . The re fo re , inclusion of brokerage size in the calculat ion of the compos i t e 
score may c o n t a m i n a t e the resul ts (bias agains t f inding a result). 
individual quality ranks for each analyst and divide this value by the number of 
analysts cover ing the f i rm. For example , Analyst A has a total rank across all four 
proxies of 15 (5+5+3+2) , and a total rank excluding that pertaining to brokerage size 
of 12 (5+5+2). In Panels B and C, Firm X is fol lowed by Analysts A, B and C, 
whose rank sums are 15, 12 and 11.5 (12, 8 and 6.5 if brokerage size is excluded); 
the average total ranks for analysts fol lowing Firm X are 12.83 ([15+12+11.5]/3) for 
CSCOREI and 8.83 for CSCORE2. The average per analyst adjustment allows for 
valid compar ison across f i rms that vary in the level of analyst coverage. 
Table 5.1: An Illustration of the Procedures to Generate the Composite Score 
Panel A: Analysts' Rank within the Long-Horizon Forecast Window of Year 2000 
i s I ? « I s 2' c,! » ^ ^ 
« S - S " 
Analyst A X 8 5 6 5 30 3 0 2 15 12 
Analyst B X 7 4 3 2 40 4 0 2 12 8 
Analyst C X 1 1 1 1 50 5 1 4.5 11.5 6.5 
Analyst D Y 4 2 4 3.5 10 1 I 4.5 11 10 
Analyst E Y 6 3 4 3.5 20 2 0 2 10.5 8.5 
Panel B: Composite Score 1 (4 proxy) for a Given Firm in Year 2000 
Sum 4 Ranks Analyst A Analyst B Analyst C Analyst D Analyst E CSCOREI 
Fi rmX 15 12 11.5 12.83 
Firm Y ]} 10.5 10.75 
Panel C: Composite Score 2 (3 proxy) for a Given Firm in Year 2000 
Sum 3 Ranks Analyst A Analyst B Analyst C Analyst D Analyst E CSC0RE2 
Fi rmX 12 8 6.5 8.83 
F , rmY ^.5 9.25 
Tests of H3b regress the di f ference in the forecast accuracy between the 'worst ' 
quality and 'bes t ' quahty analyst (estimated separately for each of the individual 
analyst quality proxies) on audit f irm industry specialisation and the control 
variables, as per Equation (5). As each of my continuous proxies for analyst quality 
is increasing in their expected effect on analyst performance, the 'wors t ' ( 'bes t ' ) 
quality analyst is identified as the analyst who has the minimum (maximum) value of 
the particular proxy in question. For example, if a f irm is followed by several 
analysts in year t, with their general experience ranging between two and eight years, 
the analyst with two years ' experience is identified as the 'worst ' and the analyst 
with eight years ' experience is identified as the 'best ' quality analyst. If the 'worst ' 
quality analyst has an absolute forecast error of $0.45, and the 'best ' quality analyst 
has an absolute forecast error of $0.20, the difference in the absolute forecast errors 
between the 'wors t ' and 'best ' quality analysts is $0.25 ($0.45 - $0.20). This 
difference is then regressed on audit f irm industry specialisation and the control 
variables to test H3b. Where ties occur with respect to the identification of the 'worst ' 
( ' bes t ' ) analyst, the mean value of the absolute forecast errors of these 'worst ' ( 'bes t ' ) 
analysts is used. This calculation is repeated separately for each continuous analyst 
quality proxy (i.e. f i rm experience and brokerage size). For tests involving the 
d ichotomous 'All-Star ' status proxy, the mean value of the absolute forecast errors 
of non-star analysts fol lowing a f irm is computed f rom which the mean value of the 
absolute forecast errors of 'All-Star ' analysts is subtracted. Tests using the 'All-Star ' 
proxy are only possible for cases where there are at least one 'All-Star ' and one non-
star analyst fo l lowing a f irm. 
Similar to the tests of H3a, I construct two composite score measures for testing H3b. 
The first composite score (CSC0RE3) is calculated by summing the analysts' 
rankings for all four analyst quality proxies where the ranking is conducted within 
the cohort of analysts following a firm in a given year, rather than summing across 
all analysts active within the long-horizon forecast window. Accordingly, the second 
measure (CSCORE4) excludes the rankings for brokerage size. This difference in the 
calculations of composite score measures for testing H3a and H3b reflects the fact 
that H3b examines the relative performance of the 'worst' and 'best' quality analysts 
following a firm in a given year. Thus, within-firm rankings are required to identify 
the 'worst' and 'best' analysts following a firm. An example of this calculation is 
shown in Table 5.2. If the CSC0RE3 (based on all four specific analyst quality 
proxies) is considered. Analyst A has the highest within-firm-year composite rank 
(8.5) and is thus identified as the 'best' analyst, while Analyst B has the lowest 
within-firm-year rank (7.5) and is thus identified as the 'worst' analyst.*"" When the 
'worst' and 'best' analysts are identified based only on analysts' personal attributes 
(CSC0RE4), Analyst A is still the 'best' analyst of Firm X, but Analyst C is now the 
'worst' analyst.^' 
" I f I use ttie ranking procedure (i.e. ranking within the long-horizon window) employed for the tests 
o f H ^ a Analyst A is still the 'best' analyst, but Analyst C is now the 'worst' analyst (see Table 5.1). 
<" Since the 'All-Star' proxy is an indicator variable, an 'All-Star' analyst will receive a much larger 
ranking value when a firm is followed by a relatively large number of analysts where most of them 
are non-stars. Therefore, in the sensitivity tests, I used different ranking procedures for 'All-Star' 
status. For example, I assign 'All-Star' analysts a ranking value of 3, 5 or 10. while assigning non-star 
analysts a ranking value of 1, or exclude the 'All-Star' proxy in the calculation o f the composite 
measures. I discuss the results in Chapter 8. 
Table 5.2: Analysts' Rank within a F irm of Year 2000 (CSC0RE3 and 
CSCORE4) 
l a s ' ^ = ^ § E g E 
I s - s ^ - SI SI 
Analyst A X 8 3 6 3 30 I 0 1.5 8.5 7.5 
Analyst B X 7 2 3 2 40 2 0 1.5 7.5 5.5 
Analyst C X 1 1 1 1 50 3 1 3 8 5 
Analyst D Y 4 1 4 1.5 10 1 1 2 5.5 4.5 
Analyst E Y 6 2 4 1.5 20 2 0 1 6.5 4.5 
5.3.6 Control Variables 
Four of the hypotheses (HIa, H lb , H2 and H3a) propo.sed in my thesis are tested 
using the same dependent variable, analysts' absolute forecast errors. I control for 
several variables identified in the prior literature as being associated with analysts' 
forecast errors, and which are also plausibly correlated with my test variables. While 
most of the control variables are common, I include additional control variables in 
the tests of H3a, which examines the impact of analyst quality on the association 
between audit firm industry specialisation and forecast accuracy. These additional 
variables are likely to be correlated with the analyst quality proxies, and their 
omission may bias the estimated regression coefficients for my test variables. The 
tests of H3b use the difference in forecast accuracy between the 'worst' and 'best' 
quality analysts as the dependent variable. In addition to the control variables 
common to other models, I include variables that are logically correlated with the 
difference in forecast accuracy across analysts of different quality (e.g. measures of 
the magnitude of the difference in analyst quality). Below, I discuss the common 
control variables (Section 5.3.6.1), followed by a discussion of the additional control 
variables used to test H3a (Section 5.3.6.2) and H3b (Section 5.3.6.3). 
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5.3.6.1 Common control variables for all tests and predictions 
This section describes the control variables common to all tests. The predicted signs 
for the control variables described are applicable to the tests of Hla , Hlb , H2 and 
H3a (where analysts' absolute forecast error is the dependent variable). While I also 
include theses controls when testing H3b (where the difference in forecast errors 
across analysts is the dependent variable), their directional impact may differ from 
that predicted for the earlier hypotheses. 1 discuss the reasons for this at the end of 
the current section. 
I include analysts' forecast dispersion (DISP) to control for the impact of analysts' 
broader information environment on their forecast accuracy. Analysts may have 
access to different levels of private information about firms' future earnings, which 
are reflected in the forecasts they issue. Forecast dispersion is found to be positively 
related to forecast errors, as firms' information uncertainty makes the forecasting 
task more complex, leading to decreased forecast accuracy (Lang and Lundholm 
1996; Zhang 2006). I measure DISP as the standard deviation of analysts' earnings 
forecasts, deflated by beginning-of-month stock price, A positive coefficient is 
predicted between DISP and forecast errors. Forecast dispersion is not included in 
my tests of H2, which examines the impact of firms' underlying riskiness on the 
relation between audit firm industry specialisation and forecast accuracy. Unlike 
cash flow volatility, which largely captures firms' underlying riskiness, forecast 
dispersion reflects uncertainty related to both the volatility of a firm's underlying 
fundamentals and its information quality (which may be endogenous to the auditor's 
identity). In my sensitivity analysis, I re-estimate my tests of H2 within sub-samples 
defined by the level of forecast dispersion. 
The forecast horizon (HORIZON) is also controlled, measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of days elapsing between the date on which a forecast is 
issued and the earnings announcement date. As the set of information available to 
analysts increases as the earnings announcement date approaches, forecast errors 
decrease in parallel. Therefore, the predicted direction for the relation between 
absolute forecast errors and the forecast horizon is positive. 
Consistent with prior literature, I control for the size of the covered firm (SIZE). To 
the extent that size proxies the firm's information environment, a negative 
relationship between firm size and absolute forecast errors is expected. This is 
because larger firms' access to more available information facilitates greater 
accuracy in their earnings forecasts (Atiase 1985; Collins et al. 1987). Conversely, 
other studies argue that size reflects stronger managerial incentives or greater 
financial reporting complexity, which may increase forecasting task difficulty, and 
show that size is positively correlated with analysts' absolute forecast errors (Hope 
2003; Dhaliwal et al. 2012). For these reasons, I do not predict a direction for firm 
size. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets or 
market value of the equity at the beginning of the year (Dhaliwal et al. 2012; Payne 
2008; BCK 2008). 
Analyst following (NUMEST), measured as either raw or the natural logarithm of the 
number of analysts covering a firm, is predicted and found to be negatively 
correlated with absolute forecast errors (Lys and Sohn 1990; Payne 2008). Greater 
analyst following imposes pressure on firms for supplementary disclosures, increases 
the competition among analysts and promotes analysts' incentives for accuracy. 
Similarly, it is contended that firms subject to greater uncertainty, such as those with 
larger absolute accruals and those suffering greater financial distress, have larger 
analysts' absolute forecast errors (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Payne 2008; BCK 
2008). Firms' absolute accruals (ABSACCR) are measured as the difference between 
net income and cash flow from operations," while financial distress is proxied by 
Zmijewski 's (1984) ZSCORE." Positive coefficient estimates are predicted for these 
two variables. 
Prior research also finds that analysts' absolute forecast errors are greater for loss-
reporting firms than for profit-reporting firms (Das et al. 1998; Gu and Wu 2003). 
This is because loss-reporting firms have relatively uncertain earnings, and analysts 
may not be able to assess fully the performance or transitoriness of the losses, 
increasing the likelihood of absolute forecast errors. An indicator variable (LOSS) is 
included to control for this effect and the coefficient sign is predicted to be positive. 
Prior earnings are typically a strong predictor of future earnings. When firms 
experience a large earnings change in the current year, or have greater standard 
deviation of return on equity in prior years, their past earnings are a relatively weak 
indicator of future earnings, and analysts' forecast errors are typically larger (Kross 
et al. 1990; Lang and Lundhom 1996; Dichev and Tang 2009). Therefore, the 
absolute value of firms' annual earnings change {ABSECHG) and standard deviation 
of return on equity over the previous five years {STDROE) are controlled. The 
" Firms' absolute accruals (ABSACCR) are very likely to be endogenous to auditor idenlity. 
Therefore. I only include this variable in tests of H l a and H l b to maintain consistency with Payne 
(2008). , ^^ 
" Zmijewski ' s (1984) financial distress ratio measures firm performance, leverage and liquidity. The 
ratio is developed based on 40 bankrupt and 8000 non-bankrupt firms: ZSCORE = -4.336 -
4.513*ROA + 5.679*leverage - 0.004*liquidity. 
coefficients for these two variables are expected to be positive. I also include a 
control for earnings level (EL) because prior research demonstrates a positive 
relationship between this measure and absolute forecast errors (Eames and Glover 
2003; BCK 2008). Other studies show that forecast pessimism (optimism) increases 
when the level of a f i rm's earnings increa.ses above (declines below) the average 
earnings of all firms (Hwang et al. 1996; Eames and Glover 2003). Thus, a positive 
relationship is predicted for EL. Following Payne (2008), a dichotomous measure of 
earnings persistence identifying firms in the middle three quintiles of the signed 
change in earnings (PERSIST) is included to control for threshold effects in 
persistence. Firms for which PERSIST equals 1 are expected to have smaller forecast 
errors, and the coefficient sign is predicted to be negative. 
1 also include the control variables identified above in the tests of H3b, in which the 
dependent variable is the difference in forecast errors of the 'worst' and 'best' 
quality analysts within a given firm. As no prior research employs this dependent 
variable, I develop and justify predicted signs for the control variable coefficients 
logically, relying on similar assumption to those underpinning H3b. If the control 
variables capture factors related to an increase in the forecasting task complexity 
(increase earnings uncertainty or firms' overall information uncertainty), the positive 
impact of these variables on absolute forecast errors is likely to be greater for the 
'worst' quality analyst than for the 'best' quality analyst. Therefore, DISP. ZSCORE, 
LOSS, ABSACCR, ABSECHG, STDROE and EL are likely to be positively correlated 
with the difference in absolute forecast errors between the 'best' and 'worst' analysts 
following a firm. Likewise, if the control variables proxy factors that decrease 
forecasting task complexity, they should have a greater impact in reducing the 
absolute forecast errors of the 'worst' analyst compared to those of the 'best' analyst. 
Thus, negative coefficients are predicted for these variables (NUMEST and 
PERSIST). I also include additional variables in testing H3b to capture the analysts' 
relative performance drivers. These variables are detailed in Section 5.3.6.3. 
5.3.6.2 Additional control variables for tests of H3a 
H3a predicts that audit firm industry specialisation has a greater impact on the 
accuracy of forecasts made by lower average quality analysts following a firm in a 
given year. In testing this hypothesis, I include proxies for the mean quality of 
analysts following a client firm in a particular year, and the interactions between 
these proxies and audit quality. There are two reasons that I include additional 
control variables to capture analysts' portfolio complexity. First, Clement (1999) 
argues that portfolio complexity may be correlated with analyst quality variables 
such as general experience because more experienced analysts typically follow 
portfolios that are more complex. Further, since analysts employed by larger brokers 
typically follow less complex portfolios, portfolio complexity may be correlated with 
brokerage size. Second, there is evidence, albeit of an inconsistent direction, that 
analysts' portfolio complexity is correlated with analyst forecast accuracy (Clement 
1999; Kim et al. 2011; Drake and Myers 2011). Therefore, I control for portfolio 
complexity when testing H3a to avoid potential omitted variable bias. Following 
prior studies (Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999; Drake and Myers 2011), I use two 
measures for analysts' portfolio complexity: the number of firms following 
(FFOLLOW) and the number of industries following (IFOLLOW). I measure 
FFOLLOW as the number of firms an analyst follows over the forecast window in 
year t, and IFOLLOW as the number of industries an analyst follows over the 
forecast window in year t, where the number of industries is calculated as the 
number of two-digit SlCs.^"* Recall that portfolio complexity may be negatively 
correlated with forecast accuracy due to the reduced time and attention analysts 
devote to each firm and lesser likelihood of an analyst obtaining private information 
from management. Conversely, portfolio complexity may be positively correlated 
with forecast accuracy if analysts benefit more significantly from knowledge 
spillovers across covered firms and industries. Therefore, there is no predicted sign 
for these two portfolio complexity measures. 
5.3.6.3 Additional control variables for tests of H3b 
H3b predicts that audit firm industry specialisation reduces the difference in forecast 
accuracy between the 'worst ' and 'best' analysts following a firm in a given year. In 
testing H3b, the dependent variable is the difference in the forecast accuracy 
between the 'worst ' and 'best' quality analysts (estimated separately for each of the 
individual analyst quality proxies at the analyst-firm-year level). Thus, when testing 
H3b, I include five additional control variables (DIFANQ, ANQ_B, ABSFE_B, 
HORIZON_B and DIFHORIZON) in an attempt to capture the effect of the extent to 
which the 'best ' and 'worst' analysts differ in quality, and the extent to which the 
timing of their forecasts differs. Since there are no prior studies that have used my 
dependent variable, I select my control variables based on their intuitive correlation 
with the dependent variables and other test variables. 
" I a lso es t ima te regress ions for which por . fo l io complexi ty is measured based on analysis c o v e r a p 
of firms over the ent i re year r. rather than over the forecast window. For example . FFOLLOW ,s the 
average of the n u m b e r of firms covered by each analyst who issues a forecast lor firm j d u r m g the 
ent i re financial year . T h e untabula ted results are similar to those repor ted in Chapte r 8. 
I include the d i f ference in the actual value of the quality proxy (DIFANQ) between 
the 'bes t ' and 'wors t ' analysts (e.g. if the 'wors t ' analyst has three years ' general 
exper ience while the 'bes t ' analyst has 10 years ' experience, DIFANQ equals 7). As 
previously discussed, the greater accuracy of the forecast of the 'best ' analyst 
relative to the 'wors t ' analyst is attributable to the 'best ' analyst 's access to a greater 
amount of private information and superior ability to analyse this information. 
Inclusion of DIFANQ captures the degree of disparity in analyst quality and its 
impact on the relative performance of analysts. A negative coefficient is thus 
expected. Since the impact of DIFANQ may be contingent on the quality level of the 
'wors t ' (or 'bes t ' ) analyst identified, I also control for the level of the quality proxy 
for the 'best ' analyst {ANQ_B). For example, a difference in general experience of 
three years may have negligible empirical meaning if the 'best ' analyst has 15 years ' 
experience, but be quite important if the 'best ' analyst has five years' experience. 
ANQ_B may also be systematically correlated with the dependent variable. When the 
'best ' analyst ' s ability to forecast increases, the forecast is likely to be more accurate, 
reducing the di f ference in forecast accuracy between this analyst and the 'worst ' 
analyst. A positive coefficient is thus predicted. 
I also control for the actual level of absolute forecast errors of the 'best ' quality 
analyst (ABSFE_B), to capture the underlying level of forecast complexity. I predict 
a negative coefficient for ABSFE_B because ABSFE_B captures the underlying 
forecast ing diff iculty pertaining to all analysts (e.g. the difficulty to access a greater 
amount of private information). When this difficulty increases, analyst forecast 
accuracy should decrease and the impact is likely to be greater for the 'best ' quality 
analyst than for the 'wors t ' quality analyst. Therefore, the difference between the 
forecast accuracy between the 'wors t ' and 'best ' analysts decreases, and I expect 
ABSFE_B to have a negative coefficient.^"' 
In the tests of H3b, I replace the average forecast horizon of analysts following a 
given f i rm with the forecast horizon of the 'best ' analyst (HORIZON_B) and add a 
control for the di f ference in the forecast horizon between the 'worst ' and 'best ' 
analysts {DIFHORIZON}.'^ As argued earlier, forecast errors decrease when the 
t iming of forecast approaches the earnings announcement date. While the average 
forecast horizon (HORIZON) is included in models examining the consensus forecast 
accuracy of a f i rm, the forecast horizon of an individual analyst (HORIZONJi) 
should logically be used in models assessing the individual analyst forecast accuracy 
of a given f irm. Similar to the HORIZON variable, a positive coefficient for 
HORIZON_B is predicted. I also include the difference in the forecast horizon 
(DIFHORIZON) between the 'worst ' and 'best ' analysts to control for the impact of 
t iming difference between these analysts on their relative performance. If 
DIFHORIZON increases (the 'worst ' analyst 's forecast is issued earlier than the 
'best ' analys t ' s forecast), the absolute forecast error of the 'worst ' analyst is likely to 
be greater than that of the 'best ' analyst because the older forecast is issued using a 
less complete information set. Therefore, I expect DIFHORIZON to have a positive 
coeff icient . 
' ' In my sensi t ivi ty tests, I re -es . imate my mode l s by dropping ^ f f f " the 
average abso lu te forecas t er rors of the 'wors t ' and 'bes t ' analysts (ABSFE_AVG) or with the absolute 
forecas t e r ror of the 'wor s t ' analyst (ABSFE__W). M y m a m resuUs are not a f fec ted . 
' ' W h e n t ies occur with respect to the ident i f icat ion of .he 'wors t ' ( 'bes t ) analyst , the mean value ot 
actual qual i ty p roxy of the 'wor s t ' ( ' b e s t ' ) analysts as well as their forecast hor izons are used. 
5.4 Estimation Methods 
Section 5.2 introduced the general form of the regression models used to test my 
hypotheses and identified the reasons that the standard OLS regression applied to 
these models may generate statistically inconsistent estimators. This section 
introduces and explains the three main estimation methods used in my thesis: OLS 
regression with clustered standard errors, two-stage regressions (2SLS or Heckman 
treatment regression) and a two-stage matched-sample approach (PSM regressions). 
Further, the extent to which each method is likely to produce efficient and consistent 
estimators in the presence of the validity threats identified in Section 5.2 is explained. 
5.4.1 Ordinary Least Squares with Clustering 
OLS standard errors may be biased for samples comprising panel data. The 
adjustment of standard errors for clustering is a response to the potential bias present 
when residuals are correlated across observations. As my samples consist of multiple 
observations for the same firms, adjusting standard errors for the observed within-
firm correlation in errors produces theoretically superior test statistics for regression 
coefficients. Therefore, I estimate models using OLS with standard errors adjusted 
for within-firm clustering as per the method of Petersen (2009). The Petersen one-
way clustering method is appropriate when residuals are correlated within firms but 
not years. For my tests of Hla, Hlb, H2 and H3b, I control for potential time effects 
by including year dummies, and thus do not cluster standard errors by years. 
However, where the regressors of interest (test variables) include significant time-
related effects, using year dummies may artificially inflate standard errors, and a 
two-way clustering by firm and year reduces bias and is most appropriate 
(Thompson 2011). My tests of H3a examine the relation between audit firm industry 
specialisation, analyst quality and forecast accuracy where several measures of 
analyst quality are collinear with the year dummies. This collinearity arises largely 
by construction: for example, the average analysts' general and firm-specific 
experience increase with the age of my sample, as experience can only be measured 
within the period for which both analysts and covered firms are included in the 
I/B/E/S database.'' ' Thus, clustering by firm and year rather than including year 
dummies is desirable for testing H3a. 
5.4.2 Two-stage Regression Approaches (2SLS or Heckman) 
Section 5.2 identified the possibility that the selection of an industry specialist 
auditor is determined endogenously, which may result in biased OLS estimates of 
the association between forecast accuracy and audit firm industry specialisation. The 
use of two-stage regressions may mitigate the limitations of OLS under these 
conditions. Below, I describe the two-stage approaches appropriate to continuous 
and dichotomous test variables: 2SLS and Heckman treatment effects regressions. 
While the use of Heckman regressions is restricted to my robustness tests, it is 
efficient to describe their nature here. 
The generic two-stage approach regresses the endogenous variable (industry 
specialisation) against the explanatory variables in a first-stage model. Statistics 
generated by the first-stage regression are then used to control for the impact of 
endogenous selection in the second-stage regression (Wooldridge 2008). The 
specific approach adopted varies according to whether the endogenous variable is 
measured continuously or dichotomously. The 2SLS method is applied when 
" Th i s induced col l inear i ty is not of concern in my tests of H3b because the exper ience measures are 
s imply used to rank analysts . 
industry specialisation is measured by a cont inuous variable. Under 2SLS, the first-
stage regression is est imated by OLS with the predicted value for industry 
specialisation obtained f rom this regression subsequently replacing the actual value 
of industry specialisation in the second-stage model (Wooldridge 2008, 521). For the 
d ichotomous measure of industry specialisation, the Heckman treatment effects 
method may be used. Here, the first-stage model estimates the likelihood of 
appoint ing a specialist using probit regression. For each observation, the inverse 
Mills ratio (IMR), which is a decreasing function of the probability of selection, is 
est imated, and this is included as an additional regressor in the second-stage model 
to control for the endogenous selection of auditor. Subject to satisfaction of 
specification tests (described below), the coefficient for the endogenous variable 
(industry specialisation) can be estimated without bias (Lennox et al. 2012). When 
using 2SLS or Heckman regressions, it is necessary to identify statistically valid 
instrumental variables, which are included in the first-stage, but not in the second-
stage regression (Wooldr idge 2008, 521; Lennox et al. 2012).^^ The general form of 
the first-stage regression is illustrated in Equation (10). 
INDSP = Po+ INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES+ CONTROLS + e (10) 
There are two important concerns regarding the use of two-stage regressions: 
consistency and eff iciency. The two-stage approaches employed here will only 
produce statistically consistent estimators if the instrumental variables used satisfy 
relevance and exogeneity conditions. Where consistent two-stage estimators are 
™ W h i l e not r e c o m m e n d e d . H e c k m a n regress ions can be est imated without the use of external 
ins t ruments because the I M R acts as an exclus ion restriction. However , the use of the H e c k m a n 
m e t h o d wi thout ms t rumen t s requires the model to be idcntir .cd solely on the distr ibutional 
a s sumpt ions abou t the res idua ls ( refer to Sartori 2003 for more details). Further , the H e c k m a n model 
wi thout ins t rument s is more likely to be subject to mult icol l incari ty problems, which may inflate the 
coe f f i c i en t s tandard e r rors or bias the es t imates if the model is also misspeci f ied (Lennox et al. 2012) . 
Thus , I apply the ins t rument s to both the 2 S L S and the H e c k m a n regressions. 
generated, these will typically be less efficient than would OLS estimators; thus, it is 
normally desirable to test the consistency of OLS estimators to determine the 
appropriate method for a particular case. These issues are now discussed in detail. 
Valid instrumental variables must be both relevant to the explanation of the 
endogenous variable and exogenous to the errors in the second (structural) equation 
(these condit ions are typically described as the ' relevance' and 'exogeneity ' 
conditions). If the instrumental variable(s) included in the first-stage regression is 
(are) not, in fact, exogenous and relevant, the two-stage approach may produce 
biased est imators (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). 
Instrument relevance is a function of the correlation between the endogenous 
regressor and the candidate instrument, and can be assessed by tests of under-
identification or weak identification. The first-stage equation is regarded as under-
identified if the number of instruments is less than the number of endogenous 
regressors, or in cases in which the former is greater than the latter but there is no 
correlation between them. In cases in which the number of instruments exceeds the 
number of endogenous regressors and there is only weak correlation between the 
instruments and endogenous regressors, the first-stage equation is described as 
weakly identified (Wooldridge 2008, 514-517) . I begin by proposing two candidate 
instruments for a single endogenous regressor (audit firm industry specialisation). I 
then test the candidate instruments for under- or weak identification. The Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) version of the Kleibergen-Paap rk test assesses under-identification 
(Baum et al. 2007). This is essentially a test of whether the correlation between the 
instrument(s) and the endogenous regressor is statistically different f rom zero 
(Kleibergen and Paap 2006). Weak instruments are identified using Waid-type F-
statistics (Baum et al. 2007)."'' Tiiese tests simply examine the coefficients of the 
instruments in the first stage, and have a null hypothesis that the instrument(s) is (are) 
jointly zero. Thus, the null is rejected if the coefficient(s) of the instrument(s) is (are) 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that the equation is identified (Stock et 
al. 2002; Baum et al. 2007). Stock et al. (2002) propose benchmarks for determining 
weak instruments using F-statistics, which I consult in developing my models. 
Further, the inclusion of the partial effect of the instruments (i.e. partial R") may help 
to determine the presence of weak instruments (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). 
An instrument is exogenous if it is strictly uncorrected with the error term in the 
second-stage equation. In models where the number of instruments is equal to the 
number of endogenous variables, the exogeneity of instruments can only be 
evaluated by the examination of the theoretical justification for exogeneity 
(Wooldridge 2008, 529-530). In cases where there are more candidate instruments 
than the number of endogenous variables (i.e. the model is over-identified), 
specification tests, such as the Sargan-Hansen over-identification test, are available 
to assess formally the exogeneity of the instruments. Under the Sargan-Hansen test, 
the R^ statistics are obtained from a model that regresses the second-stage residuals 
on all exogenous variables. The R^ should be statistically indistinguishable from zero 
if the instruments are exogenous (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). The null hypothesis 
''' The L M test, which tests the improvement in model fit (i.e. R ' ) by including additional variables 
(i.e. inslrumenl) in the model, can be used to examine under- or weak-identification (Kleibergen 
2007) However Zivot el al. (1998) show that the L M test is superior to the Wald-test in the detection 
o f weak identification only in a single instrument case, but not in the case of multiple instruments. I 
identify two instruments and thus use the Wald-type F-statistics to examine weak-identification. 
under the Sargan test is that all proposed instruments are exogenous. As such, failure 
to reject the null corroborates the validity of the instruments.™ 
Condit ional on the existence of valid instruments, the eff iciency of the instrumental 
variables est imation procedure can be assessed via the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
Hausman- type tests assess the statistical difference between a vector of consistent 
est imators ( two-stage estimators) and a vector of efficient estimators (OLS) 
(Wooldr idge 2002, 118-120) . If the efficient estimators are not statistically different 
f rom the consistent estimators, the null hypothesis of the Hausman test cannot be 
rejected and the eff icient estimator (OLS) is assumed to produce consistent estimates, 
and thus can be validly used in empirical tests. However, rejection of the null 
hypothesis under the Hausman test suggests that IV estimators are required for valid 
hypothesis testing because the effects of the endogenous regressors on the estimates 
are meaningful , and thus OLS estimators may be inconsistent (Larcker and Rusticus 
2010). 
5.4.3 Two-stage Matched-Sample Approach (Propensity Score Matching) 
The previous section discussed the effectiveness of the two-stage approach in 
mitigating endogenous auditor choice. An alternative approach is the PSM method 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), which, like the Heckman treatment approach, 
potentially provides valid estimates of average treatment effects when the subject of 
interest (audit f i rm industry specialisation) is a dichotomous measure. 
also es t imate Sa rgan tests fo r mode l s conta in ing d i cho tomous measures of special isat ion, because 70 
no equ iva len t test exis ts for H e c k m a n - t y p e models . 
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The P S M approach first computes the conditional probabiHty (the propensity score) 
of a subject to a treatment based on a vector of variables, and then matches the 
treatment f i rms to control f i rms based on their propensity score, so that the 
di f ferences in the relevant characteristics of the two groups are reduced. To test 
whether the matching procedure applied has generated a balanced sample, a 
univariate analysis of the mean differences in the matching variables across the 
treatment and control groups is conducted. If all of these mean differences are 
insignificantly different f rom zero, the sample is considered balanced with respect to 
these variables. A multivariate regression analysis can then be conducted to examine 
any causal relationships (Guo and Eraser 2010, 134). 
In my thesis, a logistic regression is used to estimate the conditional probability of a 
client hiring an industry specialist auditor, with all control variables identified in 
Equation (10) included as predictors (similar to Minutt i-Meza 2013) . " I then attempt 
to match each treatment f i rm (clients audited by industry specialist auditors) to a 
control f irm (clients audited by non-specialists) with a similar propensity score, 
subject to criteria determined by the properties of the sample and the balance test 
described above. The impact of audit f irm industry specialisation on forecast 
accuracy is then examined by estimating an OLS regression on the propensity score 
matched sample. 
Potential matching criteria include (but are not restricted to) nearest neighbour 
matching and nearest neighbour matching subject to a caliper (tolerance distance). 
" For tests of H ^ b I omit the control for the forecast accuracy of the 'bes t ' analysts {ABSFE_B) f rom 
the first s tage, as this is l ikely to induce a post- t reatment bias. M y results are not sensi t ive to this 
mode l l ing choice . 
The nearest neighbour method matches each treatment firm (clients audited by an 
industry specialist) to a control firm (clients audited by a non-specialist) with the 
smallest absolute difference in propensity score (Guo and Fraser 2010, 146). A 
limitation of this method is that it may potentially match clients whose propensity 
scores are very different. To mitigate this problem, a maximum tolerance distance, 
known as a caliper, can be applied to the nearest neighbour matched pairs, which 
filters pairs for which the absolute difference in propensity scores exceeds this 
tolerance distance. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the u.se of a caliper size 
less than or equal to a quarter of a standard deviation of the estimated propensity 
score of the sample. This matching approach has been widely used by researchers 
before conducting multivariate analyses (Guo and Fraser 2010, 149).'^ Saliently, 
Lawrence et al. (2011) apply the nearest neighbour matching within a caliper to 
examine the relation between audit firm size and short-horizon forecast accuracy, 
while Minutti-Meza (2013) applies the same matching approach in the examination 
of audit firm industry specialisation and other measures of audit outcomes 
(discretionary accruals, the auditor's propensity to issue a going-concern opinion and 
the client's propensity to meet or beat analysts' forecasts). Therefore, I also use this 
matching approach and follow the advice of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to 
determine an appropriate caliper size.'^ 
The PSM method has two potential advantages over the Heckman approach. First, it 
parses out the impact of client characteristics on auditor choice without assuming a 
Under each o f the matching approache.s described above, researchers must decide whether conlrol 
firms can be used just once (matching without replacement) or several times in the sample (matching 
with replacemenO. To maintain consistency with the extant auditing literature (Lawrence et al. 2011; 
Minutt i-Meza 2013), I use the matching 'without replacement' criterion. 
" Several tolerance calipers are applied when using this criterion. The broadest caliper level that 
generates a matched sample and as such satisfies tests for balance across the treatment and control 
groups is used in my final analysis. 
specific funct ional form, thus providing a more direct estimate of the treatment 
effects . In addition, when the underlying functional form is nonlinear, the matching 
approach reduces the ef fects of nonlinearities when estimating the treatment effects 
(Lawrence et al, 2011). Therefore , when the audit f irm industry specialisation is a 
d ichotomous measure, I use the PSM method in my main results tables. However, I 
report the results of the Heckman regression models in my additional tests. 
Alongside the advantages, there are recognised limitations to the PSM approach. 
First, C r a m et al. (2009) argue that results obtained f rom the reduced matched 
sample may not be generalisable to the full population; rather, they may only apply 
to the range of c o m m o n support. To explore the degree of overlap in the propensity 
scores between the treatment and control f irms (range of common support), I plot the 
his tograms for the propensity scores of the two groups of f irms after each matching, 
to ob.serve visually whether the control f i rms have propensity scores spanning the 
full range of the propensity scores of the treatment firms. I then examine the pseudo 
R^, the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) and the area under the R O C 
curve to evaluate the predictive power of the matching models. If the R^ and the area 
under the R O C curve approach 1, the matching models are said to be of greater 
predictive power (Minutt i -Meza 2013, 12). Second, matching is conducted on post-
treatment attributes, which may introduce a bias in the results if the matching 
variables are affected by the auditor choice (Lawrence et al. 2011). In my main test, I 
use the matching according to propensity scores generated by the first-stage models 
described above, to be consistent with recent auditing studies (Lawrence et al. 2011; 
Minut t i -Meza 2013) and to preserve the post-matching sample size. However, to 
address the possibili ty of bias induced by post-treatment matching, I re-estimate the 
models using the lagged values of the variables that are likely to be affected by 
auditor choice. In addition, because auditor identity is likely to be sticky, I replace 
the covariates potentially subject to a post-treatment bias with alternative variables 
that are theoretically independent of auditor identity. 
5.5 Regression Models 
The general form of the models used to test my hypotheses was de.scribed in Section 
5.2. In this section, I describe and discuss in detail each of the empirical models used 
to test the hypotheses. 
5.5.1 Models to Test Hypotheses la and lb 
To test H l a , I first estimate a series of regressions of short-horizon forecast accuracy 
on audit firm industry specialisation, using specifications based on those employed 
by BCK (2008) and Payne (2008), which generated contradictory results regarding 
the impact of industry specialisation on forecast accuracy. To reconcile these prior 
findings, I test the sensitivity of the base models to the use of alternative deflators for 
the dependent variable, additional control variables and endogeneity correction. I 
repeat this analysis using long-horizon forecast data to test H lb . All models employ 
a dependent variable, which is an inverse function of analyst forecast accuracy.''* 
5.5.1.1 Tests of Hla—Models based on existing literature 
I first detail the similarities and differences in the models that have been applied in 
the existing literature, followed by a discussion of their limitations. 
" T h e analysts' absolute forecast errors are measured as per Equations (6a) and (6b). The use of 
forecast errors corresponds to Payne's (2008) measurement, but contrasts with that ol BCK (2008) 
who use the negative of their absolute forecast errors when measurmg accuracy. Some varmbles have 
been renamed to enhance comparability across models. 
BCK's Model 
ABSFE = Po + lhlNDSP + P2HORIZON + PiSIZE + P4NUMEST + fUZSCORE 
+ /?6 LOSS + [hABSECHG + fluSTDROE + P^EL + YEAR + e 
Payne's Model 
PO + PI INDSP + P2DISP_eps + p,SIZE + P4NVMEST + 
ABSFE_UN = P^ABSACCR + PF,LOSS + PJABSECHG + PHPERSIST + YEAR + 
INDUSTRY + e 
Where 
ABSFE = analysts' absolute forecast errors (an inverse function of forecast 
accuracy), measured as the absolute value of difference between 
actual l/B/E/S earnings per share and forecast earnings per share, 
deflated by beginning-of-month stock price (an inverse function 
of forecast accuracy); 
ABSFE_un = analysts' absolute forecast errors (undeflated), measured as the 
absolute value of the difference between actual I/B/E/S earnings 
per share and forecast earnings per share (an inverse function of 
forecast accuracy); 
INDSP = the sum of the square root of the total assets of the clients that an 
audit firm services in a specific industry divided by the sum of 
the square root of the total assets of all clients of that audit firm; 
DlSP_eps = forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of 
analysts' forecast EPS deflated by the absolute value of the mean 
EPS forecast during the period; 
HORIZON = the natural log of the average number of days between mean 
forecast estimation date and subsequent actual earnings reporting 
date; 
SIZE = the natural log of the market value of equity (natural log of total 
assets in Payne's model); 
NUMEST = the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the firm in 
the 90-day window prior to earnings reporting (BCK model takes 
log of this number); 
ZSCORE = Zmijewski's financial distress score; 
LOSS = 1 if a firm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; 
ABSECHG = the absolute value of the change in annual earnings, deflated by 
opening stock price (natural log of total assets in Payne's model); 
STDROE = the standard deviation of return on equity over the previous five 
years; 
EL = earnings per share, winsorized at 5 (-5); 
ABSACCR = absolute total accruals, measured as the difference between net 
income and cash flow from operations divided by lagged total 
assets; and 
PERSIST = 1 if observation lies between the 20th and 80th percentiles of 
distribution of the annual earnings change, 0 otherwise. 
The models above di f fer most obviously in the controls employed for the uncertainty 
of cl ients ' operations. Consistent with much prior literature (e.g. Lang and 
Lundholm 1996; Zhang 2006), Payne (2008) includes forecast dispersion (DISP) as 
a control for the uncertainty in predicting a f i rm ' s earnings, while BCK (2008) omit 
this measure, using the time-series variability of earnings (STDROE) instead. 
Analysts have different private information about the same f i rms ' future earnings, 
and such differences are reflected in the forecasts they issue. Forecast dispersion 
reflects analysts ' uncertainty about future earnings, and this uncertainty may be 
caused by the volatility of a f i rm ' s underlying fundamentals or by poor quality 
information (Zhang 2006). Therefore, forecast dispersion may explain greater 
variability in forecast errors. In fact, the difference in the explanatory power of these 
controls is stark. I later show that adding a measure of forecast dispersion to B C K ' s 
model improves the explanatory power (R") by 7.4 per cent.^^ More importantly, a 
likely reason for B C K ' s exclusion of DISP in their model of forecast accuracy is that 
their paper also separately tests the impact of audit quality on DISP. Whether the 
possible s imultaneous determination of DISP and forecast accuracy implies a greater 
or lesser bias for the test variable than that caused by omitting dispersion is not 
axiomatically clear. However, given the significant explanatory power of DISP when 
added to B C K ' s regression, I contend that its inclusion is desirable. 
Another significant difference in the models lies in the choice of deflator for the 
dependent variable and key controls such as dispersion. While BCK deflate forecast 
errors by stock price, Payne (2008) uses the raw absolute forecast earnings per share 
" The difference in R ' for BCK models with and without STDROE is approximately 0.006 per cent, 
whereas there is a difference in R ' of approximately 2 per cent across the Payne model w,th and 
without DISP. 
as the dependent variable. Payne does not explain this choice, but it possibly arises 
because the likelihood of meeting or beating consensus is modelled separately in 
Payne ' s paper, and the undeflated measure is well suited for this purpose. Further, 
while Payne ' s control for dispersion is defined consistently with forecast accuracy (it 
is deflated simply by the mean level of forecast absolute EPS), ABSECHG and 
PERSIST are calculated after deflat ing earnings by beginning stock price. I later 
show (in Chapter 7) that if one fol lows the advice of Easton and Summers (2003) 
and deflates both forecast errors and dispersion by stock price, the explanatory power 
of Payne ' s regression model is doubled, and the resulting residuals conform more 
closely to the assumptions of OLS regression. Additionally, B C K ' s model includes 
no control for industry effects , which are likely to be related to both the level of 
auditor specialisation measured and the accuracy of analysts ' forecasts. 
A final limitation common to much of the literature and both BCK and Payne 's 
models is the failure to account explicitly for the possible endogenous determination 
of audit firm industry specialisation. BCK do use a two-stage Heckman approach to 
model the endogenous determination of audit firm size (Big N), but assume that 
industry specialisation is exogenously de te rmined . ' ' Payne (2008) states that his 
main results are supported by his untabulated two-stage regressions in which 
industry specialisation is treated as an endogenous variable. However, the prediction 
equation (first-stage regression) used is drawn f rom models of auditor size and 
includes three ' ins t ruments ' (the issuance of stock, the price to earnings ratio and 
" A n o t h e r c o m m o n de f l a to r used in the analyst forecas t ing hterature is ihe f i r m ' s absolute actual 
ea rn ings per share . T h e untabula ted coef f i c ien t s for industry special isat ion are not substant ively 
a f fec ted when this de t la lo r is used. 
" In a sensi t ivi ty test, B C K (2008) suggest in the footnote that they a lso include the IMR as an 
addi t iona l cont ro l var iable and obtain identical results as to those reported in M o d e l s B C K l a and lb . 
H o w e v e r , they do not expl ic i t ly indicate whether the I M R is f r o m a regress ion of Big N audit f i rm 
type or industry specia l i sed Big N audit firms. 
l everage) that appea r to be e n d o g e n o u s to forecas t errors. Addi t ional ly , these 
ins t ruments , wi th the excep t ion of leverage, are of weak explana tory power with 
respect to audi t f i rm indust ry special isat ion. Ident i fy ing e xoge nous fac tors with 
s ign i f ican t exp lana to ry p o w e r fo r the choice of an industry specialist auditor is 
cr i t ical ly impor tan t to two-s tage mode l s of endogenous select ion (Larker and 
Rus t i cus 2010 ; L e n n o x et al. 2012) . 
5.5.1.2 Tests of Hla—Alternative models 
T o inves t iga te the impac t of model .specification on the explanat ion of short -hor izon 
forecas t er rors , m y thes is de f ines a series of al ternative models based on the 
regress ions e m p l o y e d by B C K (2008) and Payne (2008). Mode l s su f f ixed ' a ' 
m e a s u r e indust ry special isa t ion us ing a cont inuous variable, whereas models 
su f f i xed 'b" use the d i c h o t o m o u s measure of special isat ion. I first def ine the mode l s 
that are based on B C K (2008) . 
B C K ' s shor t -hor izon regress ions : 
• B C K original m o d e l s (Mode l s B C K l a and lb) ; 
• B C K original mode l with a control for forecas t dispersion (Models B C K 2a 
and 2b) ; and 
• B C K original mode l with a control for forecas t dispersion, af ter control l ing 
fo r the e n d o g e n o u s de terminat ion of industry specialist audi tors (Models 
B C K 3a and 3b). 
Po + P,INDSP + P2HORIZON + pmE + g^K 
ABSFE = fi4NUMEST + fi,ZSCORE + fi6LOSS+ l a and lb) 
fjyABSECHG + PsSTDROE + pgEL + YEAR + e 
ABSFE = 
Po + PiINDSP + P2DISP + li,HORIZON + p^SIZE . . ^^^ 
+ P,NUMEST + p^ZSCORE + PyWSS + 
PHABSECHG + PGSTDROE + p,„EL + YEAR + e ^^ 
Where 
ABSFE 
INDSP 
HORIZON 
SIZE 
NUMEST 
ZSCORE 
LOSS 
ABSECHG 
STDROE 
EL 
DISP 
YEAR 
analysts' absolute forecast errors, measured as the absolute 
vakie of difference between actual I/B/E/S earnings per share 
and forecast earnings per share, deflated by beginning-of-
month stock price; 
the continuous measure of portfolio-share industry 
specialisation (INDSP_conl) as per Equation (8) (all models 
suffixed 'a ') OR 
the dichotomous measure of portfolio-share industry 
specialisation (INDSP_dum) as per Equation (9) (all models 
suffixed 'b"); 
the natural log of the average number of days between mean 
forecast estimation date and subsequent actual earnings 
reporting date; 
the natural log of the market value of equity; 
the natural log of the number of analysts issuing earnings 
forecasts for the firm in the 90-day window prior to earnings 
reporting; 
Zmijewski's financial distress score, winsorized at 5(-5); 
1 if a firm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; 
the absolute value of the annual change in EPS, deflated by 
beginning-of-month stock price; 
the standard deviation of return on equity over the previous 
five years; 
earnings per share, winsorized at 5 (-5); 
forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of 
analysts' forecasts deflated by the beginning-of-month stock 
price; and 
year dummies 
The final model is designed to correct for the possible endogenous determination of 
industry specialisation. Arguably, the factors that affect the choice of auditor may 
also be related to the difficulty in forecasting earnings, and this effect may not be 
completely accounted for by the control variables. Thus, factors that determine the 
choice of industry specialists might be correlated with the residuals from Models 
BCK la, lb, 2a and 2b. If such endogeneity exists, a two-stage approach (e.g. 2SLS, 
Heckman treatment regressions or the PSM approach) can potentially mitigate the 
statistical biases implied. My final short-horizon models, based on BCK (2008), use 
2SLS regressions if audit firm industry specialisation is a continuous measure 
(Model BCK 3a) and PSM regressions if audit firm industry specialisation is 
measured dichotomously (Model BCK The first-stage regressions model the 
level of industry specialisation or the likelihood of appointing a specialist auditor, 
and they are estimated by OLS regression (for continuous INDSP) or a logistic 
regression (for dichotomous INDSP). Below I provide the general form of the first-
and second-stage regressions used for 2SLS: 
First-stage model (2SLS) 
Po + fhlNDRELSlZE -f fh CYCLE + fWISP + (Model 
MORIZON + p.SIZE + fhNUMEST + fljZSCORE + BCK 3a-1) 
PhLOSS + PgABSECHG + PwSTDROE + finEL + 
YEAR+E 
Where 
INDRELSIZE = the sum of the total assets of all firms in an industry at the end of 
the current year divided by the sum of total assets of all firms at 
the end of the current year; and 
CYCLE = the industry-year adjusted length of operating cycle in days, 
which is the sum of days' inventory and days' accounts 
receivable. Days' inventories are estimated using the average of 
the most current two years' total inventories divided by the sum 
of cost of goods sold divided by 360. Days' accounts receivable 
are estimated using the average of the most recent two years of 
total receivables divided by the sum of sales divided by 360. I 
adjust this measure for industry effects by subtracting the 
industry-year mean operating cycle from each observation. 
All other variables are defined as above. 
' ' I a lso d i scuss resul ls genera ted under H e e k m a n - t y p e e n d o g e n o u s t realmenl regress ions in the 
sensi t ivi ty ana lyses . 
Second-stage model (2SLS) 
Po + P,INDSP + P2DISP + p,HORIZON + fi^SIZE + (Model 
ABSFEadj = P^NUMEST + p^ZSCORE + P7LOSS + PfiABSECHG BCK 3a-2) 
+ P9STDROE + PioEL + YEAR + e 
Where 
ABSFEadj = the industry-adjusted forecast errors, measured as the ABSFE 
minus the industry-year mean of errors. 
The first-stage model includes all of the control variables from Models BCK 2a and 
2b as well as two instrumental variables, which I argue to be exogenous to forecast 
errors. First, I include the relative size of an industry (INDRELSIZE), because this 
measure is likely to be strongly positively correlated with the measure of audit firm 
industry specialisation. The auditor of a firm in an industry comprised of very small 
firms will likely be measured as having low specialisation even if that auditor has 
100 per cent market share in that industry and a small relative share in other 
industries comprising large firms. 1 see no theoretical reason that industry relative 
size should be correlated with forecast accuracy after controlling for firm size and 
adjusting the forecast accuracy for industry-year effects. My second candidate 
instrument is clients' operating cycle (CFCLE)." Francis et al. (1999) argue that 
firms with longer operating cycles have greater amounts of short-term accruals in 
working capital accounts. These firms are associated with greater earnings 
uncertainty and accrual inanipulation opportunity, and therefore have stronger 
incentives to seek a reputable intermediary (such as a high-quality auditor) that can 
provide additional assurance to signal the reasonableness of reported earnings. 
Francis et al. (1999) show that firms' operating cycle is positively related to the 
™ As discussed earlier, the use of at least two instrumental variables allows me lo conduct over-
identification tests to examine the exogeneity o f potential instruments. 
likelihood of hiring a Big N auditor (a proxy for high-quality auditor), while Godfrey 
and Hamilton (2005) report a positive association between firms' operating cycle 
and a high-quality auditor proxied by auditor industry specialisation. 
Whi le it is possible that longer operating cycles are associated with riskier earnings 
(and thus with less accurate forecasts), given that I include several controls for the 
uncertainty of earnings (i.e. forecast dispersion, absolute earnings change, and 
variability of earnings) in the second-stage model, it is not obvious that operating 
cycle will be correlated with the errors in the second-stage models. As noted earlier, 
valid instruments must be both relevant and exogenous (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). 
When applied to my data, the LM tests and Wald-type tests found no evidence of 
under-identification or weak identification (i.e. my instruments are relevant), and the 
Sargan over-identification tests generated no evidence that the instruments were 
endogenous to the errors in the second-stage models. Thus, the two standard 
conditions for instrument validity appear to be satisfied. In developing the two-stage 
models, I tested several other specifications, which included additional predictors of 
audit firm industry specialisation as reported by Godfrey and Hamilton (2005). 
These candidate instruments included leverage, capital intensity, price-earnings ratio, 
stock issuance and industry regulation, and R & D intensity. While each of these 
candidate instruments was relevant to the prediction of auditor specialisation, over-
identification tests performed on the two-stage models suggested that these variables 
were not exogenous to forecast accuracy, and thus were not valid instruments. 
As the endogenous treatment variable and one of the instruments are a function of 
industry identity, I do not include industry fixed effects in the two-stage regressions. 
To control for industry effects in forecast accuracy, I subtract the industry-year mean 
of ABSFE from the dependent variable for each observation. 
In Model BCK 3b, where the dichotomous measure of audit firm industry 
specialisation is examined, 1 use the PSM method to correct for the potential 
endogeneity threats, owing to the advantages of this method over the Heckman 
treatment regressions, as detailed in Section 5.4.3. Results based on the Heckman 
regressions are discussed in the sensitivity tests. The models are as below: 
First-stage model (PSM) 
Po + PiDlSP + P2HORIZON + p,SIZE + P4NUMEST + (Model 
INDSP = PIZSCORE + Pd^OSS + PJABSECHG + PHSTDROE + BCK 3b-1) 
PgEL + YEAR + INDUSTRY + s 
Second-stage model (PSM) 
Po + P,INDSP + P2DISP + PiHORlZON + P4SIZE + (Model 
ABSFE = PsNUMEST + PoZSCORE + P7LOSS + PitABSECHG + BCK 3b-2) 
PoSTDROE + PioEL + YEAR -F INDUSTRY + e 
I use a logistic regression to estimate the probability of a client selecting an industry 
specialist. The dependent variable is the dichotomous measure of audit firm industry 
specialisation, while the independent variables are all control variables used in 
Model BCK 2b or industry indicator variables. Both Lawrence et al. (2011) and 
Minutti-Meza (2013) include industry indicator variables in their first-stage 
matching models and multivariate analysis models. The latter study also shows that 
the matching procedure with the inclusion of industry and year fixed effects 
increases the common range of support and the overall fit of the first-stage matching 
models. As the industry indicator variables are included in both stages, INDRELSIZE 
is largely redundant and is not included in my matching regression.'*" In the second 
stage, an OLS regression is est imated using the matched sample. To evaluate the 
impact of post- t reatment bias, I re-estimate my PSM models using the one-year 
lagged value for variables that are likely to respond to audit f i rm industry 
specialisation (DISP, ABSECHG, and ZSCORE), or replace these variables with 
alternates that are theoretically independent of auditor identity (e.g. replace 
ABSECHG with the absolute change in clients ' cash f low f rom operations, ZSCORE 
with leverage, and EL with the level of cash f low f rom operations). These additional 
tests are discussed in my sensitivity analysis. 
I next describe alternate models based on Payne (2008): 
• Payne original models (Models Payne la and lb) ; 
• Payne original models with price-deflated forecast errors and price-deflated 
dispersion (Models Payne 2a and 2b); and 
• Payne original models with price-deflated forecast errors and price-deflated 
dispersion, after controll ing for the endogenous determination of industry 
specialist auditors (Models Payne 3a and 3b). 
Po + PI INDSP + P2DISP_eps + fi.SIZE + 
P4NUMEST + P'iABSACCR + PfyWSS + ( M o d e l s P a y n e 
ABStt_un - p^ji^gsECHG + puPERSIST + YEAR + l a a n d l b ) 
INDUSTRY + e 
Po + P,INDSP + P2DISP + P,SIZE + P4NUMEST p 
ABSEE = + psABSACCR + P^LOSS + PJABSECHG + 2 a a n d 2 b ) 
P,PERSIST + YEAR + INDUSTRY -1- e 
Using INDRELSIZE instead of industry indicator variables in the models generates qualitatively 
similar results, but the first stage logistic regression reports a much smaller Pseudo R (27.5 per cent), 
relative to 53.21 per cent when industry indicator variables are used. 
Where 
ABSFE_im = analysts ' absolute forecast errors (undeflated), measured as the 
absolute value of the difference between actual I/B/E/S earnings 
per share and forecast earnings per share; 
ABSFE = analysts ' absolute forecast errors (an inverse function of forecast 
accuracy), measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between actual I/B/E/S earnings per share and forecast earnings 
per share, deflated by beginning-of-month stock price; 
INDSP = the cont inuous measure of portfolio-share industry specialisation 
(INDSP^coni) as per Equation (8) (all models suffixed 'a ' ) OR 
= the dichotomous measure of portfolio-share industry 
specialisation {INDSP_dum) as per Equation (9) (all models 
suff ixed 'b ' ) ; 
DISP_eps = forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of 
analysts ' forecast EPS deflated by the absolute value of the mean 
EPS forecast during the period; 
DISP = forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of 
analysts ' forecast EPS deflated by the beginning-of-month stock 
price; 
SIZE = the natural log of total assets; 
NUMEST = the number of analysts issuing forecasts for the firm in the 90-day 
window prior to reporting date; 
ABSACCR = the absolute total accruals, measured as the difference between 
net income and cash flow f rom operations divided by lagged total 
assets; 
LOSS = I if a f i rm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; 
ABSECHG = the absolute value of the change in annual earnings, deflated by 
beginning-of-month stock price; 
PERSIST = I if observation lies between the 20th and 80th percentiles of 
distribution of the annual earnings change, 0 otherwise; 
YEAR = year dummies; and 
INDUSTRY = industry dummies. 
The first stages of the 2SLS (PSM) model used in the endogeneity-corrected Payne-
type models use identical instruments (matching procedure) to those in the BCK-
type models above. Thus, for brevity, I do not formally define them here. 
5.5.1.3 Tests ofHlb—Audit firm industry specialisation and long-horizon forecast 
accuracy 
To test H lb , I re-estimate each of the Payne- and BCK-type regressions described 
above using long-horizon forecast accuracy as the dependent variable. When long-
horizon forecast accuracy is examined, the identity of a client's auditor in the 
immediate prior financial year is used in the measurement of audit firm industry 
specialisation, as this auditor is responsible for the quality of the published financial 
reports on which long-horizon forecasts are based. Consequently, I use the one-year 
lag of the instrumental variable CYCLE in my long-horizon endogeneity-corrected 
model (first-stage model under 2SLS). I also test the sensitivity of the long-horizon 
models to the period over which DISP. ABSECHG, ZSCORE, ABSACCR and 
PERSIST are measured, as the current year measures of these variables may be 
causally affected by audit quality. 
5.5.2 Models to Test Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the negative relationship between audit firm industry 
specialisation and forecast errors increases with the client's operating risk. The 
general form of the model was illustrated in Section 5.2. The selection of controls for 
testing H2 draws heavily on the model used to test Hlb . Both the modified BCK-
and Payne-type models capture the most important factors affecting forecast 
accuracy. However, since the modified BCK model provides greater explanatory 
power and includes a greater number of controls that are plausibly correlated with 
my key variables (i.e. f irm's operating risk), I report the results based on the 
modified BCK model.'*' However, I exclude firms' absolute earnings changes 
(ABSECHG), variability in return on equity (STDROE) and forecast dispersion 
{DISP} from the model, because cash flow is a component of earnings and volatility 
in cash flow may mechanically affect volatility in earnings, the inclusion of these 
earnings uncertainty variables may obscure the interpretation of the results. As noted 
earlier, DISP reflects the degree of disagreement among analysts and other market 
participants to information uncertainty (Zhang 2006; Imhoff and Lobo 1992; Lang 
and Lundholm 1996), where the information uncertainty may be highly correlated 
with the volatility of a f irm's underlying fundamentals. Therefore, dispersion is 
arguably a response to firms' cash flow volatility and is excluded from Model (4) 
below: 
fio + PilNDSP + P2CFVOL + PiINDSP*CFVOL + ( M o d e l 4 ) 
ABSFE = P^HORIZON + PfSIZE + P^NUMEST + P7ZSCORE + 
PhLOSS + PgEL + YEAR + INDUSTRY + e 
where 
CFVOL = cash flow volatility, measured as the natural log of the 5-year 
standard deviation of net cash flows from operating activities 
deflated by average total assets. 
I use the dichotomous measure of INDSP in testing H2 and employ the PSM method 
to correct for the endogenous selection of auditors. The dichotomous measure of 
INDSP is employed because it only recognises dominant auditors as having industry 
specialisation. It is possible that threshold levels of industry portfolio share must be 
reached before industry expertise accrues (Balsam et al. 2003); thus, the continuous 
measure of INDSP will not capture this feature. In addition, if a continuous measure 
of INDSP is used, a 2SLS model should be employed to correct for endogeneity. 
The two variables that are included in the Payne's model but not in the BCK's model are absolute 
accruals (ABSACCR) and earnings persistence (PERSIST). While the level of earnings, volatility of 
earnings and absolute earnings change are controlled, the impacts of ABSACCR and PERSIST on the 
overall fit of the model are modest. However, when 1 estimate models including these two variables, 
the untabulated results are similar to those reported. 
However, the 2SLS model might not be easily apphed in a model with an interaction 
term due to the difficulty in finding valid instruments for both the endogenous 
variable (INDSP) and the interaction {INDSP*CFVOL) (Baum 2006).'*^ Therefore, I 
use the dichotomous measure of INDSP and the PSM method for my tests of H2. To 
support H2, the coefficient for the interaction term (INDSP*CFVOL) must be 
significant and of negative sign. 
5.5.3 Models to Test Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
Hypothesis 3a predicts that the negative relationship between audit firm industry 
specialisation and analysts' absolute forecast errors is decreasing with analyst quality. 
This is tested by regressing forecast errors against audit firm industry specialisation 
and its interaction with either each of several analyst quality proxies as per Model 5a, 
or with the composite score analyst quality proxy as per Model 5b. Following prior 
studies (Clement 1999; Kim et al. 2011; Drake and Myers 2011), all analyst quality 
proxies are included in a single regression model because they are potentially 
correlated with each other. Models 5a and 5b are described below: 
PO + P,INDSP + P2GEXP + P}INDSP*GEXP + P4FEXP 
+ PFINDSP*FEXP + POBSIZE + PJINDSPWSIZE + 
_ P,STAR+P,INDSP-STAR+P,OFFOLLOW+ (Model 5a) 
ABSFE - P^^IP0LL0W + P,2DISP +PI,HORIZON+ P,4SIZE + 
PNNUMEST + PIOZSCORE + PNLOSS + P,HABSECHG 
+ PI,STDROE + P20EL + INDUSTRY + e 
I + 
) + 
Po + p,INDSP + P2CSC0RE1{CSC0RE2) 
PJNDSP*CSC0RE1(INDSP*CSC0RE2) • 
ABSFE = P4FFOLLOW + PsIFOLLOW + pf,DISP + P7HORIZON (Model 5b) 
+ PuSIZE + pgNUMEST + PwZSCORE + p„LOSS + 
PnABSECHG + pnSTDROE + PmEL + INDUSTRY + e 
Fol low,ng B a u m (2006), I use the mterac.ions of ,NDRELSIZE*CFVOL .ND CYCLE^CFVOL as 
additional instruments . The Sargan tests of instrument exogenei .y fail. I d.seuss lh,s m more dela.l m 
Chapter 8. 
Where 
GEXP 
FEXP 
BSIZE 
STAR 
CSCOREJ 
(CSCORE2) 
FFOLLOW = 
IFOLLOW = 
the average general experience of all analysts following a f irm 
during the window over which long-horizon forecast accuracy is 
calculated, where general experience is measured as the number 
of years through year t for which an analyst i supplied at least 
one forecast for any f i r m ; " 
the average f i rm experience of all analysts following a f irm 
during the window over which long-horizon forecast accuracy is 
calculated, where f irm experience is measured as number of 
years through year t for which an analyst / supplied at least one 
forecast for f i rm j; 
the average brokerage size that employs analysts following a 
f i rm during the window over which long-horizon forecast 
accuracy is calculated, where brokerage size is measured as 
number of analysts employed by a broker employing analyst / 
who fol lows firm j in year r; 
the proportion of the analysts fol lowing firm j, during the long-
horizon forecast window, who are ranked as an 'All-Star ' by II's 
All-America Research Team in year t; 
the composi te score, measured as the average of the total ranks 
for analysts fol lowing a f irm where the ranking is conducted 
according to each individual analyst quality proxy within the 
long-horizon forecast window. CSCOREl incorporates the 
rankings for four proxies (GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE and STAR), 
CSCOREl incorporates the rankings for three proxies (GEXP, 
FEXP and STAR); 
the average of the number of f irms covered, during the long-
horizon forecast window in year I, by each analyst who issues a 
forecast for f irm j during that window; and 
the average number of two-digit SIC industries covered, during 
the long-horizon forecast window in year t, by each analyst who 
issues a forecast for f irm j during that window. 
Tests of H3a use the dichotomous measure of INDSP only, for reasons similar to 
those described in the previous section. H3a is supported if the coefficients for the 
interactions between analyst quality and audit f irm industry specialisation 
(INDSP*GEXP, INDSP*FEXP, INDSP^BSIZE, INDSP*STAR, INDSP*CSC0RE1 
and INDSP*CSC0RE2) are positive and significant.®" 
W h e n the ave rage ana lys t qual i ty proxies are measured based on all analysis fo l lowing a f i rm over 
the e m i r e year , the untabula ted results are similar to the main results. 
' ' S imi la r to the tests of H2, my main regress ions for tests of H3a are based on the modi f i ed B C K 
model . H o w e v e r , if I inc lude addit ional var iables f r o m P a y n e ' s model (ABSACCR and PERSIST), the 
un tabu la ted resul t s are s imi lar to those repor ted . 
H3b regresses the differences in forecast accuracy between the 'worst ' analyst and 
the 'best ' analyst based on each of the analyst quality proxies on audit firm industry 
specialisation and the control variables. 
Po + PIINDSP + fi2ABSFE_B + FLJDIFANQ + (Model 6) 
P4ANQ_B + P:IHORLZON_B + P^DIFHORIZON + 
DIFABSFE = PJDISP + P^S1ZE +PGNUMEST +P,OZSCORE + 
PjiLOSS + PNABSECHG + p,_<STDROE + PmEL + 
YEAR +INDUSTRY + e 
Where 
DIFABSFE 
ABSFE B 
ANQ_B 
DIFANQ 
HORIZON B = 
DIFHORIZON = 
CSC0RE3 
(CSC0RE4) 
the absolute forecast error of the 'worst ' quality analyst minus 
the absolute forecast error of the 'best ' quality analyst where the 
'worst ' and 'best ' quality analysts are determined according to 
v a r i o u s a n a l y s t q u a l i t y p r o x i e s ; GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE, STAR, 
CSCORE3 a n d CSCORE4; 
the absolute forecast error (an inverse function of forecast 
accuracy) of the 'best ' analyst, according to various analyst 
q u a l i t y p r o x i e s : GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE, STAR, CSC0RE3 a n d 
CSC0RE4: 
the level of the quality proxy for the 'best ' analyst, where the 
'best ' analyst is determined according to various analyst quality 
p r o x i e s : GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE, STAR, CSC0RE3 a n d 
CSC0RE4); 
the level of the quality proxy for the 'best ' analyst minus the 
level of the quality proxy for the 'worst ' analyst, where the 
'worst ' and 'best ' analysts are determined according to various 
a n a l y s t q u a l i t y p r o x i e s : GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE, STAR, CSCORE3 
a n d CSC0RE4: 
the number of days between forecast estimation/revision date 
and subsequent actual earnings reporting date of the 'best ' 
analyst, where 'best ' analyst is determined according to various 
a n a l y s t q u a l i t y p r o x i e s : GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE, STAR, CSC0RE3 
a n d CSC0RE4: 
the number of days between forecast estimation/revision date 
and subsequent actual earnings reporting date of the 'worst ' 
analyst minus the number of days between forecast 
estimation/revision date and subsequent actual earnings 
reporting date of the 'best ' analyst , where the 'worst ' and 'best ' 
analysts are determined according to various analyst quality 
p r o x i e s : GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE, STAR, CSCORE3 a n d 
CSC0RE4: a n d _ r u , . • 
composite score, measured as the aggregate of the analysts 
rankings for each individual analyst quality proxy, where the 
ranking is conducted within the cohort of analysts following a 
firm in a given year. CSC0RE3 incorporates the rankings for 
f o u r p r o x i e s {GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE a n d STAR), CSCORE 4 
incorporates the rankings for three proxies {GEXP, FEXP and 
STAR). 
Once more, 1 employ the dichotomous measure of INDSP in my main tests, and 
discuss results using the continuous measure of INDSP in my sensitivity tests. If 
audit quahty does reduce the difference in forecasting accuracy between the 'worst' 
and 'best ' analysts, as per H3b, the coefficient of INDSP is expected to be 
significantly negative. 
5.5.4 Summary of Methods Used to Test Each Hypothesis 
In the above sections, I described various estimation methods and discussed the 
relevance of each method for testing my hypotheses. Table 5.3 summarises the 
measures of industry specialisation and the regression methods employed in the 
testing of each hypothesis. 
Table 5.3: Summary of Methods 
Hypotheses Hla Hlb H2 H3a H3b 
INDSP measures 
INDSP (dichotomous) yes yes yes yes yes 
WD5P (continuous) yes yes sensitivity 
Estimation Methods 
OLS (One-way clustering) yes yes yes yes 
OLS (Two-way clustering) yes 
2SLS yes yes sensitivity 
PSM yes yes yes yes yes 
Heckman sensitivity sensitivity sensitivity sensitivity sensitivity 
*The cells denoted as 'yes' ('sensitivity') indicate that I use the above measures and 
estimation methods in the main tests (sensitivity tests). 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I discussed the research design used to test the hypotheses developed 
in Chapter 3. Section 5.2 briefly described the general form of the regression models 
and the structure of my data. Section 5.3 discussed the various measures for the key 
independent variables (audit firm industry specialisation, analyst quality and firm's 
operating risk), dependent variables (analyst forecast accuracy and the difference in 
forecast accuracy between the 'worst' and 'best' analysts) and control variables. 
Section 5.4 discussed the estimation methods relevant for each of my hypothesis 
tests, and Section 5.5 provided the full models. In the following chapter, I describe 
the data collection process and steps used to determine the final sample for each 
hypothesis test, followed by a discussion of the descriptive statistics. 
CHAPTER 6: SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced and described the regression models and statistical 
methods used to test my hypotheses. In this chapter, I describe the data collection 
process and sample selection for each test (Section 6.2), and report the descriptive 
statistics and correlat ions among the variables (Sections 6.3 and 6.4). Section 6.5 
concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Data Collection and Sample Selection 
This section describes the sources of data used in my thesis and the criteria upon 
which the final samples were determined. The regression models used and the data 
required for testing Hypothesis la. Hypothesis l b and Hypothesis 2 are similar, and 
thus I describe the data collection and sample derivation for these tests collectively 
in Section 6.2.1. Tests of Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b employ analyst quality 
data, and as such, the final samples and variables differ f rom those used for testing 
earlier hypotheses . This is described in Section 6.2.2. 
6.2.1 Data Collection and Sample Selection for Tests of Hla, Hlb and H2 
My sample comprises U.S. f i rms for the period 1989 to 2010. The sample begins in 
year 1989 because this is the earliest year common to the papers most closely related 
to my study (BCK 2008; Payne 2008).^ ' Payne 's (2008) sample begins in 1989, 
I r e -es t imate the lesis on the re la t ionship be tween analyst forecast accuracy and audit f i rm industry 
specia l i sa t ion by res t r ic t ing the sample to (a) the years included in B C K ' s s tudy ( 1 9 9 6 - 2 0 0 1 ) and (b) 
P a y n e ' s s tudy per iod ( 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 0 5 ) . I obtain results qual i ta t ively similar to my m a m results . 
likely because this is the year in which the Big 8 audit f i rms became the Big 6. 
Analys ts ' forecasts and their respective actual values were obtained f rom the I/B/E/S 
Detail History file. Client f i rms ' financial data and the data used to calculate audit 
f i rm industry specialisation were obtained f rom COMPUSTAT North America 
Industrial file.^'' 
As the major i ty of my empirical tests examine long-horizon forecast accuracy, I 
focus on describing the derivation of the long-horizon forecast accuracy sample. I 
applied similar procedures to derive the short-horizon sample; however, for brevity, I 
do not discuss the derivation of this sample at length here (see Appendix C for 
details). Table 6.1 describes the derivation of the sample used to test H l b and H2. 
The sample derivation for tests using the Payne-type models (BCK-type models) is 
illustrated in the first (last) two columns of Table 6.1. There are 62,385 firm-year 
observat ions for which there are sufficient data to compute long-horizon consensus 
forecast errors, of which 13,791 (24,757) f irm-year ob.servations are missing 
financial information on COMPUSTAT necessary to estimate the Payne-type models 
(BCK-type models) . The greater sample attrition for the BCK-type models is due to 
the additional data required to estimate the f ive-year standard deviation of return of 
equity (STDROE), and Zmi jewsk i ' s financial distress score (ZSCORE) (a large 
number of f i rms in the financial sector do not have the current assets and current 
liabilities that are required to compute the liquidity ratio for estimating ZSCORE). 
^Mn my sens i t iv i .y analys is , I use aud , . fees (rather than el ients ' assets) to e a M a t e audit firm 
mdus t ry spec ia l i sa t ion . Aud i t fees were obta ined f rom Audit Analyt tes for the per tod 2 0 0 0 to 2010. 
I now focus my description on the sample derivation using Payne-type models.^' 
Following Payne (2008), I restrict my sample to clients of Big N firms to control for 
any potential factors that might affect my analysis induced by audit firm size. This 
reduces my sample by 5,278 observations. Financial sector firms (firms with SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6999) are then excluded (4,689 firm-year observations)^^ 
due to the special regulatory requirements impo.sed on this industry, which may 
affect f i rm's choice of industry specialist audit firms and cause abnormal accrual 
estimation. Following Payne (2008), I require a minimum of 20 observations in each 
two-digit SIC industry-year to obtain a stable indicator of audit firm industry 
specialisation, reducing the sample by a further 551 observations. Thirteen firm-year 
observations are excluded, as these firms received modified audit opinions, which 
would likely mitigate the potential impact of modified audit opinions on the quality 
of financial statements. To enable the meaningful calculation of price-deflated 
analyst forecast dispersion (DISP), I require at least three analysts to issue forecasts 
within a given window and for one-month lagged stock prices to be available. This 
reduces my sample by a further 9,249 observations. Finally, following Payne, I 
exclude 1,530 extreme observations (i.e. l"/99"' percentile of each untransformed 
continuous variable) to minimise the impact of outliers on the regression results.^' 
Therefore, the final sample consists of 27,284 firm-year observations for the long-
horizon sample using regressions based on Payne (2008). The additional data 
requirements of the endogeneity-corrected regressions (the one-year lag of client 
BCK (2008) do not detail tlieir sample construction procedure, whereas Payne (2008) explicitly 
.shows the impact of each procedure on the sample. Thus, 1 largely follow Payne's procedures to 
derive my sample. 
The data requirement for non-fmancial firms only reduces BCK's sample by 725 iirm-year 
observations because many financial firms are dropped in the first stage when I require data to 
compute ZSCORE. 
" To be consistent with Payne and BCK's approaches, the control variables, firm size (SIZE) and 
analyst following (NUMEST) are not truncated because the natural log values of the variables are 
used. Earnings per share (EL) is winsorized at 5 (-5). 
f i r m ' s operat ing cycles, absolute accruals, absolute earnings change, earnings 
persistence and analyst forecast dispersion) further reduce the sample employed in 
those models (21,232 firm-years) . A similar sample construction procedure applied 
to short-horizon forecast errors generates a sample of 31,806 f irm-year observations 
(31,358 for endogenei ty-corrected models). Despite my study spanning an additional 
f ive years, my sample is jus t 3,670 observations greater than Payne 's . There are two 
likely reasons for this. First, Payne uses the I/B/E/S Summary File, which contains a 
number of 's tale ' forecasts , and which may therefore result in fewer observations 
being fil tered due to low analyst coverage. Second, following the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis, I/B/E/S retrospectively deleted all forecasts issued by a number of 
brokers . ' " The equivalent samples employed in the BCK-type regressions are slightly 
smaller (25,489 in the single-stage models and 21,119 in the two-stage mode l s ) . " 
Hypothesis 2 is tested by augment ing the BCK-type models with main effects and 
interaction terms incorporating cash f low volatility. The availability of data 
necessary to est imate this additional measure reduces my sample to 23,558 cases for 
testing H2 (in Panel B of Table 6.1). 
' " F o r e x a m p l e , in the 2 0 1 0 detail tape update , I/B/E/S permanent ly r emoved forecas ts m a d e by 16 
brokers ( W R D S 2 0 1 0 / / e / £ A notes) . ^c-T-r^o^r, i f 
" W i t h o u t the inclus ion of the s tandard deviat ion of return on equity (STDROE). my sample for the 
s ing le -s tage B C K - t y p e regress ions conta ins 27 ,904 firm-year observat ions . Th is ,s s imilar to the 
2 7 , 2 8 4 de r ived under the Payne - type models . 
Table 6.1: Sample Selection for Tests of H l b and H2 
Panel A Tests of Hlb 
Payne-type models BCK-type models 
Available long-horizon consensus 
forecasts 62,385 62,385 
less: unavailable financial information 
from COMPUSTAT -13,791 48,594 -24,757 37,628 
less: non-Big N firms -5,278 43,316 -3,277 34,351 
less: financial sector firms -4,689 38,627 -725 33,626 
less: firms in industries with less than 
20 members in a given year -5.51 38,076 -491 33,135 
less: firms subject to modified audit 
opinions - 1 3 38,063 -11 33,124 
less: observations where forecast 
dispersion cannot be calculated -9,249 28,814 -6,903 26,221 
less: extreme observations for 
continuous variable (1/99 percentile) -1,530 -732 
Final sample of long-horizon forecast 
(used in single-stage models) 27,284 25,489 
less: additional data requirements for 
the endogeneity-corrected regressions -6,052 -4,370 
Final sample of long-horizon forecast 21,232 21,119 (used in 2SLS) 
Panel B: Tests of H2 
Available sample from Hlb 25,489 
less: insufficient data to estimate cash 
flow volatility 
-1,931 
Final sample for H2 23,558 
6.2.2 Data Collection and Sample Selection for Tests of H3a and H3b 
The samples used to test H3a and H3b begin in year 1993 because this is the earliest 
year for which I have access to data regarding the identity of 'All-Star' analysts. I 
obtain data to compute analyst quality proxies (except for the 'All-Star' proxy) from 
the 1/B/E/S detail file. To compute the average value of analyst quality proxies at the 
firm-year level, I first need to calculate individual analysts' general experience, firm-
specific experience and their employer size. I identify the individual analysts and 
brokers either by reference to the I/B/E/S broker translation file (which has not been 
updated since 2006 and is no longer publicly distributed), or by cross-referencing to 
153 
the analyst and broker names and codes reported in the 1/B/E/S Detail 
Recommenda t ions file. T o track analyst experience over as long a period as possible, 
the sample period used to compute the experience proxies spans 1983-2010, as the 
I/B/E/S database identifies most contributing analysts f rom igSS.'^^ This is consistent 
with the approach taken in prior studies (Emery and Li 2009; Clement 1999). 
Clement (1999, 294) acknowledges that the I/B/E/S data set is left censored such that 
an analyst exper ience prior to the first year of available data is unknown. In 
particular, year d u m m y variables are likely to be systematically correlated with the 
est imated experience measures, even though they may be exogenous to analysts ' 
(unobservable) true experience. While Clement (1999) estimates experience using 
data f rom 1983-1994, he conducts regression analysis for the period 1985-1994 to 
mitigate the left censoring problem. This approach is widely adopted in later studies 
(Brown 2014; Emery and Li 2009; Lee 2004). The 10-year pre-sample window 
(1983-1992) in my study reduces, but does not eliminate, mechanical bias arising 
f rom the left censoring bias. To address the potential collinearity between year 
dummies and the experience variables, I estimate models using the OLS with 
standard errors, clustering by firm and year rather than including year dummies. 
I identified 'All-Star ' analysts by reference to the rankings published in the back 
archive of the II magazine. 'All-Star ' rankings for the years 1993-1999 with 
matched analyst and broker codes were kindly provided by Craig Brown, and were 
manual ly collected f rom the magazine for the remaining sample years (2000-2010) . 
This source provides analysts ' full names, their employer firm, their rankings (P* 
' ' F o r the yea r s p r io r to 1983, the UB/E/S Deta i l His to ry f i le inc ludes 2 3 0 iden t i f i ab le ana ly s t s (i .e. 
ana lys t c o d e s lhat a re n o n - z e r o and non -mis s ing ) w h o f o l l o w e d 108 firms. F o r 1983, there are 2 , 2 8 0 
i d e n t i f i a b l e a n a l y s t s f o l l o w i n g 2 , 7 4 5 firms. C o v e r a g e inc reases the reaf te r . 
place, 2"'' place, place or r u n n e r - u p ) ' ' and the industry sector in which these 
analysts were awarded their rankings. Consistent with much prior literature (Loh and 
Stulz 2010; Marcus et al. 2014; Chan et al. 2004), I recognised an analyst as an 'All-
Star ' if the analyst is ranked (including runner-ups) in a particular year, regardless of 
the industry in which a particular client f i rm is a member. '" ' 
Table 6.2 Panel A describes the procedures used in constructing my sample for tests 
of H3a. I el iminate 2 ,710 f irm-year observations f rom the available sample (25,489) 
used in the tests of H l b due to the missing data for the 'All-Star ' rankings prior to 
1993. Fol lowing Jacob et al. (1999) and Clement (1999), if analyst and broker codes 
are missing or equal to ' 0 ' , or analyst names do not indicate an individual analyst but 
correspond to an industry or team grouping (i.e. the names provided include 
company, group or industry names), these analysts are excluded f rom the analyst 
quality sample. Accordingly, f irm-year observations where an insufficient number of 
analysts/brokers can be clearly identified according to this criterion are eliminated 
(31). My final sample for tests of H3a consists of 22,742 observations. 
" Analysis ' rankings are determined by numerical score. An analyst is designated runner-up when the 
analyst 's score falls within 35 per cent of third-analyst's score ill's magazine). 
Some prior studies (Emery and Li 2009) classify analysts as an 'All-Star' only in the industries m 
which they are ranked. Others (Chan et al. 2004; Marcus et al. 2014) do not differentiate according to 
industry classification. To preserve my 'All-Star' sample size in testing H3b (where I require a firm to 
be followed by at least one 'All-Star' analyst), I do not differentiate the industry classification. Since 
prior studies (Stickel 1992; Chan et al. 2004) show thai 'All-Star' analysts' superior forecast accuracy 
relative to other analysts persists after the selection year. I conduct additional analysis, which includes 
the testing of multiple variations in the time window over which an analyst is identilied as an 'All-
Star ' . 
Table 6.2: Sample Selection for Tests of H3a and H3b 
Panel A Tests for H3a 
Available sample from HIb 
less: firm-year observations prior to 1993 due to the 
missing value for the 'All-Star' rankings 
less: firm-year observations where mean analyst 
quality proxies cannot be computed (i.e. firm-year 
observations followed exclusively by analysts whose 
analyst codes on I/B/E/S are missing or analyst codes 
equal to '0 ' ; or whose analyst names include 
'industry', 'group' or 'company' name) 
Final sample for tests of H3a 
-2,716 
-31 
25,489 
22,773 
22,742 
Panel B Tests of H3b (Experience, Brokerage Size and Composite Score Proxies) 
Available sample from H3a 
less: extreme observations of the dependent variable 
(1/99 percentile) 
less: cases where the 'worst' and 'best' analysts have 
equivalent measures of a quality proxy 
Final sample for tests of H3b using the experience, 
brokerage size and composite score proxies 
-601 
-1,616 
22,742 
22,141 
20,525 
Panel C Tests of H3b ('All-Star' Proxy) 
Available sample from H3a 
less: extreme observations of the dependent variable 
Less: firms that do not have at least one 'All-Star' and 
one non-star analyst 
Final sample for tests of H3b using the 'All-Star' 
proxy 
-251 
-13,215 
22,742 
22,49! 
9,266 
Table 6.2 Panel B describes the procedures used in deriving my sample for tests of 
H3b. The dependent variable in tests of H3b is the difference in absolute forecast 
errors of the 'worst ' and 'best ' analysts (where the 'worst ' and 'best ' analysts are 
determined for each of the analyst quality proxies). I first exclude extreme 
observations for the dependent var iables , ' ' reducing my sample to 22,141. I then 
eliminate 1,616 cases where a f i rm's 'worst ' and 'best ' quality analysts have 
identical values for a quality proxy (e.g. analysts who have the same length of 
general or firm-specific experience; or analysts whose employers ' sizes are the 
' ' T h e t runca t ion is c o n d u c t e d af ter compu t ing the d i f fe rence in absolu te forecast er rors of "worst ' and 
' bes t ' analys ts . 
same).'"' Therefore, when I test H3b using experience, brokerage size and composite 
score proxies for analyst quality, my final sample is reduced to 20,525 firm-year 
observations. Tests using the 'All-Star' proxy are further constrained by the 
requirement that a firm is followed by at least one analyst on the 'All-Star' list and 
one analyst not on the 'All-Star' list. This requirement and the exclusion of extreme 
cases give a final sample of 9,266 for tests of H3b, which use 'All-Star' status as the 
proxy for analyst quality. 
6.3 Descr ipt ive Statist ics 
The descriptive statistics for the variables included in the models are presented in 
Section 6.3.1. Section 6.3.2 reports the univariate comparisons of the means and 
medians of the variables across two groups—clients of industry specialists and non-
specialists—for the unrestricted samples. Section 6.3.3 shows the differences in the 
mean value of the covariates across these two groups in the propensity score 
matched samples. 
6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the firm-year-level measures of 
analyst-related variables (Panel A), auditor and client firm variables used in all tests 
(Panel B), and the additional variables employed for tests of H3b (Panel C). 
Panel A tabulates the analyst-related variables measured at firm-year level. The 
tabulated statistics for analyst short-horizon absolute forecast errors, forecast 
dispersion and forecast horizon variables (rows 1 to 6) are based on the short-horizon 
" W i t h o u t this s a m p l e restr ic t ion, the untabula ted regress ions show resul ts that are similar to my main 
resul ts . 
enciogeneity-corrected BCK models used to test HI a. The descriptive statistics 
reported for long-horizon absolute forecast errors (rows 7 to 12) and other analyst-
related variables (rows 13 to 18) are based on the long-horizon sample used for tests 
of H 3 a . ' ' Unsurpris ingly, analysts ' earnings forecasts are more accurate at year-end 
than at the beginning of the year. The mean (median) price-scaled short-horizon 
forecast errors (ABSFE) are 0.012 (0.002), relative to mean (median) price-scaled 
long-horizon forecast errors of 0.026 (0.008). While the mean of the short-horizon 
forecast errors are slightly smaller than that reported by BCK (2008), their median 
value is very close to B C K ' s (0.003). Similarly, the mean and median price-scaled 
forecast dispersion (DISP) are smaller at year-end than for those forecasts made at 
the beginning of the year. This increased consensus in earnings reflects the change in 
available information at year-end. The distributions of the analyst quality and 
analysts ' portfol io complexi ty variables are similar to those reported by Drake and 
Myers (2011), who cover a shorter sample period (i.e. 1993-2008). For example, 
analysts in my sample have an average general experience (GEXP) of 6.938 years 
and an average f i rm-specif ic experience (FEXP) of 3.266 years, which is comparable 
to the 7.1 years and 3.5 years, respectively, tabulated by Drake and Myers (2011). 
On average, a f i rm is fol lowed by analysts whose brokerage f irm (BSIZE) employs 
approximately 56 analysts; and 10.9 per cent of the analysts covering a f irm have 
been ranked as 'Al l -Star ' analysts (STAR) by the II ranking system. The portfolio 
complexi ty variables show that on average an analyst fol lows approximately 17 
f i rms (FFOLLOW) and five industries (IFOLLOW). This is consistent with the 
statistics reported by Drake and Myer (2011). 
" T h e un tabu la ted descr ip t ive statist ics for long-t iorizon analyst-re la ted var iables in the tests of H l b 
and H 2 are s imi lar to those repor ted in Tab le 6.3. 
Panel B reports the distributions of my auditor and client financial data. 
Approximately 38 per cent of the firms are clients of an industry specialist audit firm, 
which is slightly higher than the 35.15 per cent reported by Payne for an overlapping, 
but earlier, sample period. Firm size (SIZE), as measured by mean assets (market 
capitalisation) is approximately $5,320 billion ($6,065 billion). The firms included in 
my sample are slightly larger compared to those included in Payne and BCK's 
studies, reflecting the relative recency of my sample. An average of seven analysts 
(NUMEST) follow a firm in a given year, which is slightly lower than the nine 
reported by Payne (2008) in examining the short-horizon forecasts. The lower 
number of analyst following in my long-horizon sample reflects analysts' tendency 
to issue forecasts more frequently at year-end. Firms in my sample have similar 
levels of uncertainty/risk (ZSCORE and ABSACCR) to those in BCK and Payne's 
samples. Approximately 15.8 per cent of the firm-year observations experience a 
loss (LOSS) in the current year, compared to 14.4 per cent in Payne's sample.'^ 
Variables capturing earnings variability (ABSECHG, STDROE, PERSIST) have 
distributions similar to those reported by Payne (2008) and BCK (2008), with the 
exception of earnings per share (EL), which has a mean of 1.043 dollars compared to 
the 42.6 cents reported by BCK (2008). This difference in EL may be attributable to 
my use of the //B/£A-defined EPS rather than the GAAP operating profit from 
COMPUSTAT. The average earnings per share (EL) calculated based on the GAAP 
operating profit is 79 cents. The use of //B/£/S-defined earnings appears preferable, 
as these reflect the 'Pro Forma' earnings that are the focus of analysts' forecasts, 
upon which my dependent variables are based. My primary operating risk proxy, 
client cash flow volatility (CEVOL), has an average value of 0.05, which is similar to 
" If L 0 5 5 is computed using the net earnings available on COMPUSTAT. the mean is 0.24, compared 
to 0.35 reported by BCK (2008). 
that reported by Dichev and Tang (2009) (0.039) over a shorter sample period 
(1988-2004) . 
Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for the difference in absolute forecast errors 
of the 'wors t ' and 'best" analysts for each of the analyst quality proxies and 
additional control variables employed for testing H3b. As expected, the average 
absolute forecast errors of the 'wors t ' analysts {ABSFE_W) are slightly larger than or 
equal to those of the 'best ' analysts {ABSFE_B). On average, the 'best ' and 'worst ' 
analysts covering a f i rm have an approximately eleven-year difference in general 
exper ience and a six-year difference in f irm-specific experience (DIFANQ). The 
mean di f ference in the number of analysts employed by a brokerage f irm is 6.343. 
The 'best ' analysts covering a given f i rm on average have around 13.526 years' 
(7.174 years ' ) general experience (firm-specific experience) and are employed by a 
brokerage f i rm with around 118 analysts (ANQ_B). There is not a large difference in 
the mean value of forecast t iming between the 'worst ' and 'best ' analysts 
(DIFHORIZON). However , it is notable that the standard deviation of the 
DIFHORIZON is relatively large (ranging f rom 2 0 - 3 2 days), which implies that the 
variations in forecast t iming may have an impact on these analysts ' forecasting 
performance. 
Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A Analyst -Related Variables Used in the Tests of H l a - H 3 a 
M E A N SD Q l M E D I A N 0 3 
Short-horizon ( n = 2 8 . 7 0 n 
ABSFE_un* 0.093 0.165 0 .013 0 .038 0.098 
ABSFE 0.012 0.07 0.001 0.002 0.007 
DISP_eps* 0.118 0.275 0.014 0.035 0.094 
DISP 0.006 0 .013 0.001 0.002 0.005 
HORIZON {Log) 3.199 0.782 2.89 3.346 3.717 
HORIZON(Days) 25 2 18 28 41 
Long-hor i zon (n=22,742) 
ABSFE_un* 0.329 0.485 0.057 0.156 0.389 
ABSFE 0.026 0.053 0.003 0 .008 0.024 
DISP_eps* 0.177 0.402 0.025 0.061 0.152 
DISP 0.009 0.017 0.001 0.003 0.009 
HORIZON(Log) 5.712 0 .100 5.677 5.709 5.745 
HORIZON(Days) 304.470 34.853 285.000 296.000 316.000 
GEXP 6.938 2.752 5.000 6.778 8.500 
FEXP 3.266 2.006 1.800 2.857 4 .333 
BSIZE 56.477 29.395 34.800 53.400 73.615 
STAR 0.109 0 .166 0 .000 0.000 0.191 
FFOLLOW 16.860 6.988 13.250 16.000 19.000 
IFOLLOW 5.213 2.636 3.286 4.750 6.500 
*The statistic for this variable is computed based on the sample used for the endogeneity-corrected 
Payne's model. 
Panel B Audit F irm Industry Specialisation and Firm--Level Variables Used in the Tests of 
H l a - H 3 a 
M E A N S D Q l M E D I A N Q 3 
lNDSP_dum 0.381 0.486 0 .000 0.000 1.000 
INDSP_cont 0.049 0.044 0.016 0.043 0.069 
SIZE (asset)($B) 5.320 16.483 0.322 0.994 3.473 
SIZE (market cap) (SB) 6.065 19.664 0.400 1.144 3.662 
NUMEST(number) 6.806 5.489 3.000 5.000 9.000 
NUMEST(log) 1.653 0.714 1.099 1.609 2.197 
ZSCORE - 1 . 6 1 9 1.536 - 2 . 6 6 8 - 1 . 6 5 5 - 0 . 7 5 6 
ABSACCR* 0.083 0.071 0.036 0 .066 0.110 
LOSS 0.158 0.365 0 .000 0 .000 0.000 
PERSIST* 0.600 0.480 0 .000 1.000 1.000 
ABSECHG 0.036 0.063 0.007 0.014 0.036 
STDROE 0.074 0.101 0.019 0.039 0.083 
EL 1.043 1.272 0.280 0.870 1.680 
CFVOL (Raw)** 0.050 0 .043 0.023 0 .038 0.062 
CFVOL (Log)** - 3 . 2 7 0 0 .740 - 3 . 7 5 0 - 3 . 2 6 0 - 2 . 7 8 0 
*The statistic for this variable is computed based on the sample used for the endogeneity-corrected 
Payne's model. 
**The statistic for this variable is computed based on the sample for tests ofH2. 
Panel C Addit ional Var iables Used in the Tests of H 3 b 
DIFABSFE ABSFEJW ABSFEJ DIFANQ ANQ_B HORIZON B (days) DIFHORIZON (days) 
Dif ference Based on GEXP (n=20,S25) 
M E A N 0 .000 0 .024 
M E D I A N 0.000 0 .009 
S D 0 .014 0.047 
Dif ference Based o n FEXP (n=20,52S) 
M E A N 0 .000 0 .024 
E D I A N 0.000 0 .009 
SD 0 .013 0.047 
Dif ference Based on BSIZE (n=20,525) 
M E A N 0 .000 0 .024 
M E D I A N 0 .000 0.009 
SD 0.015 0.047 
Difference Based on STAR (n=9,266) 
M E A N 0 .000 0 .020 
M E D I A N 0.000 0 .008 
S D 0.007 0.041 
Difference Based on CSCORE3 (n=20,52S) 
M E A N 0.000 0.024 
M E D I A N 0.000 0 .008 
S D 0.015 0.047 
Difference Based on CSCORE4 (n=20,525) 
M E A N 0 .000 0.024 
M E D I A N 0 .000 0.009 
SD 0 .014 0.047 
0.024 
0.009 
0.047 
0 .024 
0 .009 
0.047 
0.024 
0 .008 
0.046 
0.020 
0.008 
0.041 
0 .024 
0.009 
0.047 
0 .024 
0 .009 
0.047 
11.296 
11.000 
6 .064 
6.343 
5 .000 
4 .855 
6.343 
5 .000 
4 .855 
13.942 
8.500 
14.920 
11.396 
7 .500 
11.510 
13.526 
13.000 
5.676 
7 .174 
6 .000 
4 .845 
117.930 
127.000 
58 .050 
23.475 
17.000 
18.811 
18.062 
13.000 
14.311 
304 .240 
296 .000 
34.638 
303 .873 
296 .000 
33.966 
302 .560 
294 .000 
33.986 
302.966 
295 .000 
34.345 
303.518 
295.000 
34.493 
- 1 . 1 4 3 
0 .000 
30 .782 
- 1 . 5 9 4 
0 .000 
29 .020 
3 .555 
0.000 
33.161 
2 .920 
3 .750 
20.781 
1.209 
0.000 
31.989 
- 0 . 5 5 8 
0.000 
30.763 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for f irm-year-level measures of analyst-related variables (Panel A), auditor and client f irm variables used in all tests (Panel B) and 
the additional variables employed in the tests of H3b (Panel C). Variable definit ions arc provided in Table 6.7. 
6.3.2 Univariate Comparisons (Full Sample) 
Table 6.4 reports the univariate comparisons of variables across clients of industry 
specialist auditors and those of other auditors for my full samples. Panel A presents 
the differences in means and medians across the variables used in testing HI a, Hlb , 
H2 and H3a. Clients of industry specialists are generally larger (SIZE), have greater 
analyst following (NUMEST), experience less severe financial distress (ZSCORE), 
have a higher level of accruals (ABSACCR) and likelihood to incur financial losses 
{LOSS), have less persist earnings (PERSIST), lower earnings per share (EL) and 
more volatile returns on equity (STDROE)!^'^ These statistics are generally consistent 
with those reported by Payne (2008). In summary, all of the firm-level control 
variables significantly differ in means between clients of industry specialist audit 
firms and those of non-specialists, emphasising the importance of conducting 
additional analysis on propensity score matched samples. Panel B reports the 
differences in means and medians across the additional controls included in tests of 
H3b. I find significant mean and/or median differences in every case except for the 
variables relating to forecast horizon. 
" T h e t-statist ics are repor ted based on the d i f fe rences in the mean values of the variables, where 
d i f f e r ences equal the mean va lue of a non-spec ia l i s t ' s client character is t ics minus that of a spec ia l i s t ' s 
cl ient character is t ics . The re fo re , a negat ive t-statistic indicates a greater mean value of a specialist 
c o m p a r e d to a non-special is l . 
T a b i c 6 . 4 : U n i v a r i a t e C o m p a r i s o n s o f R e g r e s s i o n V a r i a b l e s ( F u l l S a m p l e n = 2 2 , 7 4 2 ) 
Panel A Variables Used in Ihe Tests of H l a - H 3 a 
(1) Industry Specialist 
( .W.12%) 
(2) Non-induslrv Specialist 
(61.8»%) Differences (2) - (1) 
MEAN MEDIAN SD MEAN MEDIAN SD t-stat wilcoxon 
ABSFE (SH) 0.025 0.(K)8 0.05 0.027 0.009 0.056 - 0 . 8 5 -3 .146*** 
DISP (SH) 0.009 0.004 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.015 - 3 . 4 3 * * * -6 .759*** 
ABSFE (LH) 0.025 0.008 0.052 0.026 0.009 0.054 3 9*** 2.321** 
DISP(I.H) 0.01 0 .004 0.018 0.008 0.003 0.015 -7 .59*** -7 .355*** 
HORIZON (SH) 3.23 3.36 0.755 3.18 3.34 0.796 - 3 . 5 * * * _4.051*** 
HORIZON (I.H) 5.714 5.711 0.117 5.711 5.707 0.089 - 2 . 4 6 * * -4 .702*** 
GEXP 6.666 6.417 2.769 7.106 7 2.728 11.75*** 13.972*** 
FEXP 3.097 2.625 1.969 3.37 3 2.021 9.97*** 11.435*** 
BSIZE 56.459 53.333 28.794 56.488 53.5 29.76 0.07 -0 .291 
STAR 0.096 0 0.154 0.117 0 0.172 9.45*** 8.994*** 
FFOLLOW 16.771 15.667 7.632 16.915 16 6.56 1.51 7.035*** 
/FOLLOW 5.055 4 .733 2.348 5.311 4.8 2.794 7.12*** 3.195** 
SIZE (asset) 
(SB) 
6.375 0.963 18.486 4.669 1.01 15.081 -7 .59*** 2.546*** 
SIZE (market 
8.031 1.262 24.911 5.084 0.994 18.422 -4 .29*** -2 .832*** 
cap) ($8) 
NUMEST 1.675 1.609 0.73 1.627 1.609 0.703 -4 .95*** -4 .186*** 
ZSCORE - 1 . 5 3 9 - 1 . 6 4 6 1.761 - 1 . 6 6 8 - 1 . 6 5 9 1.377 -6 .16*** -1 .851*** 
ABSACCR* 0.092 0.069 0.079 0.082 0.065 0.069 -10 .28*** -8 .251*** 
LOSS 0.229 0 0.42 0.114 0 0.317 -23 .56*** -23 .281*** 
PERSIST* 0.591 1 0.492 0.609 1 0.488 3*** 2.995*** 
ABSECHG 0.037 0.014 0.065 0.036 0.014 0.062 - 1 . 7 2 * 0.045 
STDROE 0.098 0.051 0.126 0.059 0.033 0.078 -28 .93*** -25 .217*** 
EL 0.825 0.682 1.312 1.178 0.98 1.227 20.53*** 21.17*** 
CEO VOL** 0.056 0.04 0.051 0.047 0.037 0.037 -15 .42*** -8 .243*** 
*The statistic for 
model. 
**The statistic for 
this variable is computed based on the sample used for the endogeneity-corrected Payne's 
this variable is computed based on the sample for tests of H2. 
Panel B Additional Variables Used in tbe Tests of H3b (Based on CSC0RE4 Analyst Quality Proxy 
MEAN MEDIAN SD MEAN MEDIAN SD t-stat wilcoxon 
DIEABSFE 0 0 0.015 0 0 0.015 2.23** 1.465*** 
ABSFE_W 0.025 0.009 0.048 0.025 0.009 0.048 2.31** 2.623** 
ABSFE_B 0.024 0.009 0.048 0.024 0.009 0.048 1.61 2.174** 
DIEANQ 13.579 8.5 14.324 13.579 8.5 14.324 -4 .46*** -3 .519*** 
ANQ_B 24.387 17.5 20.087 22.918 17 17.965 -5 .43*** -3 .867*** 
HORIZON_B 
(days) 
DIFHORIZON 
303.826 
0.928 
295 
0 
41.05 
31.301 
302.441 
0.928 
295 
0 
29.499 
31.301 
- 2 . 8 
- 1 . 6 1 
- 0 . 6 0 5 
- 0 . 0 9 4 
(davs) 
of other auditors for my full samples. Panel A presents the differences in means and medians across the variables 
used in the tests of H l a , H l b . H2 and H3a. Panel B reports the differences in the means and medians across the 
additional controls included in the tests of H3b. Variable defmitions are provided in Table 6.7. 
6.3.3 Univariate Comparisons {Propensity Score Matched Sample) 
1 address the potential endogenous selection of specialist auditors using a variety of 
approaches, including the use of a propensity score matched sample. This approach 
produces matched sample based on propensity scores generated from a logistic 
regression of auditor selection against factors posited to affect this choice. Table 6.5 
reports the mean differences across clients of industry specialists and non-specialists 
for all control variables, thereby testing the sample-balancing effectiveness of the 
propensity matching approach. For brevity, I only tabulate the statistics for the 
matching conducted in the tests of HIb , and the te.sts of H3a and H3b when the 
composite score measure (constructed ba.sed on four analyst quality proxies) is used. 
Using the one-to-one nearest neighbour within-caliper matching approach, my 
matched samples represent between 16 and 20 per cent of the full samples. The final 
calipers used range between I and 2.5 per cent (i.e. the treatment and control firms 
have an absolute difference in propensity scores of less than 1 or 2.5 per cent). 
Importantly, there are no significant differences in the means of any covariates 
across the two groups. 
I also evaluate the range of common support and the predictive power of each of my 
matching models. I plot histograms (untabulated) for the propensity scores of the 
treatment firms (clients audited by an industry specialist) and control firms (clients 
audited by a non-specialist) after each matching regression, and observe that control 
firms' propensity scores generally span the full range of the propensity scores of the 
treatment firms. I tabulate the first stage of the PSM regressions in Appendix D. The 
pseudo R^ statistics are generally above 48 per cent and the area under the ROC for 
all first-stage matching models is above 90 per cent, which suggests that my 
matching models are of great predictive power. Among the predictors, client size 
(SIZE) and volatility in return on equity (STDROE) appear to be the most important 
factors explaining the choice of industry specialist auditors, as these variables are 
correlated with INDSP across all models where these variables are included. 
In summary, the PSM approach adopted is of great predictive power for the selection 
of auditors and has been successful in generating a balanced sample, at least in terms 
of the determinants of auditor selection identified in my thesis. 
Table 6.5: Univariate Comparisons of Means (Propensity Score Matched Samples) 
Panel A Tests of Hlb (BCK-type Models) 
Industry Specialist 
Mean (1) 
Non-industry Specialist 
Mean (2) / ) -valuei 
DISP 0 .009 0 .009 0 .573 
HORIZON 5.709 5.711 0.441 
SIZE 6.782 6.822 0 .429 
NUMEST 1.668 1.676 0.711 
ZSCORE - 1 . 9 1 3 - 1 . 8 9 7 0.701 
LOSS 0.145 0 .153 0 .42 
ABSECHG 0 .039 0 .039 0 .938 
STDROE 0.072 0 .077 0.1 
EL 0 .918 0 .903 0 .654 
N 2,421 2,421 
Firs t -s tage model : INDSP = DISP + HORIZON + SIZE + NUMEST + ZSCORE + LOSS + 
ABSECHG + STDROE + EL + YEAR + INDUSTRY 
Malct i ing ca l iper size 0 .0125 
Panel B Tests of Hlb (Payne-type Models) 
Industry Specialist Non-industry Specialist 
Mean (1) Mean (2) p-value.s-
DISP 0 .009 0 .009 0 .655 
SIZE 6 .722 6 .796 0 .122 
NUMEST 10.408 10.635 0.311 
ABSACCR 0 .095 0 .092 0 .273 
LOSS 0 .142 0 .141 0 .875 
ABSECHG 0 .039 0 .038 0 .598 
PERSIST 0 .603 0 .601 0 .866 
N 2 .649 2 .649 
Fi rs t -s tage model : INDSP = DISP + SIZE + NUMEST + ABSACCR + LOSS + ABSECHG + 
PERSIST + YEAR + INDUSTRY 
M a t c h i n g ca l iper size 0 .025 
Panel C Tests of H3a 
Industry Specialist 
Mean (1) 
Non-industry Specialist 
Mean (2) p-value.s 
FFOLLOW 17.739 17.742 0 .992 
IFOLLOW 5.627 5 .599 0 .746 
DISP 0 . 0 1 0 0 .010 0 .340 
HORIZON 5 . 7 1 0 5 .708 0 .507 
SIZE 6 . 9 5 0 6 .923 0.641 
NUMEST 1.694 1.704 0 .673 
ZSCORE - 1 . 8 5 2 - 1 . 8 7 5 0 .652 
LOSS 0 .154 0 .167 0 .302 
ABSECHG 0 .040 0 .038 0 .505 
STDROE 0 .076 0 .079 0 .239 
EL 0 .945 0 .948 0.941 
N 1,843 1.843 
Firs t -s tage model : INDSP = FFOLLOW + IFOLLOW + DISP + HORIZON + SIZE + NUMEST h 
ZSCORE + LOSS + ABSECHG + STDROE + EL + YEAR + INDUSTRY 
Match ing ca l iper size 0.01 
Panel D Tests of H3b 
Industry Specialist 
Mean (1) 
Non-industry Specialist 
Mean (2) p - v a l u e i 
ABSFE_B 0 .0250 0 .027 0 .378 
DIFANQ 15.593 16.470 0 .157 
ANQ_B 9.995 10.282 0 .113 
DISP 0 .008 0 .008 0 .972 
HORIZON_B 302 .920 303 .350 0 .692 
DIFHORIZON 0 .718 1.826 0 .324 
SIZE 7.071 7 .056 0 .805 
NUMEST 1.783 1.806 0 .366 
ZSCORE - 1 . 8 5 4 - 1 . 8 8 3 0 .562 
LOSS 0 .135 0 .146 0 .343 
ABSECHG 0 .036 0 .035 0 .544 
STDROE 0 .075 0 .079 0 .167 
EL 1.011 1.0145 0.941 
N 1,662 1.662 
Firs t -s tage model ; INDSP = DIFANQ 
NUMEST + ZSCORE + LOSS + ABSECHG + STDROE + EL + YEAR + INDUSTRY 
M a t c h i n g cal iper size 0 .025 
This table presents the mean d i f fe rences across cl ients of industry specialist auditors and non-
special is ts for all control var iables for tests of H l b using Payne- type models (Panel A) or BCK- type 
mode l s (Panel B), tests of H 3 a (Panel C) and tests of H 3 b (Panel D). Var iable def in i t ions are provided 
in T a b l e 6.7. 
6.4 Correlation Analysis 
This section reports the analyses in which the potential multicollinearity issues are 
identified and addressed. Colhnearity refers to a strong linear relationship between 
two independent variables. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent 
variables in a regression model are highly correlated with one another. A high degree 
of multicollinearity in multiple regression analysis may inflate the standard errors of 
the coefficients even though the R^ for the regression is high, and may cause the 
parameter estimates to be highly sensitive to small changes in the data (Greene 2002, 
57). Researchers commonly calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to detect 
the occurrence of multicollinearity (O'Brien 2007). VIFs show to what extent the 
estimated variance of a regression coefficient exceeds the level that would be 
obtained if the independent variables were uncorrected with other variables in the 
model (O'Brien 2007, 674). As a general rule in the literature, values of 'VIF greater 
than 10 may be taken as an indication for multicollinearity concern (Neter et al. 1989, 
409; Kennedy 1992, 183; Marquardt 1970). 
Table 6.6 provides the correlation matrix for the key variables, including long-
horizon absolute forecast errors, difference in absolute forecast errors, audit firm 
industry specialisation, f irm's operating risk, and analyst quality proxies and control 
variables. Panel A shows the correlation matrix for the variables used in tests of H lb 
and H2. Absolute forecast errors (ABSFE) are correlated negatively and significantly 
with the continuous measure of auditor industry specialisation (/A'DSP)'" and are 
positively and significantly associated with cash flow volatility (CFVOL). All 
™ In the untabula ted correla t ion matrix, both measures of audit f i rm industry spec iahsa l ion 
( con t inuous and d i c h o t o m o u s measures ) are signif icantly related to raw or pr ice-del la led forecast 
er rors . 
control variables are significantly associated with absolute forecast errors,"" The 
correlations among control variables are generally below 0.5, with the exception that 
LOSS has a correlation with earnings per share (EL) of -0.5872, and absolute 
earnings change (ABSECHG) and forecast dispersion {DISP) has a correlation of 
0.5494. 
Panel B of Table 6.6 reports the correlation matrix for key variables employed in 
tests of H3a and H3b. As expected, absolute forecast errors (ABSFE) are correlated 
negatively and significantly with each of the analyst quality proxies. The dependent 
variable for tests of H3b, DIFABSFE, calculated based on the composite score 
measure is negatively correlated with INDSP.'°^ In addition, positive and significant 
correlations are observed among the analyst quality proxies, with the highest 
correlation (0.5188) between the two experience proxies, as expected. The 
correlations among the analyst quality proxies are similar to those reported by Drake 
and Myers (2011). The variables proxied for analysts' portfolio complexity 
{FFOLLOW and IFOLLOW) are correlated with ABSFE, INDSP and analyst quality 
proxies. In the untabulated correlation matrix, there are significant correlations 
among my analyst quality proxies and all of the control variables. For each 
regression estimated, I follow prior literature (e.g. O'Brien 2007) and calculate VIFs 
to examine the potential impact of multicollinearity diagnosis on my models. No VIF 
exceeds three, suggesting no serious multicollinearity concern for my models. 
" " T h e tabula ted correla t ion matr ix includes pr ice-dena ted absolute forecast errors. In the untabulated 
corre la t ion matrix, control var iables are also signif icantly correlated with undef la ted absolute forecast 
er rors . 
102 For brevi ty , I only tabulate the correlat ion for d i f fe rence in forecast errors (DIFABSFE) es t imated 
based on the compos i t e score proxy. Similar correlat ions are found when using other analyst quali ty 
p rox ies to ident i fy the 'wor s t ' and 'bes t ' analysts in comput ing DIFABSFE. 
Table 6.6: Correlation Matrix 
ABSFE 
INDSP 
_cont 
CFVOL DISP SIZE ABSECHG L O S S ZSCORE H O R I Z O N STDROE NUMEST EL 
ABSFE 1 
INDSP^cont - 0 . 0 3 9 3 1 
CFVOL 0 .1863 - 0 . 0 8 0 8 1 
DISP 0.5052 0.017 0 .2254 1 
SIZE - 0 . 3 4 4 6 0 .1343 - 0 . 3 0 0 6 - 0 . 2 9 5 1 1 
ABSECHG 0.7283 - 0 . 0 1 9 1 0.2468 0.5494 - 0 . 3 2 7 8 1 
LOSS 0.4538 0.0641 0 .2826 0.4518 - 0 . 3 1 1 8 0 .44 1 
ZSCORE 0.2341 0.1 - 0 . 0 6 4 8 0.289 - 0 . 0 0 2 9 0.2477 0 .2878 1 
HORIZON 0.0538 0.0135 0 .0142 0.0351 - 0 . 0 5 2 7 0.0185 0.0401 0 .0186 1 
STDROE 0.2055 0 .0628 0 .4476 0.2754 - 0 . 2 4 9 2 0 .2816 0.3944 0 .1706 0 .0379 1 
NUMEST - 0 . 0 6 9 7 0.0025 - 0 . 0 2 5 3 - 0 . 0 0 6 2 0.475 - 0 . 0 4 7 4 - 0 . 0 5 6 1 - 0 . 0 1 4 4 - 0 . 0 2 5 6 - 0 . 0 2 0 8 1 
EL - 0 . 3 3 4 7 - 0 . 0 0 4 3 - 0 . 2 9 6 4 - 0 . 3 1 7 5 0.4961 - 0 . 3 1 4 9 - 0 . 5 8 7 2 - 0 . 1 2 6 1 - 0 . 0 3 1 6 - 0 . 3 3 8 4 0 .1647 1 
Panel B Variables Used in the Tests of H3a and H3b 
ABSFE 
DIFABSFE 
_CSC0RE4 
INDSP 
_con> 
GEXP FEXP BSIZE STAR CSC0RE4 FFOLLOW I FOLLOW 
ABSFE 1 
DIFABSFE 
_CSC0RE4 0.0251 1 
INDSP _conl - 0 . 0 2 3 6 0.002 1 
GEXP - 0 . 0 1 8 3 0.0015 - 0 . 0 3 5 4 1 
FEXP - 0 . 0 5 2 5 - 0 . 0 0 0 6 0 .0163 0.5188 1 
BSIZE - 0 . 0 3 2 9 0.0057 0.0485 0.0569 0.095 1 
STAR - 0 . 0 1 7 3 0.0042 - 0 . 0 3 6 7 0.1838 0.2114 0.35 1 
CSC0RE4 - 0 . 0 4 4 1 0.0011 0.0327 0 .4253 0.4143 0 .3876 0.1663 1 
FFOLLOW - 0 . 0 0 9 2 0.0008 0.0917 0.2227 0.1859 - 0 . 0 8 4 6 0.1389 - 0 . 0 2 5 7 1 
I FOLLOW - 0 . 0 1 0 7 0.0027 - 0 . 0 8 0.1413 0.0531 - 0 . 2 4 8 7 - 0 . 0 6 2 6 - 0 . 0 6 4 7 0.4267 1 
This lahle presents the correlation matrix for variables used in the tests o i ' H l b and H2 (Panel A) and H3a and H3b (Panel B). Variable defini t ions are provided in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7: Variable Definitions 
ABSFE = analysts ' absolute forecast errors (an inverse function of forecast 
accuracy), measured as the absolute value of difference between actual 
l/B/E/S earnings per share and forecast earnings per share, deflated by 
beginning-of-month stock price; 
ABSFE_im analysts ' absolute forecast errors (undeflated), measured as the absolute 
value of the difference between actual I/B/E/S earnings per share and 
forecast earnings per share; 
DISP = forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of analysts' 
forecasts deflated by the beginning-of-month slock price; 
DISP_eps = forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of analysts' 
forecast EPS deflated by the absolute value of the mean EPS forecast 
during the period; 
HORIZON (days) = the average number of days between mean forecast estimation date and 
subsequent actual earnings reporting date; 
HORIZON (log) = the natural log of the average number of days between mean forecast 
estimation date and subsequent actual earnings reporting date; 
GEXP = the average general experience of all analysts following a firm during the 
window over which long-horizon forecast accuracy is calculated, where 
general experience is measured as the number of years through year t for 
which an analyst / supplied at least one forecast for any firm; 
FEXP = the average firm experience of all analysts following a firm during the 
window over which long-horizon forecast accuracy is calculated, where 
firm experience is measured as number of years through year t for which 
an analyst i supplied at least one forecast for firm j\ 
BSIZE = the average brokerage size that employs analysts following a firm during 
the window over which long-horizon forecast accuracy is calculated, 
where brokerage size is measured as number of analysts employed by a 
broker employing analyst i who follows firm j in year f; 
STAR = the proportion of the analysts following firm j, during the long-horizon 
forecast window, who are ranked as an 'All-Star ' by ll's All-America 
Research Team in year t: 
CSC0RE3 = composite score, measured as the aggregate of the analysts ' rankings for 
(CSC0RE4) each individual analyst quality proxy, where the ranking is conducted 
within the cohort of analysts following a firm in a given year. CSCORE3 
incorporates the rankings for four proxies (GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE and 
STAR), C S C O R E 4 incorporates the rankings for three proxies (GEXP, 
FEXP and STAR)-, 
FFOLLOW = the average of the number of firms covered, during the long-horizon 
forecast window in year t, by each analyst who issues a forecast for firm j 
during that window; 
IFOLLOW = the average number of two-digit SIC industries covcred, during the long-
horizon forecast window in year I, by each analyst who issues a forecast 
for firm j during that window; 
INDSP_cont = the continuous measure of portfolio-share industry specialisation, 
measured as the sum of the square root of the total assets of the clients 
that an audit firm services in a specific industry divided by the sum of the 
square root of the total assets of all clients of that audit firm; 
INDSP_dum = the dichotomous measure of portfolio-share industry specialisation, equal 
to 1 if INDSP_cont > (3 / number of two-digit industry codes used in the 
analysis in any given year), 0 otherwise; 
SIZE (asset) = the natural log of total assets; 
SIZE (market cap) = the natural log of the market value of equity; 
NUMEST(number) = the number of analysts issuing forecasts for the firm in the 90-day 
window prior to reporting date; 
NUMEST(log) = the natural log of the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the 
firm in the 90-day window prior to earnings reporting; 
ZSCORE = Zmijewski ' s financial distress score; 
ABSACCR = ihe absolute total accruals, measured as the difference between net incomc 
and cash How from operations divided by lagged total assets; 
LOSS = 1 if a firm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; 
PERSIST = 1 if observation lies between the 20th and 80th percentiles of distribution 
of the annual earnings change, 0 otherwise; 
ABSECHG = the absolute value of the change in annual earnings, deflated by 
beginning-of-month stock price; 
STDROE = the standard deviation of return on equity over the previous five years; 
EL = earnings per share, winsorized at 5 (-5); 
CFVOL (raw) = cash flow volatility, measured as the 5-ycar standard deviation of net cash 
flows from operating activities deflated by average total assets; 
CFVOL (log) = cash flow volatility, measured as the natural log of the 5-year standard 
deviation of net cash flows from operating activities deflated by average 
total assets; 
DIFABSFE = the absolute forecast error of the 'worst' quality analyst minus the 
absolute forecast error of the 'best ' quality analyst where the 'worst ' and 
'best ' quality analysts are determined according to various analyst quality 
proxies defmed above: GEXP, FEXP. BSIZE, STAR, CSC0RE3 and 
CSCORE4: 
ABSFE_B = the absolute forecast error of the 'best' quality analyst, according to 
various analyst quality proxies: GEXP, FEXP. BSIZE, STAR, CSCORE3 
and CSC0RE4-. 
ABSFE_W = the absolute forecast error of the 'worst ' quality analyst, according to 
various analyst quality proxies: GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE, STAR. CSCORE3 
and CSC0RE4-, 
ANQ_B = the level of the quality proxy for the 'best ' analyst, where the 'best' 
analyst is determined according to various analyst quality proxies: GEXP, 
FEXP, BSIZE, STAR. CSCORE3 and CSC0RE4-. 
DIFANQ = the level of the quality proxy for the 'best' analyst minus the level of the 
quality proxy for the 'worst ' analyst, where the 'worst' and 'best ' analysts 
are determined according to various analyst quality proxies: GEXP. 
FEXP, BSIZE, STAR, CSCORE3 and CSC0RE4; 
H0RIZ0N_B = the number of days between forecast estimation/revision date and 
subsequent actual earnings reporting date of the 'best' analyst, where 
'best ' analyst is determined according to various analyst quality proxies: 
GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE, STAR. CSC0RE3 and CSC0RE4: and 
DIFHORIZON = the number of days between forecast estimation/revision date and 
subsequent actual earnings reporting date of the 'worst ' analyst minus the 
number of days between forecast estimation/revision date and subsequent 
actual earnings reporting date of the 'best' analyst , where the 'worst ' and 
'best ' analysts are determined according to various analyst quality 
proxies: GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE, STAR. CSC0RE3 and CSC0RE4. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I described the sources of data and procedures used to determine my 
final sample for each hypothesis test in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, I reported the 
descriptive statistics for the variables employed in each model and conducted 
univariate compar isons of variables across clients of industry specialist audit f i rms 
and those of non-specialists for both unrestricted and propensity score matched 
samples. Section 6.3 contained the correlation analysis. In the fol lowing chapters, I 
present and analyse the results for each hypothesis test. 
C H A P T E R 7: RESULTS FOR TESTS OF 
H Y P O T H E S E S l A A N D IB 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters described the measurement of icey variables, regression 
models and the sample employed in my thesis. In this chapter, I present and analyse 
the results for the tests of Hypotheses la and lb. Section 7.2 reports and analyses the 
results for the tests of Hypothesis la, which predicts a non-directional association 
between short-horizon forecast accuracy and audit f irm industry specialisation. The 
results for the tests relating to the relationship between long-horizon forecast 
accuracy and audit f i rm industry specialisation (Hypothesis lb) are detailed in 
Section 7.3. To examine the robustness of my main results, I present and discuss the 
.sensitivity and additional test results in Sections 7.4 and 7.5. Section 7.6 concludes 
the chapter. 
7.2 Tests of Hypothesis la (Short-Horizon Regressions) 
Hypothesis l a predicts that analysts ' absolute short-horizon forecast errors are 
associated with audit f i rm industry specialisation. As earlier papers (BCK 2008; 
Payne 2008) make diametrically opposite predictions regarding the relation between 
auditor industry specialisation and forecast accuracy, and each of those predictions 
are based on plausible rationales, I do not predict a sign for INDSP coefficients and 
present two-tailed p-values adjusted for within-firm clustering using the method of 
Petersen (2009). Below I pre.sent and analyse the results of the regressions based on 
BCK-type (Section 7.2.1) and Payne-type models of short-horizon forecast errors 
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(Section 7.2.2). For brevity, I do not tabulate the coefficients for the industry and 
year indicator variables. 
7.2.1 BCK-type Models 
I discussed the limitations in B C K ' s original model in Chapter 5 and augmented the 
model to include an additional control variable and correction for the endogenous 
determination of auditor industry specialisation. The results for the original BCK 
model are now analysed, followed by those for the alternately specified models. 
7.2.1.1 Models based on BCK 
Table 7.1 reports the results for the regressions based on BCK (2008), Model BCK 
la is the original B C K ' s model, while Model lb differs f rom the original only in that 
the INDSP is measured using a dichotomous variable. 
po + p,INDSP + P2HORIZON + p,SIZE + 
ABSFE = P4NUMEST + P,ZSC0RE + P6L0SS+ ^ 1 nd 1 h> 
PjABSECHG + PsSTDROE + PGEL + YEAR + e 1 a ana 1 d; 
Models BCK l a and lb are well fitted {R- = 0 .310 ) . ' " 'Wh i l e BCK report that 
industry specialisation is negatively associated with forecast errors for a non-Big 5 
client sample, they find no significant relationship between a continuous measure of 
INDSP and forecast errors when their sample is restricted to Big N clients ( f i = 
-0 .0164 , two-tailed p = 0.4715). My re-estimation of BCK' s original model over the 
1989-2010 period also generates an insignificant but considerably smaller negative 
These R^ statistics are considerably higher than those reported by BCK. I consider this largely 
arises because of the distribution of the ABSECHG variable. BCK do not clearly define the 
measurement of this variable. I used the priced-defiated change in actual EPS as reported by I/B/E/S 
(as per Payne 2008). From the descriptive statistics in BCK. it appears that they may have used the 
COMPUSTAT-dsUnti earnings per share, shocks to which will have a noisier association with 
forecast errors, because analyst-defined earnings frequently 'strip ouf the impact of one-off charges 
af fec t ing G A A P earnings. 
coefficient for INDSP (Model BCK la ^ = -0 .0013 , p = 0.608) in a Big N client 
sample. To investigate whether this difference in significance is driven by variation 
in the sample period, I re-estimate Model BCK la using BCK's sample period and 
find that the coefficient for INDSP changes little. However, if I replace the absolute 
change in I/B/E/S earnings per share (ABSECHG) with the absolute change in GAAP 
EPS f rom continuing operations, the coefficient for INDSP is -0 .017 (almost 
identical to B C K ' s coefficient) and there is a significant deterioration in model fit 
(R^ = 0.254). The coefficient for the dichotomous measure of INDSP (Model BCK 
lb) is also negative but insignificant. All control variables are significant with the 
exception of the earnings level (EL). STDROE has the opposite sign to that predicted 
(i.e. absolute forecast errors are lower for firms with greater variability in earnings), 
which may reflect the mechanical correlation between this variable and ABSECHG. 
If ABSECHG is omitted from the regression, STDROE becomes positive and 
significant. In summary, the re-estimation of BCK's models confirms BCK's results 
that auditor industry specialisation is not associated with short-horizon analysts' 
absolute forecast errors. 
7.2.1.2 BCK model with control for dispersion 
In Models BCK 2a and 2b, I add price-deflated dispersion {DISP) as an additional 
control variable, as presented below. 
Po + PiINDSP -H + piHORIZON + P4SIZE ^^^ 
ABSFE = + PsNUMEST + P6ZSC0RE + P7LOSS + 2a and 2b) 
PsABSECHG + pgSTDROE + PwEL + YEAR + e 
In Columns BCK 2a and 2b of Table 7.1, while model fit improves significantly 
(increases in R^ of 7.4 per cent), the coefficient for auditor industry specialisation is 
not significant in either regression. Coefficients for the other control variables are 
similar to those reported in Models BCK la and lb . 
7.2.1.3 BCK models with endogeneity correction 
To control for the potentially endogenous selection of auditors, I employ a 2SLS 
regression for the model using the continuous measure of INDSP (Model 3a) and a 
propensity score matched sample regression for that using the dichotomous measure 
of INDSP (Model 3b). I now discuss the results of the 2SLS regressions, followed by 
an analysis of the propensity score matched sample results. 
Under 2SLS, the first-stage regression is estimated by OLS (Model BCK 3a- l ) , 
where I obtain the predicted value for auditor industry specialisation, which replaces 
the actual value of industry specialisation in the second-stage model (Model BCK 
3a-2). The first-stage model of the 2SLS regressions (Model Payne 3a-1) includes all 
of the controls f rom the second-stage model and two instrumental variables: the 
relative size of an industry (INDRELSIZE) and client 's operating cycle (CYCLE). 
The models are as follows: 
First-stage model (2SLS) 
Po + fiilNDRELSIZE + P2 CYCLE + P^DISP + (Model 
_ P4HORIZON + p.SIZE + P^NUMEST + pjZSCORE + BCK 3a-1) 
INDSP - p^ioSS+P9ABSECHG+p,(^TDROE + PnEL + 
YEAR+ e 
Second-stage model (2SLS) 
PO + P,INDSP + P2DISP + p,HORIZON + P4SIZE + (Model 
ABSFEadj = p,NUMEST + P6ZSCORE + P7LOSS + PHABSECHG BCK 3a-2) 
-I- PgSTDROE + PioEL + YEAR + e 
1 report the results of the second-stage of the endogeneity-corrected regressions 
(Model B C K 3a-2) in Column BCK 3a of Table 7.1. The results of the first-stage 
regression are tabulated in Appendix E. Several specification tests are conducted to 
examine the relevance and exogeneity of the candidate instruments. First, I examine 
the LM statistics, Wald-type F-statistics and partial R" to assess the relevance 
(particularly, weak identification) of my instruments. I report a large LM statistic 
(7228.503, p < 0.001), which indicates that the correlation between my candidate 
instruments and the endogenous regressor (INDSP) are statistically different f rom 
zero (i.e. not under-identified). The reported F-statistic (F = 3538.255), which is 
much larger than the suggested critical F-value (11.59) for cases where the number 
of instruments is two (Stock et al. 2002), indicates that my instruments are not 
weakly identified. The partial R^ of my instruments in the first-stage regression is 
38.16 per cent. Therefore , my instruments are clearly relevant to the prediction of the 
endogenous variable (INDSPjconi). I then conduct Sargan over-identification tests 
to examine the exogeneity of the instruments. The null hypothesis under the Sargan 
test is that all candidate instruments are exogenous, and the reported Sargan over-
identification statistics present no evidence that the instruments for auditor 
specialisation are endogenous (p = 0.9511). Having established an appropriately 
specified model, I then estimate Durban-Wu-Hausman (DWH) tests to assess 
endogenei ty. The D W H test of Model BCK 3a-2 generates evidence of endogeneity 
(p = 0 .0365), indicating that OLS estimates are inconsistent. After correcting for this 
endogenei ty , the continuous measure of auditor specialisation (INDSP_cont) has a 
negative but insignificant coefficient (P = -0 .0064 , p = 0.274). 
To control for the impact of endogenous selection of auditors in Model BCK3b-2, 
which measures specialisation using a dichotomous variable, a PSM approach is 
employed. The base specifications for the first and second-stage models, which use 
the controls from the single-stage regression model as predictors of auditor industry 
specialisation, are presented below in Models BCK 3b-1 and 3b-2. 
First-stage model (PSM) 
Po + PiDlSP + PiHORIZON -h fi.SIZE + P4NUMEST + (Model 
INDSP = [hZSCORE + PoLOSS + P7ABSECHG + PuSTDROE + BCK 3b-1) 
PgEL -(- YEAR + INDUSTRY + e 
Second-stage mode! (PSM) 
PO + PIINDSP + P2DISP + PJHORIZON + P4SIZE + ( M o d e l 
ABSFE = PSNUMEST + POZSCORE + PJEOSS + PHABSECHG + B C K 3 b - 2 ) 
figSTDROE + PioEL + YEAR + INDUSTRY + e 
Using the first-stage regression (Model BCK 3b-1, tabulated in Appendix D) to 
calculate propensity scores, and imposing a one-to-one matching subject to a 
maximum absolute difference in propensity scores (i.e. a caliper distance) of 2.5 per 
cent, the matched sample consists of 4,606 firm-year observations, which 
represents approximately 16 per cent of the unrestricted sample. As reported in 
Chapter 6, this sample is well balanced, with no significant differences in the means 
of any control variables across the treatment and control firms. I tabulate the results 
for tests of the matched sample in Column BCK 3b of Table 7.1, in which the 
coefficient for my test variable, INDSP_dum, is positive and insignificant (P = 
0.0008, = 0.153). All control variables are similar to tho.se reported above. 
™ Roscnbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest that caliper size should be less than or equal to a quarter of a 
standard deviat ion of the estimated propensity score of the sample. Applying this constraint to my 
sample I es t imated the first-stage regression using various caliper sizes equal to or less than 0.095 (25 
per cent of the standard deviation of the estimated propensity score of my sample). A caliper size of 
0 .025 is used as a matching criterion because this provides the largest balanced sample. 
In Chapter 5, I noted that a major difference between B C K ' s regressions and those of 
Payne is that BCK do not control for industry effects. Given that both forecast errors 
and my measures of auditor industry specialisation are likely to be correlated with 
industry grouping, I conduct further untabulated analysis of the BCK-type models. I 
find that insignificant coeff icients for auditor industry specialisation proxies can be 
generated in all BCK-type models either by (a) adding industry dummies 
representing each two-digit SIC group, (b) adding industry-year dummies, (c) 
adjust ing client forecast accuracy by the industry-year mean of this measure or (d) 
adjust ing all regressors by their industry-year mean. 
In summary , tests based on the BCK-type models generate no evidence that auditor 
industry specialisation is associated with analysts ' absolute short-horizon forecast 
errors. Thus, H l a is not supported. 
Table 7.1: Short-Horizon Forecast Errors against Current Year Audit Firm Industry Specialisation (Tests of H l a using BCK-type Models) 
D c D c n d e n t V a r i a b l e ; ABSFE 
M o d e l s / C o l u m n s B C K l a B C K 2 a B C K 3 a B C K l b B C K 2 b B C K 3 b 
INDSP_conr (continuous measure) INDSP_dum (dummy measure) 
P r e d . B C K ' s M o d e l P r i c e - d e l l a t e d DISP 2 S L S B C K ' s M o d e l P r i c c - d e l l a l e d DISP P S M 
INDSP 7 - 0 . 0 0 1 3 0 . 0 0 1 1 - 0 . 0 0 6 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 8 
( 0 . 6 0 8 ) ( 0 . 6 0 3 ) ( 0 . 2 7 4 ) ( 0 . 4 1 7 ) ( 0 . 4 7 1 ) ( 0 . 1 5 3 ) 
DISP + 0 . 6 1 5 1 * * * 0 . 5 6 0 4 * * * 0 . 6 1 5 2 * * * 0 . 6 5 3 9 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
HORIZON + 0 . 0 0 0 7 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 5 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 5 * * 0 . 0 0 0 7 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 5 * * * 0 . 0 0 1 8 * * * 
( 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 1 2 ) ( 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 5 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
SIZE 9 - 0 . 0 0 1 1 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 5 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 4 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 1 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 5 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 7 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 3 ) 
NUMEST - - 0 . 0 0 1 7 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 3 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 7 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 7 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 3 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 1 * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 1 6 ) 
ZSCORE + 0 . 0 0 1 3 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 3 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 4 * * * 0 . 0 0 1 3 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 4 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 5 * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 , 0 5 4 ) 
LOSS + 0 . 0 1 3 7 * * * 0 . 0 0 6 9 * * * 0 . 0 0 6 4 * * * 0 . 0 1 . 3 7 * * * 0 . 0 0 6 9 * * * 0 . 0 0 6 1 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
ABSECHG + 0 . 1 7 0 7 * * * 0 . 1 1 1 9 * * * 0 . 1 0 4 0 * * * 0 . 1 7 0 6 * * * 0 . 1 1 1 9 * * * 0 . 1 2 9 7 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
STDROE + - 0 . 0 1 3 8 * * * - 0 . 0 1 1 4 * * * - 0 . 0 1 1 9 * * * - 0 . 0 1 3 7 * * * - 0 . 0 1 1 5 * * * - 0 . 0 0 6 9 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 , 2 1 2 ) 
EL + 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 3 * 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 3 
( 0 . 1 1 1 ) ( 0 . 4 1 6 ) ( 0 . 0 7 2 ) ( 0 . 1 1 9 ) ( 0 . 3 9 8 ) ( 0 . 4 4 6 ) 
Y E A R y e s y e s y e s y e s y e s y e s 
CONSTANT 0 . 0 1 8 9 * * * 0 . 0 0 9 5 * * * - 0 . 0 0 3 7 * * * 0 . 0 1 8 9 * * * 0 . 0 0 9 5 * * * 0 . 0 0 9 6 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 8 ) 
N 2 9 , 4 0 1 2 8 , 7 0 1 3 5 , 4 5 5 2 9 , 4 0 1 4 , 6 0 6 
R- 0 . 3 1 0 0 . 3 8 4 0 . 3 1 5 0 . 3 1 0 0 . 3 8 4 0 . 4 0 6 
Durb in -Wu-Hausman test (p-value) 0 .0365 
Sargan Over-identif icat ion test (p-value) 0.9511 
Partial-R of instruments in first-stage 0 .3816 
Wald F-statisties 3538.255 
L M 7228.503 
Robust p-values of the coeff icients are two-tailed reported in parentheses (*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) . 
This table presents the results for the tests of H l a based on B C K ' s original model (Columns BCK la and BCK lb), B C K ' s model with control for forecast dispersion 
(Columns B C K 2a and B C K 2b). and B C K ' s model with endogeneity correction using a 2SLS regression (Column B C K 3a) or a propensity score matched sample regression 
(Column B C K 3b). 
Variable Definitions: ABSFE is analysts ' absolute forecast errors (an inverse function of forecast accuracy), measured as the absolute value of d i f ference be tween actual 
I/B/E/S earnings per share and forecast earnings per share, deflated by beginning-of-month stock price; INDSP is the cont inuous measure of portfol io-share audit f i rm 
industry specialisation (all models suffixed 'a ' ) , measured as the sum of the square root of the total assets of the clients that an audit f i rm services in a specific industry 
divided by the sum of the square root of the total assets of all clients of that audit firm (INDSP_cont)\ or the dichotomous measure of portfol io-share audit firm industry 
specialisation (all models suff ixed 'b ' ) , equals 1 if lNDSP_cont > (3 / number of two-digit industry codes used in the analysis in any given year), 0 otherwise (INDSP_dum)\ 
DISP is forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of analysts ' forecast EPS deflated by the beginning-of-month stock price; HORIZON is the natural log of the 
average number of days between mean forecast estimation date and subsequent actual earnings reporting date; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity; NUMEST 
is the natural log of the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the firm in the 90-day window prior to earnings reporting; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s financial distress 
score; LOSS equals 1 if a firm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; ABSECHG is the absolute value of the change in annual earnings, deflated by beginning-of -month s tock 
price; STDROE is the standard deviation of return on equity over the previous five years; EL is earnings per share, winsorized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the indicator variable for 
each year 1989-2010. 
7.2.2 Payne-type Models 
T h e or ig inal P a y n e ' s (2008) m o d e l s and adapta t ion of these models employ ing 
a l ternate de f la to r s and correc t ion for e n d o g e n o u s determinat ion of industry specialist 
audi tors w e r e desc r ibed in Chap te r 5. In this sect ion, I analyse the results for the 
or iginal P a y n e ' s m o d e l s first , f o l l owed by those for the al ternately specif ied models . 
7.2.2.1 Original Payne model 
Tab le 7.2 repor ts the resul ts of the Payne- type models . Mode l s Payne l a and l b 
presen ted be low are spec i f ied as per Payne (2008) , in which audit f i rm industry 
specia l isa t ion is measu red us ing con t inuous or d i cho tomous variables, respect ively, 
and analys t forecas t accuracy and dispersion are measured in undef la ted cents per 
share. 
Po + PI INDSP + P2DISP_eps + PJSIZE + 
P4NUMEST + P^BSACCR + PILOSS + (Models Payne 
" PJABSECHG + P,PERSIST + YEAR + l a a n d l b ) 
INDUSTRY + e 
C o l u m n s Payne l a and l b of Tab le 7.2 present the results for the original P a y n e ' s 
mode ls . T h e mode l s are reasonably well f i t ted = 0.181 in each). Consis tent with 
P a y n e ' s results , both measu re s of INDSP are posi t ive (/? = 0 .0718 for INDSP_coni; p 
= 0 .009 fo r INDSP_dum), h o w e v e r only the d icho tomous measure is s ignif icant in a 
two-ta i led test (p = 0 .012) . The coef f ic ien t for INDSPjcont is smaller than that 
repor ted by Payne (fi = 0 .158) . Th is possibly reflects P a y n e ' s use of the l/B/E/S 
S u m m a r y His tory f i le , ra ther than the Detail History file, and the result ing inclusion 
of stale fo recas t s that subtend larger forecas t errors. If I fo l low Payne and apply 
unad ju s t ed O L S s tandard errors (rather than f i rm-clustered s tandard errors) the 
coe f f i c i en t fo r INDSP^cont is s ignif icant ( two-tai led f . = 0.051). All control variables 
are in the predicted directions and significant. SIZE, for which I do not predict a 
direction, is significantly positively associated with analysts' forecast errors, likely 
reflecting the higher level of undeflated EPS for large firms. Overall, the re-
estimation of Payne 's models provides tentative evidence of a positive relation 
between auditor industry specialisation and absolute undeflated forecast errors, 
consistent with the proposition that specialist auditors successfully constraining 
earnings management intended to 'meet or just beat ' consensus forecasts. 
7.2.2.2 Payne's model with alternative deflators 
In Models Payne 2a and 2b (presented below), Payne's original model is re-
estimated after deflating both the absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion by 
the beginning-of-month stock price (consistent with BCK and much of the 
literature).'"^ As undeflated forecast accuracy is mechanically affected by the level 
of earnings per share, which in turn is positively associated with the audit quality 
proxies, there is potential for spurious correlation. 
P o + PIINDSP + P2DISP + P,SIZE + P4NUMEST 
ABSFE = + p^BSACCR + PeLOSS + PVABSECHG + ^ 2a and 2b) 
PHPERSIST + YEAR + INDUSTRY + e ' 
The adjusted models show that the R" statistics (0.383; 0.380) are more than double 
those of the Models Payne la and lb. Saliently, the coefficient for the dichotomous 
measure INDSP_dum (Model Payne 2b) is now negative and significant (P = 
-0 .0013 , p = 0.009), directly contradicting the results produced by Model Payne lb. 
The coefficient for the continuous measure of INDSP (Model Payne 2a) is also 
" " Resul ts are qual i tat ively s imilar to those reported if I scaled forecast errors by the absolute value of 
actual earnings . 
negative, but insignificant. Most control variables remain significant, although SIZE 
bears no relation to absolute forecast errors in these models. 
7.2.2.3 Endogeneity correction in Payne's model 
As above, I use 2SLS and propensity score matched sample regressions to correct for 
the possible endogenous selection of industry specialist audit firms, the results of 
which are discussed below. Column 3a of Table 7.2 reports the results of the 
endogeneity-corrected 2SLS regressions. While the 2SLS is employed, my 
instruments (INDRELSIZE and CYCLE) are both relevant (LM statistics: 1106.083, p 
< 0.001; F-statistics: 548.529), and exogenous (p-values f rom Sargan tests of 0.1744). 
There is strong evidence of endogeneity in Model Payne 3a (DWH test: p < 0.01), 
and the endogeneity-corrected coefficient for INDSP is now significantly negative (fi 
= -0 .0148 , p = 0.0124).'"® Column 3b of Panel B reports the results of tests using the 
propensity score matched sample. The means of all covariates are insignificantly 
different across treatment and control firms in the matched sample and INDSP has an 
insignificant and positive coefficient (fi = 0.0006, p = 0.23 Ij . 
Given the sensi t iv i ty of two-s tage mode l s to inst rument choice and model specif icat ion, I 
conduc ted a ser ies of untabula ted sensit ivity tests, including the substi tution of cl ients ' capital 
intensi ty for (a l ternate ly) relat ive industry size and operat ing cycle. The coeff ic ient for INDSP 
r ema ined nega t ive and ins ignif icant , but the Sargan tests re jected the null that all ins t ruments were 
exogenous . 
Table 7.2: Short-Horizon Forecast Errors against Current Year Audit Firm Industry Specialisation (Tests of H l a using Payne-type Models) 
D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e : ABSFE 
M o d e l s / C o l u m n s P a y n e l a P a y n e 2 a P a y n e 3 a P a y n e l b P a y n e 2 b P a y n e 3 b 
INDSP_cont (continuous measure) INDSP_dum (dummy measure) 
P r i c e - d e f l a t e d P r i c e - d e f l a t e d 
P r e d . P a y n e ' s m o d e l ABSFE & DISP 2 S L S P a y n e ' s m o d e l ABSFE & DISP P S M 
INDSP 9 0 . 0 7 1 8 - 0 . 0 0 2 8 - 0 . 0 1 4 8 * * 0 . 0 0 9 * * - 0 . 0 0 1 3 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 6 
( 0 . 1 4 7 ) ( 0 . 4 6 1 ) ( 0 . 0 1 2 4 ) ( 0 . 0 1 2 ) ( 0 . 0 0 9 ) ( 0 . 2 3 1 ) 
DISP + 0 . 0 7 5 5 " * 0 . 6 2 1 * * * 0 . 5 5 6 * * * 0 . 0 7 5 5 * * * 0 . 6 2 2 * * * 0 . 7 0 4 5 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
SIZE 9 0 . 0 1 7 5 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 4 * * * 0 . 0 1 7 5 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 2 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) - 0 . 8 4 3 - 0 . 0 0 1 ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) - 0 . 9 5 2 ( 0 . 5 3 3 ) 
NUMEST - - 0 . 0 0 3 3 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 3 4 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 2 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
ABSACCR + 0 . 0 8 1 2 * * * 0 . 0 0 2 4 - 0 . 0 0 1 8 0 . 0 8 1 1 * * * 0 . 0 0 2 3 0 . 0 0 1 6 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 1 7 3 ) ( 0 . 3 6 5 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 1 8 8 ) ( 0 . 6 8 2 ) 
LOSS + 0 . 0 5 7 6 * * * 0 . 0 0 6 1 * * * 0 . 0 0 5 7 * * * 0 . 0 5 7 3 * * * 0 . 0 0 5 6 * * * 0 . 0 0 6 9 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
ABSECHG + 0 . 5 4 4 0 * * * 0 . 0 9 4 7 * * * 0 . 1 0 8 0 * * * 0 . 5 4 5 0 * * * 0 . 0 9 4 5 * * * 0 . 1 2 1 2 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
PERSIST - - 0 . 0 0 7 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 5 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 6 * * * - 0 . 0 0 7 3 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 5 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 7 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 3 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 1 5 7 ) 
Y E A R y e s y e s y e s y e s y e s y e s 
I N D U S T R Y y e s y e s n o y e s y e s y e s 
CONSTANT 0 . 0 1 6 5 0 . 0 0 1 8 - 0 . 0 1 3 6 * * * 0 . 0 1 7 6 0 . 0 0 6 3 * * * 0 . 1 6 2 9 * * 
( 0 . 7 2 5 ) ( 0 . 4 9 6 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 7 0 8 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 1 9 ) 
N 3 1 , 8 0 6 3 1 , 8 0 6 3 1 , 3 5 8 3 1 , 8 0 6 3 1 , 8 0 6 5 , 3 1 6 
R^ 0 . 1 8 1 0 . 3 8 3 0 . 3 0 9 0 . 1 8 1 0 . 3 8 0 0 . 4 1 0 
D u r b i n - W u - H a u s m a n test ( / )-value) 0 . 0008 
Sa rgan Ove r - iden t i f i c a t i on test (p -va lue) 0 . 1 7 4 4 
Par t ia l -R of i n s t rumen t s in f i r s t - s tage 0 . 3 8 9 4 
W a l d F-s ta t i s t ics 5 4 8 . 5 2 9 
L M stat is t ics 1106 .083 
R o b u s t p - v a l u e s o f the c o e f f i c i e n t s are two- ta i led repor ted in pa ren theses ( •" '* n<0 .01 , ** p < 0 . 0 5 , * n<0 .1 ) . 
T h i s table p resen t s the resul ts fo r the tests of H l a based on P a y n e ' s or iginal model ( C o l u m n s Payne l a and Payne lb ) , P a y n e ' s or ig inal m o d e l with a l t e rna t ive d e f l a t o r s for 
fo recas t e r rors and forecas t d i spers ion ( C o l u m n s Pa yne 2a and 2b) and P a y n e ' s original mode l with endogene i ty cor rec t ion us ing a 2 S L S regress ion ( C o l u m n P a y n e 3a) or a 
p ropens i ty score m a t c h e d s a m p l e regress ion ( C o l u m n Payne 3b). 
Variable Definilions: ABSFE is ana lys t s ' absolu te forecas t e r rors (an inverse func t ion of forecas t accuracy) , m e a s u r e d as the abso lu te va lue of d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n ac tua l 
l/B/E/S e a rn ings per share and forecas t ea rn ings per share , deOated by beg inn ing -o f -mon th s tock price (unde l la ted in M o d e l s Payne l a and lb ) ; INDSP is the c o n t i n u o u s 
m e a s u r e of por t fo l io - sha re audi t f i rm indust ry specia l isa t ion, (all mode l s su f f ixed ' a ' ) , measu red as the s u m of the square root of the total asse t s o f the c l ients that an audi t 
f i rm se rv ices in a spec i f ic indust ry d iv ided by the sum of the square root of the total assets of all c l ients of that audit f i rm (lNDSP_conty, or the d i c h o t o m o u s m e a s u r e of 
po r t fo l io - sha re audit f i rm industry specia l isa t ion (all mode l s su f f ixed ' b ' ) , equa l s 1 if INDSP_coiit > (3 / number of two-dig i t indus t ry c o d e s used in the ana lys i s in any g iven 
year) , 0 o the rwise (INDSP_dum)-, DISP is forecas t d ispers ion , measured as the s tandard deviat ion of ana lys t s ' forecas t E P S def la ted by the b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h s tock pr ice 
(de f la ted by the absofu te v a f u e of the mean E P S forecast du r ing the per iod in M o d e t s Payne l a and lb ) ; SIZE is the natural log of total asse ts ; NUMEST is the n u m b e r o f 
ana lys t s i ssuing ea rn ings forecas ts for the f i rm in the 90-day w i n d o w prior to earn ings repor t ing; ABSACCR is the abso lu te total accrua ls , m e a s u r e d as the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n 
net i n c o m e and cash f low f r o m opera t ions d iv ided by lagged total assets; LOSS equals 1 if a f i rm repor ts negat ive earn ings , 0 o the rwise ; ABSECHG is the abso lu t e va lue of 
the c h a n g e in annual ea rn ings , de f l a ted by beg inn ing -o f -mon th stock pr ice (def la ted by the natural log of total assets in M o d e l s Payne l a and lb) ; PERSIST cqusils 1 if 
observa t ion lies be tween the 20th and 80th percent i les of dis t r ibut ion of the annual earn ings change , 0 o therwise ; YEAR is the indica tor var iab le for e ach yea r 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 1 0 ; 
INDUSTRY is the indicator var iable represent ing two-digi t S IC code numbers . 
In summary , regressions using undeflated forecast errors and undeflated dispersion 
generate eitiier posit ive or insignificant relationships between absolute forecast 
errors and auditor specialisation. However , when forecast errors and dispersion are 
deflated by stock price, there is no evidence supporting the existence of a positive 
association between auditor industry specialisation and absolute forecast errors. In 
fact, the models using cont inuous measures of specialisation document a significant 
negative association between these v a r i a b l e s . T h i s negative relationship remains 
when the 2SLS is used to correct for endogeneity, but an insignificant association 
between the d ichotomous measure of industry specialisation and forecast errors is 
reported in the propensi ty score matched sample regressions. 
In Table 7.3, I summarised the coefficients and p-values obtained f rom the BCK-
type models and Payne-type models for the test variable (INDSP). Taken together, 
the results of the BCK- and Payne-type models show that the directional association 
between INDSP and short-horizon forecast accuracy is highly sensitive to model 
specification. Specif ical ly, there is some evidence of a positive relation between 
auditor industry specialisation and absolute forecast errors when forecast errors are 
unadjusted, but a significantly negative relationship between these variables when 
forecast errors are deflated by stock price. I also note that the significance of a 
number of the results is sensitive to whether auditor specialisation is measured 
cont inuously or d ichotomously and the vector of control variables included. These 
" " This juxtaposi t ion of results plausibly reflects an imperfectly controlled relation between the level 
of f i rms ' unadjus ted E P S and firm size, which in turn is correlated with auditor industry 
specialisation. T o test this contention. I added the raw level of EPS as an additional regressor to 
Mode l s Payne l a and lb . Whi le this additional control was significant, the coefficients for each 
measure of INDSP were not substantively affected. The coeff icients (and significance levels) for 
INDSP were also similar when either the upper or lower quartile of firms ranked by size or absolute 
EPS were exc luded f rom the sample, or if I exclude the upper 5 per cent ol the distribution of 
undeflated forecast errors. I conducted similar sub-sample analysis on Models Payne 2a and 2b, and 
again my tabulated results were substantively repeated. 
erratic results may well reflect the conflict ing impacts of audit quality on short-
horizon forecast errors. Conversely, higher-quality auditors produce earnings reports 
that are more useful for predicting future earnings, but at the same time these high-
quality auditors are more effect ive in constraining client attempts to manage earnings 
in the direction of consensus forecasts. A reduction in benchmark-beating behaviour 
is arguably more likely to be detected using raw undeflated forecast errors because 
these are the measures visible to the market. While some regressions provide support 
for HI a, the sensitivity of these results to model specification provide little basis for 
confidence that short-horizon forecast accuracy is affected in either direction by 
auditor industry specialisation. 
Table 7.3: Summary of the Results for the Test Variable f rom the BCK-type Models 
and Payne-type Models 
BCK-type Models B C K l a BCK2a BCK3a B C K l b BCK2b BCK3b 
INDSP_cont (continuous measure) INDSP_dum (dummy measure) 
INDSP - 0 . 0 0 1 3 0.0011 - 0 . 0 0 6 4 
(0.608) (0.603) (0.274) 
- 0 . 0 0 0 3 0.0002 0.0008 
(0.417) (0.471) (0.153) 
Payne-type Models Payne la Payne 2a Payne 3a Payne lb Payne 2b Payne 3b 
INDSP cont (continuous measure) INDSP_dum (dummy measure) 
INDSP 0.0718 - 0 . 0 0 2 8 - 0 . 0 1 4 8 * * 
(0.147) (0.461) (0.0124) 
0.009** - 0 . 0 0 1 3 * * * 0.0006 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.231) 
Robust p-values of the coeff icients are two-tailed reported in parentlieses (*** /xO.Ol . ** p<0.05, * 
P < 0 . 1 ) . 
This table st immarises the coeff icients and p-values for the test variable (INDSP) reported in Tables 
7.1 and 7.2. 
Variable Definitions: INDSP is the continuous measure (dichotomous measure) of portfolio-share 
audit firm industry specialisation, measured as per Equation (8) (Equation [9]). 
7.3 Tests of Hypothesis lb (Long-Horizon Regressions) 
Hypothesis l b predicts that analysts ' absolute long-horizon forecast errors are 
negatively related to audit f i rm industry specialisation. Unlike HI a, this is a 
directional prediction because long-horizon forecasts do not obviously induce 
incentives for benchmaric-beating behaviour. The specifications of the models used 
to test H l b are similar to those used to test HI a, and differ only in respect of the 
t iming of the measurement of key variables. A negative and significant coefficient 
for auditor industry specialisation would be consistent with H l b . Table 7.4 presents 
the results for the regressions of long-horizon forecast accuracy against audit f irm 
industry specialisation and control variables. To maintain comparabili ty with the 
short-horizon results, the />values reported in Table 7.4 are two-tailed, but could 
credibly be halved, because 1 have a clear directional prediction for their sign. 
In Table 7.4 Panel A, I present the results of the long-horizon forecast accuracy 
regressions using models based on BCK. Again, all models are well fitted with R^ 
statistics, ranging between 27.9 and 59.4 per cent. In all OLS models (Models BCK 
la, lb , 2a and 2b), the coeff ic ients for INDSP are negative and highly significant 
(two-tailed p < 0.001), consistent with auditor industry specialisation improving the 
accuracy of analysts ' long-horizon forecasts. In the 2SLS regression (Column BCK 
3a), the F-statistic and LM statistic are 169.263 and 872.231, respectively; while the 
partial R^ statistics are approximately 15 per cent, suggesting that my instruments are 
relevant. The Sargan tests f ind no evidence that my instruments are endogenous to 
the error term in the second-stage regressions. The D W H test of the difference in 
coeff ic ients between the eff icient (OLS) and consistent (two-stage) models finds 
evidence of endogenei ty for the continuous measure of audit specialisation (j? = 
0.0193); thus, the OLS est imate is inconsistent. The coefficients for INDSP remain 
negative and significant (fi = - 0 . 0 5 4 9 , two-tailed p = 0.018) after correcting for 
endogenei ty . In the matched sample regression (Column 3b), INDSP is 
s ignificantly negat ive ( f i = - 0 . 0 0 1 9 , two-tailed p = 0.091) and all control variables, 
except for the earnings level {EL), are significant. 
Table 7.4 Panel B presents the results for models based on Payne (2008). All models 
are reasonably well fi t ted, with R" statistics ranging f rom 25.6 to 57.8 per cent. In 
Models Payne l a and lb , INDSP is negatively associated with absolute forecast 
errors, but is significant only in Model Payne la, where INDSP is a continuous 
measure (fi = - 0 . 2 0 1 6 , two-tailed p = 0.065). However, if I re-estimate Model Payne 
lb using one-year lagged (rather than current) controls for ABSACCR, ABSECHG 
and PERSIST, INDSP is significantly negative (two-tailed p < 0.05). All control 
variables are significant, with the exception of forecast dispersion. As identified 
earlier, one of the limitations of Payne ' s original specification is the inconsistency 
between the def lators to forecast dispersion (DISP) and forecast accuracy (ABSFE). 
For models in which forecast accuracy and dispersion are each deflated by stock 
price (Models Payne 2a and 2b), the coefficients for auditor industry specialisation 
are negative and significant, regardless of the measure of specialisation employed 
(INDSP_cont P = - 0 . 0 2 1 5 , two-tailed p < 0.01; INDSP_dum fi = -0 .0051 , two-tailed 
p < 0.001). Further, the appropriately specified 2SLS and matched sample 
regressions (Models Payne 3a and 3b) report significant negative coefficients for 
INDSP (INDSP_cont P = - 0 . 1 0 4 8 , two-tailed p < 0.001; INDSP_dum P = - 0 .0021 , 
1 re -es t ima ted M o d e l s B C K 3a and 3b by (a) using al ternat ive sets of ins t ruments , including client 
capital in tensi ty and indus t ry-year ad jus ted opera t ing cycle , and (b) adjus t ing all regressors by 
deduc t ing the indus t ry -year mean f r o m each observat ion. In most of these alternate formula t ions . I 
was unab le to re jec t the possibi l i ty that at least one of the ins t ruments was endogenous . In regress ions 
where the Sa rgan test f ound no ev idence of ins t rument endogenei ty , the mam results held. 
two-tai led p = 0 . 0 4 7 ) . T h e D W H test (p = 0.0024) confi rms that the presence of 
endogenei ty affects the OLS resuhs reported in Model Payne 2 a . A l l control 
variables are significant and in the predicted directions. Auditor industry 
specialisation is thus found to be negatively associated with absolute forecast errors 
in all Payne- type models that use deflated forecast errors. The only Payne-type 
model that generates an insignificant coefficient is Model Payne lb; however, the 
endogenei ty tests show that this coefficient is not a consistent estimator. 
Overall, my long-horizon regressions produce results that consistently support H l b , 
which predicts a negative relation between audit firm industry specialisation and 
analysts ' absolute forecast errors. These long-horizon results are far less sensitive to 
model specification than are those reported for short-horizon forecasts. Further, the 
relation between long-horizon forecast accuracy and audit firm industry 
specialisation is less susceptible to noise f rom short-term managerial benchmark-
beating behaviour. I argue that this reflects the fact that long-horizon forecasts are 
strongly related to the quality of earnings previously reported, as other sources of 
timely information are relatively scant. Thus, the earnings reports audited by a 
higher-quali ty auditor are more useful for predicting future earnings, decreasing 
analysts ' long-horizon absolute forecast errors. To test the robustness of my results 
further, I conduct a range of additional tests, which I describe in Sections 7.4 and 7.5. 
" " In BCK- or Payne-type 2SLS regressions, I lagged the conlrol variables, DISP. ABSECHG, 
ZSCORE, ABSACCR and PERSIST, that were likely to be causally affected by audit quality. The 
lagged structure of the models report Sargan statistics satisfying the instrument exogencity tests. 
Once again. I tested the sensitivity of my 2SLS regressions to alternate instruments, substitutmg a 
range of candidate variables (capital intensity, research and development expense and industry-
adjusted operating cycle) for my main instrumental variables. The coefficients for INDSP remained 
negative and significant in every validly specified alternate model. 
Table 7.4: Short-Horizon Forecast Errors against Prior Year Audit Firm Industry Specialisation (Tests of H lb ) 
Panel A BCK's Model 
DeDendent Variable: ABSFE 
Models/Columns BCKla BCK2a BCK3a BCKlb BCK2b BCK3b 
Lag INDSP_cont (continuous measure) Lag INDSPjdum (dummy measure) 
Pred. BCK's Model Price-denaled DISP 2SLS BCK's Model Price-deflated DISP PSM 
INDSP - -0.0320*** -0.0295*** -0.0549** -0.0037*** -0.0029*** -0.0019* 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.018) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.091) 
DISP + 0.3431*** 0.1714** 0.3422*** 0.1803 
(<0.001) (0.016) (<0.001) (0.170) 
HORIZON + 0.0199*** 0.0208*** 0.0256*** 0.0198*** 0.0208*** -0.0004 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.488) 
SIZE 7 -0.0037*** -0.0028*** -0.0071*** -0.0036*** -0.0028*** 0.5176*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
NUMEST - 0.0015*** 0.0022*** 0.0041*** 0.0016*** 0.0023*** 0.0322*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ZSCORE + 0.0023*** 0.0012*** 0.0019*** 0.0022*** 0.0011*** 0.0019*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) 
LOSS + 0.0319*** 0.0223*** 0.0614*** 0.0321*** 0.0225*** 0.0201*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) 
ABSECHG + 0.5463*** 0.5160*** 0.0599*** 0.5459*** 0.5156*** -0.0259** (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.013) 
STDROE + -0.0396*** -0.0338*** 0.0110 -0.0377*** -0.0325*** 0.0011 (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.177) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.204) 
EL + -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0017*** (0.642) (0.818) (0.350) (0.348) (0.542) (0.005) YEAR yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT -0.0672*** -0.0851*** -0.1179*** -0.0679*** -0.0855*** -0.0830** (0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.013) N 32,220 25,489 21.119 32,220 25,489 4,840 R- 0.554 0.581 0.279 0.554 0.581 0.594 
D u r b i n - W u - H a u s m a n tesi (/>-value) 0 . 0 1 9 3 
Sa rgan Over - iden l i f i ca l ion tes( ( / ;-value) 0 . 7 3 7 8 
Parl ial-R^ of i n s t rumen t s in f i rs t -s tage 0 . 1 5 0 6 
W a l d F-stat is t ics 169.263 
L M stat is t ics 872 .231 
Robus t p - v a l u e s of the coe f f i c i en t s are two- ta i led repcirted paren theses (*** p < 0 . 0 1 . ** p < 0 . 0 5 . * p<0 .1 ) . 
Th i s table p resen t s the resul ts for the tests of H l b based on B C K ' s or iginal model ( C o l u m n s B C K la and B C K lb ) . B C K ' s model with cont ro l for fo recas t d i spe r s ion 
( C o l u m n s B C K 2a and B C K 2b) . and B C K ' s mode l with endogene i ty correc t ion us ing a 2 S L S regress ion ( C o l u m n B C K 3a) or a p ropens i ty score m a t c h e d s a m p l e r eg re s s ion 
( C o l u m n B C K 3b) . 
Variable Defmitions: ABSFE is ana lys t s ' absolu te forecast e r rors (an inverse func t ion of forecast accuracy) , m e a s u r e d as the abso lu te va lue of d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n ac tual 
l/B/E/S e a rn ings per share and forecast earn ings per share , def la ted by bcg inn ing -o f -mon th stock price; INDSP is the con t i nuous m e a s u r e of po r t fo l io - sha re audi t f i rm 
indust ry specia l i sa t ion , (all mode l s su f f ixed ' a ' ) , measu red as the s u m of the square root of the total assets of the c l ients that an audi t f i rm serv ices in a spec i f i c indus t ry 
d iv ided by the s u m of the square root of the total assets of all c l ients of that audit f i rm (INDSP_conl): or the d i c h o t o m o u s measu re of po r t fo l io - sha re audi t firm indus t ry 
spec ia l i sa t ion (all mode l s s u f f i x e d ' b ' ) , equals 1 if lNDSP_conr > (3 / number of two-digi t industry codes used in the ana lys i s in any g iven year) , 0 o the rwise (INDSP_duiu); 
DISP is fo recas t d i spers ion , measu red as the s tandard devia t ion of ana lys t s ' forecast E P S def la ted by the b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h stock price; HORIZON is the natural log of the 
average n u m b e r of days be tween mean forecas t es t imat ion dale and subsequent actual ea rn ings repor t ing date; SIZE is the natural log of the marke t va lue of equ i ty ; NUMEST 
is the natural log of the number of analysis issuing earn ings forecas ts for the firm in the 90-day w i n d o w prior to earn ings repor t ing; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s financial d i s t ress 
score ; LOSS equa l s 1 if a firm repor t s negat ive earn ings , 0 o therwise ; ABSECHG is the absolu te value of the c h a n g e in annual ea rn ings , de f l a t ed by b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h s tock 
price; STDROE is the s tandard deviat ion of return on equity over the p rev ious five years; EL is ea rn ings per share , winsor ized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the ind ica tor var iab le for 
each year 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 1 0 . 
Panel B Payne's Model 
Dependenl Variable: ABSFE 
Models/Columns Payne la Payne 2a Payne 3a Payne lb Payne 2b Payne 3b 
Lag INDSP_cont (continuous measure) Lag INDSP_dum (dummy measure) 
Price-deflated Price-deflated 
Prcd. Payne's model ABSFE & DISP 2SLS Payne's model ABSFE & DISP PSM 
INDSP - -0.2016* -0.0215*** -0.1048*** -0.0122 -0.0051*** -0 .0021** 
(0.065) (0.002) (<0.001) (0.291) (<0.001) (0.047) 
DISP + 0.0054 0.3842*** 0.2290*** 0.0054 0.2454*** 0.2521* 
-0.591 (<0.001) (0.002) -0.591 (<0.001) (0.058) 
SIZE 0.0573*** 0.0013*** 0.0016*** 0.0572*** 0.0011*** 0.0010*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.007) 
NUMEST - -0.0056*** -0.0005*** -0.0009*** -0.0056*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSACCR + 0.2835*** 0.0307*** 0.0060 0.2838*** 0.0199*** 0.0458*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.410) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LOSS + 0.1829*** 0.0234*** 0.0744*** 0.1829*** 0.0206*** 0.0277*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSECHG + 2.7848*** 0.4853*** 0.0708*** 2.7842*** 0.4520*** 0.5006*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
PERSIST - -0.0346*** -0.0025*** -0.0029*** -0.0346*** -0.0029*** -0.0017 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.107) 
YEAR yes yes yes yes yes yes 
INDUSTRY yes yes no yes yes yes 
CONSTANT -0.0093 0.0032 -0.0218*** -0.0103 0.0031 0.0062 
(0.962) (0.579) (<0.001) (0.957) (0.589) (0.190) 
N 27,284 27,284 21,232 27,284 27,284 5.298 
R' 0.264 0.560 0.256 0.264 0.560 0.578 
D u r b i n - W u - H a u s m a n test (p -va lue ) 0 . 0 0 2 4 
Sa rgan Over - iden t i f i ca t ion test ( / ' -va lue) 0 . 5 8 4 5 
Parl ial-R^ of i n s t rumen t s in f i rs t -s tage 0 . 1 7 8 3 
W a l d F-s ta t is t ics 174.513 
L M stat is t ics 9 4 0 . 5 9 4 
Robus t p - v a l u e s of the coe f f i c i en t s are two- ta i led repor ted in pa ren theses (*** p < 0 . 0 1 , ** p<0.05. * p < 0 . 1 ) . 
T h i s table presents the resul t s for the tests of H l h based on P a y n e ' s or iginal model ( C o l u m n s Payne l a and Payne lb ) , P a y n e ' s mode l with a l te rna t ive de f l a to r s for fo recas t 
e r ro r s and forecas t d i spers ion ( C o l u m n s Payne 2a and 2h) and P a y n e ' s model with endogene i ty correc t ion us ing a 2 S L S regress ion ( C o l u m n P a y n e 3a) or a p ropens i ty score 
m a t c h e d s a m p l e regress ion ( C o l u m n Pa yne 3b). 
Variable Definitions: ABSFE is ana lys t s ' absolu te forecas t er rors (an inverse func t ion of forecast accuracy) , m e a s u r e d as the abso lu te va lue of d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n ac tual 
l/B/E/S e a rn ings per share and forecast ea rn ings per share, de l la ted by beg inn ing -o f -mon th s tock pr ice (undel la ted in M o d e l s Payne l a and l b ) ; INDSP is the c o n t i n u o u s 
m e a s u r e of por t fo l io - share audi t f i rm industry special isat ion, (all mode l s su f f ixed ' a ' ) , measu red as the s u m of the square root of the total assets of the c l ien ts that an audi t 
f i rm serv ices in a spec i f ic industry d iv ided by the s u m of the square root of the total assets of all c l ients of that audit f i rm {lNDSP_cont)\ or the d i c h o t o m o u s m e a s u r e of 
por t fo l io - sha re audit f i rm industry specia l isa t ion (all mode l s su f f ixed 'b ' ) , equa l s 1 if INDSP_coiit > (3 / number of two-dig i t indus t ry c o d e s used in the ana lys i s in any g iven 
year) , 0 o the rwise UNDSP_diim): DISP is forecast d ispers ion , measured as the s tandard devia t ion of ana lys t s ' forecast E P S de l la ted by the b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h s tock pr ice 
(de t la ted by the absolu te va lue of the mean E P S forecast dur ing the per iod in M o d e l s Payne l a and lb ) ; SIZE is the natural log of total assets ; NUMEST is the n u m b e r of 
analys ts i ssuing ea rn ings fo recas t s for the f i rm in the 90-day w i n d o w prior to earn ings repor t ing; ABSACCR is the absolu te total accruals , m e a s u r e d as the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n 
net i n c o m e and cash t low f rom opera t ions d iv ided by lagged total assets; LOSS equals 1 if a f i rm repor ts negat ive earn ings , 0 o therwise ; ABSECHG is the abso lu te va lue of 
the c h a n g e in annual ea rn ings , de f l a ted by beg inn ing -o f -mon th stock price (del la ted by the natural log of total assets in M o d e l s Payne l a and lb ) ; PERSIST cqnaH 1 if 
observa t ion lies be tween the 20th and 80th percent i les of distr ibution of the annual earn ings change , 0 o therwise ; YEAR is the indica tor var iable for e ach yea r 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 1 0 ; 
INDUSTRY IS the indicator var iable represent ing two-digi t S IC code numbers . 
7.4 Sensitivity Analyses for Tests of Hypotheses la and lb 
In this section, I examine the robustness of my main results to changes in the timing 
of the measurement of the control variables (Section 7.4.1), alternate specifications 
of the propensity score matched sample regressions (Section 7.4.2) and use of 
Heckman treatment effects regressions as an alternate control for endogeneity 
(Section 7.4.3). 
7.4.1 Changes in Lag-Structure of Controls 
The long-horizon OLS regressions tabulated above contain control variables that 
depend on the realisation of the earnings being forecast (ABSACCR, ABSECHG, 
PERSIST, DISP and ZSCORE), and which may be causally affected by audit quality. 
I thus re-estimate the main long-horizon OLS regressions using the one-year lags of 
these variables (tabulated in Appendix F) and re-estimate the models with these 
variables excluded. The main results hold at similar significance levels, but the 
model fit deteriorates (e.g. none of the models report a R^ statistic exceeding 30 per 
cent). 
7.4.2 Alternative Thresholds for the Dichotomous Industry Specialisation 
Measure 
To examine whether the relationship between auditor industry specialisation and 
long-horizon analyst forecast accuracy exists with respect to alternative thresholds 
from which the dichotomous variable for industry specialisation is defined, 1 test 
alternative thresholds in which INDSP_dum equals 1 if INDSP_coni exceeds 
between one and four times the inverse of the number of industries in existence. " ' 
The untabulated regressions are of similar level of model fit and generate significant 
negative coefficients for INDSP. These results suggest that my main findings are not 
sensitive to the thresholds used to define an industry specialist auditor. 
7.4.3 Alternate Specifications of the Propensity Score Matcliing Regressions 
I further test the sensitivity of my PSM regression results to variations in the 
specification of the first-stage 'matching' equation. The tabulated PSM regressions 
are derived from first-stage matching regressions, which estimate the conditional 
probability of a client hiring an industry specialist, using only the second-stage 
control variables included as predictors. I begin my sensitivity analysis by adding the 
lag of the client's operating cycle, which was used as an instrument in my 2SLS 
regressions and has predictive power regarding the likelihood of hiring an industry 
specialist auditor. My main results for tests of HIa and Hlb are substantively 
unaffected by the inclusion of this additional predictor. 
As noted in Chapter 5, matching on post-treatment variables might induce bias if the 
matching covariates are influenced by audit quality. To test the sensitivity of my 
main results to post-treatment bias, I re-estimate my short- and long-horizon 
regressions, using (a) predictors that are theoretically independent of the current-
period auditor identity and (b) first-stage regressions that include the lagged, rather 
than current, values of predictors potentially subject to post-treatment bias. I replace 
ZSCORE with leverage (which is not a direct function of current profit) and replace 
the variables capturing client firms' earnings attributes with the equivalent cash-
' " I test these a l ternat ive th resho lds for the d i cho tomous industry specialisation measure lor the tests 
of H2, H 3 a and H3b , and my results for these hypotheses are not af fected. For brevity. I do not 
d i scuss these tes ts again in Chap t e r 8. 
based variables, which are less likely to reflect a response to audit quality. I replace 
LOSS with the incidence of negative cash f lows, ABSECHG with the absolute 
change in cl ients ' cash f low f rom operations, STDROE with standard deviation of 
cash f low f rom operat ions, EL with the level of cash flow f rom operations and 
PERSIST with cash f low persistence (in the Payne-type models). I tabulate these 
alternate specif icat ions of Model BCK 3b in Table 7.5, and show that although 
model fit deteriorates, the coeff icients for my test variables are of similar tenor to the 
main results (fl = 0.0012, two-tailed p = 0.068 in the tests of H l a ; y? = - 0 . 0 0 3 0 , two-
tailed p = 0 .093 in the tests of HIb ) . I next re-estimate each model using the lagged 
rather than current values of ABSECHG, ZSCORE and DISP in both stages of Model 
BCK 3b, and tabulate these coeff icients in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7.5. Once more, 
INDSP has a significantly negative coefficient in the tests of H lb (/? = - 0 . 0 0 4 4 , two-
tailed p = 0 .013); however , the coefficient for INDSP in the tests of H I a is 
insignificant. Finally, in untabulated regressions, I re-estimate Model BCK 3b using 
the lagged measures of these controls in the first-stage 'matching ' equation only, and 
excluding ABSECHG and DISP f rom the regressions altogether. While these 
regressions have lower overall model fit, the coefficients for my test variables are of 
similar magni tude and significance. 
In summary , the evidence described above suggests that my main propensity score 
matched sample results are robust to variation in the specification of the prediction 
model and are not tainted by post-treatment bias. In the next section, I use an 
alternate two-s tage approach (Heckman treatment effects regressions) for models 
with a d ichotomous measure of endogenous regressor. 
Table 7.5: Tests of H la and H l b using Predictors Less Likely to be Subject to Post-
Treatment Bias 
PcpcndL-nl Variahle: ABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pred. H l a H l b Pred. H l a H l b 
INDSP 9 0.0012* -0 .0030* INDSP - -0 .0007 -0.0044** 
(0.068) (0.093) (0.436) (0.013) 
DISP + 0.9740*** 1.7329*** DISPJag 0.3002*** 0.1306 
(<0.001) ( < a o o i ) (0005) (0.402) 
HORIZON + 0.0008 0.0134 HORIZON + 0.0026*** 0.0375*** 
(0.121) (0.255) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
SIZE 7 -0 .0007** -0.0026*** SIZE 7 0.0006 0.0004 
(0.017) (0.002) (0.201) (0.567) 
NUMEST - -0 .0013** 0.0003 NUMEST - -0.0037*** -0 .0009 
(0.011) (0.873) (<0.001) (0.459) 
LEVERAGE 0.0052*** 0.0206*** ZSCOREJag -1- 0.0008* 0.0018* 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.099) (0.071) 
NEGCF -1- 0.0011 0.0102 LOSS + 0.0263*** 0.0721*** 
(0.618) (0.108) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSCFCHG + 0.0000 0.0009* ABSECHGJag -1- 0.0120 0.0845** 
(0.413) (0.087) (0.453) (0.027) 
CFVOL + 0.0274* 0.1042** STDROE + 0.0118 0.0460** 
(0.065) (0.020) (0.182) (0.013) 
CF + -0 .0167*** -0 .0247 EL + -0.0017** -0.0057*** 
(0.003) (0.127) (0.014) (<0.001) 
YEAR yes yes YEAR yes yes 
INDU.STRY yes yes INDUSTRY yes yes 
CONSTANT 0.0018 -0 .0378 CONSTANT 0.1996*** - 0 1 5 7 4 * * * 
(0.609) (0.576) (<0.001) (0.006) 
N 3,134 3,196 N 3,848 4,252 
R^ 0.334 0.329 R ' 0.253 0.327 
Robust p-values of the coefficients are two-tailed reported in parentheses (*** p<O.OI, ** p<O.OS. * p<0.1). 
This table presents the matched sample regression results for the tests of H1 a and H I h based on Model BCK 
3b using predictors that are less likely to be subject to post-treatment bias. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
results of the regressions using predictors that are theoretically independent of the current-period auditor 
identity. Co lumns (3) and (4) report the results of the regressions using the lagged (rather than current) 
values of predictors that are less likely to reflect a response to audit quality. 
Variable Definitions: ABSFE is the analysts' absolute earnings forecast errors (an inverse function of 
forecast accuracy), as per Equation (6b); INDSP is the dichotomous measure of portfolio-share audit firm 
industry specialisation, measured as per Equation (9); DISP (DISPJag) is forecast dispersion, measured as 
the (lagged value o f ) standard deviation of analysts' forecast EPS deRated by the beginning-of-month stock 
price- HORIZON is the natural log of the average number of days between mean forecast estimation date 
and subsequent actual earnings reporting date; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity (natural 
log of total assets in Payne ' s model); NVMEST is the natural log of the number of analysts issuing eammgs 
forecasts for the firm in the 90-day window prior to earnings reporting; LEVERAGE is the leverage; 
NEGCF equals 1 if a firm reports negative cash n o w from operations, 0 o themise ; ABSCFCHG is the 
absolute value of the change in cash n o w from operations, deHated by beginning-of-month stock price; 
CFVOL is the standard deviation of cash flow from operations over the previous five years; CF is cash How 
per share- ZSCOREJag is the lagged value of Zmi jewski ' s financial distress score; LOSS equals 1 if a firm 
reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; ABSECHGJ^g is the lagged value of absolute value of the change in 
annual earnings, deflated by beginning-of-month stock price; STDROE is the standard deviation of return on 
equity over the previous five years; EL is earnings per share, winsorized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the indicator 
variable for each year 1989-2010; INDUSTRY is the indicator variable representing two-digit SIC code 
numbers. — — — — — — — -
7.4.4 Heckman-type Two-Stage Regressions 
My main tests employ a PSM approach to control for endogenous selection in 
models where audit f i rm industry specialisation is measured using a dichotomous 
variable. This method was selected because it does not rely on an assumed functional 
fo rm or the validity of exclusion restrictions and provides a more direct estimate of 
the treatment ef fects (Lawrence et al. 2011). However, the limitations of the 
matching approach include that the generalisation of the results is dependent on the 
balance of the matched sample and the range of common support, and the likelihood 
of post- t reatment bias (issues addressed in Chapter 6). Here, I employ Heckman 
treatment ef fects regressions, a method commonly employed in earlier auditing 
literature, to fur ther investigate the robustness of the results generated by the PSM 
approach. The first-stage of Heckman regressions estimates the likelihood of 
appoint ing an industry specialist auditor using probit regression, f rom which I 
est imate the IMR and include it in the second-stage model as an additional regressor. 
For the first-stage Heckman regressions, I use the same instruments (industry relative 
size INDRELSIZE and clients ' operating cycle CYCLE) as those employed in the 
2SLS regressions. I now discuss the results for tests of H1 a and H1 b. 
In Table 7.6, I present the second-stage Heckman regression results for the tests of 
the impact of auditor industry specialisation on short-horizon (HIa ) and long-horizon 
( H l b ) forecast accuracy, each of which is based on Model BCK 3b. I find that my 
test variable (INDSP) is insignificant in tests of HI a, but is significantly negative in 
tests of H l b (/? = - 0 . 0 0 4 4 , p < 0.01). Standard specification tests suggest that my 
instruments are both exogenous and relevant. Once more, I show that the association 
between auditor industry specialisation and analysts ' short-horizon forecast errors is 
sensitive to model specification. More importantly, I demonstrate the robustness of 
my long-horizon f indings, that audit quality decreases long-horizon forecast errors, 
to alternate means of controlling for the endogenous choice of auditors. 
Table 7.6: Heckman Treatment-Effect Regressions for a Dichotomous Measure of Audit Firm 
Industry Specialisation 
Dependent Variahle: ABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) 
Pred. H l a Pred. H l b 
INDSP ? - 0 . 0 0 0 8 - - 0 . 0 0 4 4 * * * 
(0.288) (0.004) 
DISP + 0.,'>604*** + 0.1722*** 
(<0 .00 l ) (<0.001) 
HORIZON + 0.0005** + 0.0253*** 
( 0 0 1 3 ) (<0.001) 
SIZE ? - 0 . 0 0 0 4 * * * 9 - 0 . 0 0 7 2 * * * 
(0.001) (<0.001) 
NUMEST - 0 . 0 0 1 7 * * * - 0.0043*** 
(<0.001) ( < a o o i ) 
ZSCORE + 0.0004*** + 0.0018*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
LOSS + 0.006.")*** + 0 0 6 1 3 * * * 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSECHG + 0.1040*** + 0.0598*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
STDROE + - 0 . 0 1 1 7 * * * + 0.0126*** 
(<0.001) (0.008) 
EL + 0.000.3* + - 0 . 0 0 0 6 
(0.081) (0.176) 
IMR ? 0.0001 7 0.0002 
(0.817) (0.853) 
YEAR yes yes 
CONSTANT - 0 . 0 0 9 6 * * * - 0 . 1 0 1 6 * * * 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 28.701 21.119 
R^ 0.3 LS 0.281 
Durb in -Wu-Hausman test (p-values) 0.7817 0.9328 
Sargan Over- ident if lcat ion test (/j-values) 0.8.'i73 0.8397 
Partial-R^ of inst ruments in first-stage 0.2920 0.2365 
Wald F-statist ics 3153.174 200.59 
LM 6373.849 746.676 
Robust n-values of the coeff ic ients are two-tailed reported in parentheses (*** p < a o i . ** ^ p<0.05, *p<0 .1 ) . 
This table presents the second-stage Heckman treatment-effect regression results for the tests of H l a (Column I) 
and H I b (Column 2) based on Model BCK 3b. , • f , , 
Variable Defmiiiom: ABSFE is the analysts ' absolute e a m m g s forecast errors (an inverse function of forecast 
accuracy), as per Equat ion (6b); INDSP is the d ichotomous measure of portfoHo-share audit firm industry 
specialisation, measured as per Equat ion (9): DISP is forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation ol 
analysts ' forecast EPS deflated by the beginning-of-month stock price; HORIZON is the natural log of the 
average number of days between mean forecast estimation date and subsequent actual earnings reportmg dale; 
SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity; NUMEST is the natural log of the number of analysts 
issuing earnings forecasts for the firm in the 90-day window prior to earnings reporting; ZSCORE is Zmi jewsk i ' s 
financial distress score; LOSS equals I if a firm reports negative earnings. 0 otherwise; ABSECHG is the absolute 
value of the change in annual earnings, deflated by beginning-of-month stock price; STDROE is the standard 
deviation of return on equity over the previous five years; EL is earnings per share, winsorized at (-5). /-WK is 
the inverse Mil ls ratio for endogenous auditor choice; YEAR is the indicator variable for each year 1989-2010. 
7.5 Additional Tests for Hypotheses la and lb 
I conduct and report additional analyses including the use of alternate industry 
specialisation measures for tests of H l a and H l b in Section 7.5.1, and sub-sample 
analysis for H l b in Section 7.5.2. 
7.5.1 Alternate Industry Specialisation Measures 
While my main test results use the portfolio-share measure of auditor industry 
specialisation, I re-estimate my regressions using a range of alternate measures, 
including the market-share, weighted market-share and city-level industry 
specialisation measures to examine whether my main results hold. Below I provide a 
brief description of the alternate industry specialisation measures applied. I first use 
a national-level market-share-type metric to capture the effect of industry 
specialisation on auditor expertise. Recall that the market-share industry 
specialisation measure reflects an audit f i rm's share of the total audit fee revenue 
generated in an industry. While the benefits of knowledge spillover and economies 
of scale are likely to increase with an audit f i rm's market share in an industry, the 
negative effect of market dominance on the quality of audit outcomes may be greater 
for audit f irms with higher-level market share (Yardley et al. 1992). Some empirical 
studies obtain evidence that market-share industry specialist auditor is associated 
with superior audit outcomes (Balsam et al. 2003; Knechel et al. 2007), while others 
find no significant relationship between the market-share measure of industry 
specialisation and various proxies for financial reporting quality (Francis et al. 2012; 
Minutt i -Meza 2013; Boone et al. 2012). For the market-share measure, I u.se client's 
total assets to proxy audit fees to maintain consistency with the portfolio-share 
measure and to preserve sample s ize ."" The generic form of the continuous national 
market-share measure of industry specialisation is as follows: 
WD5P_marke t_ = the sum of the square root of the total assets of the (11) 
cont clients that an audit firm services in a particular 
industry divided by the sum of the square root of 
the total assets of all clients in that industry. 
Following prior studies (Balsam et al. 2003; Reichelt and Wang 2010), the 
dichotomous market share is coded as 1 if the audit firm has the largest proportion of 
the market share in an audit industry, and 0 o therwise . " ' 
I then employ the national-level weighted market-share measure proposed by Neal 
and Riley (2004) to estimate auditor industry specialisation. The association between 
weighted market-share industry specialisation and better audit outcomes is not clear 
because the limitations of the market-share measure may also affect the weighted 
market-share measure; however, it remains interesting to explore whether my results 
are robust to this combined measure. Following Neal and Riley (2004), this measure 
is the product of the continuous (dichotomous) measure of auditor market share and 
portfolio share: 
INDSP_weighted_markel = lNDSP_market * lNDSP_portfolio (12) 
While all of the industry specialisation measures I employ are estimated across the 
national audit markets, I also use the city-level measure because industry expertise of 
an audit firm is argued by some to be city-specific (Ferguson et al. 2003). Prior 
In the un tabu la ted regress ions , I also use audit fees to es t imate market -share measure at national 
level . M y s a m p l e s ize is r educed by almost 5 0 per cent and 1 obtain similar results to those es t imated 
based on c l ien ts ' total assets . 
I a lso es t ima te the d i c h o t o m o u s marke t - share measure , ident i fy ing special is ts as l i rms whose 
marke t sha re is g rea te r than 1.2 t imes the inverse of the number of Big N audit f i rms . M y sample 
per iod fo r s tudy ing the nat ional- level industry special isat ion measure covers 1989 -2010 . There was a 
Big 6 for the per iod 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 7 , a Big 5 for the per iod 1998-2001 and a Big 4 onwards . M y 
un tabu la ted resul t s a re qual i ta t ive ly the same as those repor ted in Tab le 7.7. 
studies examining city-specific expertise typically estimate the market-share measure 
of industry specialisation and use audit fees (rather than proxies for fees) to compute 
the measure since both audit firm location data and audit fee data are available post 
1999 (Francis and Yu 2009; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Numan and Willekens 2012). 
Consistent with the literature, I estimate both the continuous and dichotomous city-
level market-share specialisation measures using audit fee data obtained from Audit 
Analytics and conduct my sensitivity analysis over a sample period of 2000-2010."" 
The cities are defined using the U.S. Census Bureau definition of a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) consistent with Francis and Yu (2009) and Reichelt and 
Wang (2010). The continuous city-level measure is as per Equation (13): 
City-level = the sum of the total audit fees an audit firm (13) 
iMn<;p I receives from its clients in an industry and in a 
lNU>>f_market_cont divided by the sum of total audit fees an audit 
firm receives in that city. 
Following Numan and Willeken (2012), the dichotomous measure of the city-level 
specialisation is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the incumbent audit office is the 
market leader in an audit industry, and 0 otherwise."^ 
Using the above-mentioned alternate industry specialisation measures, I report the 
results for tests of H I a and H l b based on the matched sample regressions (Model 
I use c l i e n t ' s total a s se t s to p roxy audit f ees in es t imat ing ttie audi tor por t fo l io share in the main 
tests b e c a u s e fee da ta a re not ava i lab le ac ross the ful l s a m p l e per iod. In untabula ted regress ions , I use 
audi t f ees ra ther than a p roxy to es t imate the nat ional- level industry special isat ion measures . M y m a m 
resul ts are u n a f f e c t e d , wi th the excep t ion of Mode l Payne 2a, where the con t inuous measu re of 
INDSP is pos i t ive and ins ign i f ican t . H o w e v e r , the D W H statistics provide ev idence of endogene i ty (p 
= 0 .0497 ) , and thus , the O L S es t ima te obta ined f r o m M o d e l Payne 2a is inconsis tent , indicat ing that 
the 2 S L S e s t ima te (/? = - 0 . 0 7 7 3 , p < 0 . 0 0 1 ) p roduces conv inc ing ev idence . 
I a l so use an a l te rna t ive ind ica tor var iable that r ecognises a c i ty-speci f ic industry special is t if the 
aud i to r has a marke t share g rea te r than 50 per cent at ci ty level. M y untabula ted results are 
qua l i ta t ive ly s imi la r to those t abu la ted in Tab l e 7.7. 
B C K 3b-2) in T a b l e 7 . 7 . ' " ' In tests of H l a ( C o l u m n s I to 3), 1 f ind that the 
coe f f i c i en t s fo r m y test var iable (INDSP) are ins igni f icant in all mode l s where the 
a l ternate indus t ry spec ia l i sa t ion measures are used. In tests of H l b (Co lumns 4 to 6), 
the coe f f i c i en t s fo r INDSP are s ign i f ican t ly negat ive in mode l s where the nat ional-
level ( C o l u m n 4 = - 0 . 0 0 0 9 , two- ta i led p = 0 .159) and ci ty-level market -share 
measu re s ( C o l u m n 6 /? = - 0 . 0 0 1 4 , two- ta i led p = 0 .143) are used, a l though at lower 
s ign i f i cance levels c o m p a r e d to m y main results. W h e n the we igh ted marke t - share 
measu re is used ( C o l u m n 5), the coe f f i c i en t for m y test var iable remains negat ive but 
ins igni f icant {p = 0 .193) . A plaus ib le explana t ion for these results is that the extent 
to wh ich the we igh t ed marke t - sha re measure captures audit qual i ty depends on the 
exp lana to ry p o w e r of the s ingle special isat ion measure . Whi l e greater market share 
may ref lec t super ior t e chno logy or industry exper ience , this m a y be tempered by the 
fact that m a r k e t share m a y con fe r a degree of m o n o p o l y power , which could reduce 
compe t i t i on and lead to negat ive audit ou tcomes . These e f fec t s may similar ly 
in f luence the c o m p l e m e n t a r y measure , reduc ing the impact of this measure of 
industry spec ia l i sa t ion in improv ing the accuracy of ana lys ts ' predict ion of earnings . 
' " T h e results for tests using the 2SLS regressions (Model BCK 3a) lo control for (he continuously 
endogenous industry specialisation measures are generally similar to those reported m Table 7.7. 
Table 7.7: Tests of H l a and H l b using Alternate Audit Firm Industry Specialisation Measures 
D e p e n d e n t Var iab le : ABSFE 
C o l u m n s (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Additional Tests of Hla Additional Tests of Hlb 
Nat iona l - leve l Nat iona l - leve l Ci ty- level Nat iona l - leve l Na t iona l - l eve l Ci ty - leve l 
Prcd . INDSP marke t /A 'DS/ ' _we igh tcd_marke t INDSP market Pred . INDSP marke t INDSP we igh ted marke t INDSP ma rke t 
INDSP 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 .0001 _ - 0 . 0 0 0 9 - 0 . 0 0 1 3 - 0 . 0 0 1 4 
(0 .408) (0 .601) (0 .855) (0 .159) (0 .386) ( 0 . 1 4 3 ) 
DISP + 0 . 5 8 5 0 * * * 0 . 5 9 7 0 * * * 0 . 5 2 9 1 * * * + 0 . 4 3 4 9 * * * 0 . 3 7 1 1 * * * 0 . 3 3 0 7 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .005) ( 0 . 0 0 2 ) 
HORIZON + 0 . 0 0 0 5 * 0 . 0 0 1 0 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 5 * + 0 . 0 1 9 6 * * * 0 . 0 1 7 0 * * * 0 . 0 2 8 3 * * * 
(0 .055) (0 .009) (0 .072) (<0 .001) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
SIZE 7 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 5 * * 9 0 . 0 0 0 6 * - 0 . 0 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 0 1 
(0 .916) ( 0 7 3 7 ) (0 .013) (0 .078) (0 .224) ( 0 . 9 1 9 ) 
NUMEST - - 0 . 0 0 1 8 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 6 * * * - 0 . 0 0 2 5 * * * - - 0 . 0 0 0 8 0 . 0 0 0 9 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .115) (0 .336) ( 0 . 9 0 8 ) 
ZSCORE + 0 .0002 0 . 0 0 0 3 0 .0002 + 0 . 0 0 1 0 * * 0 . 0 0 1 9 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 8 
(0 .118) (0 .194) (0 .233) (0 .012) (0 .004) ( 0 . 1 1 2 ) 
LOSS + 0 . 0 0 7 2 * * * 0 .0049*** 0 . 0 0 4 9 * * * + 0 . 0 2 2 5 * * * 0 . 0 3 0 1 * * * 0 . 0 1 7 0 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
ABSECHG + 0 . 1 1 8 4 * * * 0 . 1 2 6 1 * * * 0 .0848*** + 0 . 5 1 4 7 * * * 0 . 4 9 8 9 * * * 0 . 4 9 2 0 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
STDROE + - 0 . 0 1 2 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 5 1 - 0 . 0 0 5 0 * + - 0 . 0 2 6 9 * * * - 0 . 0 2 9 8 * * * - 0 . 0 2 6 9 * * * 
(<0 .001) (0 .109) (0 .078) (<0 .001) (0 .008) (0 .002) 
EL + - 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 0 4 * * + - 0 . 0 0 1 9 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 9 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 3 * * 
(0 .151) (0 .933) (0 .033) (<0 .001) (0 .004) ( 0 . 0 2 7 ) 
Y E A R yes yes yes yes yes y e s 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT 0 . 0 0 3 5 * 0 . 0 0 3 0 0 .0029* - 0 . 0 9 7 1 * * * - 0 . 1 0 3 1 * * * - 0 . 1 5 7 0 * * * 
(0 .069) (0 .479) (0 .086) (<0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) 
N 18,076 5 ,616 9 ,682 15,415 4 , 8 2 4 5 ,334 
R- 0 .394 0 .416 0 .347 0 .574 0 . 5 8 0 0 . 5 5 5 
R o b u s t p - v a l u e s of the c o e f f i c i e n t s are two- la i led repor ted in pa ren theses ( * * * p < O . O I , * * p < 0 . 0 5 . * p < 0 . 1 ) . 
Th i s table p re sen t s the p ropens i ty score m a t c h e d s a m p l e regress ion resul ts for the tests of H l a ( C o l u m n s 1 - 3 ) and H l b ( C o l u m n s 4 - 6 ) based on M o d e l B C K 3 b us ing 
a l te rna te audi t f i r m indus t ry spec ia l i sa t ion m e a s u r e s . C o l u m n s (1) and (4) repor t the resul t s of the r eg ress ions us ing the na t iona l - leve l m a r k e t - s h a r e m e a s u r e of i ndus t ry 
spec ia l i sa t ion . C o l u m n s (2) and (5) report the resul t s of the r eg ress ions us ing the na t ional - leve l we igh ted marke t - sha re m e a s u r e of indus t ry spec ia l i sa t ion . C o l u m n s (3 ) a n d 
(6) repor t the resu l t s of the r eg ress ions us ing the c i ty- level marke t - sha re m e a s u r e of indust ry spec ia l i sa t ion . 
Variable Definilions: ABSFE is the ana lys t s ' abso lu te ea rn ings forecas t er rors (an inverse func t ion of forecas t accuracy) , as per Equa t i on (6b) ; INDSP e q u a l s 1 if the c l ien t is 
aud i t ed by a na t iona l indu.stry special is t w h o has the largest marke t share in a two-dig i t S IC industry (Nat iona l - leve l INDSPjmnxYel), w h e r e the marke t share is c a l c u l a t e d as 
per E q u a t i o n (11) , 0 o the rwi se ; or , if the cl ient is audi ted by a nat ional industry special is t w h o has the largest w e i g h t e d marke t share in a two-d ig i t S I C indus t ry (Na t i ona l -
level / W D S P _ w e i g h t e d _ m a r k e t ) , where the we igh ted marke t share is ca lcu la ted as per Equa t ion (12) , 0 o therwise ; or. if the cl ient is aud i t ed by a c i ty - indus t ry spec ia l i s t w h o 
has the larges t marke t share m a two-d ig i t S IC indust ry in a city de f ined as the U.S. C e n s u s Bureau def in i t ion of M e t r o p o l i t a n Stat is t ical A r e a (Ci ty - leve l INDSP_mark<tl), 
w h e r e the ci ty marke t share is ca lcu la ted as per Equa t ion (13) , 0 o therwise ; DISP is fo recas t d i spers ion , m e a s u r e d as the s tandard dev ia t ion of ana ly s t s ' f o r ecas t E P S 
d e f l a t e d by the b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h s tock pr ice ; HORIZON is the natural log of the ave rage n u m b e r of days be tween m e a n forecas t e s t ima t ion da t e and s u b s e q u e n t ac tua l 
e a r n i n g s repor t ing da te ; SIZE is the natural log of the marke t va lue of equi ty ; NUMEST is the natural log of the n u m b e r of ana lys t s i s su ing e a r n i n g s fo r ecas t s f o r the f i rm in 
the 90 -day w i n d o w pr ior to ea rn ings repor t ing ; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s f inancial dis t ress score; LOSS equa l s 1 if a f i rm repor t s nega t ive ea rn ings , 0 o t h e r w i s e ; ABSECHG 
is the abso lu te va lue of the c h a n g e in annua l ea rn ings , de f l a ted by b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h s tock pr ice ; STDROE is the s tandard devia t ion of re turn on equ i ty ove r the p r e v i o u s 
f ive years ; EL is e a r n i n g s per share , winsor ized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the indicator var iable for each year 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 1 0 ; INDUSTRY the ind ica tor var iab le r ep re sen t ing two-d ig i t 
S I C c o d e n u m b e r s . 
In sunnTiary, these sensitivity analyses provide evidence consistent with my main 
results for the tests of HI a, suggest ing that the association between audit f i rm 
industry special isat ion and short-horizon forecast accuracy is affected by the models 
(industry special isat ion measures) applied. I obtain some weak evidence to support 
my main results for the tests of H l b , and show that forecast accuracy increases with 
auditor industry special isat ion when specialisation is estimated using the national-
and city-level market -share measures . These results are not surprising, as I conceive 
auditor industry special isat ion as the extent to which auditors concentrate their 
business by industry; the alternate measures described above do not directly capture 
this. 
7.5.2 Other Tests for Hypothesis lb 
To aid the interpretat ion of results for tests of H l b , I examine whether my results are 
robust to re-est imation of regressions on sub-samples of f i rms across which it may 
be expected that the impact of audit quality on forecast errors will vary. For brevity, 
these results are discussed but are not tabulated. First, I examine whether the 
observed associat ion holds for f i rms experiencing different financial performance. A 
significant negat ive association is documented between each measure of auditor 
industry special isat ion and forecast accuracy for both prof i t -making and loss-making 
f i rms, but the coeff ic ients for the loss-making f i rm regressions were of greater 
absolute magni tude . Given that the operations of loss-making f i rms are likely to be 
relatively volati le, this juxtaposi t ion of results is consistent with a greater return to 
audit quali ty for these f i rms. Second, since auditor changes may obfuscate any causal 
relation be tween audit quali ty and forecast accuracy, I re-estimate the models 
excluding cases with auditor changes in year t or / - / This has no substantive effect 
on the main results. 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter , I reported and discussed the results for the tests of H l a and H l b . My 
results for the tests of H l a suggest that the association between audit f i rm industry 
specialisation and short-horizon forecast accuracy is highly sensitive to model 
specification. I f ind some evidence that audit firm industry specialisation is 
positively (negatively) associated with absolute forecast errors when forecast errors 
are unadjusted (deflated by stock price). These inconsistent results across different 
specifications of models indicate the conflicting effects of audit quality on short-
horizon forecast errors. However, I demonstrated that audit firm industry 
specialisation decreases analysts ' long-horizon absolute forecast errors, and that 
these results are robust to variation in model specification, supporting H l b . 
Sensitivity and additional analyses indicate that my main results for the tests of H l b 
are generally robust. These results support my argument that long-horizon forecasts 
are strongly related to the quality of prior period earnings, and that the accuracy of 
long-horizon forecasts should be improved when the quality of earnings, and thus 
audit quality, is increased. While these test results may provide evidence indicating 
the existence of a causal relationship between audit quality and forecast accuracy, I 
continue to examine whether this relationship varies cross-sectionally with the 
underlying diff iculty of the forecasting task to bring more convincing evidence. I 
present and discuss these test results in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 8: RESULTS FOR TESTS OF 
HYPOTHESES 2,3A AND 3B 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the association between audit firm 
industry specialisation and analysts' short-horizon forecast errors is sensitive to 
model specification. However, I presented robust evidence in support of Hypothesis 
lb, which predicts that greater industry specialisation increases the usefulness of 
published financial reports for the prediction of future earnings and thus improves 
analyst long-horizon forecast accuracy. To further investigate whether any 
documented empirical relationship between audit firm industry specialisation and 
long-horizon forecast accuracy may be causal, I test additional hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 2, 3a and 3b) related to cross-sectional variation in the theoretical 
association between audit quality and forecast accuracy. In Section 8.2, I first present 
and analyse the results for one source of such cross-sectional variation, which 
predicts that the relationship between audit firm industry specialisation and forecast 
accuracy is conditional on the riskiness of client firm's operating risk (H2). 
Sensitivity and additional tests for H2 are reported and discussed in Sections 8.3 and 
8.4, respectively. Section 8.5 reports and analyses the main results for the tests of 
H3a and H3b, which predict that the relationship between forecast accuracy and 
audit firm industry specialisation is conditional on the quality of analysts issuing 
forecasts for a firm, measured at the firm-year level (H3a) or analyst-firm-year level 
(H3b). I present and discuss the sensitivity and additional test results for H3a and 
H3b in Sections 8.6 and 8.7. Section 8.8 concludes the chapter. 
8.2 Main Tests of Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the negative association between audit firm industry 
specialisation and analysts ' long-horizon absolute forecast errors increases in 
strength with the level of client f i rm's operating risk, consistent with a greater return 
to audit quality where the auditor 's task complexity is greater. Recall that I use cash 
flow volatility (CFVOL) to proxy operating risk and include CFVOL and its 
interaction with auditor industry specialisation (INDSP*CFVOL) in the empirical 
model (Model 4), as described below: 
Po + PilNDSP + P2CFVOL + PilNDSP *CFVOL + (Model 4) 
ABSFE = P4HORIZON + PsSIZE + P^NUMEST + P7ZSCORE + 
PHLOSS + PgEL + YEAR + INDUSTRY + e 
H2 is supported if the coefficient for INDSP*CFVOL is significantly negative. Table 
8.1 reports the results for tests of H2 for both the unrestricted and propensity score 
matched samples. One-tailed p-values are reported for INDSP, CFVOL and 
INDSP*CFVOL. For other variables, p-values are two-tailed. 
Overall, the models are well fitted, with R^ statistics of approximately 27 and 31 per 
cent. In the unrestricted sample (Column 1), the coefficient for INDSP is negative and 
significant (fi = -0 .0242 , p < 0.001), consistent with the results in Table 7.2. As 
expected, the coefficient for CFVOL is significantly positive (P = 0.0084, p < 0.001), 
suggesting that f i rm ' s operating risk is associated with greater absolute forecast 
errors (less accurate forecasts). The coefficient for INDSP*CFVOL is negative and 
significant (fi = -0 .0065 , p < 0.001), consistent with my prediction that the negative 
impact of audit f i rm industry specialisation on absolute foreca.st errors increases with 
client 's operating risk. Similarly, the matched sample regression (Column 2) reports 
a signif icantly posit ive coeff ic ient for CFVOL (Ji = 0.0099, p < 0.001) and negative 
coeff ic ients , at a lower conf idence level, for INDSP ( f i = -0 .0190 , p = 0.028) and 
INDSP*CFVOL ( f t = - 0 . 0 0 4 7 , p = 0.045). All control variables with the exception of 
SIZE are significant . As noted earlier in Chapter 5, SIZE may have confounding 
effects on forecast accuracy, and if such effects offset each other, it is unsurprising 
that SIZE has no incremental explanatory power in the regressions. 
In summary , both the unrestricted and matched sample regressions provide evidence 
in support of H2, which predicts that audit f irm industry specialisation has a greater 
impact in reducing the absolute forecast errors in analysts' prediction of earnings 
when client f i r m ' s operating risk is higher. These results are consistent with the 
effect of audit quality increasing with the difficulty of audit and forecasting tasks. 
The empirical support for this hypothesis provides further evidence consistent with 
the exis tence of a causal relationship between auditor industry specialisation and 
analyst long-horizon forecast accuracy. 
Tabic 8.1: Long-Horizon Forecast Errors against Audit Firm Industry Specialisation 
and Client Firm's Operating Risk (Tests of H2) 
Dependent Variable: ABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) 
Pred. Unrestricted Sample Matched Sample 
INDSP - - 0 . 0 2 4 2 * * * -0 .0190** 
(<0.001) (0.028) 
CFVOL -t- 0.0084*** 0.0099*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
INDSP*CFVOL - - 0 . 0 0 6 5 * * * -0 .0047** 
(<0.001) (0.045) 
HORIZON -1- 0.0282*** 0.0328*** 
(<0.001) (0.001) 
SIZE 7 0.0002 - 0 . 0 0 0 5 
(0.706) (0.529) 
NUMEST - - 0 . 0 0 2 0 * * * 0.0008 
(0.002) (0.615) 
ZSCORE -1- 0.0053*** 0.0070*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
LOSS + 0.0547*** 0.0568*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
EL + - 0 . 0 0 5 3 * * * -0 .0060*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
YEAR yes yes 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes 
CONSTANT - 0 . 0 7 5 4 * * - 0 . 1 1 9 8 * * 
(0.011) (0.039) 
N 23,558 4,080 
R^ 0.267 0.307 
Robust /)-values of the coeff icients for INDSP, CFVOL and INDSP*CFVOL are one-tailed reported, 
and for other variables are two-tailed reported in parentheses (***p<Q.OI, **p<0 .05 . *p<O.I ) . 
This table presents the results for the tests of H2 using an OLS regression on an unrestricted sample 
(Column I) and a propensity score matched sample (Column 2). 
Variable Definitions: ABSFE is analysts ' absolute forecast errors (an inverse function of forecast 
accuracy), measured as the absolute value of difference between actual I/B/E/S earnings per share 
and forecast earnings per share, deflated by beginning-of-month stock pricc; INDSP is the 
d ichotomous measure of portfolio-share audit firm industry specialisation, measured as per Equation 
(9); CFVOL is cash How volatility, measured as the natural log of the 5-year standard deviation of 
net cash Hows f rom operating activities dellated by average total assets; INDSP*CFVOL is the 
interaction between INDSP and CFVOL, HORIZON is the natural log of the average number of days 
between tnean forecast estimation date and subsequent actual earnings reporting date; SIZE is the 
natural log of the market value of equity; NVMEST is the natural log of the number of analysts 
issuing earnings forecasts for the firm in the 90-day window prior to earnings reporting; ZSCORE is 
Zmi jewsk i ' s financial distress score; LOSS equals I if a firm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; 
EL is earnings per share, winsorized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the indicator variable for each year 1989-
2010; INDUSTRY is the indicator variable representing two-digit SIC code numbers. 
8.3 Sensitivity Tests of Hypothesis 2 
In this section, 1 examine the sensitivity of my main results for tests of H2 to 
alternately specified two-stage regressions and the use of alternate proxies for firm's 
operating risk. I also estimate regressions on sub-samples defined by the quartiles of 
operating risk proxies to examine the appropriateness of the functional form assumed 
in the main tests of H2. 
8.3.1 Alternate Specifications of the Two-stage Regressions 
My main tests use a propensity score matched sample approach to control for 
endogenous selection of specialist auditor. Similar to the sensitivity tests conducted 
for HIa and HIb, I test the robustness of my propensity score matched sample 
results to variations in the specification of the first-stage matching equation, and to 
an alternative two-stage approach that is commonly used in earlier auditing literature 
(Heckman treatment effects regressions) for controlling for the dichotomously 
endogenous regressor. 
My main results for the tests of H2 are substantively unaffected when I re-estimate 
Model 4 by (a) adding client's operating cycle to the first-stage regression, (b) 
replacing the current-period ZSCORE, which may reflect a response to audit quality, 
with the lagged values of this measure, or (c) replacing ZSCORE with leverage, 
which is relatively less affected by the current-period auditor identity. For brevity, 
these results are untabulated. 
I next examine the robustness of my tabulated results to the use of Heckman 
treatment effects regressions. Model 4 includes an interaction between the 
endogenous variable, auditor industry specialisation, and a proxy for firm's operating 
risk {INDSP*CFVOL), implying that this interaction term is also potentially affected 
by endogeneity. Thus, in addition to the instruments included in the 2SLS 
regressions (industry relative size INDRELSIZE and client firm's operating cycle 
CYCLE), I add interactions between INDRELSIZE, CYCLE and the risk proxy 
{lNDRELSIZE*CFVOL and CYCLE*CFVOL). Consequently, while the untabulated 
coefficient for the interaction (INDSP*CFVOL) is consistent with that reported in the 
main tests (fi = -0.0059, p < 0.001), the Sargan tests reject the null hypothesis that 
all of the instruments are strictly exogenous (Sargan test: p = 0.0037). I tested 
alternate candidate instruments, including clients' capital intensity, price-earnings 
ratio and stock issuance, and the interactions between these alternate candidate 
instruments and CFVOL. However, I was unable to reject the possibility that at least 
one of the instruments was endogenous. 
In summary, the above results show that my main propensity score matched sample 
results are not sensitive to variations in the specification of the matching model, and 
are not affected by post-treatment bias. For tests of H2 using the Heckman treatment 
effects regressions, the coefficient for the test variable is consistent with my main 
results; however, the inability to confirm the exogeneity of the instruments means 
that these findings should be treated with caution. 
8.3.2 Alternate Proxies for Firm's Operating Risk 
My results for the tests of H2 suggest that industry specialist auditors play a greater 
role in improving forecast accuracy when firm's operating risk, proxied by cash flow 
volatility, is higher. In this section, I re-estimate my tests of H2 using alternate 
proxies for firm's operating risk. I first use the untransformed cash flow volatility 
measure to examine whether my main results are sensitive to the transformation 
applied. I next use the innate accrual quality measure, developed by Francis et al. 
(2005a), to proxy client firm's operating risic. The innate accrual quality measure 
captures the extent to which firm fundamentals explain cross-sectional variation in 
accrual estimation errors (Francis et al. 2005a). This measure should be 
systematically related to firm and industry characteristics and be relatively 
independent of managerial choices. Poor innate accrual quality affects the mapping 
of accounting earnings into cash flow (Francis et al. 2005a), which is therefore likely 
to affect the precision of information available for the prediction of a firm's future 
cash flow and earnings (closely related to my definition of firm's operating risk). 
Therefore, greater analysts' absolute forecast errors should be associated with poorer 
quality of clients' innate accruals. 
Using McNichols's (2002) modification of the Dechow and Dichev's (2002) accrual 
quality model, Francis et al. (2005a) model innate accrual quality as a function of 
firm size, the standard deviations of cash flow from operations, the standard 
deviation of sales revenues, firm's operating cycle and the incidence of negative 
earnings. A larger value of the fitted value indicates poorer innate accrual quality. 
The innate accrual quality measure is thus a more broadly based proxy for firm's 
underlying operating risk than is cash flow volatility. However, a potential limitation 
of the innate accrual quality measure is that the measure includes variables that may 
represent a response to audit quality, and which may thus bias against finding a 
significant interaction between auditor industry specialisation and r i s k . ' " The 
estimation of the innate accrual quality model is detailed in Appendix G. 
Table 8.2 reports the results of the tests of H2 using these alternate risk proxies. All 
models are well f i t ted ."^ In the unrestricted samples (Columns 1 and 2), the 
coefficients for the risk proxies are positive and significant as expected, and those for 
the interaction terms are negative and significant (CFVOL_raw: p = -0 .1234, p < 
0.001; INNATEAQ: p = -0 .1659, p < 0.001). In the matched samples (Columns 3and 
4), the coefficient remains significantly negative for CFVOL_raw, but is negative 
and insignificant (p = 0.135) when INNATEAQ is examined. The results for the 
INNATEAQ measure should be interpreted with caution because the main effect 
(INDSP) is positive and significant in the unrestricted sample. While INDSP is in the 
predicted direction (negative) in the matched sample, the interaction term is 
insignificant. In summary, while I obtain strong evidence to reinforce my main 
results using the untransformed cash flow volatility measure, my sensitivity analyses 
based on the innate accrual quality provide less convincing support. This may reflect 
the fact that the INNATEAQ measure may itself represent a response to audit quality. 
For example, high-quality auditors may constrain the variation in f i rm's revenues, 
resulting in lower estimated INNATEAQ. The data requirements for estimating 
INNATEAQ also effectively filter younger firms, which are typically riskier. 
I re-computed innate accrual quality after excluding those factors that may he affected by auditor 
identity (i.e. the standard deviation of sales revenues and incidence of negative earnings). Untabulated 
regressions using this accrual quality measure generate results similar to those reported in Table 8.2. 
When accrual quali ty is used to measure f i rm ' s risk, my sample decreases to 17,358, compared to 
23 ,558 observat ions in a model using cash f low volatility. The fall in sample size is largely due to the 
requirement for data to compute changes in working capital accounts. 
Table 8.2: Tests of H2 using Alternate Proxies for Client F i rm ' s Operat ing Risk 
Dependen t V a r i a h k ABSFE 
C o l u m n s (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unres t r ic ted S a m p l e s Matched Samples 
Pred . CFVOL raw INNATEAQ CFVOL raw INNATEAQ 
INDSP 0 . 0 0 2 8 * 0 . 0 0 5 7 * * 0 .0036 - 0 . 0 0 1 7 
(0 .063) (0 .018) (0 .141) (0 .364) 
RISK + 0 . 1 4 0 6 * * * 0 . 1 3 9 5 * * * 0 . 1 9 1 5 * * * 0 .2768*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .002) 
INDSP*RISK - - 0 . 1 2 3 4 * * * - 0 . 1 6 5 9 * * * - 0 . 1 4 6 6 * * - 0 . 1 0 7 8 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .018) (0 .135) 
HORIZON + 0 . 0 2 8 0 * * * 0 . 0 2 5 1 * * * 0 .0524*** 0 .0364*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .006) 
SIZE 9 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 
(0 .825) (0 .423) (0 .883) (0 .793) 
NUMEST - - 0 . 0 0 1 7 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 7 - 0 . 0 0 1 2 0 .0010 
(0 .005) (0 .276) (0 .378) (0 .544) 
ZSCORE 0 . 0 0 5 2 * * * 0 .0059*** 0 .0054*** 0 .0073*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
LOSS + 0 . 0 5 4 7 * * * 0 .0558*** 0 .0584*** 0 .0492*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
EL + - 0 . 0 0 5 3 * * * - 0 . 0 0 5 9 * * * - 0 . 0 0 5 7 * * * - 0 . 0 0 6 7 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
Y E A R yes yes yes yes 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT - 0 . 1 0 6 5 * * * - 0 . 1 3 2 3 * * * - 0 . 2 3 0 5 * * * - 0 . 1 8 8 5 * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .002) (0 .014) 
N 23 ,558 17,358 3 ,900 2 ,804 
R^ 0 .267 0 .273 0 .304 0 .299 
Robus t p - v a l u e s of Ihe coef f i c ien t s for INDSP. RISK and INDSP*RISK are one-tai led repor ted , and 
for o ther var iab les are two- ta i led repor ted in parentheses ( * * * p < 0 . 0 1 . * * p < 0 . 0 5 , * p < 0 . 1 ) . 
Th i s table presents the results for the tests of H2 using al ternate proxies for c l ien t ' s opera t ing risk. 
C o l u m n s (1) and (3) report the results of the regress ions using the un t rans fo rmed cash f low volatility 
p roxy on an unrestr ic ted sample and a propensi ty score matched sample . C o l u m n s (2) and (4) report 
the resul ts of the regress ions using the innate accrual quality proxy on an unrestr icted sample and a 
p ropens i ty score matched sample . 
Variable Defmitions: ABSFE is the ana lys t s ' absolu te earn ings forecast errors (an inverse funct ion of 
forecas t accuracy) , as per Equa t ion (6b); INDSP is the d i c h o t o m o u s measure of por t fo l io-share audit 
firm indus t ry special isat ion, measured as per Equat ion (9); RISK is cash f low volatility, measured as 
the s tandard deviat ion of the c l i en t ' s last five years ' opera t ing cash f lows, def la ted by total assets 
(CFVOL_ravj) in C o l u m n s 1 and 3; or the innate accrual quali ty (INNATEAQ), as per Equat ion (13) 
inc luded in A p p e n d i x G, in C o l u m n s 2 and 4 (INNATEAQ)-, INDSP*RISK is the interact ion be tween 
INDSP and RISK: HORIZON is the natural log of the average number of days be tween mean forecast 
e s t ima t ion da te and subsequen t actual earnings repor t ing date ; SIZE is the natural log of the market 
va lue of equi ty ; NUMEST is the natural log of the number of analysts issuing earn ings forecas ts for 
the firm in the 90-day w i n d o w prior to earnings report ing; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s f inancial distress 
score ; LOSS equa l s 1 if a firm repor ts negat ive earn ings , 0 o therwise ; EL is earnings per share, 
winsor ized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the indicator var iable for each year 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 1 0 ; INDUSTRY is the 
indica tor var iable represent ing two-digi t SIC code numbers . 
8.3.3 Sub-sample Tests 
To further examine the robustness of the test results of H2, I estimate regressions of 
absolute forecast errors against auditor industry specialisation within the sub-
samples defined by the quartiles of the operating risk proxy. While the interaction-
based model used in my main tests (Model 4) constrains the coefficients for the 
control variables to be constant at all levels of risk, the sub-sample approach does 
not impose this constraint. The sub-sample results for the sensitivity tests of H2 are 
presented in Table 8.3. Client firms are grouped into quartiles based on CFVOL, 
with Quartile 1 (4) representing the sub-sample of clients with the lowest (highest) 
level of risk. The coefficients for INDSP are negative and significant across all sub-
samples, among which the coefficient for INDSP is most negative in the 4th Quartile 
(jS = -0.0171, p < 0 .001) ." 'Thus , while the functional form assumed in the main 
tests may be imperfect, this does not appear to compromise the test results. 
I a lso es t imate regress ions within quart i les of forecast dispers ion. I find that the coef f i c ien t s for 
aud i to r indust ry spec iahsa t ion (INDSP) are most negat ive in ihe upper two quar t i les of forecas t 
d i spers ion . 
Table 8.3: Sub-Sample Tests of H2 
D c p e n J c n l Var iah ic : ABSFE 
C o l u m n s (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q = 1 ( lowest 
Q = 2 Q = 3 Q = 4 (Highe.st 
Pred. CFVOL) CFVOL) 
INDSP - - 0 . 0 0 5 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 6 4 * * * - 0 . 0 0 7 9 * * * - 0 . 0 1 7 1 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
HORIZON -I- 0 . 0 1 6 6 * * * 0 . 0 1 4 6 * * 0 . 0 2 4 1 * * 0 .0758*** 
(0 .001) (0 .011) (0 .040) (<0 .001) 
SIZE 7 - 0 . 0 0 1 4 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 2 * * 0 .0008 0 .0032*** 
(0 .002) (0 .048) (0 .298) (0 .002) 
NUMEST - 0.0001 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 2 0 * - 0 . 0 0 4 0 * * 
(0 .869) (0 .934) (0 .084) (0 .015) 
ZSCORE -1- 0 . 0 0 4 7 * * * 0 .0060*** 0 .0061*** 0 .0043*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
LOSS + 0 . 0 4 4 5 * * * 0 .0613*** 0 .0606*** 0 .0494*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0.001) 
EL + - 0 . 0 0 3 8 * * * - 0 . 0 0 4 1 * * * - 0 . 0 0 4 8 * * * - 0 . 0 0 7 6 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
Y E A R yes yes yes yes 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT - 0 . 0 5 9 0 * * - 0 . 0 2 1 7 - 0 . 0 9 7 2 - 0 . 3 8 2 9 * * * 
(0 .036) (0 .542) (0 .152) (<0 .001) 
N 5 ,890 5 ,889 5 ,890 5 ,889 
R^ 0 .228 0 .263 0 .277 0 .206 
Robus t p - v a l u e s of the coe f f i c i en t s for INDSP. CFVOL and INDSP*CFVOL are one-tai led 
repor ted , and for o thers are two-ta i led repor ted in parentheses (*** p<0 .01 , p < 0 . 0 5 . * p<0.1). 
This table presents the resul ts for the tests of H 2 within the sub-samples def ined by the quar t i les of 
the opera t ing risk proxy , cash f low volatil i ty. C o l u m n s I to 4 report the results for the sub-sample 
of c l ients with the lowes t level of risk to highest level of risk. 
Variable Defmilions: ABSFE is the analys ts ' absolute earnings forecast er rors (an inverse funct ion 
of forecas t accuracy) , as per Equat ion (6b); INDSP is the d i cho tomous measure of por t fo l io-share 
audit f i rm industry special isat ion, measured as per Equat ion (9); CFVOL is cash f low volatil i ty, 
m e a s u r e d as the 5 -year s tandard deviat ion of net cash flows f rom opera t ing activit ies def la ted by 
ave rage total assets; HORIZON is the natural log of the average number of days be tween mean 
forecas t es t imat ion date and subsequen t actual earn ings report ing date; SIZE is the natural log of 
the marke t value of equi ty; NUMEST is the natural log of the number of analysts issuing earnings 
fo recas t s for the firm in the 90-day w i n d o w prior to earnings report ing; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s 
financial d is t ress score ; LOSS equals 1 if a f i rm reports negative earnings , 0 o therwise ; EL is 
ea rn ings per share , winsor ized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the indicator variable for each year 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 1 0 ; 
INDUSTRY is the indicator var iable reprc,senting two-digi t SIC code numbers . 
8.4 Additional Tests of Hypothesis 2 
My main results for the tests of H2 show that auditor portfolio-share industry 
specialisation decreases analysts ' absolute forecast errors to a greater extent when 
c l ient ' s operat ing risk is higher. In Chapter 7, I described three alternate industry 
specialisation measures (national-level market-share, national-level weighted 
market-share and city-level market-share measures) and argue that these measures 
may also capture some aspects of auditor expertise that may lead to superior audit 
outcomes, such as improvements in the usefulness of financial reports for analysts ' 
prediction of future earnings. In this section, I re-estimate tests of H2 using alternate 
industry specialisation measures. For brevity, I report only the matched sample 
results in Table 8.4. My main results are robust to models using national-level 
market and weighted market-share measures of auditor industry specialisation. The 
coeff ic ients for INDSP*CFVOL are significantly negative (market share /? = -0 .0023 , 
p = 0 .076; weighted market share p = -0 .0058 , p = 0.026), while the coefficients for 
the main effects are in the predicted directions and are significant. However, I find 
no support for H2 when using the city-level market-share measure of auditor 
industry specialisation. 
Table 8.4: Tests of H2 using Alternate Audit Firm Industry Specialisation Measures 
Dependen t Var iable : ABSFE 
C o l u m n s (1) (2) (3) 
Nat ional- level Nat ional- level City-level 
Pred . INDSP market INDSP weighted market INDSP market 
INDSP - - 0 . 0 0 8 9 * - 0 . 0 2 3 3 * * - 0 . 0 0 2 9 
(0 .063) (0 .014) (0.352) 
CFVOL 0 .0070*** 0 .0087*** 0 .0022* 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .087) 
INDSP*CFVOL - - 0 . 0 0 2 3 * - 0 . 0 0 5 8 * * - 0 . 0 0 0 2 
(0 .076) (0 .026) (0 .464) 
HORIZON + 0 . 0 2 7 0 * * * 0 .0325*** 0 .0354*** 
(<0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .002) 
SIZE 0 .0006 - 0 . 0 0 0 4 0 .0003 
(0 .296) (0 .609) (0 .710) 
NUMEST - - 0 . 0 0 2 4 * * * 0 .0007 - 0 . 0 0 1 4 
(0 .002) (0 .640) (0 .260) 
ZSCORE + 0 .0054*** 0 .0069*** 0 .0040*** 
(<0 .001) (<0.001) (<0 .001) 
LOSS + 0 .0537*** 0 .0571*** 0 .0450*** 
(<0 .001) (<0.001) (<0 .001) 
EL -1- - 0 . 0 0 5 9 * * * - 0 . 0 0 5 9 * * * - 0 . 0 0 4 1 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0.001) (<0 .001) 
Y E A R yes yes yes 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes 
CONSTANT - 0 . 0 8 9 9 * * - 0 . 1 3 0 8 * * - 0 . 1 9 2 2 * * * 
(0 .011) (0 .025) (0 .004) 
N 14,514 4 , 0 8 0 5 ,194 
0 .262 0 .307 0 .245 
Robus l p - v a l u e s of the coef f ic ien ts for INDSP. CFVOL and INDSP*CFVOL are one-tai led 
repor ted , and for other var iables are two-tai led repor ted in parentheses ( • * * / ;<0 .0 I , ** p<0 .05 , * 
p<0 .1 ) . 
Th is table presents the propensi ty score matched sample regression results for the tests of H2 based 
on M o d e l (4) using al ternate audit firm industry special isat ion measures . Co lumns (1) reports the 
resul ts of the regress ion using the nat ional- level market-share measure of industry special isat ion. 
C o l u m n s (2) repor ts the results of the regress ion using the national-level weighted market-share 
measu re of industry special isat ion. C o l u m n s (3) reports the results of the regress ion using the city-
level marke t - share measure of industry special isat ion. 
Variable Definitions: ABSFE is the analys ts ' absolute earnings forecast errors, measured as per 
Equa t ion (6b); INDSP equals 1 if the client is audi ted by a national industry specialist w h o has the 
largest marke t share in a two-digi t SIC industry (National- level INDSP_m3ikei), where the market 
share is ca lcula ted as per Equat ion (11), 0 o therwise ; or, if the client is audited by a national 
industry special is t w h o has the largest weighted market share in a two-digit SIC industry (Nat ional-
level /A 'DS/ '_weigh ted_marke t ) , where the weighted market share is calculated as per Equat ion 
(12) , 0 o therwise ; or, if the client is audi ted by a ci ty-industry specialist who has the largest market 
share in a two-digi t S IC industry in a city def ined as the U.S. Census Bureau defini t ion of 
Met ropo l i t an Statistical Area (City-level W D 5 F _ m a r k e t ) , where the city market share is calculated 
as per Equa t ion (13), 0 o therwise ; CFVOL is cash fiow volatility, measured as the natural log of the 
5 -year s tandard deviat ion of net cash f lows f r o m opera t ing activities def la ted by average total 
assets; INDSP*CFVOL is the interact ion be tween INDSP and CFVOL, HORIZON is the natural log 
of the ave rage number of days be tween mean forecast es t imat ion date and subsequent actual 
ea rn ings repor t ing date ; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equi ty; NUMEST is the 
natural log of the n u m b e r of analysts issuing earn ings forecasts for the firm in the 90-day w indow 
prior to ea rn ings repor t ing; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s financial distress score; LOSS equals 1 if a 
firm repor t s negat ive earn ings , 0 o therwise ; EL is earnings per share, winsor ized at 5 (-5); YEAR is 
the indica tor var iable for each year 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 1 0 ; INDUSTRY h the indicator variable represent ing 
two-dig i t S IC c o d e numbers . 
8.5 Main Tests of Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
Another potential source of predictable variation in the effectiveness of audit quality 
in improving forecast accuracy derives from the quality of analysts covering a client 
firm. I argue that, if my earlier findings regarding the relationship between long-
horizon forecast accuracy and audit firm industry specialisation actually derive from 
audit quality rather than a spurious correlation, auditor industry specialisation should 
be observed to have a greater impact on the accuracy of forecasts made by lower-
quality analysts. I develop separate hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
auditor industry specialisation, analyst quality and forecast accuracy on a firm-year 
basis (Hypothesis 3a), and on an analyst-firm-year basis (Hypothesis 3b). Empirical 
support for the.se hypothe.ses would provide further evidence consistent with the 
existence of a causal relationship between audit quality and analyst forecast accuracy. 
Further, support for these hypotheses provides evidence regarding the extent to 
which audit quality contributes to the achievement of the stated objectives of 
financial report (i.e. u.sefulness of the financial reports to a greater number of 
financially competent users). 
8.5.1 Main Tests of Hypothesis 3a 
Hypothesis 3a predicts that the negative association between auditor industry 
specialisation and analysts' absolute long-horizon forecast errors decreases with the 
average quality of the analysts covering client firms. Since H3a refers to a firm-year-
level prediction, I test this hypothesis using proxies for the average quality of the 
analysts following a firm in a given year. Model 5a includes every specific analyst 
quality proxy and their interactions with industry specialisation (INDSP). Model 5b 
includes (alternatively) each of the two composite measures of analyst quality and 
their interactions with INDSP. In addition to the control variables included in Models 
BCK la and lb, I also control for analysts' portfolio complexity, proxied by the 
average number of firms and industries followed by an analyst (FFOLLOW and 
IFOLLOW). Models 5a and 5b are described below: 
Po + PilNDSP + PiGEXP + p,INDSP*GEXP + P4FEXP 
+ fS,INDSP*FEXP + [hBSIZE + [hlNDSP^BSIZE + 
akkff - PxSTAR+PglNDSP*STAR+p,oFFOLLOW+ ^ , ^ ^ 
" PuIF0LL0W + PnDlSP + PuH0RIZ0N + p,4SIZE+ (Model 5a) 
PisNUMEST + PiiZSCORE + PijLOSS + PinABSECHG 
+ P19STDROE + P20EL + INDUSTRY + E 
Po + PiINDSP + PiCSCOREliCSCOREl) + 
PiINDSP*CSCOREl (INDSP *CSCORE2) + 
ABSFE = P4FFOLLOW + P^IFOLLOW + P(,DISP + PJHORIZON (Model 5b) 
+ PHSIZE + P9NUMEST + PioZSCORE + p„LOSS + 
PnABSECHG + P13STDROE + P^EL + INDUSTRY + e 
While the main effect of audit firm industry specialisation on absolute forecast errors 
{INDSP) is expected to be negative, H3a is supported if the interactions between the 
analyst quality proxies and auditor industry specialisation are positive and significant. 
Table 8.5 presents the results for tests of H3a. Panel A provides the results for the 
unrestricted samples using OLS with standard errors adjusted for firm and year 
clustering, while Panel B presents the results for the propensity score matched 
samples. One-tailed p-values are reported in all of the following tables for the 
variables for which I have a directional prediction; otherwise, the p-values are two-
tailed. 
In Column 1 of Panels A and B, 1 report the results of tests in which each of the 
singular analyst quality proxies are interacted with auditor industry specialisation. 
The R^ statistics are 55.8 per cent in the unrestricted sample (Panel A) and 53.7 per 
225 
cent in the propensi ty score matched sample (Panel B), suggesting that the models 
are well fitted. In both samples, the main effect for INDSP is negative and significant 
(p <= 0.001), consistent with the results in Table 7.2.'^° The interaction terms for 
auditor industry specialisation and each analysts ' expertise proxy are positive and 
significant in the unrestricted sample (INDSP*GEXP p = 0.0004, p = 0.032; 
INDSP*FEXP p = 0 .0006, p = 0.053; INDSP*BSIZE p = 0.0003, p < 0.01; 
INDSP*STAR p = 0 .0107, p < 0.01). This is consistent with my hypothesis that audit 
quality becomes less important to average forecast accuracy when the average 
quality of analysts increases. The coefficients for 1NDSP*GEXP and INDSP*BSIZE 
are also in the predicted directions and are significant in the propensity .score 
matched samples; however , the interaction between auditor industry specialisation 
and analysts ' f i rm-specific forecasting experience (INDSP*FEXP), and the 
interaction between auditor industry specialisation and the analysts' 'All-Stars ' 
status (INDSP*STAR), are not significant in the matched sample. I suggest caution in 
interpreting any of the results of tests of H3a using the forecasting experience 
proxies and the mean 'All-Star ' proxy, as the main effects for these variables (GEXP, 
FEXP and STAR) are insignificant, suggesting that these metrics applied in isolation 
may not be strong proxies for the average quality of analysts following a firm. 
The coeff ic ients for control variables imported f rom tests of H l b are similar to tho.se 
reported in Chapter 7. Of the additional controls included in the tests of H3a, the 
number of industries fol lowed by an analyst is increasing with absolute forecast 
errors (IFOLLOW P = 0 .0004, p <= 0.001) for the unrestricted sample. This result 
T h e avai labi l i ty of 'Al l -S ta r ' analyst data restr icts the samples used to test H 3 a to the per iod 1 9 9 3 -
2010 . If this shor ter s a m p l e per iod is used for tests of H l b . I generate similar results to tho.sc tabulated 
in Chap t e r 7 (INDSP_dum /? = - 0 . 0 0 1 8 , p = 0 .035 in the unrestr icted sample, /? = - 0 . 0 0 2 4 , p = 0 .026 
in the m a t c h e d sample) . Th is regress ion is tabulated in Appendix H. 
indicates that ' busy ' analysts perform worse in forecasting earnings, consistent with 
prior argument and evidence (Clement 1999). However, there is no association 
between either of the portfolio complexi ty measures and forecast errors in the 
matched sample. 
In Co lumns 2 and 3 of Table 8.5, I present the results for the tests of H3a, in which 
analyst quality is proxied by alternate composi te score measures. I ranked all 
analysts who were active within a f i rm ' s long-horizon forecast window according to 
each of the quality proxies and summed the rankings across the four quality proxies 
for each analyst (i.e. general experience, f irm-specific experience, brokerage size and 
'Al l -Star ' status). CSCOREI is the average value of total rankings of the analysts 
fol lowing a client f i rm in a given year. CSCOREI is similarly defined, but brokerage 
size is excluded f rom the aggregation. The models based on the composite score are 
well fitted (R" statistics range f rom 53.5 to 55.9 per cent). Again, the main effect of 
INDSP on forecast errors is negative and significant in both the unrestricted and 
matched samples. In the tests based on the unrestricted samples (Panel A, Columns 2 
and 3), the interaction terms INDSP*CSCOREI and /NDSP*CSC0RE2 are positive 
but insignificant (p = OAH, p = 0.208, respectively). However, when I estimate the 
regressions after matching samples of treatment and control f i rms with inherently 
similar characteristics (Panel B Columns 2 and 3), I obtain evidence of significant 
positive coeff icients for the interactions between auditor industry specialisation and 
the composi te analyst quality measures (p-values of 0.022). 
Table 8.5: Long-Horizon Forecast Errors against Audit Firm Industry Specialisation 
and Analyst Quality (Tests of H3a) 
Panel A OLS Regressions on Unrestricted Samples 
Dependent Variable: ABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) (3) 
Pred. Singular Proxy CSCOREl CSCOREl 
INDSP - -0 .0089*** -0 .0031** -0 .0026** 
(<0.001) (0.014) (0.035) 
GEXP -0 .0002 
(0.109) 
INDSP*GEXP • 0.0004** 
(0.032) 
FEXP -0 .0000 
(0.421) 
IN DSP*FEXP + 0.0006* 
(0.053) 
BSIZE -0 .0002 
(0.119) 
INDSP*BSIZE • 0.0003*** 
(0.003) 
STAR -0 .0000 
(0.498) 
INDSP*STAR • 0.0107*** 
(0.002) 
CSCORE - -0 .0020*** 
(0.005) 
-0 .0024*** 
(0.006) 
INDSP*CSCORE + 0.0005 
(0.114) 
0.0004 
(0.208) 
F FOLLOW 9 -0 .0000 -0 .0000 -0 .0000 
(0.587) (0.561) (0.567) 
1 FOLLOW 9 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 
(0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
DISP + 0.3898*** 0.3998*** 0.3990*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
HORIZON + 0.0189*** 0.0206*** 0.0207*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
SIZE 7 0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 
(0.808) (0.340) (0.401) 
NUMEST _ -0 .0019*** -0 .0012* -0 .0012* 
(<0.001) (0.087) (0.076) 
ZSCORE + 0.0010* 0.0011* 0.0011* 
(0.083) (0.059) (0.062) 
LOSS -1- 0.0186*** 0.0191*** 0.0191*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSECHG + 0.4928*** 0.4953*** 0.4953*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
STDROE + -0 .0216*** -0 .0225*** -0 .0226*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
EL + -0 .0020*** -0 .0014*** -0 .0014*** 
(<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) 
INDUSTRY yes yes yes 
CONSTANT -0 .1132*** -0 .0905*** -0 .1245*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 22,742 22,742 22,742 
R^ 0.558 0.559 0.559 
Robust p-values of the coeff.cienls for INDSP. GEXP. FEXP. BSIZE. STAR, CSCORE. 
INDSP*GEXP, INDSP*FEXP, INDSP*SIZE, INDSP*STAR and INDSP*CSCORE are one-tailed 
reported, and for other variables are two-tailed reported in parentheses ( * " p<0.01, " /><0.05, • 
p < 0 . n . — 
Panel B O L S Regress ions on Propensity Score Matched Samples 
Dependent Variable: ABSFE 
Columns ( I ) (2) (3) 
Pred. Singular Proxies CSCORE! CSC0RE2 
INDSP - - 0 . 0 1 6 4 * * * - 0 . 0 0 9 3 * * * - 0 . 0 0 9 3 * * * 
(0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) 
GEXP - - 0 . 0 0 0 5 
(0.223) 
INDSP*GEXP 0.0011** 
(0.042) 
FEXP - 0.0006 
(0.235) 
INDSP*FEXP + 0.0002 
(0.383) 
BSIZE - - 0 . 0 0 0 8 * * 
(0.013) 
INDSP*BSIZE -H 0.0008** 
(0.018) 
STAR - 0.0086 
(0.15) 
INDSP*STAR + 0.0107 
(0.109) 
CSCORE - - 0 . 0 0 3 4 * * * - 0 . 0 0 4 2 * * 
(0.008) (0.013) 
INDSP*CSCORE + 0.0020** 0.0026** 
(0.022) (0.022) 
F FOLLOW 7 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.911) (0.307) (0.270) 
IFOLLOW 9 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
(0.633) (0.493) (0.437) 
DISP + 0.3225 0.3268 0.3256 
(0.131) (0.133) (0.133) 
HORIZON + 0.0107 0.0141* 0.0141 
(0.204) (0.099) (0.104) 
SIZE 7 - 0 . 0 0 0 3 0.0004 0 .0003 
(0.762) (0.638) (0.704) 
NUMEST - 0 . 0 0 1 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 
(0.367) (0.912) (0.888) 
ZSCORE • 0.0011 0.0013 0.0013 
(0.332) (0.253) (0.260) 
LOSS -t- 0 .0213*** 0.0224*** 0 .0224*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSECHG -1- 0.4780*** 0.4811*** 0.4807*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
STDROE + - 0 . 0 1 9 3 * - 0 . 0 1 9 3 * - 0 . 0 1 9 5 * 
(0.080) (0.070) (0.067) 
EL + - 0 . 0 0 2 3 * * - 0 . 0 0 1 5 - 0 . 0 0 1 5 
(0.021) (0.194) (0.194) 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes 
CONSTANT - 0 . 0 5 8 2 - 0 . 0 7 4 6 - 0 . 0 7 4 7 
(0.206) (0.121) (0.126) 
N 3,686 3,686 3,686 
R^ 0.537 0.535 0.535 
for Robust p-va lues of the coeff ic ients , 
INDSP*GEXP INDSP*FEXP, INDSP*SIZE. INDSP*STAR and INDSP*CSCORE are one-tailed 
reported, and for other variables are two-tailed reported in parentheses ( * " p<0.01 . ** /)<0.05, * 
P<0.1) . 
Thi s lable p rcsen l s the resul t s for the tests of H 3 a using O L S regress ions on unrestr icted samples 
(Panel A) and propens i ty score ma tchcd samples (Panel B). Co lumn 1 of Panel A and B repor ts the 
resul ts ot the r eg ress ions us ing the s ingular analyst quality proxies. C o l u m n s 2 and 3 report the results 
of the r eg ress ions us ing t w o c o m p o s i t e measures of analyst quali ty. 
Variable Definitions: ABSFE is ana lys t s ' absolu te earnings forecast errors , measured as per Equat ion 
(6h); GEXP is the ave rage general exper ience of all analysts fo l lowing a f i rm dur ing the w indow over 
which long-hor izon forecas t accuracy is ca lcula ted, where general exper ience is measured as the 
n u m b e r of years th rough year t fo r which an analyst i supplied at least one forecast for any f i rm; 
FEXP is the ave rage f i rm exper i ence of all analysts fo l lowing a f i rm dur ing the w indow over which 
long-hor izon forecas t accuracy is calculated, where firm exper ience is measured as number of years 
th rough year t for wh ich an analys t i supplied at least one forecast for f i rm j\ BSIZE is the average 
b roke rage size that e m p l o y s analys ts fo l lowing a firm dur ing the w indow over which long-hor izon 
forecas t accuracy is ca lcula ted , where brokerage size is measured as number of analysts employed by 
a broker e m p l o y i n g analys t ; w h o fo l lows f i rm j in year t\ STAR is the proport ion of the analysts 
fo l lowing f i rm j , du r ing the long-hor izon forecast window, who are ranked as an 'Al l -S tar ' by Ws 
A l l - A m e r i c a Resea rch T e a m in year t: CSCOREI {CSC0RE2) is the compos i te score, measured as 
the ave rage of the total ranks for analysts fo l lowing a firm where the ranking is conduc ted according 
to each individual analyst quali ty proxy within the long-hor izon forecast w indow; CSCOREI 
incorpora tes the r ank ings for four proxies (GEXP, FEXP. BSIZE and STAR), CSC0RE2 incorporates 
the r ank ings for three p rox ies (GEXP, FEXP and STAR)-. INDSP is the d i cho tomous measure of 
por t fo l io - share audit f i rm industry special isat ion, measured as per Equat ion (9); INDSP*GEXP is the 
interact ion be tween INDSP and GEXP, INDSP*FEXP is the interaction be tween INDSP and FEXP: 
INDSP*BSIZE is the interact ion be tween INDSP and BSIZE: INDSP*STAR is the interaction be tween 
INDSP and STAR: INDSP*CSCORE is the interaction be tween INDSP and CSCOREI or CSCOREI: 
FFOLLOW is the ave rage of the number of f i rms covered , dur ing the long-hor izon forecast w indow in 
year t, by each analys t w h o issues a forecast for f i rm j dur ing that w indow; IFOLLOW is the average 
number of two-digi t S IC industr ies covered , dur ing the long-horizon forecast w indow in year t, by 
each analys t w h o issues a forecas t for firm j dur ing that window; DISP is forecast dispersion, 
measured as the s tandard devia t ion of analysts ' forecasts def ia ted by the beg inn ing-of -month stock 
price; HORIZON is the natural log of the average number of days be tween mean forecast es t imat ion 
date and subsequen t actual earn ings report ing date; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of 
equi ty; NUMESTis the natural log of the number of analysts issuing earn ings forecasts for the firm in 
the 90-day w i n d o w pr ior to earn ings report ing; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s financial dis t ress score; 
LOSS equa l s 1 if a firm repor ts negat ive earnings, 0 o therwise ; ABSECHG is the absolute value of the 
change in annual earn ings , def la ted by beg inn ing-of -month stock price; STDROE is the s tandard 
devia t ion of return on equi ty over the previous five years; EL is earnings per share, winsor ized at 5 (-
5); INDUSTRY is the indicator var iable represent ing two-digit SIC code numbers . 
In summary , there is mixed evidence in support of H3a. I report strong evidence in 
support of H3a, which argues that the relationship between audit f irm industry 
specialisation and analysts ' absolute forecast errors is stronger when the average 
quahty of analysts (proxied by analysts ' general experience or analysts ' employer 
size) cover ing a f i rm is lower. However, when analyst quality is proxied by firm-
specific experience or 'All-Star ' status, H3a is only supported in the unrestricted 
sample. Further, results f rom the tests using the two composite measures of analyst 
quality support H3a when applied to matched samples of client f irms with similar 
propensit ies to be audited by an industry specialist. This evidence is generally 
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cons i s t en t wi th , but obv ious ly not proof of , the ex i s tence of a causal re la t ionship 
b e t w e e n aud i to r indus t ry special isa t ion and the use fu lness of publ ished earnings for 
p red ic t ing fu tu r e p e r f o r m a n c e . In the next sect ion, I examine this fur ther but focus 
on the impac t of aud i to r indust ry special isa t ion on the forecas t ing pe r fo rmance of 
individual ana lys t s f o l l o w i n g a given f i rm. 
8.5.2 Main Tests of Hypothesis 3b 
Hypo thes i s 3b predic ts that audit f i rm industry special isat ion reduces the d i f fe rence 
in ana lys t s ' abso lu te fo recas t errors be tween the 'wor s t ' and 'bes t ' quali ty analysts 
f o l l o w i n g a cl ient f i rm in a given year. In the tests of H3b, the d i f fe rence in absolute 
fo recas t e r rors be tween the 'wors t ' and 'bes t ' analysts ( ident if ied separately for each 
s ingular ana lys t qual i ty p roxy) is regressed on audi tor industry special isat ion and the 
control var iables , as per M o d e l 6: 
Po + fiilNDSP + P2ABSFE_B + p.DIFANQ + (Model 6) 
P4ANQ_B + PsHORIZON_B + PoDIFHORIZON + 
DIFABSFE = P7DISP + PSSIZE + P9NUMEST + P,OZSCORE + 
PJILOSS + PnABSECHG + Pi_,STDROE + P14EL + 
YEAR +INDUSTRY + e 
H 3 b is suppor ted if audi tor industry special isat ion {INDSP) is s ignif icant ly negat ive. 
Tab le 8.6 p resen t s the resul ts for the unrestr icted (Panel A ) and matched sample tests 
(Panel B) of H3b . T h e regress ions reported in Table 8.6 d i f fe r with respect to the 
m e a n s by w h i c h the 'wors t qual i ty ' and 'best qual i ty ' analysts are identif ied. The 
first f ou r c o l u m n s relate to d i f fe rences in analys ts ' general forecas t ing exper ience 
( C o l u m n I), f i rm-spec i f i c forecas t ing exper ience (Co lumn 2), emp loy ing b rokerage 
size ( C o l u m n 3) and 'Al l -S ta r ' s tatus (Column 4), whi le the last two c o l u m n s report 
regressions in which the 'best' and 'worst' analysts following a particular firm are 
identified using the two composite score measures of analyst quality, CSC0RE3 
(Column 5) and CSC0RE4 (Column 6). As I have a directional prediction for the 
signs of auditor industry specialisation (INDSP), one-tailed p-values for INDSP are 
reported in all of the following tables. 
The models used to test H3b are less well fitted than those used to test my other 
hypotheses (R^ statistics reported in Table 8.6 range from 4.9 to 7.6 per cent). This 
may be because most of my control variables are defined on a firm-year basis and 
are likely to have a lower explanatory power regarding the differences in individual 
analyst forecast accuracy than they do for average level of forecast accuracy. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8.6 present the results for the tests of H3b, where analysts' 
general (GEXP) and firm-specific forecasting experience (FEXP) are used to identify 
the 'worst' and 'best' quality analysts. In Column 1 of Panel A (unrestricted sample) 
and Panel B (matched sample), my test variable (INDSP) is significantly and 
negatively correlated with DIFABSFE (fi = -0.1440, p-values < 0.001). In the 
regressions in which I use analysts' firm-specific experience to identify the 'worst' 
and 'best' quality analysts (Column 2), I also obtain negative and significant 
coefficients for my test variable (INDSP) (Panel A: /? = -0.0816, p < 0.01; Panel B: [i 
= -0.1143, p < 0.01). Taken together, these results support my prediction that 
industry specialist auditors reduce absolute forecast errors to a greater extent when 
the forecasts are made by less experienced analysts, which in turn reduces the 
difference in forecast errors between the 'worst' and 'best' quality analysts. 
Tabic 8.6: Difference in Long-Horizon Forecast Errors between the 'Wors t ' and 'Best ' Analysts 
against Audit Firm Industry Specialisation (Tests of H3b) 
Panel A OLS Regressions on Unrestricted Samples 
Dependent Variable: DIFABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pred. GEXP FEXP BSIZE STAR CSC0RE3 CSC0RE4 
INDSP - -0.1440**» -0.0816*** -0.0509 -0.0320 -0.1654*** -0,1621*** 
(<0.001) (0.009) (0.101) (0.117) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSFE_B - - 8 . 4 4 8 8 " * -8.2844*** -10.4029*** -5.5898*** -10.2225*** -8,8123*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0,001) 
DIFANQ - 0.0055 0.0062 -0.0003 -0,0002 0,0037 
(0.309) (0.562) (0.628) (0,972) (0,656) 
ANQ_B + -0.0058 -0.0070 0.0000 0.0025 -0,0025 
(0.294) (0.503) (0.992) (0.587) (0,723) 
HORIZON_B + 0 . 0 0 0 8 " * 0.0012*** 0.0007* 0.0006* 0.0008** 0.0009*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.069) (0.068) (0,019) (0,005) 
DIFHORIZON + 0.0038*** 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0031*** 0.0040*** 0,0042*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0,001) (<0,001) 
DISP + 3.2919 3.7148 12.1542*** 6.4156*** 7.3146 3,2008 
(0.242) (0.182) «0.001) (0.009) (0.107) (0.290) 
SIZE 7 -0.0085 0,0030 0.0138 -0.0038 0.0022 0,0030 
(0.373) (0.753) (0.202) (0.581) (0.846) (0,764) 
NUMEST - 0.0169 0.0181 -0.0020 0.0254* -0.0454 0,0061 
(0.405) (0.299) (0.934) (0.071) (0.218) (0.847) 
ZSCORE + 0.0096 0.0062 0.0233** 0.0208*** 0.0291** 0,0024 
(0.354) (0.518) (0.034) (0.007) (0.023) (0,827) 
LOSS + 0.2662*** 0.2497*** 0.2254*** 0,1051* 0.3296*** 0.2827*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0,056) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSECHG + 3.6513*** 4.1667*** 4.6941*** 3.2101*** 4.2578*** 4.0463*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0,001) (<0,001) 
STDROE + -0.0839 -0.3203** -0.2388 -0.15.34 -0,2823* -0,3388** 
(0.605) (0.034) (0.167) (0.295) (0,091) (0,042) 
EL + 0.0184 0.0120 -0.0155 0.0038 0,0048 0,0096 
(0.109) (0.282) (0.204) (0.634) (0,695) (0.385) 
YEAR yes yes yes yes yes yes 
INDUSTRY yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT 0.0275 -0.2647 0.1955 -0.1620 -0.0625 -0.1582 
(0.930) (0.191) (0.429) (0.173) (0.749) (0,498) 
N 20,525 20,525 20,525 9,276 20.525 
20.525 
0.049 0.050 0.061 0.070 0,058 0,052 
J, 
reported in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ^  
this table . 
i n u j r d i e . . -pwii^ ." . — 
' ' p<0 .05 . * p<0.1). Coef f ic ien t es t imates are mult ipl ied by 100 in 
Panel B OLS Resressinns on Pr»pensity Score Matched Samples 
Dependent Variahle: DIFABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pred. GEXP FEXP BSIZE STAR CSC0RE3 CSC0RE4 
INDSP - -0.1.%2*** -0.1143*** -0 ,0652 -0 .0542* -0.1665*** -0.1866*** 
(0.()03) (0,008) (0,10.5) (0.065) (0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSFE_B - -7 .5087*** -8,7732*** -7,9161*** -5.2555*** -8.7246*** -9.0078*** 
(<0.001) (<0,001) (<0,001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
DIFANQ - -0 .0136 -0,0021 -0 ,0017 0.0141 0.0045 
(0.463) (0,932) (0,361) (0.243) (0.814) 
ANQ_B + 0.0181 0,0007 0.0000 -0 .0117 -0.0035 
(0.333) (0,976) (0.999) (0.277) (0.831) 
HORIZON_B -f 0.0003 0,0003 -0 ,0007 -0 .0014 -0 .0000 0.0001 
(0,.'i59) (0,613) (0,168) (0.169) (0.988) (0.905) 
DIFHORIZON 0,0031*** 0,0041*** 0,0036*** 0.0025** 0.0034*** 0.0036*** 
(<0,001) (<0,001) (<0,001) (0.030) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
DISP + 12.23.'i7* -2 .8012 21,0413** 1.6674 20.4877*** 2.7630 
(0,062) (0.700) (0,014) (0.831) (0.008) (0,697) 
SIZE 7 0.032.'! 0.0362 0,0175 -0 .0119 0.0330 0,0461* 
(0,191) (0.137) (0,534) (0.459) (0.278) (0,077) 
NUMEST - 0,0529 0.0708 0,1391** 0.0731* 0.1230 0,0593 
(0,.340) (0.141) (0,032) (0.052) (0.182) (0,465) 
ZSCORE -t- 0,0104 -0 .0018 0,0180 0.0343 0.0435 0,0072 
(0,708) (0.944) (0,566) (0.106) (0.168) (0.797) 
LOSS -t- 0,3996*** 0.4412*** 0,3075** 0.1208 0.4232*** 0.4587*** 
(0,002) (<0.001) (0,037) (0.445) (0.004) (<0.001) 
ABSECHG + 2,1453 4.8026*** 2,8191* 4.4507*** 3.1066* 3.6800** 
(0,128) (0.001) (0,060) (0.002) (0.067) (0.015) 
STDROE + 0,2307 0,1582 -0 .4747 -0 .2150 -0 .2520 0.2491 
(0,607) (0,690) (0,275) (0.513) (0.581) (0.561) 
EL + 0.0055 0,0214 0.0092 0.0246 0.0278 0.0012 
(0,845) (0,438) (0,777) (0.217) (0.396) (0.967) 
YEAR yes yes yes yes yes yes 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT -0 ,2868 -0 ,3822 1.4156*** 0.0436 -0.2391 -0 .2299 
(0,.340) (0,231) (<0.001) (0.893) (0.514) (0.478) 
N 3,312 3,312 3,312 1,462 3,312 3,312 
R ' 0,060 0,072 0.064 0.074 0.076 0.069 
Robust p-values of the coefficients for INDSP are one-tailed reported, and for other variables are two-tailed 
reported in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** /)<0.05, * p<0.1). Coef f ic ien t es t imates are mult ipl ied by 100 in 
this table . 
This table presents the results for the tests of H3b using OLS regressions on unrestricted samples (Panel A) 
and propensity score matched samples (Panel B). Column 1 of Panel A and B reports the results of the 
regressions using analysts ' general forecasting experience (GEXP) to identify the 'worst ' and 'best ' quality 
analysts. Column 2 of Panel A and B reports the results of the regressions using analysts ' f irm-specific 
forecasting experience (FEXP) to identify the 'worst ' and 'best ' quality analysts. Column 3 of Panel A and 
B reports the results of the regressions using the size of analysts' employing brokerage firm {BSIZE) to 
identify the 'wors t ' and 'best ' quality analysts. Column 4 of Panel A and B reports the results of the 
regressions using analysts ' 'All-Star ' status (STAR) to identify the 'worst ' and 'best ' quality analysts. 
Co lumns 5 and 6 of Panel A and B report the results of regressions using two composite score measures 
(CSC0RE3 and CSCORE4) to identify the 'worst ' and 'best ' quality analysts. 
Variable Defmitkms: DIFABSFE is the abso lu te Ibrecast e r ror of the 'wor s t ' qual i ty analys t minus the 
abso lu te fo recas t e r ror of the ' bes t ' qual i ty analys t w h e r e the 'wor s t ' and 'bes t ' quali ty analysts are 
d e t e r m i n e d acco rd ing to var ious ana lys t qual i ty proxies : GEXP, FEXP, BSIZE, STAR, CSC0RE3 and 
CSCORE4 where GEXP represents analysts ' general experience, FEXP represents analysts' f irm-specific 
experience, BSIZE represents the number of analysis employed by a brokerage firm, STAR equals I if an 
analyst was ranked by / / ' s Al l -America Research Team, 0 otherwise, CSC0RE3 is a composite measure of 
analyst quality, based on all four quality proxies (GEXP. FEXP. BSIZE and STAR). CSC0RE4 is the 
composi te measure of analyst quality, based on three quality proxies representing the personal attributes of 
the analysts (GEXP. FEXP and STAR): INDSP is the d i c b o t o m o u s measure of por t fo l io-share audit f i rm 
indust ry spec ia l i sa t ion , m e a s u r e d as per Equa t ion (9); ABSFE_B is the absolute forecast error of the 
' bes t ' qual i ty analys t , acco rd ing to var ious analyst qual i ty proxies : GEXP. FEXP. BSIZE. STAR. 
CSC0RE3 and CSCORE4, ANQ_B is the level of the qual i ty proxy for the 'bes t ' analyst , where the 
' bes t ' analys t is d e t e r m i n e d accord ing to var ious analys t qual i ty proxies : GEXP. FEXP. BSIZE. STAR, 
CSC0RE3 and CSC0RE4: DIFANQ is the level of the quali ty proxy for the 'bes t ' analys t minus the 
level of the qual i ty p roxy for the ' w o r s t ' analyst , where the 'wors t ' and 'bes t ' analys ts are de te rmined 
acco rd ing to va r ious analys t qual i ty proxies : GEXP, FEXP. BSIZE. STAR. CSC0RE3 and CSC0RE4: 
HORIZON_B is the n u m b e r of days be tween forecast es t imat ion/ revis ion date and subsequent actual 
ea rn ings repor t ing da te of tbe 'bes t ' analyst , where ' bes t ' analys t is de te rmined accord ing to various 
analyst qual i ty p rox ies : GEXP. FEXP. BSIZE. STAR. CSC0RE3 and CSC0RE4\ DIFHORIZON is the 
n u m b e r of d a y s be tween forecas t es t imat ion / rev is ion date and subsequent actual earn ings repor t ing 
da te of the ' w o r s t ' analyst minus the number of days be tween forecast es t imat ion/ revis ion date and 
subsequen t actual ea rn ings repor t ing date of the ' bes t ' analyst , where the 'wor s t ' and 'bes t ' analysts 
are de t e rmined accord ing to var ious analys t qual i ty proxies : GEXP. FEXP. BSIZE. STAR. CSCORE3 
and CSC0RE4; DISP is forecas t d ispers ion , measured as the s tandard deviat ion of analys ts ' forecast 
E P S de l la ted by tbe b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h stock price; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of 
equi ty; NUMEST is the natural log of the number of analys ts issuing earn ings forecas ts for the f i rm in 
the 9()-day w i n d o w pr ior to earn ings repor t ing; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s f inancial di.stress score; LOSS 
equa l s I if a f i rm repor t s nega t ive earn ings , 0 o therwise ; ABSECHG is the absolute value of the change 
in annua l ea rn ings , de l l a ted by b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h stock price; STDROE is the s tandard deviat ion of 
return on equi ty over the p rev ious five years; EL is ea rn ings per share, winsor ized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the 
indicator variable for each year 1989-2010; INDUSTRY is the indicator variable representing two-digit SIC 
code numbers. 
Column 3 reports the results of the tests of difference in forecast accuracy according 
to analyst quality, where quality is proxied by the size of the broker employing the 
analysts {BSIZE). In both the unrestricted and matched samples, the coefficients for 
audit f i rm industry specialisation (INDSP) are negative but insignificant (Panel A: p 
= 0.101; Panel B; p = 0.105). This indicates that audit quality does not significantly 
reduce the d i f ference in forecast accuracy between analysts employed by larger or 
smaller brokerage f i rms. 
Co lumn 4 reports the results for the tests of H3b using analysts ' 'All-Star ' status 
[STAR) to identify the 'wors t ' and 'best ' quality analysts. The coefficient for my test 
variable {INDSP) is negative but insignificant in the unrestricted sample (Panel A). 
However, it is significantly negative {fl = -0.0542, p = 0.065) in the propensity score 
matched sample (Panel B). This supports my prediction that the hiring of a high-
quality audit firm decreases the forecasting disadvantage of non-star analysts, 
consistent with the specialist auditors enhancing the quality of the published 
financial reports on which non-star analysts tend to more heavily rely. 
In Columns 5 and 6, I report the results of the regressions of differences in absolute 
forecast errors across analysts of higher and lower quality, where quality is proxied 
by my two composite measures, CSC0RE3 and CSC0RE4. Similar to the tests of 
H3a, CSC0RE3 is a function of all four analyst quality proxies (GEXP, FEXP, 
BSIZE and STAR), while CSC0RE4 only captures analysts' personal attributes (thus 
excluding BSIZE). The coefficients for audit firm industry specialisation (INDSP) 
are negative and highly significant (p-values <= 0.001) for both composite measures, 
regardless of whether the regressions are estimated on the unrestricted or propensity 
score matched samples. These results provide further support for my contention that 
audit quality improves the usefulness of published financial reports for predicting 
future performance and that such positive impact is greater for lower-quality analysts 
who rely more heavily on financial reports when generating their forecasts. 
Since the models used to test H3b are exploratory, I discuss the statistical properties 
of the control variables employed in more detail than for earlier models. In addition 
to the firm-level control variables used in previous tests, I include five analyst-
specific control variables for the tests of H3b, because the dependent variable in 
these tests is defined at the analyst level. The firm-level control variables are either 
insignificant or less significant in the tests of H3b than they are in the tests of the 
other hypotheses . Whi le the control variables ABSECHG and LOSS have positive 
and significant coef f ic ients consistently across different regressions, the other f irm-
year-level controls are not consistently significant across the various models 
presented in Panel A. Overall , the firm-level control variables have no consistent 
correlation with the d i f fe rence in forecast accuracy between the 'worst ' and 'best ' 
analysts. 
The coeff ic ients for the analyst-related control variables contribute more greatly to 
model fit. For example , the coeff ic ients for the level of the absolute forecast errors of 
the 'bes t ' quality analyst (ABSFE_B), the forecast horizon of the 'best ' analyst 
(H0R1Z0N_B) and the di f ference in forecast horizon between the 'worst ' and 'best ' 
analysts (DIFHORIZOM) are in the predicted directions and are significant in all 
unrestricted and matched samples. These results indicate that the timing of forecasts 
made by higher and lower-quali ty analysts and the pertaining underlying forecasting 
diff iculty explain some of the difference in forecast accuracy across analysts. 
However , the variables capturing the extent to which the 'wors t ' and 'best ' analysts 
differ in quality (DIFANQ and ANQ_B) are not correlated with the difference in their 
forecast ing per formance . 
In summary , I f ind strong evidence to support H3b, which argues that audit f irm 
industry specialisation reduces the difference in forecast accuracy of the 'worst ' and 
'best ' analysts when these analysts are identified based on analysts ' general 
experience, f i rm-specif ic experience or composi te scores. I obtain similar evidence 
in a matched sample regression using the 'All-Star ' analyst quality measure. 
Al though H3b is not supported when brokerage size is exclusively used to proxy 
analyst quality, the partial impact of brokerage size on difference in forecast 
accuracy is implicitly captured through the composite score measure (CSC0RE3), 
tests based on which support H3b. These results provide further support for my 
conjecture that the presence of an industry specialist auditor enhances the usefulness 
of published financial reports for predicting future performance, thereby improving 
the relative performance of lower analysts who I argue are relatively dependent on 
primary information sources such as financial reports when generating their forecasts. 
This evidence is again consistent with the existence of a causal relationship between 
auditor industry specialisation and the accuracy of analysts' prediction of earnings. 
8.6 Sensitivity Tests for Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
In this section, I conduct a range of sensitivity tests for both H3a and 3b, including 
variation in the lag-structure of controls (Section 8.6.1), and alternate specifications 
of the propensity score prediction regressions and the use of Heckman treatment 
effects regressions (Section 8.6.2). I also report robustness tests specific to each 
hypothesis in Section 8.6.3 (H3a) and Section 8.6.4 (H3b). I now describe these tests 
in turn. 
8.6.1 Changes in Lag-Structure of Controls 
The control variables (ABSECHG, DISP and ZSCORE) that I included in Models 5a, 
5b and 6 may be affected by the realisation of the earnings being forecast, which is 
subject to the impact of auditor identity. Therefore, I re-estimated the models using 
the one-year lags of these controls to examine the robustness of the reported results. 
In these untabulated regressions, my main results are not substantively affected. 
8.6.2 Alternate Specifications of the Two-stage Regressions 
My main tests of H3a and H3b use a PSM approach to control for the endogenous 
selection of industry specialist auditors. In this section, I test the sensitivity of my 
PSM regression results to variations in the specification of the first-stage 'matching' 
equation, and to the use of Heckman treatment effects regressions. For brevity, these 
results are not tabulated but are discussed below. 
I begin my sensitivity analyses by testing several alternate specifications of the first-
stage matching regressions under the PSM approach. In the main tests, my first-stage 
regressions, which estimate the conditional probability of a client hiring an industry 
specialist, include only the second-stage controls as predictors, with one exception— 
that I do not include the level of the best analysts' absolute forecast errors (ABSFE_B) 
in the first-stage regressions for tests of H3b. I add the lag of the client's operating 
cycle (in tests of H3a and H3b), analyst quality main effects (in tests of H3a) and the 
level of the 'best' analysts' absolute forecast errors (in tests of H3b). I generate 
results of similar direction and significance to my main results, with the single 
exception being that the interaction between INDSP and CSCORE2 in the tests of 
H3a is marginally insignificant (/? = 0.11). 
Further, to test the sensitivity of my main results to matching on post-treatment 
variables, I re-estimate Models 5a, 5b and 6 using first-stage regressions that include 
the lagged (rather than current) values of ABSECHG, ZSCORE and DISP, and 
predictors that are theoretically independent of the current-period auditor identity 
(e.g. replacing ABSECHG with the absolute change in clients' cash flow from 
operations, and replacing STDROE with the standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations). The overall model fit decreases for these untabulated regressions, but 
the coefficients for my test variables are in the predicted directions and of similar 
significance to the main results. 
I next employ the Heckman treatment effects regressions to examine the robustness 
of the results generated by the PSM approach. I commence this analysis using the 
same instruments employed in the 2SLS regressions (INDRELSIZE and CYCLE). 
For the tests of H3a, I also interact these instruments (INDRELSIZE and CYCLE) 
with the analyst quality proxies and include these interaction terms as additional 
instrumental variables in the first-stage Heckman regressions. While I obtain 
coefficients similar to my main results, the Sargan tests suggest that my instruments 
are not exogenous (e.g. Sargan test: CSCOREI p = 0.0127; CSCORE2 p = 0.005). I 
test alternate candidate instruments, such as clients' capital intensity, price-earnings 
ratio and stock issuance, but I cannot reject the possibility of the instruments' 
endogeneity in any of the tests. For the tests of H3b, the specification tests show that 
my instruments are both relevant and exogenous; thus, the resulting estimators are 
consistent. The coefficients for my test variable (INDSP) are significantly negative 
(CSC0RE3 p = -0.0897, p = 0.017; CSC0RE4 (i = -0.0542, p = 0.075), consistent 
with my main findings that audit quality reduces the difference in forecast accuracy 
between the 'worst' and 'best' analysts. 
In summary, my main results for the tests of H3a and H3b are robust to the various 
specifications of the matching regressions and are not tainted by post-treatment bias. 
The Heckman treatment-effect regressions confirm my findings for the tests of H3b, 
for which exogenous instruments can be identified and confirmed. For tests of H3a, 
the coefficients for tiie test variables are consistent with my main results, but these 
findings should be interpreted with caution because the specification tests fail to 
confirm the exogeneity of the instruments. 
8.6.3 Other Sensitivity Tests for H3a 
I conduct a range of additional tests of the robustness of my main results for tests of 
H3a, which 1 describe below. My main tests of H3a use the average quality of 
analysts following a client firm to proxy the overall quality of that cohort of analysts. 
However, the quality of the best analyst following a firm may be of greater empirical 
significance, because other analysts may use the expert's forecasts to inform their 
own (this phenomenon is known as 'herding'). Consequently, 1 re-estimate Models 
5a and 5b using the maximum value of the analyst quality proxies within the cohort 
of analysts following a firm as my proxy for analyst quality. For brevity, in Table 8.7 
I tabulate only the results for the regressions using the maximum value of the 
composite score measures. The coefficients for my test variables (interactions 
between INDSP and the relevant analyst quality proxies) remain positive and 
significant, providing further support for my prediction that the association between 
auditor industry specialisation and forecast accuracy decreases with analyst quality. 
As my 'All-Star' proxy likely reflects the other analyst quality proxies, I exclude this 
proxy (STAR) in the calculation of the composite measures and re-estimate Models 
5a and 5b using these composite measures. Once more, my untabulated test 
coefficients improve in their significance levels, or are substantively unaffected by 
this modelling choice. 
Table 8.7: Tests of H3a using the Maximum Value of Analyst Quality Proxies 
Dependen t Var iable : ABSh'E 
C o l u m n s (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unrestr icted Samples Matched Samples 
Pred. CSCOREIM CSCOREIM CSCOREIM CSCOREIM 
INDSP - -0 .00 .37*** - 0 . 0 0 3 1 * * - 0 . 0 0 9 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 9 0 * * * 
(0.003) (0 .011) (0.003) (0.003) 
CSCOREM - - 0 . 0 0 0 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 9 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 3 * * * - 0 . 0 0 3 4 * * * 
(0.003) (0.004) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
INDSP*CSCOREM -f 0 .0000** 0 .0005 0 .0001*** 0 .0018*** 
(0.041) (0.112) (0.006) (0.005) 
FFOLLOW 7 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 .0000 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 
(0.. ' il4) (0.466) (1.000) (0.989) 
IFOLLOW 7 0 .0004*** 0 .0004*** 0.0003 0 .0004 
(<0 .001) (<0.001) (0.314) (0.257) 
DISP + 0 .3990*** 0 .3988*** 0.2607 0 .2609 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.231) (0.230) 
HORIZON -1- 0 .0205*** 0 .0207*** 0 .0235*** 0 .0236*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
SIZE 7 0 .0005 0 .0004 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 
(0.353) (0.388) (0.740) (0.676) 
NUMEST - - 0 . 0 0 0 5 - 0 . 0 0 0 5 0 .0020 0.0019 
(0.623) (0.607) (0.188) (0.231) 
ZSCORE + 0 .0011* 0 .0011* 0 .0010 0 .0010 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.222) (0.237) 
LOSS + 0 .0192*** 0 .0192*** 0.0219*** 0 .0219*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSECHG + 0 .4951*** 0 .4952*** 0 .5755*** 0..5753*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
STDROE + - 0 . 0 2 2 4 * * * - 0 . 0 2 2 6 * * * - 0 . 0 2 5 6 * * * - 0 . 0 2 6 1 * * * 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
EL + - 0 . 0 0 1 3 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 4 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 3 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 4 * * * 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.006) 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT - 0 . 0 9 0 8 * * * - 0 . 0 9 2 0 * * * - 0 . 1 1 5 6 * * * - 0 . 1 1 6 1 * * * 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 22,742 22.742 3 ,740 3 ,740 
0 .559 0.559 0.612 0 .612 
other variables are iwo-lai led r e p o n e d in parentheses (*** p<0 .01 . ** p<0.05. * p<0.1). 
This table presents the results fo r the tests of H3a based on regressions using the m a x i m u m value of the four-
quali ty compos i t e measure (CSCOREIM) (Columns [1] and [3]). and the three-quality composi te measure 
(CSC0RE2M) of analyst qual i ty on both the unrestricted and propensity score matched samples. 
Variable Defmiiions: ABSFE is analysts ' absolute earnings forecast errors, measured as per Equation (6b); 
INDSP is the d i cho tomous measure of portfol io-share audit f irm industry specialisation, measured as per 
Equat ion (9); CSCOREM is a composi te measure of analyst quality calculated based on the m a x i m u m value of 
the four s ingular analyst qual i ty proxies (CSCOREIM). or the three quality proxies representing the personal 
at tr ibutes of the analysts (CSCOREIM)'. INDSP*CSCORE is the interaction between INDSP and CSCOREIM or 
CSCOREIM: FFOLLOW is the average of the number of f i rms covered, during the long-horizon forecast 
windov^ in year (, by each analyst who issues a forecast for firm) during that window; lEOLLOW .s the average 
number of two-digi t SIC industr ies covered, during the long-horizon forecast window m year /, by each analyst 
who issues a forecast fo r f i rm j during that window; DISP is forecast dispersion, measured as the standard 
deviat ion of analys ts ' forecas t E P S deflated by the beginning-of -month stock price; HORIZON is the natural log 
of the average number of days be tween mean forecast est imation date and subsequent actual e a m m g s repor tmg 
date- SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity; NVMEST is the natural log of the number of analysts 
issuing earn ings forecas ts for the firm in the 90-day window p o o r to e a m . n g s reporting; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s 
financial dis t ress score; LOSS equals 1 if a firm reports negat ive earnings, 0 otherwise; ABSECHC, ,s the absolute 
value of the change in annual earnings, def la ted by beginning-of-month stock pnce ; STDROE ,s the standard 
deviat ion of return on equi ty over the previous five years; EL is earnings per share, wmsor ized at 5 (-5); 
INDUSTRY is the indicator variable represent ing two-digit SIC code numbers . 
8.6.4 Other Sensitivity Tests for H3b 
To further examine the robustness of my results for the tests of H3b, I conduct a 
range of tests. To eliminate the mechanical correlation between the forecasts made 
by the 'worst ' and 'best ' analysts and my control for observed dispersion (DISP), 
which has the potential to obscure the interpretation of coefficients, I re-compute 
DISP by (a) excluding the 'worst ' and 'best ' analysts' forecasts '^ ' and (b) replacing 
DISP with the forecast range, equal to the difference between the highest and lowest 
forecast earnings for a firm, excluding the forecasts of the 'worst ' and 'best ' analysts. 
For parsimony, I tabulate only the coefficients for my test variable (INDSP), in Table 
8.8. In Panels A and B, I find that my main results are robust to variation in the 
measurement of DISP and the use of forecast range as a substitute for DISP. 
My main results for the tests of H3b are based on models that include a control for 
the absolute forecast errors of the 'best ' analyst. As this variable is likely to be 
structurally related to my treatment variable ilNDSP), I re-estimate my regressions 
by (a) replacing this measure with the forecast error of the 'worst ' analyst, (b) 
replacing this measure with the mean value of the forecast errors of the 'best ' and 
'worst ' analysts and'"^ (c) excluding this control altogether. I tabulate the results for 
the models using the forecast errors of the 'worst ' analyst in Table 8.9. While some 
of these models have slightly higher R" statistics than those reported in Table 8.6, the 
coefficients for my test variables (INDSP) remain negative and significant at similar 
or stronger confidence levels. 
Thi s c o m p u t a t i o n of d i spers ion is not pract ical for the •All-Star" model , as most of (he f i rms 
inc luded are fo l l owed b y j u s t one •Al l -S t a r ' ana lys t . 
In m o d e l s in wh ich I use the forecas t accuracy of the 'wor s t ' analys t or .he average o H h e for cas , 
accuracy of the ' b e s t ' and ' w o r s t ' analysts , I change the value of a q u a h t y proxy iANQS) and the 
forecas t ho r i zon (HORIZON_B) accord ing ly . 
Table 8.8: Tests of H3b using Alternative Controls for Forecast Dispersion 
Panel A Re-computation of Forecast Dispersion {DISP) 
Dependent Variable: DIFABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pred. GEXP FEXP BSIZE CSC0RE3 CSC0RE4 
Unrestricted 
Sample 
INDSP - -0.1202*** -0.0659* -0.0440 -0.1432*** -0.1562*** 
(0.003) (0.052) (0.186) (0.004) (<0.001) 
DISP_excl 3.7601 4.9536* 7.2149** 5.0986 3.4995 
(0.203) (0.083) (0.042) (0.377) (0.312) 
Matched Sample 
INDSP - -0.1977*** -0.0816* -0.0426 -0.1480** -0.2227*** 
(<0.001) (0.06) (0.250) (0.015) (<0.001) 
DlSP_excl -I- 12.3264 3.4222 32.4227*** 31.3349** 8.5522 
(0.147) (0.679) (<0.001) (0.014) (0.355) 
Robust p-values of the coefficients for INDSP are one-tailed reported and for others are two-tailed reported 
in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** /7<0.05, * p<0.1). Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100 in this table. 
Panel B Forecast Range as a Replacement for Forecast Dispersion (DISP) 
Dependent Variable; DIFABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pred. GEXP FEXP BSIZE STAR CSC0RE3 CSC0RE4 
Unrestricted 
Sample 
INDSP -0.1437*»* -0.0812*** -0.0499 -0.0328 -0.1648*** -0.1618*** 
(<0.001) (0.009) (0.106) (0.113) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
RANGE + 0.0038 -0.0015 0.0018 0.0038 0.0131 0.0079 
(0.579) (0.728) (0.750) (0.606) (0.171) (0.406) 
Matched 
Sample 
INDSP -0.1963** * -0.1172*** -0.0536 -0.0609** -0.1705*** -0.2119*** 
(<0.001) (0.005) (0.155) (0.047) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
RANGE + 0.0681 0.1283* 0.1953** 0.0240 0.3198** 0.0703 
(0.472) (0.086) (0.037) (0.655) (0.012) (0.472) 
in parentheses (***p<O.OI. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1). Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100 in this table. 
This table presents the results for the tests of H3b using alternative controls for forecast dispersion. Panel A 
reports the results of the regressions using the re-computed forecast dispersion on both the unrestncted and 
propensity score matched samples. Panel B reports the results of the regressions using the forecast range as 
a replacement for dispersion on both the unrestricted and propensity score matched samples. 
Variabie Defmitions- DIFABSFE is the difference in absolute forecast errors between the 'worsf and -best-
quality analysts, measured as per Equation (7); INDSP is the dichotomous measure of portfolio-share audit 
firm industry specialisation, measured as per Equation (9); DlSP_excl is the forecast dispersion [DISP). 
excluding of the forecasts of the -worst' and 'besf analysts; RANGE is the difference between the highest 
and lowest forecast earnings for a firm, excluding of the forecasts of the 'worsf and -besf analysts. 
Tab le 8.9: Tests of H 3 b us ing A l t e rna t e Cont ro l s f o r the Value of the 'Bes t ' Qual i ty Analyst 
Panel A OLS Resressions iin Unrestricted Samples 
D e o c n d e n t Var i ab le : DIFABSFE 
C o l u m n s (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pred . GEXP FEXP BSIZE STAR CSC0RE3 CSC0RE4 
INDSP - 0 . 1 1 2 8 * * * - 0 . 0 5 0 6 * - 0 . 0 1 1 1 - 0 . 0 4 4 2 * - 0 . 1 2 3 1 * * * - 0 . 1 2 6 5 * * * 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) (0 .07) (0 .377) (0 .05) (0 .001) (<0 .001) 
ABSFE_W + 10 .0033*** 8 . 8 2 7 6 * * * 12 .2283*** 1.3733** 12 .3598*** 10.5114*** 
( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .016) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
DIFANQ - 0 . 0 0 3 9 * - 0 . 0 0 1 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 .0019 0 .0007 
(0 .081) (0 .370) (0 .959) (0 .148) (0 .745) 
ANQ_W - 0 . 0 0 6 1 - 0 . 0 0 6 6 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 3 5 - 0 . 0 0 6 7 
(0 .274) (0 .531) (0 .920) (0 .455) (0 .338) 
HORIZON_W - 0 . 0 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 0 7 * * - 0 . 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 0 5 - 0 . 0 0 0 3 
(0 .390) (0 .934) (0 .049) (0 .916) (0 .114) (0.367) 
DIFHORIZON + 0 . 0 0 3 5 * * * 0 . 0 0 3 5 * * * 0 .0040*** 0 .0028*** 0 .0039*** 0 .0040*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
N 20 ,525 20 ,525 20 ,525 9.216 20,525 20 ,525 
0 .065 0 . 0 5 6 0 .080 0 .028 0 .081 0 .070 
R o b u s t / ) -values 
pa ren theses (*** 
of the coe f f i c i en t s for INDSP are one- ta i led reported 
p<0.0\. **p<0.05. *p<0.]). Coef f i c i en t es t imates are 
and for others are two-tai led reported in 
mult ipl ied by 100 in this table. 
Panel B OLS Regressiiins on Propensity Score Matched Samples 
D e p e n d e n t Var iab le : DIFABSFE 
C o l u m n s (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fred. GEXP FEXP BSIZE STAR CSC0RE3 CSCORE4 
INDSP - 0 . 1 0 2 5 * * - 0 . 0 8 5 6 * * - 0 . 0 2 2 7 - 0 . 0 6 5 2 * - 0 . 1 2 4 9 * * - 0 . 1 5 5 2 * * * 
(0 .017) (0 .034) (0 .323) (0 .073) (0 .037) (0.001) 
ABSFE_W + 9 . 9 3 1 1 * * * 7 .1590*** 13.2741*** 3 .0690** 12.7045*** 9 .2474*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .030) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
DIFANQ - 0 . 0 0 1 8 - 0 . 0 0 2 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 .0003 
(0 .752) (0 .659) (0 .414) (0 .423) (0 .955) 
ANQ_W 0.0151 0 . 0 0 6 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 1 9 5 * 
- 0 . 0 0 7 2 
(0 .417) (0 .795) (0 .870) (0 .064) (0 .652) 
HORIZON_W - 0 . 0 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 0 1 6 * - 0 . 0 0 2 0 * * - 0 . 0 0 0 8 
- 0 . 0 0 0 7 
(0 .646) (0 .490) (0 .086) (0 .041) (0 .237) (0 .366) 
DIFHORIZON + 0 . 0 0 3 1 * * * 0 .0041*** 0 .0042*** 0 .0042*** 0 .0040*** 
0 .0039*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0.001) 
N 3 ,312 3 ,312 3 ,312 1,462 
3 ,312 3 ,312 
R^ 0 .085 0 .056 0 .118 0 .053 
0 .116 0.071 
Robus t / j -va lues ot tne c o e t n c i e n i s loi u v i ^ j r an; - - - -
pa ren theses (*** p < 0 . 0 1 . ** p < 0 . 0 5 . * / ;<0.1) . Coef f i c i en t es t imates are mult ipl ied by 100 in the table. 
1 i - t i . - : . L KQCIOH n n t h p v a l l l P n f 
p a r e m n e s e s i . ' • . j ^ — — ^ — 
This table p resen t s the resul ts for the tests of H 3 b using the controls cons t rac ted based on the value of the worst 
qual i ty ana lys t (i.e. ABSFE^W. HORIZON_W and ANQ^W). Panel A (Panel B) reports the results of O L S 
regress ions on unres t r ic ted s amples (propens i ty score matched samples) . .. ^ -K ,• 
Variable Denmtiom: DIFABSFE is the d i f f e rence in absolute forecast errors be tween the wors t and best 
qual i ty ana lys ts , m e a s u r e d as per Equa t ion (7); INDSP is the d i cho tomous measure of por t fo l .o-share audit firm 
L u s t r y spec ia l i sa t ion , measu red as per Equa t ion (9); ABSFE_W ,s the abso ute forecast e r ro of the w o st 
qual i ty a n d y s t , a cco rd ing to var ious analyst qual i ty proxies; DIFANQ is the leve of the • X P - y o th 
•besf analyst m inus the level of the qual i ty p roxy for the 'wors t ' analyst , where the worst and best analysts 
are d e t e r ^ n d accord ing to var ious analyst qual i ty proxies ; ANQ.W is the level of the qual i ty p roxy for the 
w o r s r a n a T y r where the ' w o r s t ' analyst is de te rmined accord ing to var ious analyst qual i ty proxies; 
HORZONwll the n u m b e r of days be tween forecast es t imat ion/revis ion date and subsequent actual earn ings 
r e p o « t e of the wors t ' ana ly l t , whe re ' w o r s t ' analyst is de te rmined accord ing to var ious analyst qua ity 
7 O ^ D^FHOR^ON is the n u m b e r of days be tween forecast es t imat ion/ revis ion date and subsequen t actual 
Z n g s Z o ^ n g da te of the ' w o r s t ' analyst m inus the n u m b e r of days be tween forecast e s t im^ ion^rev i s ion da te 
a ^ r s u b s T e n l f c tua l ea rn ings r e p o r t , n g ' d a t e of the ' bes t ' analyst , whe re the 'wors t ' and 'best analysts are 
de t e rmined acco rd ing to var ious analyst qual i ty proxies . ' 
My main tests for H3b are based on the dichotomous measure of audit f i rm industry 
specialisation. 1 examine the impact of this modell ing choice and re-estimate Model 
6 using the cont inuous measure of industry specialisation. Table 8.10 tabulates the 
results for m y test variable (INDSP) using both OLS (Panel A) and 2SLS regressions 
(Panel B). In regressions in which endogeneity exists (BSIZE and STAR), the 2SLS 
coeff ic ient est imates show that auditor industry specialisation is significantly and 
negatively correlated with the difference in forecast accuracy, consistent with my 
main results. In regressions in which the D W H statistics show no evidence of 
endogenei ty (GEXP, FEXP, CSC0RE3 and CSC0RE4), the OLS estimates are 
efficient and consistent and the coefficients are significantly negative for models 
based on the GEXP, CSC0RE3 and CSC0RE4 analyst quality proxies. In summary, 
these results are generally consistent with my main results, which suggest that audit 
quality reduces the difference in forecast accuracy between the 'worst ' and 'best ' 
analysts. In fact, while I f ind no evidence that INDSP decreases DIFABSFE in 
models based on BSIZE in the main tests, my sensitivity analyses show that the 
cont inuous measure of auditor industry specialisation reduces the difference in 
forecast accuracy between analysts employed by smaller and larger brokerage firms. 
Table 8.10: Tests of H3b using the Continuous Measure of Portfolio-Share Audit Firm Industry 
Specialisation 
Panel A O L S Regressions 
Dependent Variable: DIFABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pred. GEXP FEXP BSIZE STAR CSCOREJ CSC0RE4 
INDSP - -0 .6375 '** - 0 . 3 7 4 6 - 0 . 2 5 8 3 0.1142 -0 .5866*» - 0 . 7 0 7 5 " 
(0.036) (0.139) (0.230) (0.303) (0.049) (0.024) 
N 20,525 20,525 20,525 9,276 20,525 20,525 
R^ 0.048 0.050 0.061 0.070 0.058 0.051 
Robust /)-values of the coefficients are one-tailed reported in parentheses (*** /xO.Ol , ** /7<0.05. * p < 0 . l ) . 
Coeff icient estimates are multiplied by 100 in this table. 
Panel B 2SLS Regressions for Endogeneity Corrections 
Dependent Variable: DIFABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pred. GEXP FEXP BSIZE STAR CSC0RE3 CSC0RE4 
INDSP - 0 . 5 1 3 7 - 1 . 0 9 8 8 * * * - 1 . 3 8 4 3 * * * -0 .5875** -1 .1616** - 0 . 7 0 2 2 * 
(0.141) (0.007) (0.005) (0.041) (0.016) (0.073) 
N 19,402 19,402 19,402 8,628 19.402 19,402 
R^ 0.042 0.045 0.053 0.051 0.051 0.044 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
(/)-values) 
0.9085 0.9085 0.2717 0.0865 0.0312 0.3697 
Sargan test (/)-values) 0.4703 0.4703 0.6217 0.4162 0.7396 0.2883 
Part ial-R^of instruments 
in first-stage 
0.1971 0.1971 0.1966 0.1977 0.2061 0.1973 
Wald F-statistics 271.204 271..594 271.023 224.652 ni.mi 269.,345 
LM statistics 909.034 919.446 906.987 472.995 914.585 911.558 
Robust /)-values of the coefficients are one-tailed reported in parentheses (*** ;j<0.01, ** p<0.05. * / x O . l ) . 
Coeff icient estimates are multiplied by 100 in this table. 
This table presents the results for the tests of H3b using the continuous measure of portfolio-share audit firm 
industry specialisation. Panel A reports the results of OLS regressions. Panel B reports the results of 2SLS 
regressions. 
Variable Definiiions: DIFABSFE is the difference in absolute forecast errors between the "worst' and 'best ' 
quality analysts, measured as per Equation (7); INDSP is the continuous measure of portfolio-share audit firm 
industry specialisation, measured as the sum of the square root of the total assets of the clients that an audit firm 
services in a specific industry divided by the sum of the square root of the total assets of all clients of that audit 
firm. 
T o e x a m i n e whe the r m y resul ts for the tests based on the compos i t e measures are 
sens i t ive to the we igh t of the 'A l l -S ta r ' rankings , I re-es t imate M o d e l 6 af ter re-
c o m p u t i n g the c o m p o s i t e score measu re (CSC0RE3) by ass igning 'Al l -S ta r ' analysts 
a r ank ing va lue of 3, 5 or 10, whi le ass igning non-s tar analysts a ranking value of 1, 
or e x c l u d i n g the 'A l l -S ta r ' p roxy in the ca lcula t ion of the compos i t e measures . Th is 
is b e c a u s e 'A l l -S t a r ' analys ts receive a much larger ranking value w h e n a f i rm is 
followed by a relatively large number of predominantly non-star analysts, which 
results in a greater distance between the ranking of 'All-Star' and non-star analysts. 
For example, if a firm is followed by 21 analysts, the only 'All-Star' analyst in the 
firm would be ranked 21, while the remaining non-stars would be assigned the 
average value of 10.5. However, if a firm is followed by three analysts, the only 
'All-Star' analyst has a ranking value of three, while the others have an average 
ranking value of 1.5. My tabulated main results remain qualitatively the same when I 
alter the weight of the rankings and exclude the 'All-Star' proxy in the calculation of 
the composite measures. 
8.7 Additional Tests 
1 conduct two additional tests of Hypotheses 3a and 3b. These tests comprise the use 
of alternate industry specialisation measures and the examination of the impact of the 
Reg FD, which may shed light on the nature of analyst expertise and its association 
with audit quality. 
8.7.1 Alternate Industry Specialisation Measures 
My main findings for the tests of H3a and H3b suggest that auditor portfolio-share 
industry specialisation has a greater (lesser) impact on the forecast accuracy of lower 
(higher) quality analysts. Similar to the additional analyses applied to the tests of 
HI a, H lb and H2, I use the alternate industry specialisation measures described in 
Chapter 7 to examine whether my main results are affected. For brevity, these 
additional tests focus on the composite score measures of analyst quality (CSCOREl 
and CSCOREl for H3a, CSC0RE3 and CSC0RE4 for H3b). 
Table 8.11 Panel A reports the propensity score matched sample results for the 
sensitivity tests of H3a. In regressions in which the national-level weighted market-
share measure is used to est imate INDSP, the coeff icients for the interactions 
(INDSP*CSC0RE1 p = 0 .0002, p = 0.032; INDSP*CSC0RE2 p = 0.0023, p = 0.07) 
are significantly posi t ive (as predicted), while the coefficients for the main effects 
are significant and of the predicted signs. However, I do not obtain significant 
coeff ic ients for the interactions between the composi te score measures and the other 
alternate measures of auditor industry specialisation. Panel B reports the matched 
sample results for the sensitivity tests of H3b using the alternate industry 
specialisation measures . Once more, my main results for the tests of H3b are 
reinforced when the national-level weighted market-share measure is u.sed to 
est imate INDSP. I f ind some evidence in support of a negative association between 
the national- or city-level market-share-defined INDSP and the difference in forecast 
errors between the 'bes t ' and 'wors t ' analysts, where analysts are identified based on 
the composi te score measures; however, each of these results is specific to a 
particular composi te score measure. 
Table 8.11: Tests of H3a and H3b using Alternate Audit Firm Industry Specialisation Measures 
Panel A Tests of H3a 
Dependen t Variable ; ABSFE 
C o l u m n s (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
National-level National-level City-level 
INDSPjnarkel INDSP_weighted_market INDSP_inarket 
Pred. CSCOREI CSCOREI CSCOREI CSCOREI CSCOREI CSCOREI 
INDSP - 0 .0007 0 .0002 - 0 . 0 0 9 7 * * * - 0 , 0 0 8 9 * * - 0 . 0 0 0 8 0 .0002 
(0.355) (0 ,448) (0 .003) (0.010) (0.326) (0.457) 
CSCORE - - 0 . 0 0 2 1 " - 0 . 0 0 0 2 * - 0 . 0 0 0 3 * * - 0 . 0 0 3 3 * * - 0 . 0 0 0 1 * - 0 . 0 0 1 1 
(0.033) (0 .030) (0 .012) (0.02) (0.096) (0.135) 
INDSP* 
CSCORE 
- 0 . 0 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 .0002»* 0 .0023* 0 .0000 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 
(0.247) (0 .334) (0.032) (0.07) (0.427) (0.373) 
F FOLLOW 7 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 .0000 0,0001 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 0 1 
(0.287) (0 .284) (0.626) (0,583) (0,445) (0.427) 
1 FOLLOW 7 0 .0005*** 0 .0004*** 0 .0003 0 ,0004 0 .0005*** 0 .0005*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.406) (0.360) (0.008) (0.006) 
DISP 0 .4374*** 0 .4379*** 0 .3514* 0 .3507* 0 .4257*** 0 .4258*** 
(<0.001) (<0,001) (0.070) (0.070) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
HORIZON + 0 .0223*** 0 .0222*** 0 .0150*** 0 .0151** 0.0221*** 0 ,0222*** 
(<0 .001) (<0,001) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
SIZE ? 0 .0006 0.0007 0 .0006 0.0005 0.0012 0 .0012 
(0.190) (0 .153) (0.544) (0.594) (0.217) (0.228) 
NUMEST - - 0 . 0 0 1 1 * - 0 . 0 0 1 1 * - 0 . 0 0 0 3 - 0 , 0 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 5 - 0 . 0 0 0 5 
(0.080) (0 .081) (0.850) (0.830) (0.619) (0.585) 
ZSCORE -f 0 .0012** 0 .0012** 0 .0007 0.0007 0.0007 0 .0007 
(0.037) (0 .036) (0.536) (0.549) (0.120) (0.120) 
LOSS + 0 ,0195*** 0 .0194*** 0 .0220*** 0 .0221*** 0.0149*** 0 .0150*** 
(<0.001) « 0 . 0 0 l ) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSECHG + 0 .4818*** 0 ,4817*** 0 .5147*** 0 .5143*** 0.4882*** 0 .4883*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0,001) 
STDROE + - 0 . 0 2 1 8 * * * - 0 . 0 2 1 8 * * * - 0 . 0 1 3 0 - 0 . 0 1 3 1 - 0 . 0 2 1 5 * * * - 0 . 0 2 1 6 * * * 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.163) (0.158) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
EL + - 0 . 0 0 1 7 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 7 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 4 - 0 . 0 0 1 4 - 0 , 0 0 1 9 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 9 * * * 
(0,003) (0.004) (0.217) (0.224) (0.009) (0.008) 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT - 0 . 1 2 0 7 * * * - 0 . 1 2 0 1 * * * - 0 . 0 8 2 8 * * - 0 . 0 8 3 1 * * - 0 . 1 3 0 3 * * * - 0 . 1 3 1 2 * * * 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.016) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) 
N 14,098 14.098 3.694 3 .694 5 ,020 5 .020 
0 552 0.551 0 .554 0 ,554 0.552 0 .552 
other variables are iwo-lai led reported in parentheses (*** p<0.01 • ** p<0.05 , * p<0.1). 
This table presents the propensi ty score matched sample regression results for the tests of H3a using alternate 
audit f i rm indust ry special isat ion measures across models based on the composi te measure of the analyst quality 
proxies (Model 5b). Co lumns (1) and (2) report the results of the regressions using the national-level market-
share measu re of indust ry specialisation. Co lumns (3) and (4) report the results of the regressions usmg the 
nat ional- level weighted market -share measure of industry specialisation. Co lumns (5) and (6) report the results of 
the regress ions us ing the city-level market-share measure of industry specialisation. 
Panel B Tests of H3b 
Dependent Variable: DIFABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
National-Level INDSP_market National-Level INDSP_ _weightecl_inarl<et City-Level INDSPjnarket 
Fred. CSCORE3 CSC0RE4 CSC0RE3 CSCORE4 CSCORE3 CSCORE4 
INDSP _ -0.0561** -0.0247 -0.1126* -0.1310** 0.0276 -0 .0586* 
(0.016) (0.158) (0.052) (0.023) (0.272) (0.072) 
ABSFE_B - -10.4061*** -9.0877*** -8.7006*** -8.9900*** -12.5878*** -9.5852*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
DIFANQ - 0.0078 0.0071 0.0142 0.0051 0.0033 -0 .0108 
(0.202) (0.503) (0.238) (0.789) (0.754) (0.462) 
ANQ_B + -0.0050 -0.0058 -0.0118 -0 .0040 -0 .0016 0.0065 
(0.363) (0.522) (0.270) (0.803) (0.862) (0.603) 
HORIZON J + 0.0007 0.0012** -0.0001 0.0000 -0 .0000 0.0008 
(0.140) (0.017) (0.923) (0.964) (0.981) (0.397) 
DIFHORIZON + 0.0038*** 0.0040*** 0.0033*** 0.0036*** 0.0039*** 0.0047*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
DISP + 1.1A%1 1.2093 20.5156*** 2.7996 -5.6715 -7 .7168 
(0.161) (0.778) (0.008) (0.696) (0.602) (0.115) 
SIZE 7 -0.0030 -0.0023 0.0348 0.0481* 0.0160 0.0173 
(0.840) (0.859) (0.257) (0.068) (0.486) (0.405) 
NUMEST - 0.0009 0.0285 0.1239 0.0613 -0.0405 0.0605 
(0.984) (0.477) (0.179) (0.451) (0.593) (0.394) 
ZSCORE + 0.0202 0.0016 0.0429 0.0064 0.0154 -0.0121 
(0.217) (0.911) (0.174) (0.819) (0.565) (0.571) 
LOSS + 0.2492*** 0.2238*** 0.4355*** 0.4730*** 0.4581*** 0.1715 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (<0.001) (0.001) (0.123) 
ABSECHG + 3.5125*** 3.5786*** 3.0719* 3.6451** 4.5357** 4.7552*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.071) (0.016) (0.021) (<0.001) 
STDROE + -0.2863 -0.3659* -0.2405 0.2619 -0.1573 -0 .3314 
(0.189) (0.094) (0.599) (0.542) (0.674) (0.336) 
EL + -0.0028 -0.0038 0.0298 0.0034 -0.0075 -0 .0347 
(0.868) (0.797) (0.364) (0.904) (0.769) (0.121) 
YEAR yes yes yes yes yes yes 
INDUSTRY yes yes yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT 0 .4012 0.3035 - 0 . 4 2 2 4 - 0 . 4 3 9 8 0.1052 - 0 . 7 4 0 9 * * 
(0.317) (0.525) (0.255) (0.177) (0.774) (0.039) 
N 12,808 12.808 3,312 3,312 4 ,576 4 ,576 
R ' 0 .060 0.053 0.074 0.066 0 .094 0 .085 
Robust p-values of Ihe coeff icients for /NDSP are one-lailed reported and for others are two-tailed reported in parentheses (*** /xO.Ol , ** p<0.05. * p<0.1). Coeff ic ient est imates are 
multiplied by 100 in this table. 
This table presents the propensity score matched sample regression results for the tests of H3b using alternate audit firm industry specialisation measures across models based on 
composi te measure of the analyst quality proxies (Model 6). Columns (1) and (2) report the results of regressions using the national-level market-share measure of industry 
specialisation. Co lumns (3) and (4) report the results of regressions using the national-level weighted market-share measure of industry specialisation. Co lumns (5) and (6) report the 
results of regressions using the city-level market-share measure of industry specialisation. 
Variable Definilroiis: D/FABSFE is the di f ference in absolute forecast errors between the 'worst ' and 'best ' quality analysts, measured as per Equation (7); INDSP equals 1 if the 
client is audited by a national industry specialist who has the largest market share in a two-digit SIC industry (National-level lNDSP_matkct), where the market share is calculated as 
per Equat ion (11), 0 otherwise; or, if the client is audited by a national industry specialist who has the largest weighted market share in a two-digit SIC industry (National- level 
/A'D5P_weighted_market) , where the weighted market share is calculated as per Equation (12), 0 otherwise; or, if the client is audited by a city-industry specialist w h o has the largest 
market share in a two-digit SIC industry in a city def ined as the U.S. Census Bureau definition of Metropolitan Statistical Area (City-level /A'£)SP_market), where the city market 
share is calculated as per Equation (13), 0 otherwise; CSCORE is a composite measure of analyst quality, based on either all four analyst quality proxies (CSCOREI) or the three 
quality proxies representing the personal attributes of the analysts (CSC0RE2)-. INDSP*CSCORE is the interaction between INDSP and CSCOREI or CSC0RE2-. FFOLLOW is the 
average of the number of firms covered, during the long-horizon forecast window in year t. by each analyst who issues a forecast for firm j during that window; and,- IFOLLOW is the 
average number of two-digit SIC industries covered, during the long-horizon forecast window in year by each analyst who issues a forecast for firm j during that window; ABSFE_B 
is the absolute forecast error of the 'best ' quality analyst, according to various analyst quality proxies: CEXP. FEXP. BSIZE. STAR. CSC0RE3 and CSCORE4-. ANQ_B is the level of 
the quality proxy for the 'best ' analyst, where the 'best ' analyst is determined according to various analyst quality proxies; DIFANQ is the level of the quality proxy for the 'bes t ' 
analyst minus the level of the quality proxy for the 'worst ' analyst, where the 'worst ' and 'best ' analysts are determined according to various analyst quality proxies; HORIZON_B is 
the number of days between forecast estimation/revision date and subsequent actual eamings reporting date of the 'best ' analyst, where 'best ' analyst is determined according to 
various analyst quality proxies; DIFHORIZON is the number of days between forecast estimation/revision date and subsequent actual eamings reporting date of the 'wors t ' analyst 
minus the number of days between forecast estimation/revision date and subsequent actual eamings reporting date of the 'best ' analyst , where the 'wors t ' and 'best ' analysts are 
determined according to various analyst quality proxies; DISP is forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of analysts ' forecast EPS dellated by the beginning-of-month 
stock price; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity; NUMEST is the natural log of the number of analysts issuing eamings forecasts for the firm in the 90-day window 
prior to eamings reporting; ZSCORE is Zmi jewski ' s financial distress score; LOSS equals 1 if a firm reports negative eamings, 0 otherwise; ABSECHG is the absolute value of the 
change in annual eamings , deflated by beginning-of-month slock price; STDROE is the standard deviation of return on equity over the previous five years; EL is eamings per share, 
winsorized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the indicator variable for each year 1989-2010; INDUSTRY is the indicator variable repre.senting two-digit SIC code numbers. 
In summary, the weighted market-share measure of industry specialisation is 
associated with improved forecast accuracy, with this association being increased 
when the quality of analysts is lower. While I obtain mixed evidence concerning the 
relationship between market-share-defined industry specialisation measures, analyst 
quality and forecast accuracy, I am not surprised that the results for measures based 
on market share are weaker than are those for the portfolio-share metrics. This is 
because the market-share measure is strongly correlated with market dominance, a 
condition that economics has long recognised as having potential dysfunctional 
consequences. Moreover, Minutti-Meza (2013) has recently demonstrated the 
weakness of this proxy as a measure of audit quality. 
8.7.2 Regulat ion Fair Disclosure 
My primary results for the tests of H3a and H3b suggest that analysts with greater 
general or firm-specific experience, employed by a larger broker, designated as 'All-
Star' or with higher composite ranking scores have a better understanding of the 
implications of earnings and rely less heavily on the quality of published financial 
reports (and thus audit quality) to predict earnings accurately. I argue earlier that this 
difference in forecasting performance reflects these analysts' greater access to 
information beyond that contained in the financial statements and their superior 
ability to process complex information. 
However, analysts' access to private information is likely to have been reduced 
following the passage of Reg FD by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), which became effective on 23 October 2000. Reg FD prohibits 
management's selective disclosure of material information to analysts and other 
investment profess ionals without disclosing the same information to the public. 
Although analysts ' private information is not limited to that obtained from 
management , ' ^ ' the reduction in analysts ' access to managerial information because 
of the regulation may result in a deterioration in the forecasting performance in the 
post-Reg FD period, with those analysts with superior pre-Reg FD performance 
likely to have been more greatly affected. Findlay and Mathew (2006) show that 
average analyst forecast accuracy decreases significantly after the passage of Reg FD. 
Similarly, others studies f ind that the positive association between analysts' general 
and f i rm-specif ic experience, brokerage size, 'All-Star ' status and forecasting 
per formance (i.e. forecast accuracy and the reduced accrual-related over-optimism) 
observed in the pre-Reg FD period is weaker or non-existent in the post-Reg FD 
period (Drake and Myers 2010; Keskek et al. 2013). Thus, to the extent that my 
singular and composi te analyst quality proxies reflect the effects of access to 
managerial information, a weaker relation between analyst quality and forecast 
accuracy should be observed after the implementation of Reg FD. High-quality 
analysts should also be more dependent on the quality of financial reports for 
forecasting earnings post-Reg FD. As such, audit f irm industry specialisation should 
have an increased impact on the forecast accuracy of these high-quality analysts in 
the post-Reg FD period. Of my proxies, the experience proxies are the most likely to 
be closely related to access to managerial information. This is because the longer an 
analyst fol lows a f i rm, the greater the likelihood that this analyst will develop a good 
relationship with management and gain access to private information. Therefore, I 
conjecture that the impact of Reg FD has a greater impact on my main results for 
tests employ ing the exper ience proxies. 
As no ted earl ier , ana lys t s m a y have var ious sources of pr ivate informat ion , such as f r o m industry 
advocacy bodies , e c o n o m i c consu l tanc ies and f i rm managemen t . 
To examine the interaction associations among analyst quality, audit firm industry 
specialisation and forecast accuracy and Reg FD, I follow Drake and Myers (2010) 
to include an indicator variable (REGFD) that equals 1 in the post-Reg FD period 
(2002-2010) and 0 otherwise (1989-1999) , ' ^%nd interact this indicator variable 
with each of the test variables included in Models 5a, 5b and 6. 
For parsimony, I tabulate only the key coefficients for my pre-post-Reg FD tests. 
Table 8.12 presents these coefficients for the tests of H3a (Panel A) and H3b (Panel 
B). For the tests of H3a (in Panel A), the coefficients for INDSP are significantly 
negative, while the untabulated sums of coefficients for INDSP and INDSP*REGFD 
are also negative and significant (Model5a: /? = -0.0111, two-tailed p < 0.01; 
Model5b: CSCOREl fi = -0 .0086, two-tailed p = 0.023; CSC0RE2 p = -0.0063, 
two-tailed p = 0.067). These results suggest that audit firm industry specialisation 
has a negative effect on analysts' absolute forecast errors in both the pre- and post-
Reg FD periods, consistent with my main results for the entire sample period. The 
coefficients for the interactions between /NDSP and GEXP, STAR, CSCOREl and 
CSCOREl are positive and significant as expected; however, the coefficient for the 
interaction term INDSP*GEXP*REGFD is negative and significant. These results 
show that the moderating impact of analysts' general experience on the association 
between audit firm industry specialisation and forecast accuracy existing prior to 
Reg FD is less significant in the post-Reg FD period. In other words, analysts with a 
greater general experience may increase their dependence on the quality of published 
financial reports (and thus audit quality) in predicting client firms' future 
I e x c l u d e the y e a r s 2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1 to e l imina te the pos,sibilily that analys ts forecas t ing firms' 2 0 0 0 and 
2001 e a r n i n g s bene f i t t ed f r o m any manager ia l pr ivate in fo rmat ion obta ined pr ior to the e n a c t m e n t of 
R e g F D . U n t a b u l a t e d r eg re s s ions based on a s a m p l e of 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 1 0 show s imi la r resul ts to lho.se 
r epor ted . 
p e r f o r m a n c e af ter the implementat ion of Reg FD. These results indicate that Reg FD 
is an exogenous shock f r o m which I can test predictable changes in the test 
coef f ic ien t s and establish evidence consistent with the importance of audit quality on 
analysts ' forecas t ing per formance . 
Table 8.13 reports selected coeff ic ients for the Reg FD tests of H3b. Consistent with 
my main f indings for the entire sample period, the coeff ic ients for INDSP and the 
sum of coeff ic ients (untabulated) for INDSP and INDSP*REGFD are negative and 
signif icant in models where GEXP. FEXP, CSC0RE3 and CSCORE4 are used to 
ident i fy the 'wors t ' and 'bes t ' analysts. This indicates that audit quality reduces the 
d i f fe rence in forecast accuracy in both the pre- and post-Reg FD periods. Whi le the 
coeff ic ient for the interaction term (INDSP*REGFD) is insignificant in other models, 
it is posi t ive and significant ( f t = 0.2519, two-tailed p = 0.041) in the FEXP model . 
These results suggest that Reg FD reduces the negative association between audit 
quali ty and the d i f fe rence in forecast accuracy between analysts with the least and 
most f i rm-speci f ic experience. These results are consistent with my conjecture that 
the improvements in the quality of f inancial reports driven by industry specialist 
audi tors affect the forecast ing per formance of analyst with least f i rm-specif ic 
exper ience and analyst with most experience to the same extent in the post-Reg F D 
period because the latter one may benefi t less f rom managerial information and rely 
more heavi ly on the quali ty of f inancial reports to predict earnings. 
Table 8.12: Reg FD Tests of H3a 
DcncnJcn l Variable: ABSFIi 
Co lumns 
(1) 
Prcd. 
(2) (3) 
CSCOREI 
REGFD 7 - 0 . 0 0 7 2 * " -0 .0067*** -0 .0069*** 
INDSP 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
-0.0061» -0.0074 -0.0082* 
(0.070) (0.131) (0.088) 
IND.SP* REGFD -0.0050 -0.0012 0.0019 
(0.178) (0.824) (0.717) 
GEXP -0.0000 
(0.813) 
INDSP*GEXP + 0.0010** 
(0.016) 
INDSP*GEXP*REGFD ? -0.0007* 
(0.073) 
FEXP -0.0002 
(0.136) 
INDSP*FEXP + 0.0003 
(0.592) 
INDSP*FEXP*REGFD ? 0.0004 
(0.519) 
BSIZE 0.0002 
(0.263) 
INDSP *BSIZE + -0.0005** 
(0.027) 
INDSP*BSIZE*REGFD ? 0.0011*** 
(<0.001) 
STAR -0.0037 
(0.144) 
INDSP*STAR + 0.0094** 
(0.035) 
INDSP*STAR*REGFD ? -0.0017 
(0.642) 
CSCORE -0.0000 0.0000 
(0.996) (0.963) 
INDSP*CSCORE + 0.0039 0.0057* 
(0.117) (0.075) 
INDSP*CSCORE*REGFD ? -0.0023 -0.0044 
(0.336) (0.1.57) 
N 20,735 20,735 20,735 
0.553 0.552 0.552 
Robust/j-values of the coefficients are two-tailed reported in parentheses (**" ' p<0 .01 , * *p<0 .05 . *p<0.1) . 
This table presents the results for the Reg F D tests of H3a. Co lumn I reports (Columns 2 and 3 report) the results 
o f the regressions using the singular (two composite measures of) analyst quality proxies. 
Variable Definitions: ABSFE is analysts' absolute earnings forecast errors, measured as per Equation (6b); 
REGFD is an indicator variable which equals 1 in the post-Reg FD period (2002-2010) and 0 otherwise (1989-
1999); INDSP is the dichotomous measure of portfolio-share audit firm industry specialisation, measured as per 
Equation (9); GEXP is the average general experience of all analysts following a firm during the window over 
which long-horizon forecast accuracy is calculated, where general experience is measured as the number o f years 
through year t for which an analyst / supplied at least one forecast for any firm; FEXP is the average firm 
experience of all analysts fol lowing a firm during the window over which long-horizon forecast accuracy is 
calculated, where firm experience is measured as number o f years through year r for which an analyst i supplied 
at least one forecast for firm j: BSIZE is the average brokerage size that employs analysts following a firm during 
the window over which long-horizon forecast accuracy is calculated, where brokerage size is measured as 
number o f analysts employed by a broker employing analyst i who follows firm j in year r. STAR is the 
proportion o f the analysts fol lowing firm j. during the long-horizon forecast window, who are ranked as an 'All-
Star' by ll's Al l-America Research Team in year I: CSCORE is a composite measure of analyst quality, based on 
either all four analyst quality proxies (CSCOREI) or the three quality proxies (CSCOREI): INDSP*REGFD is 
the interaction between INDSP and REGFD: INDSP*GEXP is the interaction between INDSP and GEXP: 
INDSP*FEXP is the interaction between INDSP and FEXP: INDSP'BSIZE is the interaction between INDSP and 
BSIZE INDSP*STAR is the interaction between INDSP and STAR: INDSP*CSCORE is the interaction between 
INDSP and CSCOREI or CSCOREI: INDSP*GEXP*REGFD is the interaction between INDSP. GEXP and 
REGFD INDSP*FEXP is the interaction between INDSP. FEXP and REGFD: INDSP*BSIZE is the interaction 
between INDSP BSIZE and REGFD: INDSP*STAR is the interaction between INDSP. STAR and REGFD: 
INDSP*CSCORE*REGFD is the interaction between INDSP. CSCOREI (CSCOREI)md REGFD. 
Table 8.13: Reg FD Tests of H3b 
PL-pcndcnl Variahle: DIFABSFE 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pred. GEXP FEXP BSIZE STAR CSCORE3 CSC0RE4 
REGFD ? - 0 . 0 3 9 5 - 0 . 0 1 3 1 -0 .2015*** - 0 . 0 3 3 2 - 0 . 0 3 1 2 0.0060 
(0.472) (0.806) (0.001) (0.418) (0.602) (0.917) 
INDSP - 0 . 1 5 3 2 * " - 0 . 0 9 1 4 * * - 0 . 0 4 8 5 - 0 . 0 2 2 5 -0 .1321*** -0 .1586*** 
(0.001) (0.012) (0.299) (0.509) (0.006) (0.001) 
INDSP*REGFD ? 0.0162 0.2519** 0.0285 - 0 . 0 3 0 5 - 0 . 0 5 4 0 - 0 . 0 2 1 3 
(0.714) (0.041) (0.549) (0.374) (0.260) (0.643) 
N 18,752 18,752 18,752 8,410 18,752 18,752 
R ' 0.051 0.053 0.066 0.072 0.060 0.053 
Robust p-values of Ihe coefficients are two-tailed reported in parentheses (**» p<0.01, ** /;<0.05, * / x O . l ) . 
Coeff ic ient est imates are multiplied by 100 in this table. 
This table presents the results for the Reg FD tests of H3b across all models. 
Variable Definitions: DIFABSFE is the difference in absolute forecast errors between the 'worst ' and 'best ' 
quality analysts, measured as per Equation (7); REGFD is an indicator variable which equals 1 in the post-
Reg FD period (2002-2010) and 0 otherwise (1989-1999) ; INDSP is the dichotomous measure of portfolio-
share audit f irm industry specialisation, measured as per Equation (9); INDSP*REGFD is the interaction 
between INDSP and REGFD. 
In summary , I f ind limited evidence that Reg FD eliminates the moderating impact 
of average analyst quality on the association between audit f irm industry 
specialisation and forecast accuracy. While there is evidence suggesting that a cohort 
of analysts with relatively greater general experience performs better and is less 
reliant on the quality of financial reports in predicting earnings prior to Reg FD, this 
superior pe r formance is perhaps attributable to experienced analysts ' greater access 
to managerial private information. When examining how audit f irm industry 
specialisation affects the difference in forecast accuracy of the individual analysts 
fo l lowing a client f i rm in the pre- and post-Reg FD periods, I find only an increase in 
the forecast accuracy of more (firm-specific) experienced analysts post-Reg FD. This 
is consistent with these experienced analysts ' increased reliance on the quality of 
f inancials reports in forecast ing earnings post-Reg FD. Overall, these results provide 
evidence consistent with the interpretation that high-quality analysts are less 
dependent on the quality of public information in generating forecasts, and that their 
superior pe r fo rmance is related to both their greater access to private information and 
their abilities in processing information. In the post-Reg period, this ability effect is 
likely to be more dominant . 
8.8 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter , I reported and discussed the results for the tests of H2, H3a and H3b. 
I presented evidence to support H2, which hypothesises that the negative impact of 
audit f i rm industry specialisation on the absolute forecast errors in analysts ' 
prediction of earnings is more pronounced when client f i rm ' s operating risk is higher, 
consistent with a greater return to audit quality where the auditor 's task complexity 
is higher. My results for the tests of H3a and H3b are generally consistent with my 
expectat ions and suggest that audit f irm industry specialisation has a greater impact 
in improving analyst forecast accuracy when the quality of analysts covering a f irm 
is lower. Overall , these results bring further convincing evidence to indicate that 
auditor industry specialisation causally affects analyst forecast accuracy. 
C H A P T E R 9: CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes my thesis by summarising the findings (Section 9.2), 
discussing the implications of my thesis (Section 9.3), identifying and discussing its 
hmitations (Section 9.4) and finally identifying potential opportunities for future 
research (Section 9.5). 
9.2 Summary of Research Design and Findings 
My thesis proposes and examines two research questions: 
RQ 1: Is audit firm industry specialisation associated with analyst forecast accuracy? 
RQ2: Does the strength of the association between audit firm specialisation and 
analyst forecast accuracy vary with factors affecting the relative importance of audit 
quality to the predictability of earnings? 
Below, I describe how these research questions are addres.sed in my thesis and 
summarise the main findings. 
9.2.1 Research Question One 
My first research question examines whether audit firm industry specialisation is 
associated with analyst forecast accuracy. I conceive audit firm industry 
specialisation as the extent to which audit firms concentrate their productive 
activities in particular industries. 1 reviewed the relevant audit quality literature and 
developed a f ramework built thereon, to articulate the means by which the supply of 
high-quality audit services may improve client financial reporting quality, a measure 
of which is the predictability of earnings by sophisticated users (analysts). I argue 
that industry specialist auditors develop industry-specific expertise arising from 
these f i rms ' strategic concentration of their services within specific industries. I 
further argue that this improves the auditors' judgment and decision making applied 
in client negotiations and other stages of the audit processes, leading to superior 
audit outcomes (such as improved earnings predictability). Based on this logic, two 
hypotheses are developed concerning the general association between audit firm 
industry specialisation and analyst forecast accuracy. Hypothesis l a is a maintained 
hypothesis, the tests of which largely seek to reconcile prior findings. It predicts a 
non-directional association between analysts ' short-horizon absolute forecast errors 
and audit f i rm industry specialisation. Hypothesis lb predicts that analysts' long-
horizon absolute forecast errors decrease with audit firm industry specialisation. 
To test these hypotheses, I regress the absolute value of short- or long-horizon 
forecast errors (inverse measures of forecast accuracy) on audit firm portfolio-share 
industry specialisation (as a proxy for the supply of high-quality audit services) and a 
vector of control variables. My results for tests of H l a show that auditor industry 
specialisation does not consistently improve or impair analyst short-horizon forecast 
accuracy, and that the direction and significance of the measured relationship 
between these variables is highly susceptible to subtle changes in model 
specification. These results reflect the conflicting effects of audit quality on short-
horizon forecast accuracy. On the one hand, industry specialist auditors improve the 
usefulness of financial reports for predicting future earnings; but at the same time, 
these specialist auditors are more likely to constrain clients' attempts to manipulate 
earnings to bias earnings towards market expectations. Conversely, my results for 
tests of H l b demonstrate that analyst long-horizon forecast accuracy increases with 
audit firm industry specialisation, and are robust to numerous model specifications 
and modelling choices. These results strongly support my predictions that earnings 
reports audited by an industry specialist auditor are more useful for predicting future 
earnings, thus increasing analyst forecast accuracy. 
9.2.2 Research Question Two 
My second research question concerns cross-sectional variation in the relationship 
between audit firm industry specialisation and forecast accuracy. The assumed 
sources of this variation are the underlying riskiness of client operations and the 
quality of the analysts covering a client firm. I argue that the impact of audit quality 
on the importance of published financial reports for predicting future earnings should 
be greater where the complexity of audit and forecasting tasks are greater and where 
these reports represent a relatively large proportion of the information used in 
forecasting. Consequently, I predict that audit firm industry specialisation has a 
greater impact in improving forecast accuracy when client firm's operating risk is 
higher (Hypothesis 2) and when the quality of analysts covering the client firm is 
lower (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). 
To test Hypothesis 2, I proxy client f irm's operating risk using cash flow volatility 
and include this measure and its interaction with auditor industry specialisation in a 
regression of analysts' absolute forecast errors. My results for tests of H2 indicate 
that the relationship between audit firm industry specialisation and forecast accuracy 
is more p ronounced when c l ient ' s operat ing risk is higher. This is consistent with the 
argument that the impact of audit quality increases with the di f f icuhy of audit and 
forecast ing tasks, and thereby suggest ing greater confidence that the results of the 
tests of H lb are not purely driven by omitted variables. 
To address the extent to which industry specialist auditors affect the relative forecast 
accuracy of high-quali ty and low-quality analysts (H3a and H3b), I draw on prior 
literature and measure analyst quality using analysts ' general experience, f i rm-
specific experience, brokerage size and 'All-Star ' status. I also develop two 
composi te measures to capture all aspects of analyst quality or only the analysts ' 
personal attributes. To test H3a, which predicts that auditor industry specialisation is 
more strongly associated with forecast accuracy when the average quality of analysts 
is lower, I modi fy the base model to include proxies for the average quality of 
analysts fo l lowing a client and their interactions with audit f irm industry 
specialisation. To test H3b, which concerns the differential effect of audit quality on 
forecast accuracy across individual analysts, I regress the difference in forecast 
errors between the 'wors t ' and 'best ' quality analysts against audit f irm industry 
specialisation and controls. My results broadly support my predictions that the 
relationship between auditor industry specialisation and forecast accuracy is stronger 
when analyst quality is lower. This is consistent with audit quality having a greater 
impact on the usefulness of financial reports for predicting future performance for 
lower-quali ty analysts, who are expected to be more reliant on the quality of audited 
financial reports when issuing forecasts. Overall, these f indings provide further 
evidence consistent with the existence of a causal, rather than spurious, relationship 
between audit quality and the usefulness of published earnings for predicting future 
performance. 
9.3 Implications 
The results reported and discussed in my thesis have several implications, including 
for regulators, scholars and investors. These implications are discussed in turn in the 
following sections. 
9.3.1 Implications for Regulators 
The FASB Conceptual Framework states that the objective of general-purpose 
financial reporting is to provide financial information relevant to decision making 
that will meet the needs of the maximum number of primary users, including 
existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors (SFAC No. 8, FASB 
2010 O B I ; 0 B 2 ; 0 B 8 and BC1.9). Information relevant to the prediction of future 
earnings (OB. 17) and cash flows (OB. 18) is central to this objective. My thesis 
presents evidence that the forward-looking and 'user coverage' objectives of 
financial reporting are more likely to be fulfilled when audit quality is relatively high; 
a finding that should be of clear interest to regulators of financial reporting. In 
particular, my results suggest that the accuracy of analysts' prediction of clients' 
earnings is greater when the clients are audited by industry specialist auditors, which 
is consistent with superior quality audit services improving the quality of published 
general-purpose financial reports for predicting future performance (as per SFAC 
No. 8, FASB 2010 OB2, OB3 and BC1.3I) . I further demonstrate that the positive 
impact of audit quality on the usefulness of financial reports for predicting future 
performance is greater for those financial statement users who rely relatively heavily 
on the published financial reports in making decisions (i.e. analysts of lower quality). 
This indicates that higher-quality financial reports are of superior usefulness to a 
potentially greater number of financially competent users. 
9.3.2 Implications for Scholars 
My research also has implications for scholars. First, I reconcile and explain the 
inconsistent findings in the prior literature regarding the impact of audit firm 
industry specialisation on analyst forecast accuracy. In particular, I show that short-
horizon regressions are highly sensitive to model specification, which is attributable 
to analyst short-horizon accuracy being confounded by the competing impacts of 
audit quality on the usefulness of historic reports and the likelihood of constraining 
benchmark-beating earnings management. I further demonstrate that long-horizon 
regressions consistently produce evidence that forecast accuracy increases with audit 
quality, supporting my argument that long-horizon forecasts are directly related to 
the quality of the audited reports and are less likely to be used as a benchmark 
towards which management manipulates future earnings to 'meet or just beat" 
analysts' forecasts. My thesis concludes that long-horizon forecast accuracy is a 
more direct and less noisy measure than short-horizon forecast accuracy, of the 
extent to which the objectives of financial reporting are satisfied. 
Second, I present evidence that audit firm industry specialisation is associated with 
the accuracy of analysts ' forecasts, and that this relationship is stronger in cases 
where theory predicts that audit quality should be of greater importance in explaining 
forecast accuracy. To this end, I show that auditor industry specialisation is more 
strongly associated with forecast accuracy when client f i rm's operating risk is higher 
and when the quality of the analysts following a firm is lower. These findings are of 
clear relevance to the auditing literature, which seeks to understand the economic 
role of audit quality and the factors that drive the provision of high-quality audit 
Finally, my thesis addresses the current concerns regarding the endogenous selection 
of auditors in the auditor industry specialisation literature by identifying well-
specified endogeneity models. In particular, prior studies fail either to account 
explicitly for the endogenous determination of auditor industry specialisation (BCK 
2008; Payne 2008) or to use propensity score matched sample regressions to correct 
for the endogenous determination of auditor market-share industry specialisation 
(Minutti-Meza 2013). My study is the first to employ and validate a range of 
endogeneity-corrected regressions, including 2SLS, PSM and Heckman treatment-
effect regressions, to control for both the dichotomous and continuous endogenous 
regressors (auditor portfolio-share industry specialisation). The methodologies 
applied here should be useful to scholars wishing to disentangle client characteristics 
from audit quality effects in their future research. 
9.3.3 Implications for Investors 
My thesis has implications for investors. My results show that analysts' predictions 
of earnings is more accurate for client firms audited by industry specialist auditors. 
These findings should be useful to investors for at least two reasons. First, analysts' 
earnings forecasts have been demonstrated as proxies for market expectations of 
future earnings (Kothari 2001; Affleck-Graves et al. 2002; Crabtree and Maher 2005; 
Dichev and Tang 2009). My study identifies an important cross-sectional 
determinant of analyst forecast accuracy, which indicates that the reliability of this 
proxy for market earnings expectat ions should be greater when audit quality is 
higher. Second, ident i fying condit ions under which published earnings are more 
predictable are of clear interest to investors relying on analysts ' forecasts as a basis 
for their resource allocation decisions. 
9.4 Limitations 
My thesis is subject to a number of limitations. While I do not consider that these 
l imitations significantly bias the reported results, they should be taken into 
consideration when interpreting my findings. 
First, empirical measures of audit f irm industry specialisation are a noisy signal of 
the economic construct that they purport to measure, and thresholds used in the 
d ichotomous quality measures are arbitrary. While I tested and demonstrated the 
robustness of my results using alternative thresholds to determine a dichotomous 
portfol io industry specialist, it remains possible that the results would be weaker if 
other arbitrary thresholds were employed. In addition, my sensitivity analyses show 
a less consistent and weaker association between auditor industry specialisation and 
forecast accuracy when alternate measures of specialisation are employed, each of 
which relies on 'market -share ' metrics. However , these results are not surprising 
because the market-share measure is strongly correlated with market dominance, 
which may reduce competi t ion and lead to negative audit outcomes. A recent study 
has demonstrated the weakness of this proxy as a measure of auditor industry 
specialisation (Minut t i -Meza 2013). More importantly, as my thesis focuses on 
whether the extent to which audit f i rms concentrate their business in particular 
industries affects the quality of clients' published financial reports for analysts' 
predictions of future earnings, the portfolio-share measure of industry specialisation 
is of more direct relevance to the examination of this question. 
Second, because the selection of an industry specialist auditor is not random, I 
control for endogeneity using various two-stage regressions, including 2SLS, PSM 
and Heckman regressions. Each approach has limitations, and while I have attempted 
to control for these limitations, such as through tests using alternate instruments for 
the 2SLS and Heckman regressions and using alternate first-stage matching variables 
for the PSM regressions, it remains possible that audit firm industry specialisation 
proxies some unobserved risk factors naturally correlated with the difficulty in 
forecasting earnings. 
A further limitation is that the quality of analysts following a given firm may not be 
random, and this may affect my results, particularly those regarding the tests of 
Hypothesis 3a, which examines the average quality of analysts following a client 
firm. 
Finally, my findings pertain directly to industry specialisation within U.S. Big N 
firms and may not be applicable outside this sample. My results may have limited 
implications in an international context in which the institutional settings and analyst 
behaviour are different to the U.S. context. Further, because I constrain my sample to 
clients of Big N firms, whether industry specialisation within non-Big N firms 
improves the usefulness of financial reports for predicting future performance is 
unknown. However, BCK (2008) and my untabulated statistics show that 
approximate ly 90 per cent of the U.S. public f irms fol lowed by at least three analysts 
are audited by a Big N audit f i rm, suggesting that my results are at the very least 
generalisable to a major i ty of U.S. public f i rms covered by financial analysts. 
9.5 Future Research Opportunities 
My thesis demonstra tes the diff iculty for researchers in examining associations 
between audit quality and market measures. While the problems with measures of 
audit quality are well known, I identify additional difficulties that can arise f rom 
model specification. Future research is needed to identify the precise mechanisms by 
which audit quality affects the predictability of earnings; however, in the absence of 
rigorous theoretical specifications, my study highlights the need to consider carefully 
the t ime horizons over which audit quality (or other variables posited to affect 
earnings quality) and the market proxy of interest are measured. 
Second, I conjecture that the quality of analysts following a given firm is not random, 
and to my knowledge, the literature is relatively scarce on the determinants of this 
aspect of analyst fol lowing. Identifying the factors affecting a high-quality analyst 's 
decision to fol low a f i rm is important to understand the economic role of analyst 
quality on improvements in forecast accuracy. This is because previously 
documented evidence on analyst quality increasing forecast accuracy may be 
attributable to a high-quality analyst 's superior ability to identify and cover a f i rm 
whose earnings can be easily predicted. 
Further, my thesis shows that the relationship between auditor industry specialisation 
and forecast accuracy is more pronounced when client f i rm ' s operating risk is higher 
and analyst quality is lower. Future research may investigate other potential sources 
of predictable variation in the importance of audit quality in improving forecast 
accuracy. 
Finally, I developed firm-year-level analyst quality metrics, which may be useful in 
testing the relative importance of other earnings quality proxies. In particular, future 
research may apply the difference in forecast accuracy between the 'wors t ' and 'best" 
quality analysts fo l lowing a given firm to assess the effect of real and accrual-based 
earnings manipulat ion and disclosure quality. 
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A p p e n d i x A: K K P S V (2013) Audi t Qual i ty F r a m e w o r k 
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Appendix B: Probit Regressions of Benchmark-Beating against Audit 
Quality 
Below I report the results of probit regressions modelling the likelihood of zero or 
small posit ive forecast errors to provide further evidence that long-horizon forecasts 
are relatively independent of earnings management behaviour. The dependent 
variable in the probit regression is a dummy variable (MBE) indicating that the 
signed forecast error is between 0 and 1 cent inclusive. The test variable is either a 
cont inuous or d u m m y measure of industry specialisation (INDSP). If f i rms audited 
by an industry specialist are constrained in their attempts to manipulate earnings to 
meet or beat analysts ' forecasts, industry specialisation should be negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts ' forecasts. Table B. I 
reports the probit regressions of MBE against audit quality and controls for both 
short- and long-horizon forecasts. Consistent with Payne 's (2008) results, both 
cont inuous and dichotomous measures of industry specialisation (INDSP) are 
negatively associated with short-horizon defined MBE, suggesting that industry 
specialist audit f i rms may constrain benchmark-beat ing earnings management . If, 
however , MBE is measured as a function of long-horizon forecast errors, INDSP is 
not significantly correlated with any extant benchmark beating, and thus the relation 
between INDSP and long-horizon accuracy is less likely to be confounded by 
benchmark-beat ing behaviour. 
Table B.l: Probit Regressions of the Likelihood of Meeting or Just Beating Analysts' 
Consensus Earnings Forecasts 
D e p e n d e n t Var iab le : MBF. 
C o l u m n s (1) (2) (3) (41 
Shor t -Hor izon Forecas ts Long-Hor i zon Forecas ts 
Pred . INDSP com INDSP dum INDSP com INDSP dum 
INDSP - - 0 . 9 1 5 0 * * - 0 . 0 8 9 1 * * * - 0 . 4 4 7 0 0 . 0 0 8 6 
DISP 
(0 .026) (<0 .001) (0 .554) (0 .902) 
- - 0 . 2 2 1 0 * * * - 0 . 2 2 0 0 * * * - 0 . 0 7 5 2 - 0 . 0 7 4 6 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .213) (0 .216) 
SIZE 7 - 0 . 0 8 9 9 * * * - 0 . 0 9 0 4 * * * - 0 . 0 3 9 0 * * - 0 . 0 3 9 5 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (O.OIl) (0 .010) 
NUMEST -1- 0 . 0 2 1 4 * * * 0 .0215*** 0 .0101*** 0 . 0 1 0 0 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) 
ABSACCR - - 0 . 5 5 5 0 * * * - 0 . 5 5 5 0 * * * - 0 . 6 4 5 0 * * - 0 . 6 4 6 0 * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .020) (0 .020) 
LOSS - - 0 . 2 6 5 0 * * * - 0 . 2 6 2 0 * * * - 0 . 0 7 3 0 - 0 . 0 7 5 0 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (0 .269) (0 .257) 
ABSECHG - - 2 . 3 4 5 0 * * * - 2 . 3 4 6 0 * * * - 2 . 6 7 5 0 * * * - 2 . 6 7 0 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
PERSIST - 0 . 0 5 0 5 * * * - 0 . 0 5 0 2 * * * - 0 . 0 6 3 7 * - 0 . 0 6 3 7 * 
(0 .006) (0 .007) (0 .081) (0 .080) 
Y E A R yes yes yes yes 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT - 1 . 1 3 5 * * * - 1 . 1 8 0 * * * - 1 . 4 2 5 * * * - 1 . 4 2 6 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
Case s w h e r e MBE=\ 5 , 8 3 0 5 ,830 663 6 6 3 
% of meet or beat 19 .29% 19.29% 2 .86% 2 .86% 
N 30 ,225 30 ,225 23 ,203 23 ,203 
Pseudo R^ 0 .063 0 .063 0 .043 0 .043 
Robus t p - v a l u e s of the coe f f i c i en t s are two-ta i led repor ted in parentheses (*** p<O.Ol, ** p < 0 . 0 5 , * 
P<O.I ) . 
Th i s table p resen t s the resul ts of probit regress ions model l ing the l ikel ihood of zero or small posi t ive 
shor t -hor izon forecas t e r rors ( C o l u m n s 1 and 2) and long-hor izon forecast er rors ( C o l u m n s 3 and 4). 
Variable Definitions: MBE equa l s I if the s igned analyst forecast error is be tween 0 and 1 cent 
inclusive, 0 o therwise ; INDSP_cont is the con t inuous measure of por t fo l io-share audit f i rm industry 
specia l i sa t ion , measu red as the s u m of the square root of the total assets of the cl ients that an audit 
f i rm serv ices in a spec i f ic industry d iv ided by the sum of the square root of the total assets of all 
c l ients of that audit firm: INDSP_dum is the d i cbo tomous measure of por t fo l io-share audit firm 
indust ry specia l i sa t ion , equa l s 1 if INDSP_cont > (3 / number of two-digit industry codes used in the 
analys is in any g iven year) , 0 o therwise ; DISP is forecast d ispers ion, measured as the s tandard 
devia t ion of ana lys t s ' fo recas t E P S def la ted by the beg inn ing -o f -mon th stock price; SIZE is the 
natural log of total assets ; NUMEST is the number of analysts issuing earnings forecas ts for the firm 
in the 90 -day w i n d o w pr ior to ea rn ings report ing: ABSACCR is the absolute total accruals , measured 
as the d i f f e r e n c e be tween net i ncome and cash fiow f rom opera t ions divided by lagged total assets; 
LOSS equa l s 1 if a firm repor t s negat ive earnings , 0 o therwise ; ABSECHG is the absolu te value of the 
c h a n g e in annua l ea rn ings , def ia ted by beg inn ing-o f -month stock price; PERSIST equa l s I if 
obse rva t ion lies be tween the 20th and 80lh percent i les of distr ibution of the annual earn ings change , 0 
o the rwise ; YEAR is the indica tor var iable for each year 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 1 0 ; INDUSTRY is the indicator 
var iable r epresen t ing two-d ig i t S IC c o d e numbers . 
A p p e n d i x C: S a m p l e Se l ec t ion f o r Tes t s of H l a ( S h o r t - H o r i z o n Forecas t s ) 
Table C . l : Sample Selection for Tests of H l a (Short-Horizon Forecasts) 
Payne-type models BCK-type models 
Available short-horizon consensus 
forecasts 65,710 65,710 
less: unavailable financial 
information from COMPUSTAT -11,973 53,737 -24,358 
41,352 
less: non-Big N firms -5,646 48,091 -3,439 37,913 
less: financial sector firms -5,217 42,874 -810 37,103 
less: firms in industries with less than 
20 members in a given year 
-615 42,259 -545 36,558 
less: firms subject to modified audit 
opinions 
-15 42,244 - 1 3 36,545 
less: observations where forecast 
dispersion cannot be calculated 
-9,814 32,430 -6,329 30,216 
less: extreme observations for 
continuous variable (1/99 percentile) 
-624 -815 
Final sample of short-horizon 
forecast (used in single-stage models) 
31,806 29,401 
less: additional data requirements for 
the endogeneity-corrected regressions 
-448 -700 
Final sample of short-horizon 
forecast (used in 2SLS) 
31.358 28,701 
Appendix D: First Stage Regressions (Logit Regressions) of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Models 
Table D.l: First Stage (Logit Regressions) of PSM Models 
Dependent Variable: INDSP dum 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Test o f H l b Test o f H l b Test o f H 2 Tests of H3a Tests of H3b Test o f H 3 b Pred. (BCK Model) (Payne Model) (All-Star Proxy) (exel. STAR proxy) 
DISP 9 0.4213 2.7632 -0 .4839 0.8509 1.3702 
(0.816) (0.122) (0.815) (0.877) (0.646) 
HORIZON -7 -0 .1121 
(0.598) 
-0 .2144 
(0.366) 
-0 .2740 
(0.253) 
SIZE + 0.1371*** 0.0574*** 0.0741*** 0.1156*** 0.1922*** 0.1284*** 
(<0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
NUMEST 7 0.0056 0.0111*** 0.0375 -0 .0568 -0 .1316* -0 .2514** 
(0.885) (0.003) (0.368) (0.196) (0.072) (0.010) 
ZSCORE 7 -0 .0269 -0 .0059 -0 .0312 -0 .0669* - 0 . 0 2 6 4 
(0.154) (0.761) (0.141) (0.056) (0.251) 
LOSS - 0.2447*** 0.2818*** 0.2274** 0.1714* 0.1234 0.1144 
(0.005) (<0.001) (0.011) (0.083) (0.483) (0.279) 
ABSECHG - -1 .3078*** -0 .5972 -0 .8768* 0.1090 -0 .7746 
(0.003) (0.173) (0.087) (0.916) (0.196) 
STDROE + 2.1418*** 
(<0.001) 
1.9842*** 
(<0.001) 
2.7877*** 
(<0.001) 
2.1559*** 
(<0.001) 
EL - -0 .0373 -0 .0093 0.0036 0.0141 -0 .0184 
(0.170) (0.751) (0.908) (0.743) (0.567) 
ABSACCR — -0 .3820 
(0.212) 
PERSIST 
FFOLLOW 
IFOLLOW 
DIFANQ 
0.0328 
(0.500) 
0.0228*** 
(<0.001) 
-0 .0485*** 
(<0.001) 
-0 .0052 
( 0 . 6 9 6 ) 
ANQ_B 9 0 . 0 1 2 5 
( 0 . 2 9 3 ) 
HORIZON_B 7 - 0 . 0 0 1 8 
(0 .332) 
- 0 . 0 0 0 7 
( 0 . 3 0 4 ) 
DIFHORIZON 9 - 0 . 0 0 3 4 
(0 .141) 
- 0 . 0 0 0 9 
(0 .324) 
Y E A R yes yes yes yes yes yes 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes yes yes y e s 
CONSTANT 1.3635 1 .2478*** 2 . 7 4 8 6 * * 2 . 7 9 2 7 * * 1 .1810* 1 . 5 3 6 9 * * * 
(0 .269) (<0 .001) (0 .045) (0 .046) (0 .073) ( < 0 . 0 0 1 ) 
N 19,599 20 ,765 16,864 16,720 5 ,565 15,098 
Pseudo R^ 0 .5465 0 .53 4 0 .5538 0 . 5 8 1 5 0 . 4 8 1 8 0 . 5 8 1 4 
R O C Area 0 . 9 0 6 5 0 . 9 0 4 4 0 .907 0 . 9 0 9 6 0 . 9 1 0 5 0 . 9 0 9 5 
P - v a l u e s of the c o e f f i c i e n t s a re iwo- ta i led repor ted paren theses (*** p < 0 . 0 1 . ** p<0.05. * p<0.\). 
T h i s table p resen t s the resul t s for the f i rs t -s tage regress ions of the P S M models . C o l u m n s 1 and 2 report the regress ions for tests of H I b based on the B C K - t y p e and P a y n e -
type mode l s . C o l u m n 3 repor t s the regress ion for tests of H2 . C o l u m n 4 repor ts the regress ion for tests of H3a . C o l u m n 5 repor t s the regress ion for tests of H 3 b based on the 
m o d e l us ing the 'A l l -S ta r ' analys t qual i ty proxy to ident i fy the ' bes t ' and 'wors t ' analysts . C o l u m n 6 repor ts the regress ion for tests of H 3 b based on all the o the r m o d e l s . 
Variable Definition: INDSP diim is the d i c h o t o m o u s measu re of por t fo l io-share audit f i rm industry specia l isa t ion, measu red as per Equa t ion (9); DISP is fo recas t d i spe r s ion , 
m e a s u r e d as the s tandard devia t ion of ana lys t s ' forecast E P S def la ted by the beg inn ing -o f -mon th s tock price; HORIZON is the natural log of the a v e r a g e n u m b e r of d a y s 
be tween m e a n forecas t e s t ima t ion dale and subsequent actual earn ings repor t ing date; SIZE is the natural log of the marke t value of equi ty; NUMEST is the natural log of the 
n u m b e r of ana lys t s issuing ea rn ings fo recas t s fo r the f i rm in the 90-day w i n d o w prior to earn ings repor t ing; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s f inancia l d is t ress score ; LOSS equa l s 1 if 
a firm repor t s negat ive earn ings , 0 o therwise ; ABSECHG is the absolute value of the change in annual earn ings , def la ted by b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h s tock pr ice ; STDROE is the 
s tandard devia t ion of re turn on equi ty over the previous five years; EL is ea rn ings per share, winsor ized at 5 (-5); ABSACCR is the abso lu te total accrua ls , m e a s u r e d as the 
d i f f e r e n c e be tween net i n c o m e and cash flow f r o m opera t ions d iv ided by lagged total assets; P £ / f 5 / 5 7 ' e q u a l s 1 if observat ion lies be tween the 20th and 80th percent i les o f 
d is t r ibut ion of the annua l ea rn ings change , 0 o therwise ; FFOLLOW is the average of the number of firms covered , dur ing the long-hor izon forecas t w i n d o w in year r. by each 
analys t w h o issues a forecas t fo r firm j dur ing that w indow; IFOLLOW is the average nu inber of two-digi t S IC industr ies covered , dur ing the long-hor izon forecas t w i n d o w in 
year t. by each analys t w h o issues a forecas t for firm j dur ing that w i n d o w ; DIFANQ is the level of the qual i ty proxy for the ' bes t ' analys t m i n u s the level of the qua l i ty p r o x y 
for the 'wor s t ' analyst , where the 'wor s t ' and 'bes t ' analys ts are de te rmined accord ing to various analyst quali ty proxies ; ANQ_B is the level of the qual i ty p r o x y for the ' bes t ' 
analyst , w h e r e the 'bes t ' analys t is de te rmined accord ing to var ious analyst quali ty proxies; HORIZON_B is the number of days be tween forecas t e s t imat ion / rev i s ion da te and 
subsequen t actual ea rn ings repor t ing da te of the 'bes t ' analyst , where 'bes t ' analys t is de te rmined accord ing to var ious analyst qual i ty proxies ; DIFHORIZON is the n u m b e r of 
days be tween forecas t es t imat ion / rev is ion date and subsequent actual earn ings repor t ing date of the 'wor s t ' analyst m i n u s the n u m b e r of d a y s be tween forecas t 
es t imat ion / rev is ion date and subsequen t actual earn ings repor t ing date of the 'bes t ' a n a l y s t , where the 'wor s t ' and 'bes t ' analys ts are de t e rmined acco rd ing to va r ious analys t 
qual i ty proxies ; YEAR is the indicator var iable for each year 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 1 0 . INDUSTRY is the indicator var iable represent ing two-dig i t S IC c o d e number s . 
Appendix E: First Stage Regressions of Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
Table E. l : First Stage of Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
Dependent Variable: INDSP • 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tests of H l a Tests o f H l b 
Pred. BCK Model Payne Model BCK Model Payne Model 
INDRELSIZE + 1.3923*** -0 .0191*** 0.9041*** 0.8585*** 
CYCLE 
{<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
+ 0.0002*** - 0 . 0 0 0 0 * 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 
(<0.001) (0.097) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
DISP - 0 . 0 2 1 3 0.5561*** 0.0064 - 0 . 0 1 4 6 
(0.288) (<0.001) (0.763) (0.504) 
HORIZON 0.0012*** 
(<0.001) 
0.0054** 
(0.049) 
SIZE + 0.0007*** 0.0003*** 0.0042*** 0.0039*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
NUMEST 9 0.0002 -0 .0002*** -0 .0069*** -0 .0002*** 
(0.585) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ZSCORE 7 0.0019*** 
(<0.001) 
0.0035*** 
(0.001) 
LOSS - - 0 . 0 0 0 4 0.0056*** -0 .0269*** 0.0112*** 
(0.658) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSECHG - -0 .0323*** 0.1089*** 0.0024*** -0 .0418*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
STDROE + 0.0029 
(0.256) 
0.0126*** 
(<0.001) 
EL — - 0 . 0 0 0 4 
(0.113) 
-0 .0012*** 
(<0.001) 
ABSACCR - 0 . 0 0 1 9 
(0.174) 
- 0 . 0 0 2 2 
(0.564) 
PERSIST -0 .0006** 
(0.016) 
-0 .0026*** 
(<0.001) 
Y E A R yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT -0 .0046** -0 .0081*** - 0 . 0 1 2 4 - 0 . 0 0 1 9 
(0.016) (<0.001) (0.435) (0.366) 
N 28,701 31,358 23,131 23,422 
0.414 0.310 0.209 0.193 
P-values of the coeff icients are two-tailed reported parenlheses (***p<O.OI, **p<0 .05 , *p<0.1) . 
This table presents the results for the first-stage regressions of 2SLS. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for 
tests of H l a based on the BCK-type model and Payne-type model. Columns 3 and 4 report the results for 
tests of H1 b based on the BCK-type model and Payne-type model. 
Variable Definition: INDSP com is the continuous measure of portfolio-share audit firm industry 
specialisation, measured as per Equation (8); INDRELSIZE is the sum of the total assets of all firms in an 
industry at the end of the current year divided by the sum of total assets of all firms at the end of the cunrent 
year; CYCLE is the industry-year adjusted length of operating cycle in days; I adjust this measure for 
industry ef fec ts by subtracting the industry-year mean operating cycle f rom each observation: DISP is 
forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of analysts' forecast EPS deflated by the beginning-
of-month stock price; HORIZON is the natural log of the average number of days between mean forecast 
estimation date and subsequent actual earnings reporting date; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of 
equity; NUMEST is the natural log of the number of analysts issuing cannings forecasts for the firm in the 
90-day window prior to earnings reporting; ZSCORE is Zmi jewski ' s financial distress score; LOSS equals 1 
if a f i rm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; ABSECHG is the absolute value of the change in annual 
earnings, del la ted by beginning-of-month stock price; STDROE is the standard deviation of return on 
equity over the previous five years; EL is earnings per share, winsorized at 5 (-5); ABSACCR is the absolute 
total accruals, measured as the difference between net income and cash flow from operations divided by 
lagged total assets; PERSIST equals I if observation lies between the 20th and 80th percentiles of 
distribution of the annual earnings change, 0 otherwise; YEAR is the indicator variable for each year 1989-
2010. 
Appendix F: Long-Horizon Forecast Errors against Prior Year Audit 
Firm Industry Specialisation and Prior Year Controls 
Table F. l : Long-Horizon Forecast Errors against Prior Year Audit Firm Industry 
Specialisation and Prior Year Controls 
Panel A B C K ' s Model 
Dependent Variahle: ABSFF. 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pred. BCK la BCK2a B C K l b BCK2b 
INDSP - -0 .0345*** -0 .0316*** -0 .0054*** -0 .0053*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
DISPJag + 0.2564*** 
(<0.001) 
0.2568*** 
(<0.001) 
HORIZON + 0.0202*** 0.0216*** 0.0201*** 0.0216*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
SIZE 7 -0 .0087*** -0 .0080*** -0 .0086*** -0 .0078*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
NUMEST - 0.0055*** 0.0053*** 0.0056*** 0.0054*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ZSCOREJag -1- 0.0022*** 0.0015*** 0.0021*** 0.0014*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
LOSS -1- 0.0657*** 0.0617*** 0.0659*** 0.0620*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSECHGJag -1- 0.0973*** 0.0707*** 0.0964*** 0.0693*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
STDROE 0.0033 0.0071 0.0068 0.0109 
(0.656) (0.363) (0.353) (0.168) 
EL -1- 0.0002 0.0002 -0 .0000 -0 .0000 
(0.660) (0.699) (0.985) (0.944) 
YEAR yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT -0 .0268 -0 .0436 -0 .0273 -0 .0444 
(0.296) (0.175) (0.288) (0.168) 
N 26,679 22,217 26,679 22,217 
0.294 0.292 0.295 0.293 
P-values of the coefficients are two-tailed reported parentheses (*** p<0.01. **p<0.05, *p<O.I). 
This table presents the results of the long-horizon regressions based on Models BCK la, lb, 2a and 
2b, re-estimated using the one-year lagged values of the control variables that depend on the 
realisation of the earnings being forecast {DISP, ZSCORE and ABSECHG). 
Variable Definitions: ABSFE is analysts' absolute earnings forecast errors, measured as per Equation 
(6b); INDSP is the continuous measure of portfolio-share audit firm industry specialisation (all 
models suffixed 'a ' ) , measured as per Equation (8) (INDSP_cont)\ or the dichotomous measure of 
portfolio-share audit firm industry specialisation (all models suffixed 'b ') , measured as per Equation 
(9); DISPJag is the lagged value of the forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of 
analysts' forecast EPS dellated by the beginning-of-month stock price; HORIZON is the natural log of 
the average number of days between mean forecast estimation date and subsequent actual earnings 
reporting date; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of equity; NUMEST is the natural log of the 
number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the firm in the 90-day window prior to earnings 
reporting; ZSCOREJag is the lagged value of Zmijewski ' s financial distress score; LOSS equals I if a 
firm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; ABSECHGJag is the lagged value of the absolute value 
of the change in annual earnings, dellated by begmning-of-month stock price; STDROE is the 
standard deviation of return on equity over the previous five years; EL is earnings per share, 
winsorized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the indicator variable for each year 1989-2010. 
Panel B P a y n e ' s Model 
Dependent Variable: ABSFF. 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) Pred.. Payne la Payne 2a Payne l b Payne 2b INDSP - - 0 . 3 0 7 8 * * - 0 . 0 2 5 8 * * -0.02.30 - 0 . 0 0 6 3 * * * 
DISPJag 
(0.026) (0.012) (0.132) (<0.001) 
-1- 0.0183 0.1608*** 0.0197 0.1817*** 
(0.128) (0.005) (0.102) (0.002) 
SIZE 9 0.0557*** 0.0009*** 0.0556*** 0 .0005** 
(<0.001) (0.004) (<0.001) (0.041) 
NUMEST - - 0 . 0 0 7 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 8 * * * - 0 . 0 0 7 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 8 * * * 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSACCRJag + 0.1089** - 0 . 0 0 1 2 0.1083** 0 .0039 
(0.048) (0.843) (0.050) (0.510) 
LOSS + 0.3593*** 0.0592*** 0.3589*** 0.0566*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
ABSECHGJag 0.4018*** 0.0523*** 0.3841*** 0.06.36*** 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
PERSISTJag - - 0 . 1 1 6 9 * * * - 0 . 0 1 7 6 * * * - 0 . 1 1 6 4 * * * - 0 . 0 1 7 3 * * * 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Y E A R yes yes yes yes 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes yes yes 
CONSTANT 0.3307** 0.0875*** 0.2601* 0.0496*** 
(0.049) (<0.001) (0.072) (<0.001) 
N 19,437 19,564 19,467 19,564 
R^ 0.174 0.296 0.174 0.280 
P-values of the coeff ic ients are two-tailed reported parentheses (*** fxO.Ol , ** /)<0.05, * p<0.1). 
This table presents the results of the long-horizon regressions based on Models Payne la, lb, 2a and 
2b, re-estiinated using the one-year lagged values of the control variables that depend on the 
realisation of the earnings being forecast (DISP, ABSACCR, ABSECHG and PERSIST). 
Variable Defmitions: ABSFE is analysts ' absolute earnings forecast errors, measured as per Equation 
(6b); INDSP is the cont inuous measure of portfolio-share audit firm industry specialisation (all 
models suff ixed ' a ' ) , measured as per Equation (8) (INDSP_cont)\ or the dichotomous measure of 
portfol io-share audit firm industry specialisation (all models suffixed 'b ' ) , measured as per Equation 
(9); DISPJag is forecast dispersion, measured as the lagged value of the standard deviation of 
analysts ' forecast EPS deflated by the beginning-of-month slock price (detlated by the absolute value 
of the mean EPS forecast during the period in Models Payne l a and lb); SIZE is the natural log of 
total assets; NUMEST is the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the firm in the 90-day 
window prior to earnings reporting; ABSACCRJag is the lagged value of the absolute total accruals, 
measured as the di f ference between net income and cash How from operations divided by lagged total 
assets; LOSS equals I if a firm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; ABSECHGJag is the lagged 
value of the absolute value of the change in annual earnings, deflated by beginning-of-month stock 
price (deflated by the natural log of total assets in Models Payne la and lb); PERSIST Jag equals I if 
observation lies between the 20th and 80th percentiles of distribution of the prior year annual earnings 
change, 0 otherwise; YEAR is the indicator variable for each year 1989-2010; INDUSTRY is the 
indicator variable representing two-digit SIC code numbers. 
Appendix G: Estimation of Innate Accrual Quality Models 
The McNichols 's (2002) modification of the Dechow and Dichev's (2002) accrual 
quality model regress measures accrual quality as the standard deviation of the 
residuals from firm-specific regressions of working capital accruals on last year, 
current and one-year-ahead cash flow from operations, change in current sales and 
the level of current property, plant and equipment, as per Equation (14). 
Modified DD accrual quality (MDAQ): 
^WC, = po + PiCFO,.i+P2CFO, + PiCFO,^, + pASales + P^PPE + e (14) 
Where 
AWC, = the change in working capital, computed as change in accounts 
receivables + change in inventory - change in accounts payable - taxes 
payable + change in other assets; 
CFO,.] = Cash flow from operations, last period; 
CFO, = Cash flow from operations, current period; 
CFO,+i = Cash flow from operations, next period; 
ASales = the change in sales; and 
PPE = Property, plant and equipment. 
The residuals from the above regressions reflect the accruals that are uncorrected 
with cash flow realisations. The standard deviations of these residuals across five-
year periods are computed and are used as a measure of accrual quality, a larger 
value of which indicates poor accrual quality. 
Francis et al. (2005a) model innate accrual quality as a function of firm size, the 
standard deviation of cash flow from operations, the standard deviation of sales 
revenues, f i rm ' s operating cycle and the incidence of negative earnings, as per 
Equation (15). 
Innate accrual quality: 
INNATEAO = Po + PiSlZE,+ p2STDCF,+ p,STDSALE,+ P4CYCLE,+ (15) 
' PfNEARN, + e 
Where 
INNATEAQ, = Modified Dechow and Dichev accrual quality measure, which is 
the standard deviations of the residuals from Equation (14) 
calculated over years t-4 through t; 
SIZE = the natural log of total assets; 
STDCF, = the standard deviation of cash flow from operations; 
STDSALE, = the standard deviation of revenues; 
CYCLE, = the length of f i rm's operating cycle, measured as the natural log of 
the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory; and 
NEARN, = the incidence of negative earnings realisation, measured as the 
number of years, out of the past 10, where a firm reported a 
negative earnings. 
The fitted value f rom Equation (15) is the innate accrual quality measure, a larger 
value of which indicates poorer innate accrual quality. 
Appendix H: Long-Horizon Forecast Errors against Prior Year Audit 
Firm Industry Specialisation for Years 1993-2010 
Table H. l : Long-Horizon Forecast Errors against Prior Year Audit Firm Industry 
Specialisation for Year 1993-2010 
D e p e n d e n t Var iab le : ABSFF. 
C o l u m n s (1) (2) 
Pred . Full Sample ( 1 9 9 3 - 2 0 1 0 ) Matched Sample ( 1 9 9 3 - 2 0 1 0 ) 
INDSP - - 0 . 0 0 1 8 * * - 0 . 0 0 2 4 * * 
(0 .035) (0 .026) 
DISP + 0 . 3 9 3 5 * * * 0 .4243*** 
(<0 .001) (0 .007) 
HORIZON + 0 .0224*** 0 .0329*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
SIZE -7 0 .0003 0 .0001 
(0 .263) (0 .817) 
NUMEST - - 0 . 0 0 1 1 * * 0 .0007 
(0 .011) (0 .242) 
ZSCORE + 0 .0010*** 0 .0010* 
(0 .001) (0 .075) 
LOSS + 0 .0195*** 0 .0210*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
ABSECHG -1- 0 . 4 9 2 9 * * * 0 .5028*** 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
STDROE + - 0 . 0 1 9 6 * * * - 0 . 0 1 7 5 
(<0 .001) (0 .178) 
EL + - 0 . 0 0 1 5 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 9 * * * 
(<0 .001) (0 .008) 
Y E A R yes yes 
I N D U S T R Y yes yes 
CONSTANT - 0 . 1 3 2 1 * * * - 0 . 1 7 2 3 * * * 
(<0 .001) (<0 .001) 
N 22 ,742 3 ,642 
R^ 0 .564 0 .584 
Robus t p - v a l u e s of the coe f f i c i en t s fo r INDSP are one-tai led repor ted and for others are two-tai led 
repor ted in pa ren theses (*** p < 0 . 0 1 , ** p < 0 . 0 5 , * p<0.1). 
This table p resen t s the resul ts of the long-hor izon model to lest H l b over a shorter sample per iod. 
Variable Definitions: ABSFE is ana lys t s ' abso lu te earn ings forecast errors , measured as per Equat ion 
(6b) ; INDSP is the d i e h o t o m o u s measu re of por t fo l io -share audit f i rm industry special isat ion, 
m e a s u r e d as per Equa t ion (9); DISP is forecas t d ispers ion , measured as the s tandard deviat ion of 
ana lys t s ' fo recas t E P S de f l a t ed by the b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h stock price; HORIZON is the natural log of 
the ave rage n u m b e r of days be tween m e a n forecas t es t imat ion da te and subsequent actual earnings 
repor t ing da le ; SIZE is the natural log of the marke t value of equi ty; NUMEST is the natural log of the 
n u m b e r of ana lys t s i ssuing e a r n i n g s fo recas t s for the f i rm in the 9()-day w indow prior to earnings 
repor t ing; ZSCORE is Z m i j e w s k i ' s f inanc ia l d is t ress score ; LOSS equals 1 if a f i rm reports negat ive 
earn ings , 0 o the rwise ; ABSECHG is the abso lu te value of the c h a n g e in annual earnings , def la ted by 
b e g i n n i n g - o f - m o n t h s tock pr ice ; STDROE is the s tandard devia t ion of return on equity over the 
p rev ious five years ; EL is ea rn ings per share , winsor ized at 5 (-5); YEAR is the indicator var iable for 
each year 1 9 9 3 - 2 0 1 0 . 
